STUDIA PHILOLOGICA BUDDHICA

Monograph Series

IVb

ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy

Part II

Notes, Bibliography and Indices

Lambert Schmithausen

Tokyo · The International Institute for Buddhist Studies · 1987

ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

On the Origin and the Early Development
of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy

Part II

Notes, Bibliography and Indices

Lambert Schmithausen

TOKYO
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
1987

Published by The International Institute for Buddhist Studies:
5-3-23 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan

First published 1987

Printed in Japan by Fuji Printing Company, Kawasaki

ISBN 4-906267-20-3

Correspondence regarding all editorial matters should be sent to the Director of The International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo.

Contents of Vol. II

1. Usually, however, Chinese translations do not translate but only transliterate *'ālaya-'* (cp. Hôb fasc. 1, p. 35). For the occasional rendering of 'ālayavijñāna' by 宅識 or 家識, see Ui 1958, 165f.; BDJT s.v. *araya-shiki*; Fukihara 1953, 378; for 無沒識 = **á-laya°* see ib. and Hôb fasc. 1, p. 35.
2. E.g. Lamotte 1934-35, 170ff.
3. For a different Tibetan rendering see n. 191.
4. Frauwallner 1969, 328; 352; 386f.
5. The best introduction to the essential aspects of the concept and theory of ālayavijñāna in a Western language is, in my opinion, still de La Vallée Poussin 1934-35. More recent works concerned with ālayavijñāna, as e.g. Verdu 1974 or Brown 1981, focussing on later developments, are less relevant to the present study. Of course, valuable information may also be gathered from the translations of pertinent portions of Yogācāra works into Western languages, above all from MSg_L (esp. ch. I; cp. also Lamotte 1934-35) and Si_P (esp. pp. 94-224). - Important aspects of the present study are touched upon, from a more philosophical standpoint than mine, in Griffiths 1986, which also contains the text and an English translation of the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 1.5 + n. 92, and n. 226).
6. Suguro 1977, 127f.
7. This distinction is, however, not a strict one, for in some cases the two categories overlap, and Hsüan-tsang's Siddhi (Si 15b19-19a26) goes so far as to introduce a l l systematical contexts by (partly unidentified and thus dubious) Sūtra quotations.
8. This is, to be sure, at the same time a special case of exegetical context.
9. Most of these concepts are, at the same time, key terms of certain systematical contexts with which ālayavijñāna is associated.

1o. Yokoyama 1979, 114; similarly Saigusa 1983, 1o9; cp. already Yūki 1935, 142. I n t u i t i o n into the [subliminal] continuity of mind is asserted to be the precondition of the ālayavijñāna theory also by N. Hakamaya (1978, 21-23). - Cp. § 7.4.

11. Cp., e.g., de La Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 146 + 156f.; 162; Conze 1953, 161f.; Cousins 1981, 22; Griffiths 1986, 91f.

12. I have tried to include at least all those contexts which can already be traced in the Yogācārabhūmi. My documentation in the following notes merely intends substantiation but by no means completeness.

13. Cp., e.g. Ui 1958, 171; Yokoyama 1979, 114; Saigusa 1983, 1o7; cp. also de La Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 161f.; Yūki 1935, 75f.; Takasaki 1982, 27; 1985, 44; Y. Sasaki 1982, 197 note 62. - P r o o f: see n. 14. - As for the continuity and homogeneity of ālayavijñāna, cp., e.g., Saṃdh V.7 (see n. 321); MSg I.1 (see n. 14) and the equation of ālayavijñāna with the **āsaṃsārika-skandha* of the Mahīśāsakas in MSg I.11.3 (see § 1.3.4.2; cp. also Hirakawa 1981, 126); Hsien-yang 48oc6; KSi §§ 3o (Muroji p. 37,8) and 37 (Muroji p. 47,8); PSVy 24b5 (Muroji p. 4o,1of.); PSk_t 17a2 (PSk_D § 26; Muroji p. 44,8): *rgyun chags par 'jug pa*; Tr 4d + TrBh; Si 12b28ff. See also §§ 3.4-3.6.

14. Cp. de La Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 152f. - P r o o f for the existence of ālayavijñāna by showing that otherwise both Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) and Purification (*vyavadāna*), or both the continuance (*pravṛtti*) and the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of saṃsāra, would be impossible: MSg I.29-49 and 56-57; PSk_t 17a3 (PSk_D § 26; Muroji p. 44,13f.): *'khor bar 'jug pa daṅ ldog pa'i phyir ro*; TrBh 37,14ff.; Si 18c24ff. - Cp. also MSg I.1 (Abhidharmasūtra: ... *sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ / tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo 'pi ca //*). - As for the function of ālayavijñāna with regard to (supramundane) Purification, see also § 4.8.

15. Cp., e.g., de La Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 152f.; Frauwallner 1969, 329; Cousins 1982, 22; Hirakawa 1981, 126f.; Griffiths 1986, 92. – P r o o f : KSi, esp. §§ 2off. (Muroji pp. 21,14ff.) and 32 (Muroji p. 39,1ff.); in the context of the proof that without ālayavijñāna *saṃkleśa/saṃsārapravṛtti* would be impossible (see n. 14): Si 19a3-7; in the same context and at the same time presented as an e x e g e t - i c a l issue: see ns. 51 and 52.

16. Frauwallner 1969, 328; cp. Demiéville 1952, 132f.; Griffiths 1986, 94 + 1o4ff. – P r o o f : PSk_t 17a2f. (PSk_D § 26; Muroji p. 44,9ff.): *'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa daṅ / 'du śes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa daṅ / 'du śes med pa pa rnams las laṅs nas yaṅ yul rnam par rig pa źes bya ba 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa* (**viṣayavijñapty-ākhya-pravṛttivijñāna*) *'byuṅ ba (...'i phyir ro)*. – Cp. also Y_m 78b5 (see n. 146): *nirodhaṃ samāpannasya ... p r a v ṛ t t i v i j ñ ā n a - b ī j a -parigṛhītam ālayavijñānam anuparataṃ bhavati ā y a t y ā ṃ t a d u t p a t t i d h a r m a t ā y a i* ; KSi §§ 21ff. (Muroji pp. 23,1ff.) and 3o + 32 (Muroji p. 37,1ff. and 37,19ff.); TrBh 35,2-4. – A somewhat different issue, connected with the exegetical one that according to the Dharmadinnāsūtra *vijñāna* has not withdrawn from the body in *nirodhasamāpatti* (see § 1.3.2(3) + n. 57), is the impossibility of a re-emergence, in one and the same life, of the *v i p ā k a -vijñāna* after it has once been interrupted: MSg I.51 (read *gdod* (= *punaḥ*) *'byuṅ ba yaṅ ma yin te*); Si 18a3ff., esp. 11f. – For materials concerning the presence of ālayavijñāna in *nirodhasamāpatti*, etc., cp. also ns. 4o, 131, 218, 322 and § 6.6.

17. Cp., e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 156ff.; S. Katō 1933, 215f.; Yūki 1935, 74; Nishi 1937, 68f. and 81; 1975, 489; Frauwallner 1969, 328; Yokoyama 1979a, 8ff.; Hirakawa 1981, 127; Griffiths 1986, 92f.; 1o5. – P r o o f : Y_t zi 3a8ff. (see n. 783); PSk_t 17a3 (PSk_D § 26; Muroji p. 44,12:

dmigs pa'i rkyen la ltos nas rnam pa gźan du 'jug pa ñid daṅ / chad nas yaṅ 'byuṅ ba ñid (... kyi phyir ro): the passage seems to be based on Y_t zi 3a8ff. (cp. also PSkVai 5ob6f. and PSkBh 191a4ff.); I take the first argument to prove that the homogeneous Seed of a given pravṛttivijñāna cannot be the preceding pravṛttivijñāna but only ālayavijñāna because (most) consecutive pravṛttivijñānas differ as to their o b j e c t i v e content (Y_t zi 3a8ff.: difference as to their moral or spiritual quality)); Si 15b19ff. Cp. also, e.g., Y_m 78b5 (see n. 146); Y 4,7 etc. (*sarvabījakam ... ālayavijñānam*; see §§ 6.1-6.3); 1o9,14f. (see § 6.4); Y_t zi 5b4f. (see n. 438) and 7ff. (H 1979, 31f. [§ 3.b.B] ; cp. ns. 418 and 417); 17b6 (see n. 452); 3oa5ff. (see n. 553); Saṃdh V.2 (see n. 5o8) and V.7 (see n. 321); Hsien-yang 48oc4 (see n. 536), 16, 23, 28. etc. (see n. 439); 5o5b21f. (cp. n. 159); MSg I.2; 9; 14ff., etc.; AS 3,3f. and 8f. (see n. 445); 12,1 (see n. 45o); KSi §§ 3off. (Muroji p. 37f.); Tr 2d and 18-19 + TrBh; Si 8a5ff.; etc., etc.

18. Si_P 312; cp. also AKBh 278,21; MSg I.15 (MSg_L p. 9,34ff.); KSi § 19 (Muroji p. 21,2-6; cp. ib. 22,2ff. = PSVy 23b3-5). Recollection does not appear to have been a prominent issue in classical Yogācāra philosophy.

19. AKBh 299,1of.; 477,9ff.; KSi §§ 2o and 32 (Muroji pp. 21,14-17and 39,2-9); PSVy 22b1ff. (Muroji p. 24,2off.); Vś 5,1off.; TrBh 38,4ff. (cp. PSkVai 52a5ff.; PSkBh 195b8ff.); Si 19a3-5; 43a14-17; cp. also Y_t zi 5b7f. + 6a3f. (see ns. 418 and 417).

2o. Cp. Y_m 78b5 (see n. 16); KSi §§ 19 (Muroji p. 21,6-8; cp. ib. 22,1f. + 6f. = PSVy 23b3-5) and 3o+32 (Muroji p. 37,4-13 and 19-25).

21. As for the term *'kleśa'*, the polemical remarks of Anacker 197o, 233f., miss the point since the defilement metapher is obvious from canonical passages like SN III 131 (*vatthaṃ saṅkiliṭṭhaṃ mala-ggahitaṃ*; cp. ASBh 62,7f. [see n. 933]:

kliṣṭasya dhātrī-cailasya ...; AKBh 157,8f.; BHSD s.v. *kliśyate*). In the case of the (wider) term *'saṃkleśa'* the meaning "Pollution" is moreover confirmed by the fact that its antonym is *'vyavadāna'* ("purification"). Cp. also the canonical comparison of the *u p a k l e ś a s* of mind with i m p u r i t i e s of gold (AN III 16f., etc.), or of immoral habits (*upakkilesa*) with clouds, etc., "defiling" or obscuring sun and moon (AN II 53f., etc.; see CPD s.v. *upakkilesa*). The interpretation of *kleśa* as "affliction", testified to by Chinese and Tibetan equivalents, is clearly a secondary development, probably influenced by the usage of *kliś-/kleśa* in standard Sanskrit (cp. the Brahmanical explanations collected by T. Sahoda in G. Sasaki 1975, 42), and perhaps also by Abhidharmic theories like the association or even identification of *kleśas* with *vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā* (cp., e.g., ŚrBh 256,17ff.; S 1977, 921; see also n. 602). Yet, even a comparatively late author like *Pṛthivībandhu (probably later than Sthiramati but not later than the beginning of the 9th century because known to the lDan- (or: lHan-) -dkar-ma catalogue [Yoshimura 1974, 178, No. 635]) still gives the older meaning side by side with the new one: "They are called *'kleśas'* because they render body and mind afflicted, i.e. uneasy (**kleśayanti duḥkhayanti*?), and because they render the mind d e f i l e d (PSkBh 119a3f.: *de dag gis* (D) *lus daṅ sems la sdug bsṅal źiṅ ñon moṅs par byed pa daṅ / sems d r i m a c a n du byed pas na ñon moṅs pa źes bya'o //*). Cp. also Si 22b4-6 (擾濁).

22. MSg I.30-32 (*kleśas*); 33 + 59.1-2 (karman); TrBh 37,14-19 and 38,4ff. (karman: cp. n. 19); Si 18c24ff. (*kleśas* [18c28 ff.] and karman [see n. 19]). As for the latent continuance, as Seeds, of bad as well as good (and even certain neutral) states of mind, or of Defilements as well as good habits, and the "fattening" (*(pari-)puṣṭi*) of these Seeds by the Impressions (*vāsanā*) left by actual occurrences of such factors, cp., e.g., Y_t zi 5b7ff. (H 1979,31 [§ 3.b.B.1]).

23. MSg I.43-44; Si 19a1o-18; cp. also § 4.8.3.

24. TrBh 38,13ff,; PSkVai 52b2ff.; PSkBh 197a2ff.; Si 19a18ff.; cp. also MSg I.57.

25. AKBh 295,21f.; KSi § 15 (Muroji p. 15,15ff.); PSVy 22a8f. (Muroji p. 24,14ff.).

26. AKBh 72,16-18; KSi § 22 (Muroji p. 23,1of.).

27. Cp. Si_P 312.

28. AD 272,18ff.: *rūpādau khalv api vastuny abhyatīte* *s a t y e v a* *buddhir utpadyate / na hy asad-ālambanā buddhir utpadyate / ... yad etad rūpādi-dravyaṃ pūrvānubhūtaṃ* *t a d e v a* *tat-smṛtyā gṛhyate /*; cp. AKBh 295,18f.

29. AKBh 63,14ff.

3o. Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 473ff. (with further references); cp. also Mizuno 1932, 1o84ff.; S. Katō 1933, 215; Yūki 1935, 47ff.; Hirakawa 1974, 218; Saigusa 1983, 111f.; see also Nishi 1937 and 1938 (= 1975, 483ff.), discussing the occurences of the term *'bīja'* in the Vibhāṣā and its systematical and historical relations to the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra *bīja* theories.

31. Bareau 1955, 188 (thèse 1o); Frauwallner 1969, 328; Nishi 1975, 485.

32. Yokoyama 1979, 117. -- Cp. Y_t zi 6a7f. (see n. 945); MSg I.3 (see n. 137, with further references; cp. also n. 14o, 2nd explanation); I.13C (MSg_L p. 8,33f.; 9,2f. and 6f.); I.59,3; Hsien-yang 48oc23f.; AS 12,3 (read: *ālayavijñānālambanaṃ* [AS_G 19,14]); MSABh 174,16f.; PSk_t 17a5 (PSk_D § 27; Muroji p. 44,19) + PSkVai 54b1-3 and PSkBh 2o2a3-5; Tr. 5c + TrBh 22,22ff. and Si 21c17ff.; Si 2a12f.; 15b1ff. - Cp. also § 3.11. -- As far as I can see, this issue is nowhere made into a p r o o f of the existence of ālayavijñāna.

33. Cp., e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 161. Cp. Y 4,7 (see § 6.1); 11,5 (§ 6.2); 24,4f. (§ 6.3); 192,8 (§ 6.5); Saṃdh

V.2 (see n. 5o8); Hsien-yang 48oc4f.; 5o4b12f.; MSg I.21, etc.; I.59.2; I.62; AS 12,2; KSi §§ 3o-33 (Muroji pp. 37-39); PSVy 24b3f. (Muroji p. 4o); Tr 2d and 19 (see n. 419) + TrBh 37,4ff.; etc. etc. - In Si 16a16ff., the fact that a *vipākacitta* is otherwise impossible is made into a p r o o f of ālayavijñāna. A similar consideration seems to be implicit in the first three arguments of Y_t zi 2b4ff. (ASBh 12,1ff.; H 1978, 8 [§ i(a-c)]). - See also § 3.12.

34. Saṃdh V.2 (see § 3.9.2); MSg I.5 (≈ PSkViv 95b3-5; cp. n. 1477 (*A* (13) and *G*); Sasaki 1982, 179ff.; Takeuchi 1985, 267ff.); cp. also Y_t zi 6a3f. (see n. 417); ASBh 11,12f. (see n. 1477 (*A* (12))); PSVy 24b4f. (Muroji p. 4o,8-1o); TrBh 33,21 (*gatiṣu janmopādānāt*). - In the case of rebirth in the *kāma-* or *rūpa-dhātu*, this function is, at least in older sources, not always distinguishable from the initial phase of biological appropriation (for which see § 1.3.1.*7* + n. 39): see, e.g., Y_t zi 2b4ff. (see n. 33), and the material in n. 348. Moreover, in the case of rebirth as a man (or womb-born animal), taking possession of a new existence would seem to overlap with the issue of (ālaya)vijñāna's entering the womb and coalescing with proto-embryonic matter (§ 1.3.1(*8*)), as e.g. at MSg I.34.

35. Cp. de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 157 and 162. - Homogeneity and continuity of ālayavijñāna throughout a given existence: Si 17a1; cp. Y_t zi 4b6-8 (H 1979, 27 [§ B.2-3]). - Ālayavijñāna as the basis of the ordinary forms of mind or as the basic layer of a living being: Saṃdh V.4-5 (see § 3.9.3); Y 11,4f. (see § 6.2); Y_t zi 5b5-7 (see n. 358); MSg I.1; Tr 5b and 15; $MSgU_t$ 251a3 (see n. 367); Si 2ob6ff. and c12ff. Cp. also the identification of ālayavijñāna with, and its designation as, *mūlavijñāna* (§ 1.3.4.2). See also § 3.1o.

36. P r o o f : Si 16b3ff.; arguing from special cases: MSg I.4o-41, etc. (see n. 37). Cp. also MSg I.21. - The arguments are, of course, valid only on the assumption that a

metaphysical *ātman* or *pudgala* and hypostatized entities like the *jīvitendriya* and the *nikāyasabhāgatā* of the Vaibhāṣikas do not exist (cp. KSi § 34c [Muroji p. 41,16-21): Si 16b9f. and 7c26f.; VGPVy 425b7f.

37. E.g. when in a living being of the world sphere where corporeal matter is lacking (*ārūpya-dhātu*) a good or defiled state of mind arises, this living being would, if ālayavijñāna is rejected, lose its affiliation to this sphere because in the absence of corporeal matter and sense-perception (KSiṬ 104b3) no *vipāka* element constituting this affiliation would be left (KSi § 34c [Muroji p. 41,8-12]; PSVy 25a6f. [Muroji p. 42,5-7]; PSVyṬ 155b1ff.; Si 16b11f.). Even if one asserted that not only the *vipāka* elements but a l l mundane elements belonging to that sphere constitute affiliation to it (Si 16b12f., but rejected in PSVyṬ 155b4f.), this affiliation would be lost if the living being actualizes a s u p r a mundane (*lok•ttara*) state of mind (Si 16b13; MSg I.40). Suppose it is admitted that even such a supramundane state of mind belongs, in a sense, to that stage (**sva-bhūmika*: VGPVy 425b8; cp. also KSiṬ 104b8), this would not work in the case of a person born in the sphere of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness (*naîva-saṃjñā-nâsaṃjñâyatana*) because such a person, in view of the d i m n e s s of consciousness in this sphere (cp. MSgBh 161b1, etc.), can actualize a supramundane state of mind - which is a c l e a r gnosis of Truth (cp. ib.) - only by mentally descending to the next lower level, viz. the sphere of nothingness (*ākiñcanyâyatana*). This, however, would, in the absence of ālayavijñāna, inevitably mean that no element belonging to the *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* would be left, i.e. that he would lose his existence there (MSg I.41; KSi § 34c [Muroji p. 41,12-16]; PSVy 25a7f. [Muroji p. 42,8-10]).

38. KSi § 34a (Muroji p. 41,4); PSVy 25a6 (Muroji p. 42,3f.) + PSVyṬ 155a1ff., esp. 6ff.; PSkVai 53b7 (see n. 1373); PSkBh

199b8 (*kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni lus mtha' dag la khyab par gnas te*; cp. 201b1: *len pa'i rnam par śes pa źes bya ba ni lus thams cad khyab par len pa ...*); MSgU$_t$ 259b6 (*des lus la khyab pa'i phyir ro*; cp. § 12.2.2(d)). Cp. also Y$_t$ zi 2b7f. (ASBh 12,7f.; H 1978, 8 [§ i(d)]) implying that ālayavijñāna, in contrast to sense perceptions, pervades the whole body; Si 16b22-24, 17a18f. and 20b24f.: pervasiveness (遍) of the *vipāka-citta* (largely = ālayavijñāna) as a presupposition for biological appropriation.

39. Cp., e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 165ff.; Yūki 1935, 74; Ui 1958, 171; Yokoyama 1979a, 2ff.; Takasaki 1985, passim; Hirakawa 1981, 127; Saigusa 1983, 108f.; Takeuchi 1985, 268f.; Griffiths 1986, 94. - Proof: Y$_t$ zi 2b4ff. (ASBh 12,1ff.; H 1978, 8f. [§ i]; Griffiths 1986, 97f. and 130ff.); MSg I.35; KSi § 34a (Muroji p. 41,2-5); PSVy 25a6 (Muroji p. 42,3): *lus zin pa ñid kyaṅ* (sc. *kun gźi rnam par śes pa med par gźag par mi nus so*: PSVyṬ 155a1); Si 16b20ff. - Cp. also Y 4,7, etc. (see §§ 6.1-6.3); Y$_t$ zi 5b5f. (see n. 358); Saṃdh V.2-3; MSg I.5 (≈ PSkViv 95b3f.); Hsien-yang 480c5 (see n. 536); 483c9 (see n. 440); PSk$_t$ 17a4 (Muroji p. 44,18): *lus* (Ch. 身) *len pa'i phyir* (not unambiguous: cp. n. 34); PSkVai 54a2f.; PSkBh 200a2ff.; ASBh 45,5f.; Si 10a15-17.

40. Griffiths 1983, 571f., referring to Y$_t$ zi 3b8ff. (see n. 227). Cp. also PSVyṬ 154b4f. and Si 17b26-c1 and 11b7f.. This issue of the presence of a *vijñāna*, preventing death, in states like *nirodhasamāpatti* has also an exegetical aspect: see § 1.3.2.3.

41. Cp., e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 165; Ui 1958, 171; Yokoyama 1979a, 16ff. - Proof: MSg I.34; Si 16c23ff. - Cp. also Y 24,4f. (see § 6.3); Saṃdh V.2 (see n. 508). See § 3.3.1.

42. Cp., e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 165f.; Takasaki 1985, 44. - P r o o f : Y_t zi 4a2ff. (see n. 281); MSg I.42; Si 16c23ff., esp. 17a13ff. - Cp. also Y 18,16ff. and 2o2,2o (only *vijñāna*, and not ālaya-v.). See § 3.3.2.2.

43. P r o o f : Y_t zi 3b6ff. (see n. 295). - Cp. Si 16a25ff. See § 3.7.1.

44. Hsien-yang 487a3-6 (see n. 297). See § 3.7.2.

45. Y_t zi 3b4ff. (see n. 63o). - Cp. Saṃdh VIII.37.1.*1* (see n. 629); Y_t zi 4a8ff. (see ns. 633 and 531); 189b4f. (see n. 653). See § 5.6.

46. Esp. Y_t zi 8a4ff. (see ns. 549, 444 and 548), 9a3f. (see § 1o.1(o) and 9b6 (see n. 568); MSg I.45 (see n. 574). See § 4.7. - Cp. also the verse quoted at TrBh 44,15f. (*jñeyam ādānavijñānaṃ dvay ā v a r a ṇ a l a k ṣ a ṇ a m* ...), which is taken from T No. 16o7 (p. 774b4f.), viz. from the Liu-mên-chiao-shou-hsi-ting-lun (六門教授習定論) ascribed to Asaṅga (cp. Ui 1979, 585); in the commentary (774b14), *ādānavijñāna* is expressly identified with ālayavijñāna.

47. Cp. S 1977, 925f. - Cp., e.g., Y_t zi 9b5 (see n. 551); 3oa5ff. (see n. 553); ASBh 55,13f. (see n. 489); MAVṬ 79,23ff.; 8o,21ff.; 93,26ff.; 168,11f.; TrBh 44,6f.; Si 51a6 and 13; cp. also the equation of ālayavijñāna with *dauṣṭhulyāśraya* or *dauṣṭhulya-kāya* (see n. 133o; H 1976, 53, 58 (+ note 66) and 61 (+ note 77)). See §§ 4.1-2 and, esp., 4.7. - Whereas in some sources (esp. the *Nivṛtti Portion* [cp. n. 226]: see § 4.7) ālayavijñāna appears to be e s s e n t i a l l y characterized by, or even consist of, Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*), other texts (MSg I.61.1; cp. also Hsien-yang 487a3ff. [see § 3.7.2 + n. 297]) take it to contain or comprise both Badness a n d its opposite, E a s e (*praśrabdhi*, implying also the nuance of good-naturedness), the latter being defined, in MSg I.61.1, as the Seeds of such good dharmas as are still under the sway

of Cankers (*sāsrava-kuśala*). Usually, however, *praśrabdhi* is, in contrast to *dauṣṭhulya*, n o t interpreted as a subcategory of Seeds. Rather Ease, especially mental Ease, is established as a m e n t a l f a c t o r (*caitta*) on its own (e.g. Y 11,16; AS 6,19f.; PSk_D § 18.8 (read *sbyaṅs*); Tr 11b + TrBh 27,14ff.; AKBh 55,8f.), and b o d i l y Ease is often defined as a special kind of t a n g i b l e (*spraṣṭavyaviśeṣa*: TrBh 27,19f. = PSkVai 25b6f.; PSkBh 131a6; cp. AKBh 21,2f. and 439,10f.).
On the other hand, the Seeds of mundane good dharmas are, nevertheless, usually considered to be contained in ālaya-vijñāna (cp., e.g., Y 109,14f. [see § 6.4]); Y_t zi 5b4f. and 8ff. (H 1979, 30f. [§ 3.b.A.1 and B.1]); TrBh 18,10f.). But they seem to be overlooked or even ignored in the basic material of the *Nivṛtti Portion* (§ 4.7) and may have been taken to be c o m p r i s e d i n B a d n e s s (viz. *sarvatraga-dauṣṭhulya*; cp. also ASBh 92,5-7) in Y_t zi 30a5 ff. (see n. 553), whereas Y 26,14-16 (which, by the way, looks like an insertion) expressly excludes them from *dauṣṭhulya* though, in contrast to MSg I.61, n o t making use of the term '*praśrabdhi*'.

48. Cp. S 1977, 925f. - Cp., e.g., comm. ad PG 33-34 and 37 (see App. II); Y_t zi 8b1 (see n. 548); ASBh 55,14f. (see n. 489). See § 4.1.4.

49. Cp. esp. Kajiyama 1985 (see § 7.3.2).

50. For further though (at least partly) dubious cases see n. 7.

51. MSg I.33.1 and 59.1; PSVy 17a6ff., esp. 18b2ff. and 23b6-24a2; TrBh 37,16-38,13; PSkVai 51b2-52b2; PSkBh 193b4-197a2; Si 19a7-9. - According to the afore-mentioned sources, the *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* is the *vijñāna* of the prior existence which receives the Impression of karman and - by continuously propagating itself along with this Impression - becomes, in its turn, the cause of a new existence (beginning with *nāmarūpa*) (cp. n. 1128). This exegetical issue thus

involves the systematical issue of (ālaya)vijñāna as the recipient and support of karmic Impressions (*vāsanā*).

52. MSg I.33.2; 59.1: Si 19a9f. (+ Si_p 218). - According to $MSgU_t$ 257a8ff., *'bhava'* means the karmic Impression (*vāsanā*) when it is about to mature, or actualize itself. In order to be able to reach this stage, it of course presupposes a *vijñāna* by which it was received at the moment of the act and passed on until the moment of its actualization.

53. MSg I.36; Si 17a23ff.

54. Y 23o,1off. Cp. § 12.1.

55. Cp. Enomoto 1982 and Kajiyama 1985. See § 7.3.

56. See n. 149.

57. Y_m 78b5 (see § 2.1 + n. 146); MSg I.5o(f.); KSi § 24ff. (Muroji p. 27ff.); PSVy 25a8-b4 (Muroji p. 42, 11-25); cp. PSVy 18b5ff. (Muroji p. 28) + 24a1 (Muroji p. 48,2-5) [where the **saṃskāra-paribhāvitaṃ vijñānam*, the presence of which in *nirodhasamāpatti* had been corroborated by the Sūtra passage under discussion at 18b5ff., is equated with ālayavijñāna]; PSVyṬ 139a6-b3; Si 17c25ff.; cp. also Y_t zi 4a2 (see n. 4o); TrBh 19,24f.; Si 11b6f.

58. Si 16c6ff. The quotation probably refers to the Mahākauṣṭhilasūtra (see AKṬU tu 191a3ff.; $MĀ_c$ 791b23ff.; cp. MN I 295). Yet, none of these versions preserved mentions *vijñāna*. Even Śamathadeva's text which most probably represents the Mūlasarvāstivāda version (see S 1987, §§ 5.1.5.1, 6.1 + note 142a, and 6.2.2.2.o) speaks of a commingling or inseparable association of life-force and bodily heat only, as is also confirmed by a quotation of the pertinent sentence in Yaśomitra (AKVy 667,29f.: *yac câyuṣman Kauṣṭhila āyur yac côṣmakaṃ, saṃsṛṣṭāv imau dharmau, na visaṃsṛṣṭau*). Since at least the early Yogācāras, too, appear to have used the Mūlasarvāstivāda version (see n. 166), the wording to be presupposed for the early period is most probably that of Yaśomitra

and not that of Hsüan-tsang. This would also explain the fact that the Sūtra is, to my knowledge, not used as a proof of ālayavijñāna in any earlier source. Hsüan-tsang's version is, however, also adduced by Vibhajyavādins at Vi 431b11f. (cp. n. 154) as well as by an opponent at TSi 345b8f., and, in the latter case, as a proof of the presence of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* at that.

59. MSg I.37; Si 17b8ff.; cp. § 4.3.

60. See n. 64.

61. § 1.3.1.*8*.

62. See § 1.3.2.*1*, *2* and *6*.

63. Cp., e.g. Ui 1958, 171; Kanakura 1980, 169; Yokayama 1979a, 18; Takasaki 1982, 27; 1982a, 50,3f.; Y_t zi 2b5f. (see n. 859). Cp. also § 1.3.1.*8* + n. 41.

64. DN II 63; cp. $DĀ_c$ 61b9ff.; T 14, 243b18ff.; $MĀ_c$ 579c17ff.; AKVy 669,1ff.; AKṬU tu 157a1f.; $DhSk_D$ p. 34f.; cp. also ns. 238 and 244.

65. MN I 296; SN III 143 (cp. AKBh 73,19f., etc.; ŚrBh 376,4f.); cp. also § 2.4 + n. 165.

66. Cp. SN No. 4.23 (= I 120f.).

67. Cp., e.g. Si_P 178ff.; Mizuno 1932, esp. 1070ff.; 1957, 448ff.;
Yūki 1935, 78ff.; Katsumata 1974, 520ff.; Katano 1968, 52ff.; Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 473f. and 485f. (with copious references, q.v.); Hirakawa 1981, 125ff.; Kim 1985, 194ff.

68. MSg I.11, mentioning the *mūlavijñāna* of the Mahāsāṅghikas and the **āsaṃsārika-skandha* of the Mahīśāsakas.
Vasubandhu the Kośakāra replaces the latter by *bhavāṅga-vijñāna* which he ascribes to the Tāmraśāṭīyas or -parṇīyas (i.e., as KSiṬ 105a6f. confirms, the Sthaviras or Theravādins; cp. also the Tibetan version of MSg I.11) at KSi § 35, (Muroji p. 45,2f.), whereas at PSVy 24b5 (Muroji p.

40,12f.) he attributes it to the Mahīśāsakas (cp. Matsuda 1982, (65)) whom, however, some scholars regard as the Continental counterpart of the Theravādins (Bareau 1955, 183; cp. Cousins 1981, 23).
Vasubandhu's replacement of **asaṃsārika-skandha* by *bhavāṅga-vijñāna* calls, of course, for an explanation. Does it indicate a difference of geographical horizon, or rather a doctrinal or at least terminological shift on the part of the Mahīśāsakas/Sthaviras, and perhaps a not too insignificant lapse of time between MSg and KSi/PSVy? At any rate, the fact that *bhavāṅgavijñāna* is not mentioned in the earliest pertinent source (i.e. MSg) would seem to suggest that this concept, though fairly old according to specialists (e.g. Cousins 1981, 38ff.), is not likely to have decisively stimulated the introduction of ālayavijñāna.

69. Cp. the reserves in Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 485.
It may be pointed out in this connection that Vasubandhu the Kośakāra informs us in his PSVy (25b5; Muroji p. 42,30f.) that "the same (viz. ālayavijñāna) is mentioned in the *Abhidharma-dharmaparyāya* of the Bhadanta-*Mahīśāsakas*" (*btsun pa Sa ston pa'i chos mṅon pa'i chos kyi rnam graṅs las de ñid brjod do*). It would seem natural to see in this Abhidharma-dharmaparyāya the Abhidharmasūtra quoted at MSg I.2., esp. in view of the fact that Asaṅga is said to have been affiliated with the Mahīśāsakas (Frauwallner 1969, 327; Wayman 1961, 25ff.; Griffiths 1986, 174 note 7) and in spite of Guṇamati's classifying it as a Śāstra (PSVyṬ 156b5). But if this is true, why does MSg tell us then that the Śrāvakayāna has not taught ālayavijñāna as 'ālayavijñāna' but only by means of synonyms, i.e. as *'*āsaṃsārikaskandha'* in the case of the Mahīśāsakas? Obviously because the Abhidharma-dharmaparyāya, though stemming from the Mahīśāsaka-*nikāya* (as a Vinaya school), was a *Mahāyāna* text, as would seem to be confirmed by the very name 'Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra' at MSg, Prast. 1.

70. Otherwise Hirakawa 1981, 128.

71. *ālayārāmā, bhikkhave, pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā*. The (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version (cp. VGPVy 389b3f.) is quoted at MSg I.11 as referring to ālayavijñāna. For parallels see MSg_L vol. II, 7*; cp. also Funahashi 1976, 19ff.

72. Mentioned at Y_t zi 9a2f. (Y_c 581b20; H 1979, 39) as referring to ālayavijñāna; cp. H 1981.

73. Cp. Yokoyama 1979, 114,6f.; Cousins 1981, 22.

74. Cp., e.g., ŚrBh 384,13ff.; 386,18; 431,15; 445,6; 507,8; $BoBh_D$ 69,10 ($BoBh_W$ 97,24); 71,6 (100,19); 218,11 (318,19f.), etc. (cp. Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 482f.); PG 31; 42; Y_t 'i (= VaSg) 151a2; 201a2ff.; 285b8 and 286a7ff. = Y 200,2f. (see n. 1135) and 17ff.; Y 5,15; 6,8; 11,13; 19,1; 25,3ff.; 52,12ff.; 55,14ff.; 61,3ff.; etc.; cp. also the §§ indicated in n. 85.

75. Cp., e.g., ŚrBh 196,17; 200,8; 257,14; 269,2; 271,16ff.; 283,7; 292,2; 301,8ff.; 320,5; 390,4; 432,22; 433,4; 444,1; 450,13; 490,7; 500,19; 501,8; 507,8; $BoBh_D$ 6,2 ($BoBh_W$ 9,1); 10,4 (14,26); 13,15-17 (20,7-9); 18,16 (27,5); 77,23 (110,10); 196,17 (289,25); 243,7ff. (356,14ff.); 253,23 (368,5); 265,5ff. (384,5ff.); 280,1 (405,25); Y_t 'i (= VaSg) 145b4; 221a2; 222a2; 237a4; 261b4; 312b3; 335a8; Y 26,12ff.; 90,18ff.; 99,6; Y_t dzi 139a4; 143b2; etc.

76. E.g. Y_t 'i 288b1 (see n. 788); Y 4,11; 24,7f. (see § 6.3.1); 25,1; cp. also 224,19 (*bījabhūtam vijñānam*). Cp. § 7.3.6.3.3.

77. See n. 374.

78. E.g. Y 199,7. – As for the continuous *sarvabījakam vipākavijñānam* ascribed to "some Sautrāntika(s)" at KSi § 30 (Muroji p. 37,1ff.), it does not justify Lamotte's (KSi p. 178; cp. Silburn 1955, 252f.) assertion that it is the Sautrāntikas who are to be credited with the discovery of ālayavijñāna; for it is only in a later paragraph (KSi § 33 [Muroji p. 39,26ff.]; cp. also §§ 37 (end) and 40) that

Vasubandhu equates this *vipākavijñāna* with ālayavijñāna, and it cannot be doubted that this equation (which also includes *ādānavijñāna*) is made after the pattern of Saṃdh V.3, the more so since Vasubandhu's familiarity with this text and thus with the Yogācāra tradition is obvious from the fact that he expressly quotes Saṃdh V.7 at KSi §§ 32 and 37; cp. also KSi § 35 reminiscent of MSg I.11, and PSVy 25b4f. (Muroji p. 42,28f.) expressly referring to Yogācārabhūmi and Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra as explicitly proclaiming ālayavijñāna. Moreover, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya does not contain even a hint of ālayavijñāna, not even of a continuous *vipākavijñāna* as a Sautrāntika concept, and Yaśomitra (AKVy 167,6f.) expressly declares ālayavijñāna to be a specific Yogācāra notion (Mimaki 1972, 89 note 11). Therefore, the *vipākavijñāna* of KSi § 30 is more likely to have been modelled, in its turn, - probably by Vasubandhu himself - after the ālayavijñāna of the Yogācāras. Cp. also Yamaguchi 1975, 34f.; H 1975a, (40); Hyōdō 1982, (47); Matsuda 1982b, 52 [addendum]; Suguro 1983, 9ff. - The assumption of a *vipākavijñāna* in addition to the ordinary six *vijñānas* is, by the way, ascribed to the Sāṃmitīyas in Paramārtha's translation of MSgBh ad I.11 (T 1595, 160c9; cp. Katsumata 1974, 552) and VGPVy 390b7; see also Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 474 note 1.

79. E.g. Y 4,12; PG 28c and 29a (see App. II).

80. Y_t 'i 311a7 and b2 (see ns. 500 and 502).

81. Y_t 'i 167b3 (Y_c 781c12f.); Y_t 'i 312a6 (Y_c 839a16); see § 4.3.

82. *Bījas*: e.g. MSABh ad MSA XI.44 and XIX.49 (see n. 719(a)); *dauṣṭhulya(-kāya, -āśraya)*: see n. 47; *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam* (or *cittam*): Saṃdh V.2+3; cp. Tr 18a + TrBh 36,7; de facto already Y 4,7+11 and 24,4f.+7f. (see §§ 6.1.3 and 6.3.3); *vipāka-vijñāna*: MSg I.34ff.; II.32; AS 12,1f.; KSi § 33 (Muroji p. 39,28ff.); PSVy 24b2-4 (Muroji p. 40,1 + 5-7);

sarvabījako vipākaḥ: indirectly Y 4,11f. + 4,7; **indriya-mahābhūtôpādātṛ vijñānam*: cp., e.g., Y 4,7 *āśrayôpādātṛ* ... *ālayavijñānam*; *sopādānaṃ vijñānam*: Hsien-yang 48oc12-14.

83. Cp. §§ 6.1 and 6.3.

84. Cp., e.g., Yūki 1935, 47ff.; Mizuno 1957, 433ff.; Mikogami 1965; cp. also Odani 1976, 169.

85. Cp. § 2.5 + n. 172; §§ 3.13.1-4, 6.1.2.2*a* and 7.3.6.3.1.

86. Cp. esp. Ui 1958, 17of.; Aramaki 1963, 211f.; Odani 1976; Takasaki 1982, 27; Enomoto 1982 (see § 7.3); Kajiyama 1985 (see ib.).

87. Y. Sasaki 1982 and 1982a. Cp. also Takasaki 1982a and 1985, and Takeuchi 1985.

88. Preliminary attempts: see n. 468.

89. As is testified to by the case of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa*, which in spite of its subliminal nature is still regarded as a form of *manovijñāna*, the assumption of a peculiar type of *vijñāna* bearing a special name of its own does not necessarily preclude its remaining included within the framework of the traditional set of six kinds of *vijñāna*. Even in Yogācāra texts such an inclusion, though unusual, is occasionally met with: cp., e.g., T 1618 (*Khyātivijñānaśāstra of Paramārtha), 879b3ff. (= Ui 1965, 363), where both ālayavijñāna and *ādānavijñāna* (here = *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*, cp. Katsumata 1974, 721; Paul 1984, e.g. 59; 7o; 97f.; 1o4ff.; 114; 212 note 23) are said to be forms of *manovijñāna*. Cp. also n. 159.

9o. See §§ 7.1A, 7.1B and 7.2.

91. See n. 226.

92. Y_t zi 1b2-1ob6 = Y_c 579a7-582a12 = Chüeh-ting 1o18c5-1o2oc13; cp. Ui 1965, 544ff. and 717ff.; 1958, 172ff.; Yūki 1935, 4o3ff. Cp. also the partial editions and translations mentioned in n. 226.

93. MSg I.29-57; cp. Yūki 1935, 605ff.; Ui 1966, 291ff.; Nagao 1982, 177ff. - Further sources containing proofs for the existence of ālayavijñāna are especially KSi § 34 (Muroji p. 41; KSiṬ 103a7ff.); PSVy 25a5ff. (Muroji p. 42; PSVyṬ 154b7ff.); PSk_t 17a2f. (PSk_D § 26; Muroji p. 44,9-14; PSk_C 850a1-4; cp. PSkVai 47a7ff.; PSkViv 94b6ff.; PSkBh 185a7ff., esp. 186b5ff.); TrBh 37,9ff.; Si 15b19ff.; YVy 98b4ff., esp. 100b4ff. (cp. Matsuda 1982a); YidKun 64,1ff., esp. 65,1ff. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 89ff.); cp. also Hsien-yang 480c10-16.

94. Cp. Frauwallner 1953, 385. - As for the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, cp. also § 9.

95. In fact, what is considered in the present study to be the original motive has been moulded into the seventh proof of the VinSg (see § 3.2.1 + n. 227), though with a certain shift in the nature of the argument (see ib.).

96. Cp., e.g., Yūki 1935, 16; 73; 142; 148; Weinstein 1958, 48; 52; Katsumata 1974, 560ff.; Funahashi 1969, 37; H 1977, 220; Kanakura 1980, 169; Nagao 1978, 34f.; Yokoyama 1979, 115; 118; 122 (but see also n. 111); Nakamura 1980, 255 note 15; Saigusa 1983, 109; 320; Griffiths 1986, 77.

97. Cp., e.g., Yūki 1935, 234f.; Katsumata 1974, 562ff.; 639; 713. Hirakawa (1981, 80; 85; 92) does not commit himself to the priority of Saṃdh but has both Sūtras preceding the Śāstras.

98. With regard to the chronological priority of the Yogācārabhūmi over the other Śāstras see S 1969, 819ff. Cp. also § 8.2.
For the present investigation, it does not matter whether the "Maitreya" works are actually later than the latest elements (i.e. the final compilation) of the Yogācārabhūmi, because the concept of ālayavijñāna does not occur in them (see § 5.11). Although some terminological and doctrinal differences may be explained by a difference of ambiance,

the "Maitreya" works are, on the whole, doctrinally more advanced and can be shown to presuppose elements even from the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (cp. also Yokoyama 1982; Odani 1984, 43ff.), whereas I have so far not come across a passage in the Yogācārabhūmi which can be conclusively demonstrated to depend on one of the "Maitreya" works.

99. The title is often provisionally retranslated as *(Ārya-deśanā-)Vikhyāpana (Si_P, Index, 51; Frauwallner 1969, 327), sometimes (somewhat strangely) as *Prakaraṇāryaśāsanaśāstra (Demiéville 1954, 384). After a careful reconsideration of the matter, A. Mukai (1979, 42ff., esp. 45ff.) suggests *Śāsanodbhāvana. In an Uigur text, however, the Sanskrit title is given as Sadarma-viyakiyan (Saddharmavyākhyāna: Kudara 1980, 54 and 59; cp. Mukai 1979, 46), whereas YVy 84b5f. gives the Tibetan rendering *bsTan pa la khyab pa* (Matsuda 1982a, 668 [add.]; 1982, (66) [add.], suggesting *Śāsanasphūrti or -sphuraṇa, which sounds somewhat queer). I refrain from committing myself in the matter.

As for the chronological priority of the Yogācārabhūmi with regard to the Hsien-yang, no doubt seems to be possible (cp. also Mukai 1979, 39f. and 53ff.; Sueki 1980, 48 and 52 note 48). Hakamaya's (1978, 2f.) reserves against my statement that the Hsien-yang has "taken over" passages from the Yogācārabhūmi are not justified because the expression does not by itself anticipate a decision on the question of authorship, for I do not exclude "taking over" from one's own earlier works: see n. 1198.

What would need additional investigation is the question of the chronological relation of the Hsien-yang to the works of Maitreya, esp. the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. On the whole, it does not seem to have received much influence from that quarter (cp. Hotori 1982, 51 note 84, suggesting that the Hsien-yang is earlier than MSA), though a few passages like 493c6ff., 562b15ff. and 583b8ff. (cp. Hayashima 1982, esp.

156f.) will have to be studied more closely in this connection. Anyway, Ui's view that the prose of the Hsien-yang should be ascribed to Vasubandhu is, in my opinion, rightly rejected by Mukai (1979, 52f. + 60).

100. The assertion, found in the works of some American scholars (Warder 1970, 441; Willis 1979, 10), that the Abhidharmasamuccaya is earlier than the Yogācārabhūmi does not deserve to be taken seriously because it is mere guess-work, no reasons being adduced. As an argument to the contrary, I may refer to S 1969, 822 note 48(*f*). Besides, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, in contrast to the Yogācārabhūmi, is acquainted with the "Maitreya" texts, as is, e.g., shown by its references to the *trikāya* doctrine (AS 94,11), to (*darśanamārga* as) *grāhyagrāhaka-anupalabdhi* (AS 82,18; cp. 66,3), and to the spiritual practice of *cittamātra* (though using *saṃjñā*, not *citta*: AS 82,20ff. [Sanskrit text not altogether reliable; cp. N. Funahashi in: ŌtG 66.1/1986, 28f.]). Yet, this is not the right occasion to enter into further details.

101. In this study, I use the expression "(works of) Vasubandhu the Kośakāra" when referring to (the author of) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhi, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā, because I find there are good reasons for taking the author of these works to be one and the same person (cp. also Matsuda 1984, 96; 85 n. 5). This position has been vehemently disputed by Amar Singh (1984, 23ff., esp. 31ff.). His rigid dissociation of the author of AKBh from all works containing any Yogācāra elements is, however, contradicted not only by undeniable internal affinities (cp. Muroji 1985, passim [KSi, PSVy, AKBh]) but also by express cross-references including a reference to AKBh in PSVy (cp. Matsuda 1984a, 1042). Yet, this is not the place for a detailed rejection of Singh's view (and of his objections to S 1967, which misunderstand the purport of, and partly even misrepresent, my arguments). On the other hand – disregarding, for the moment, works

ascribed to Vasubandhu which are not referred to in the present study - I prefer to treat the Vasubandhu commentaries on Madhyāntavibhāga, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (the comm. on the latter being, sometimes, even ascribed to Asaṅga) as well as the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (the authorship of which may at any rate need reconsideration) as a separate group, because in these certain central doctrinal peculiarities of the comparable parts of the first group[1] seem to be lacking (or at best marginal)[2]. This procedure should not, however, be misunderstood as a commitment with regard to the authorship problem; for this would require a more careful study and critical evaluation of at least the most important of the recent contributions to the question (especially Matsuda 1984 and 1984a, and Sugawara 1984; cp. also the synopsis of the present state of research in Griffiths 1986, 164f.) than I can afford in the context of the present study.

1. E.g. *vijñāna(santāna)pariṇāma*, etc. (cp. S 1967); or the function fulfilled by *vijñāptimātra(tā)* in the context of liberating insight (as shown by me in a lecture delivered at the Univ. of Calgary in 1982 but not yet published). Cp. also the treatment of ālayavijñāna as an actual cognition (§§ 5.13-14).

2. E.g. the notion of *santāna-* or *santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, occurring only once, viz. at MSABh 152,21, in what may well be an argument borrowed from the Sautrāntikas.

1o2. Cp. Suguro 1976, 1f. - For the same reason, even the L a ṅ k ā v a t ā r a s ū t r a is occasionally listed, along with the Saṃdhinirmocana- and the Abhidharmasūtra, as one of the earliest Yogācāra sources (e.g. Hôb I, 36; cp. also de la Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 168,3ff.). But this Sūtra is altogether ignored by all the early Yogācāra texts until Vasubandhu's Vyākhyāyukti (Yamaguchi 1973, 311f.; Funahashi 1976, 367ff.; Takasaki 198o, 56ff.), but has in its turn, as I hope to show on another occasion, almost certainly drawn upon Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā and Viṃśatikā in passages some of which are already documented in the Chinese translation of

443. Therefore I think I can disregard it in the present investigation. Besides, a preliminary glance at the Laṅkāvatāra materials referring to ālayavijñāna or to the *vijñāna* system as a whole does not create the impression of originality but rather of making use of ready concepts (including not only ālayavijñāna but even *manas* as a *vijñāna* on its own). As far as I can see, the text does not anywhere indicate any motive due to which ālayavijñāna may have come to be introduced. To be sure, some passages of the Sagāthaka mention, or allude to, fairly archaic aspects or functions of ālayavijñāna, but even these passages merely m e n t i o n these aspects or functions as a fact or even presuppose them as well-known. Cp., e.g., the references to ālayavijñāna as the principle of physical life which sticks in the body and leaves it at death in LAS 285,1o (*mātāpitṛsamāyogāt ālaya(ṃ) mana-saṃyutaṃ* (!) ... *saha śukreṇa* (v.l.) *vardhate*), 293,9 (*ālayo muñcate kāyaṃ*), 296,1o (*ālayaṃ* ... *k ā y e*) and 323,2 (*āyur uṣmātha vijñānam* [cp. n. 165] *ālayo jīvitendriyam* ...).

1o3. I tend to follow Nagao 1982, 31 in considering the Abhidharma(mahāyāna)sūtra of MSg as one text (cp. also n. 69), in spite of the possibility of a generic use of the term *'abhidharmasūtra'* in ASBh 156, 25, where Tib. (*chos mṅon pa'i mdo rnams las*) suggests an interpretation of Skt. *-sūtrataḥ* in a collective sense or even a reading *-sūtrebhyaḥ* (cp. Aramaki 1963a, 34; cp. also H 1978a, 245). Or could one, in view of the fact that the main source of AS is no doubt the Yogācārabhūmi, even understand *'abhidharmasūtrataḥ'* as a dvandva (with the predominant element being placed first), i.e. in the sense of "from Abhidharma and Sūtras"??

1o4. Cp. Yūki 1935, 24off.; Ui 1966, 39ff.; Nagao 1982, 32. - The Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti (quoting, at 72,13f., the same verse as MSg I.1) is hardly earlier; at least it is later than MSA which it quotes twice (RGVV 71,1ff. = MSA IX.15; RGVV 71,16f. = MSA IX.37).

1o5. Cp. especially the quotations in MSg I.2 + I.27 (cp. I.3; see ns. 136 and 137), II.26, and VIII.2o (cp. II.14 + 14^b).

1o6. Cp. H 1978a, 3o9 note 33; Nagao 1982, 33.

1o7. Cp. Katsumata 1974, 562f.

1o8. Cp., e.g., Obermiller 1933, 96; S 1969, 822; Kawasaki 1976, 168.

1o9. S 1969, 822f.

11o. Suguro 1976, 31ff.

111. E.g. Yokoyama 198o, 196-198; cp. also 2o4ff.; 1982, 69; Takasaki 1982, 13f. and 32; Hirosawa 1983; 1984, 61 note 1; Mōri 1983; 1984; 1986; cp. also H 1982, 51. The chronological priority of the Bodhisattvabhūmi over the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is stressed and demonstrated by Hotori (1983; cp. also 1982, 44 note 12) and Hirosawa (1984, 46 and 6o), and it seems to be indicated already by Frauwallner when he treats, in his anthology (1969, 264ff.), BoBh before Saṃdh.

112. For an exception see n. 132.

113. Cp. Kudara 198o, 54 + 59. But cp. Y_t dzi 332a7 *sa maṅ po* (cp. H 1982, 59) and lDan(/lHan)-dkar-ma No. 615 (*sa maṅ po ba*) [*Basic Section* except ŚrBh and BoBh]. In VinSg, the *Basic Section* is called *sa'i dṅos gźi* (S 1969a, 17f. note 4).

114. As for the alleged references of the Bodhisattvabhūmi to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Nagazawa 1978, 325f., note 5), or at least to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra *in statu nascendi* (Suguro 1976,47), it is quite obvious that one of them ($BoBh_D$ 175,22 = $BoBh_W$ 257,1o: *nītārthaṃ sūtraṃ pratisarati, na neyārtham*) is too vague to allow any identification at all, whereas another one ($BoBh_D$ 179,6f = $BoBh_W$ 262,24ff.: *gambhīrāṃs tathāgatabhāṣitān śūnyatāpratisaṃyuktān dharmān tathā tathā uttānīkaroti ... yathā pare śrutvā tīvraṃ ... saṃvegam utpādayanti*) may just as well refer to traditional Sūtras like AN I 72f. (cp. Suguro 1982b, 213ff.) or to

Mahāyānasūtras emphasizing *śūnyatā*, as e.g. the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. Reference to such Mahāyāna Sūtras is certainly made by $BoBh_D$ 31,10ff. = $BoBh_W$ 46,8ff. (*ekatyā durvijñeyān sūtrāntān mahāyānapratisaṃyuktān gambhīrān śūnyatāpratisaṃyuktān ābhiprāyikārthanirūpitān* ("conceived with an intentional meaning"?) *śrutvā yathābhūtaṃ ... artham avijñāya ... evaṃdṛṣṭayo bhavanti ...: 'prajñaptimātram eva sarvam ...' iti*) and $BoBh_D$ 180,16ff. = $BoBh_W$ 265,3ff. (*ye ... sattvā gambhīrāṇāṃ tathāgatabhāṣitānāṃ śūnyatāpratisaṃyuktānāṃ sūtrāntānām ābhiprāyikaṃ tathāgatānām artham avijñāya - ye te sūtrāntāḥ niḥsvabhāvatāṃ dharmāṇām abhivadanti nirvastukatām anutpannāniruddhatām ākāśasamatāṃ māyāsvapnopamatām ..., teṣāṃ yathāvad artham avijñāya - uttrastamānasāḥ tān sūtrāntān ... pratikṣipanti ..., teṣām api sattvānāṃ sa bodhisattvaḥ ... teṣāṃ sūtrāntānām ābhiprāyikam arthaṃ yathāvad anulomayati*). As these Sūtras are told to be easily m i s u n d e r s t o o d , thus n o t *nītārtha* but "intentional", they cannot be identified with the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra the aim of which (cp. especially ch. VII) is precisely to make e x p l i c i t what is meant by the doctrine of essencelessness (etc.) and to r e m o v e the possibility of misunderstanding. Therefore, the Sūtras referred to in these passages can only be the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras or similar texts (as is quite obvious from the additional qualification of the doctrine of these Sūtras in the latter passage: cp. Hotori 1982, 47 note 30).

115. Saṃdh X.5.2 (cp. Mukai 1985, 10) is unintelligible by itself and is therefore most probably based Y 71,12ff. which in its turn seems to presuppose the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī (Y_t 'i 143b1ff.: cp. Mukai 1985, 9ff.). Cp. also Mōri 1983; 1984; 1986, 28ff. + 36ff..

116. S 1969, 823 + note 54; Suguro 1976, 42; Takasaki 1982, 13f.; Hotori 1983.

117. Viz. Saṃdh V (passim) and VIII (37.1.*1*).

118. Saṃdh V.3 (see § 2.8 + n. 181). I for one do not see any clue for regarding Saṃdh V.3 (or the ālayavijñāna sentence in it) as a later interpolation, the more so as all the three concepts it treats of recur at V.6. Of course, I cannot altogether exclude the possibility of earlier oral materials containing only *ādānavijñāna*, but I regard it as fairly improbable since Saṃdh V seems to presuppose, and even be intended to supersede, the ālayavijñāna passages in the first two Bhūmis of the *Basic Section* of Y (see § 3.9.1). Yet, even if such materials had in fact existed and were to be regarded as prior to all the ālayavijñāna passages of the Yogācārabhūmi, the *ādānavijñāna* of these materials would be nothing but a close precursor of ālayavijñāna, and the question of the origin of the latter in the strict sense (§ 1.4) would still have to be distinguished and assessed independently.

119. Cp. Suguro 1976, 37; 1977, 129.

120. The same is true of the Hsien-yang (480c14f.), whereas MSg (I.4f.) and AS (12,1f.) as well as many later sources (e.g. KSi § 33 (Muroji p. 39,26ff.); PSVy 24b2f. (Muroji p. 40,1-5); Si 13c9ff.; cp. also n. 46) expressly identify *ādānavijñāna* with ālayavijñāna (as for Paramārtha, see n. 89).

121. Or at least after most of the materials it contains, including the concept of ālayavijñāna, had taken shape.

122. S 1969; Suguro 1976. Cp. also Kudō 1975 (esp. p. 20) and Sh. Takemura 1940 (see n. 129), and more recent publications like Hirakawa 1981, 96, 98f. and 115 note 23, or Sueki 1981.

123. Mukai 1981, especially 682 and 684.

124. If the author had planned the work in five sections right from the outset, why does he not tell us so in the very beginning? For usually the macro-structure of the text, especially of the five main sections (cp., e.g., the list of

the 17 Bhūmis in the beginning of the *Basic Section*) and (except for most of VinSg) even of many sub-sections, is expressly stated or at least indicated in advance. If, as Mukai (1981, 682) thinks, the author's personal views as well as the difficult subject-matter requiring discussion or explanation were, from the outset, planned to be treated in VinSg, why is this not indicated either, once for all, in a general way (e.g. in the beginning of the *Basic Section*), or by a reference in each case (as is in fact done, in the *Basic Section*, with regard to more extensive treatments in other chapters of the *Basic Section* or other sections like the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī, but n e v e r with regard to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī)[1]? And how to explain, if VinSg mainly contained the author's o w n views and discussions of intricate matters, the statement, found at the end of each chapter of VinSg (see S 1969a, 21 + note 20), that further m a t e r i a l s or even t e x t s (*gźuṅ*, 文, **grantha*) supplying clarification concerning the respective Bhūmi are not f o u n d (*mi snaṅ*, 不現, **na dṛśyate*)? In my opinion, this statement unambiguously supports the evidence supplied for the compilatory character of this text by incoherences of both (micro-)structure and contents (cp. S 1969, 813ff.; 1969a, 20ff.; §§ 4.5ff. (esp. 4.8ff.), 9 and 11 of the present study). 1. Cp. Suguro 1976, 4ff.; 9f.; 15.

The situation is somewhat different with regard to the *Basic Section*, but here too many incoherences or at least bewildering discrepancies of both structure and contents can be discovered on more or less closer observation. (A closer inspection of style and grammar - e.g. the distribution of the use of gerunds in *-(i)tvā* in the case of compound verbs - would probably reveal an unevenness of evidential value already on this level, but I have to leave this task to future research.)

To be sure, incoherences and discrepancies may also occur within the genuine work of one single author (who may have

revised or supplemented his own work or even have simply patched together several works of his own). But surely in mediaeval India too (see n. 1183) such inconsistencies would not, at any rate in a philosophical or dogmatical text, exceed certain limits, unless the person is, to say the least, unnaturally careless or unsystematic. But would it not show lack of respect to impute such a thing to a famous scholar like Asaṅga?

On the other hand, in a c o m p i l a t i o n of heterogeneous materials such inconsistencies are quite n a t u r a l , especially if the compiler(s) refrained from tampering with the wording of their materials or if the compilation was done in several stages or by different persons. After all, Mukai (1981, 684f.) himself considers the Bodhisattvabhūmi to be based on an older, independent work preserved in a Chinese translation so close to the present BoBh that it had so far been regarded as nothing else but an aberrant recension of the latter. But how can we, in view of this precedent, preclude that other parts of the Yogācārabhūmi, too, or even all of it, consist of, or are at any rate based on, preexisting materials?

125. Mukai 1981, 682.

126. See § 4.9.

127. As this doctrinal contradiction subsists i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the "compilation hypothesis" and of textual analysis, no circular reasoning is involved. Of course, I cannot prevent anybody from asserting that, in order to a v o i d such a contradiction, one has to a s s u m e that " t h e a u t h o r ", f o r c e r t a i n r e a s o n s , which one will no doubt be imaginative enough to invent, has used the term 'ālayavijñāna' in two different senses. But one should at least admit that such an assumption would not in any way be based on the text itself but merely on the p r e c o n c e p t i o n (supported by

"tradition" though it may be) that the text was composed by one single author - a famous one at that - and therefore at all events h a s t o be free from gross contradictions. If such a view is deliberately adopted, it is of course altogether futile to continue the discussion by adducing further doctrinal or textual evidence to the contrary.

128. H 1977, 221; 223f. (for a detailed discussion of this article, see § 8); H 1978, 2. Cp. also the short but more soft-spoken reference to this issue in H 1982, 54. - In view of the compiler's final remark at the end of each chapter and the considerable structural and doctrinal inhomogeneity w i t h i n the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (see n. 124) as well as the considerable differences in the ālayavijñāna theories of VinSg (see §§ 4.8.1-4 and esp. 5.6.2-4.1) on the one hand and MSg and AS (see §§ 4.8.5 and esp. 5.12.1-2) on the other, I cannot but express serious reserves against Hakamaya's view (H 1978, 2f.) that most of the material of VinSg is Asanga's own.

129. This was, in principle, already recognized by Sh. Takemura (194o, esp. 79f. [summary]).

13o. Saṃdh X, e.g., though included in the quotation of the whole Sūtra in the Bodhisattvabhūmi-viniścaya, does not seem to have had much doctrinal influence on the other materials (cp. Suguro 1976, 46), in any case not on the Nirvāṇa chapter which does not use the terms *dharma-* and *vimuktikāya* typical of Saṃdh X but has the Buddha continue to work for the salvation of living beings a f t e r his entrance into the Nirvāṇa where no Possessions (i.e. skandhas) remain (*nirupadhiśeṣaṃ nirvāṇam*) (S 1969a, 37; 54ff.; 66f.). On the other hand, the ālayavijñāna theory of this chapter would seem, in a sense at least, to be more advanced than that of the *Nivṛtti Portion* (see n. 226) of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see §§ 4.9 + 4.1o.2); but the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, as a whole, presupposes Saṃdh V and VIII, though this need

not, *eo ipso*, be true of the basic material made use of in the *Nivṛtti Portion* (see § 11).

131. Cp., e.g., Y_t 'i 2b4ff. (see n. 471) where Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) and Ease (*praśrabdhi*, cp. n. 47) are taught to exist in b o d y a n d m i n d , and Seeds (*bīja*) in the g o o d , b a d and neutral dharmas (i.e. in the mental series made up of these?), or Y_t zi 215a5f. (see n. 495) where it is said that the Seeds of Defilements, which are also called 'Badness', exist in mind and in the mental factors as well as in the pellucid matter [of the sense faculties]. - As far as I can see, the quotation of the whole of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra in the Bodhisattvabhūmi-viniścaya apart, ālayavijñāna does not occur except in the Pañcavijñānakāya-mano-bhūmi, the Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ and the Nirvāṇa chapter of VinSg. Several of its occurrences in the Pañcavijñānakāya-mano-bhūmi-viniścaya are, in the present connection, especially interesting because in their case the reference to ālayavijñāna looks, more or less, appended: Y_t zi 15b5ff. (= Y_c 583b21ff.) extensively describes a theory of *bījas* according to which mind and corporeal matter contain their own Seeds as well as those of each other (see § 2.5). The description of this theory is, however, followed by the express statement - in my opinion to be ascribed to the compiler - that it is valid only so long as ālayavijñāna is not introduced and that, if ālayavijñāna i s introduced, it alone functions as the container of the Seeds of all dharmas (Y_t zi 17b6: see n. 452). Similarly, in Y_t zi 76b2ff. (= Y_c 607b4ff.) the traditional view that *nirodha-samāpatti*, once obtained in this world-sphere, can be reproduced even in the *rūpadhātu* (but not in the *ārūpyadhātu* because no basis of existence would be left) is reported but afterwards supplemented by the (compiler's own ?) remark that this is what is taught only so long as ālayavijñāna is not introduced, whereas when it i s introduced there is no need for such a restriction (because even in the *ārūpyadhātu*

ālayavijñāna will still be available even when all pravṛttivijñānas have ceased). Cp. also Y_t zi 39a3ff. (= Y_c 593a1ff.) where the (traditional) definition of *nirodhasamāpatti* as cessation of mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) [in general, i.e. of all of them,] is followed by the remark (once again by the compiler?) that what ceases is only the pravṛttivijñānas but not ālayavijñāna.

132. Such a case is, in my opinion, the passage containing the only occurrence of the continuous *manas* in the *Basic Section*, viz. Y 11,4-8 (see § 6.2, especially 6.2.3-4, and n. 943). Another one I take to be the passage from the Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ pointed out by Mukai (1981, 683f.), viz. Y_t dzi 184b8ff. (= Y_c 345b19ff. = Y_m 84a4ff.), where, after a set of key terms (*pada*) for explaining Śrāvakayāna, another set of such terms for Vaipulya, i.e. Mahāyāna (Y_m 84b2), is presented along with short definitions consisting of enumerations of the items comprised in the key terms. Among these key terms, several of which are typical of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, we find the five *vastus* (*nimitta, nāman, vikalpa, tathatā*, and *samyagjñāna*), the three *svabhāvas* (*pariniṣpannaḥ, paratantraḥ* and *parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ*), the three *niḥsvabhāvatās* (*lakṣaṇa-, utpatti-* [Y_m: *upapatti-*] and *paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*), and the fivefold *mahābodhi* (*svabhāvataḥ śaktitaḥ upāyataḥ pravṛttito nivṛttitaś ca*). These terms do not occur anywhere else in the *Basic Section*. The three *svabhāvas* and *niḥsvabhāvatās* are found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra but the other two key-terms point to the Bodhisattvabhūmi of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī. Mukai is certainly right in assuming that the very enumeration of these terms in the present passage presupposes additional information about them, but I do not think it probable that such additional information existed merely in the mind of the author, in the sense that he had a clear conception, right

from the very beginning, of the details of the later parts of the work. For in this case one would expect him to give a hint to the effect that full treatment was intended at a later point. And even if he wanted to anticipate such a treatment by introducing no more than the terms here: since this treatment is found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi-viniścaya, why does he anticipate it in the Śrutamayī Bhūmi of the *Basic Section* and not in the B o d h i s a t t v a b h ū - m i ? Is it not more probable that the passage was added only a f t e r the *Basic Section* a n d the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī were already there, i.e. added, e.g., by the final compiler or redactor of Y as a whole, who found that these important terms should not be missing in such a list of the key terms of Mahāyāna (cp. also Yokoyama 1982, 62)? To insert a few items in such a list would by no means be unprecedented. It may even be that the whole list of Mahāyāna key terms is a later addition, for although the concluding phrase refers to the dichotomy of key terms into Śrāvakayānist and Mahāyānist ones, and although the Mahāyānist ones are expressly introduced as such, the Śrāvakayāna key terms lack such an introductory phrase. The text rather starts with simply presenting key terms, without any specification as to the *yāna*. Such a situation would appear quite n a t u r a l if there had been, originally, t r a d i - t i o n a l key terms o n l y and if the Mahāyānist terms had been added later, but one would not expect it if b o t h sets of key terms had been conceived f r o m t h e o u t s e t .

133. Cp. Suguro 1976, 38; 1977, 128 (below).

134. Cp. Suguro 1977, 129 above, 1ff.

135. See § 2.8 + n. 181.

136. MSg I.2 + I.27:
"Mind containing all Seeds is the *ālaya* of all dharmas; therefore it is [called] '*ālaya-vijñāna*'; I have taught it [only] to the excellent [disciples].

[It is the *ālaya* of all dharmas] because all dharmas always stick to [this] mind, and likewise this [mind] sticks to them, in the sense of being the result and the cause of each other."

(*chos kun sa bon thams cad pa'i // rnam par śes pa kun gźi ste //*
de bas kun gźi rnam śes te // dam pa dag la ṅas bśad do //
chos kun rnam par śes la sbyor // de dag la yaṅ de de bźin //
phan tshun 'bras bu'i dṅos po daṅ // rgyu yi dṅos por rtag tu sbyor //

**ālayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ vijñānaṃ sarvabījakam /*
**tasmād ālayavijñānam ...* // (cp. H 1978a, 223)
sarvadharmā hi ālīnā vijñāne, teṣu tat tathā /
anyonyaṃ phalabhāvena hetubhāvena sarvadā // (MAVṬ 34,1f.))

As the second verse shows, *'ālaya'* is understood here in more or less the same sense as in the first explanation of MSg (see n. 137).

137. MSg I.3 (≈ YVy 98a8f.):
"It is [called] 'ālayavijñāna' because all polluted (*sāṃkleśika*) dharmas which have an origin (i.e. are non-permanent) stick (*ālīyante*) to it as [its] results (*phalabhāvena*), and it sticks to them as [their] cause. Or it is [called] 'ālayavijñāna' because living beings stick to it as to [their] Self (probably **sattvā vā tad ātmatvenâlīyante*, Tib. having understood **tad-ātma-*)".
(*skye ba can kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i chos thams cad 'bras bu'i dṅos por der sbyor ba 'am / de yaṅ rgyu'i dṅos por de dag tu sbyor ba'i phyir kun gźi rnam par śes pa'o // yaṅ na sems can dag de'i bdag ñid du sbyor bas*[1] *kun gźi rnam par śes pa'o //*).

1. YVy: *de la bdag tu sbyor ba'i phyir*; Hts.: 攝藏此識爲自我故 ; similarly Pa. and Buddhaśānta.

The first explanation (for which cp. TrBh 18,24f., [illegible] 33,8f., ASBh 11,10f., and Si 7c21f. and 13c13f.) is close to that of the Abhidharmasūtra (see n. 136). As Sthiramati (TrBh 18,24f.) aptly points out, *'ālīyante'* in this explanation means *upanibadhyante*, i.e. to be bound or attached to something else in a causal, o n t o l o g i c a l sense, the noun *'ālaya'* being explicable either in an active (more precisely: middle) or in a locative meaning.
On the other hand, in the second explanation *'ālaya'* is used in a locative or objective application (cp. n. 202) of the (traditional Buddhist) meaning "(spiritually evil) emotional or intellectual clinging" (cp. also ASBh 11,10f.: *ālīyante t a s m i n ... sattvā ... ātmagrāheṇa*, Si 7c22 and 13c14f., and the second explanation of the Pañcaskandhaka (see n. 140)).

138. KSi § 33 (Muroji p. 39,28f.): "It is called *'ālayavijñāna'* because it is the abode or receptacle (**ālaya*) of the Seeds of all dharmas" (*chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gźir gyur pa'i phyir*). This explanation starts from the standard Skt. use of *'ālaya'* in the sense of "hiding-place", "abode", which is also common in non-terminological Buddhist language. Cp. also the definition of PSVy (n. 139), the first definition of PSk (n. 140), and TrBh 18,23f. (*tac ca* [Ui 1979a, 55; ed.: *tatra*] *sarva-sāṃkleśika-dharma-bīja-sthāna-tvāt ālayaḥ*).

139. PSVy 24b2 (Muroji p. 40,1f.): *ci'i phyir 'di kun gźi rnam par śes pa źes bya źe na / chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gźi gaṅ yin pa'o* ("because (**yat*) it is the receptacle of the Seeds of all dharmas").

140. PSk_t 17a3f. (PSk_D § 26; Muroji, p. 44,15-17; Anacker 1984, 72; Shimokawabe/Takayama 1976, 22): "It is [called)] 'ālaya-vijñāna' 1) because it is the receptacle of all Seeds, 2) because it is the object of Clinging to personal existence (v.l.: because it is the object of Clinging [consisting in] the conceitful conception of Self),[1] and 3) because it

sticks to (or hides in) the body." (*kun gźi rnam par śes pa de*[2] *ñid*[3] *ni sa bon thams cad kyi gźi ñid daṅ* / [4]*lus kyi kun*[4] *gźi daṅ rgyu ñid daṅ / lus la gnas pa ñid kyi yaṅ phyir ro*; PSk$_{C}$ 85oa5f.: 阿賴耶識者、謂能攝藏一切種子故、又能攝藏我慢相故、又復縁身爲境界故、Presumable original: **tadālayavijñānatvaṃ*[5] *sarvabījālayatām ātmabhāvālaya-nimittatāṃ* (v.l.: *ātmamānālaya-*) *kāyālayanatāṃ* (Ch.: *kāyālambanatāṃ*) *copādāya*). Cp. PSkVai 53a7ff.; PSkViv 95a7ff.; PSkBh 199a1ff.

1. Tib. (and the commentaries) take **-ālayanimitta-* as a dvandva, involving t w o arguments; but the latter of these deviates from the otherwise consistently etymological character of the explanations. For this reason I have not followed this interpretation.
2. PSkVai 53a7: *'di*; PSkBh 199a2f.: om.
3. PSkVai 53a7: om.
4. ... 4 PSkVai 53b4 gives as a v.l.: *bdag tu ṅa rgyal gyi* (cp. Ch.!).
5. Tib. seems to have (mis)understood **tad-ālaya-* as **tad ālaya-*.

141. Cp. §§ 3.11.8; 3.13.8; 4.7.3; 6.2.2.*d* + 6.2.3.*a*.

142. CPD s.v. ālaya; Funahashi 1969, 32 and 37 (above, 2f.); 1976, 7ff.; cp. also Tsukinowa 1971, 177ff.
Cp. also AKBh 245,19: *chando vā rāgo vā sneho vā prema* (text wrongly *yena*) *vā ā l a y o vā niyantir* <*vā*?> *adhyavasānam vā* (SĀ$_{C}$ No. 312 [Honjō 1984, 68f.]). Similarly DhSk$_{D}$ 51,17f. As for the use of *'ālaya'* in an objective sense, see ns. 2o2 and 137.

143. Cp. Funahashi 1976, 39ff.; for details see ns. 192, 193, 195, 2o3 and 2o4.

144. Cp. Yokoyama 1979, 116ff.

145. Suguro 1976, 38; 1977, 128 (below, l. 21ff.).

146. Y$_{m}$ 78b5 (Y$_{t}$ dzi 172a6-8; Y$_{c}$ 34oc27ff.): *nirodhaṃ samāpannasya cittacaita*[1]*sikā niruddhā bhavanti / kathaṃ vijñānaṃ kāyād anapa*[2]*krāntaṃ bhavati / tasya hi rūpiṣv indriye*<*ṣv a*>*pariṇateṣu pravṛttivijñānabījaparigṛhītam ālayavijñānam anuparataṃ bhavati āyatyāṃ tadutpattidharmatāyai* </>.

1. Y_m *-tta-*.
2. Y_m *-va-*.

147. *a)* The use of *-parigṛhīta* in Yogācāra sources (especially in Y) calls for special investigation which is beyond the limits of this study. As far as I can see, it may be used both in a passive and in an active sense (for the latter use see H. Bechert, Eine eigentümliche Partizipialkonstruktion, in: Münchner Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft 10/1957, 54ff.; BHSG § 34.15; BHSD s.v. *paryupāsita*). The active use is unambiguously documented by $BoBh_D$ 68,7 (= $BoBh_W$ 96,12f.): *sarvavidyāsthānaparigṛhītāni pañca vidyāsthānāni* ("the five fields of knowledge which comprise all fields of knowledge", inspite of Tib. [Y_t źi 61a5: *rig pa'i gnas kyis yoṅs su bsdus pa*] and Chin. [Y_c 500c21f.: 一切明處所攝]). The passive use is unequivocal at $BoBh_D$ 35,3f. (= $BoBh_W$ 51,5f.): *nāma-saṃjñābhilāpa-parigṛhīto nāma-saṃjñābhilāpa-paribhāvito vikalpaḥ*, where *-parigṛhīta*, as a quasi-synonym of *-paribhāvita* ("soaked in or permeated by"), must mean "possessed or influenced by", as is confirmed by AS 23,26f. (*tair eva nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāyaiḥ parigṛhītāḥ citta-caitasikā dharmāḥ*). Cp. also $BoBh_D$ 187,19 (= $BoBh_W$ 276,7f.): *kleśena duḥkhena ca parigṛhītatvāt* ("seized by or stricken with ..."); $BoBh_D$ 115,6 (= $BoBh_W$ 167,27f.): *akalyāṇamitra-parigṛhīta* ("taken in by ...", "under the sway of ..."); MSABh 59,6: *mantraparigṛhītaṃ ... kāṣṭhaloṣṭādikam* ("influenced by ...").

b) In connection with *bīja* or related notions, an active relation of (ālaya)vijñāna (etc.) to *bīja* (etc.), denoted by *pari-grah-*, is unambiguously expressed at MAVṬ 34,8f.: *ālayavijñānaṃ ...-vāsanāṃ parigṛhṇāti*, or Y_t zi 8b4f.: *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ... dge ba'i rtsa ba rnams kyi sa bon yoṅs su 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa* ("ālayavijñāna in so far as it possesses/comprises the Seeds of ..."). The substantive *'bījaparigraha'*, too, appears to be mostly used in this sense of receiving, or possessing, Seeds; cp., e.g.,

ŚrBh 384,17 where both Tib. (Y_t wi 169b7: *sa bon yoṅs su zin pa*) and Chin. (Y_c 454b25: 攝受 ... 種子) render *bīja* as the object of *parigraha*, or as that which is, or has been, taken possession of; cp. also MSg I.14.1 (*sa bon yoṅs su 'dzin pa*) + $MSgU_t$ 248a8 (*de yoṅs su 'dzin par b y e d p a s kun gźi rnam par śes pa* (D) *ni* ...). Of course, this intrinsically active relation, viz. the fact that (ālaya)vijñāna receives or contains (*pari-grah-*) Seeds, may also be expressed in a passive construction, as e.g. at ŚrBh 384,14 (cp. Y 2o7,9 [see n. 1155]) where *vijñāna-parigṛhītaṃ* ... *-nāmarūpabījam* must mean "the Seed of *n.* possessed by, or contained in, *v.*"; cp. Y 2oo,16f.: *vijñānam* ... *-nāmarūpabījopagatam* ("*v.* is 'approached by', i.e. furnished with, the Seed of *n.*"). Cp. also Bhāṣya on MSg I.39: "... from its Seed which is contained in ālayavijñāna" ($MSgBh_t$ 161a5f.: *kun gźi rnam par śes* [*pa la rnam par śes*] *pas yoṅs su bzuṅ ba'i raṅ gi sa bon las*; part in square brackets missing in all Chin. versions).

c) On the other hand, *pari-grah-* (esp. *-parigṛhīta*) is also used to express a relation in which *vijñāna* (etc.) plays an i n t r i n s i c a l l y p a s s i v e rôle. So far, I have noted unambiguous examples only for the use of *-parigṛhīta* in the sense of *vijñāna* being possessed or influenced by, or infested with, k a r m a n or karmic impressions (perhaps because in this case the aspect of spiritually negative h e t e r o n o m y is prominent); cp. ŚrBh 384,12f.: *saṃskāra-parigṛhītaṃ* ... *punarbhava-vijñānâṅkura — prādurbhāvāya tad-bījam* (i.e. present *vijñāna* as the Seed of future *vijñāna*: cp. Y 2o6,15 (see n. 1154) *puṇyāpuṇyāneñjya-saṃskāra-paribhāvita-bījabhūtaṃ vijñānam*, confirming at the same time that in this context *-parigṛhīta* is used in the sense of *-paribhāvita*, as at $BoBh_D$ 35,3f. (see above)); cp. also Y_t 'i 154a5: *bag la ñal daṅ bcas pa'i 'du byed kyis yoṅs su zin pa'i lus mṅon par 'grub pa* (**sānuśaya-saṃskāra-parigṛhītâtmabhāvâbhinirvṛtti*).

d) There are, to be sure, some passages where the Tibetan and/or Chinese translation presupposes this intrinsically passive use of -*parigṛhīta* also in the case of the relation of Seeds, etc., to their support. Cp., e.g., Y_t zi 225b1f. (Y_c 665a17f.): *las dkar ba rnam par smin pa dkar ba'i rnam par smin pa ni ... gcig tu 'dod pa'i tshor ba'i sa bon gyis yoṅs su zin pa* (種子所攝受) *yin pa'i phyir gcig tu 'dod pa ... yin par rig par bya'o //*, corresponding to something like **śuklānāṃ śuklavipākānāṃ karmaṇāṃ vipākaḥ ... ekānte-nêṣṭavedanābījaparigṛhītatvāt ekāntenêṣṭo ... veditavyaḥ*. Yet, I for one find it difficult to exclude the possibility that -*parigṛhīta* is used, in this passage too, in the same way as at $BoBh_D$ 68,7, i.e. in an active sense ("because it (= the [result of] Maturation) contains exclusively Seeds of agreeable sensations"). On the other hand, at Y_t zi 245b2 (Y_c 672b12f.), where it is said that impermanent conditioned entities are Suffering (*duḥkha*, i.e. unsatisfactory) because (and in as far as) they contain (Y_t: *'du byed mi rtag pa rnams kyi* (P, D!) *gnas ṅan len yoṅs su 'dzin pa'i phyir ro*) or are possessed by or infested with (Y_c: 無常諸行皆爲麁重所攝受故) Badness (**anityānāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ dauṣṭhulya-parigrahāt*), the passive interpretation is perhaps preferable since in the case of Badness, as in the case of karman, the aspect of spiritually negative heteronomy may be prominent.

e) In view of these - admittedly preliminary - observations on the use of *pari-grah-* and -*parigṛhīta*, esp. with reference to the relation of (ālaya)vijñāna (etc.) to Seeds (etc.), I prefer to interpret, in the present passage, -*parigṛhīta* not, with Tib. (*sa bon gyis yoṅs su zin pa*), in a passive but rather, with Chin. (能執持 ... 種子), in an active sense; at any rate, this is the rational procedure so long as no unambiguous example is available in Y itself for the use of -*parigṛhīta* in the sense of an intrinsically passive relation between *vijñāna* and Seeds (not karman!).

148. See n. 227. - It is clear from the additional mention of *asaṃjñisamāpatti* that in this passage emphasis is no longer on the exegetical aspect (see § 3.2.1; cp. also Griffiths 1983, 571f.).

149. The passage corresponds to MN I 296 (No. 43: Mahāvedalla-sutta); it is also found in the Sarvāstivāda version of this Sūtra, viz. the Mahākauṣṭhilasūtra ($MĀ_c$ 791c16ff.), but a complete Mūlasarvāstivāda version of this Sūtra, including the present passage, is not known to me. On the other hand, the passage is also contained in the Dharmadinnāsūtra of the Sarvāstivādins ($MĀ_c$ 789a7ff.) - corresponing to the Cūḷave-dallasutta (MN No. 44) where the passage is, however, missing -, and of this Sūtra the Mūlasarvāstivāda version, it too containing the present passage, has been transmitted by Śamathadeva (AKṬU tu 7a7ff., esp. 9b2ff.; cp. also H 1975a, (39) note 26; Honjō in Bukkyō Bunka Kenkyū 28/1983 [not accessible to me]). Moreover, the passage is met with in a partial parallel to the Dharmadinnāsūtra in the Saṃyu-ktāgama ($SĀ_c$ No. 568, cp. SN No. 41.6 [IV 294]), and it is, in view of the name of one of the interlocutors ('Dod pa can, Pāli Kāmabhū), from this Sūtra that the passage is quoted by Guṇamati (PSVyṬ 139a6-b3). Cp. also S 1987, § 6.2.2.2.0 and chart VII line B.b (where, unfortunately, I have forgotten to list the occurrence of our passage in SN No. 41.6).

150. See n. 614.

151. PSVy 25b2 (Muroji 42,19f.) mentions the proposal of an opponent to take the Sūtra statement that mind has, in *nirodhasamāpatti*, not withdrawn from the body to refer to its r e a p p e a r a n c e a f t e r *nirodhasamāpatti* (cp. also $MSgBh_t$ 164a1f. and 167a3f. [ad MSg I.51]). But the *Initial Passage* does not seem to have been even conscious of the possibility of such an evasive interpretation; rather it has taken the Sūtra at its words, as it were. Nor would

Vasubandhu's reply (PSVy 25b2f. = Muroji p. 42,21), viz. that without the p r e s e n c e of mind i n *nirodhasamāpatti* there would be nothing from which mind could r e a p - p e a r a f t e r w a r d s , be cogent in earliest Yogācāra since for t h i s purpose the S e e d s of mind in the material sense-faculties would have sufficed, without having to be hypostatized into a form of m i n d p r o p e r .

152. KSi § 24 (Muroji p. 27); PSVy 18b6-8 (partly quoted, in a better translation, in PSVyṬ 150a8) + PSVyṬ 139a5ff. and PSVy 25a8f. (Muroji pp. 28 and 42); cp. AKBh 72,21f. Cp. Demiéville 1952, 133; H 1975a, (37)f.; Griffiths 1986, 67f.

153. Obviously a master other than the Vasumitra of the Vibhāṣā who is expressly stated to have d e n i e d the existence of *citta* and *caittas* in *nirodhasamāpatti* (Vi 774a22ff.; Vi_2 331c6ff.); cp. AK_p Introd. XLIV f.; KSi p. 237 note 77; H 1975a, (36) note 18; Griffiths 1986, 126.

154. Cp. also the opponent in Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Mahāvedallasutta (Ps II 351; Griffiths 1986, 6-8). Cp., moreover, the opponent at TSi 345b6ff., and Buddhadeva (Vi_2; Vi: Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins, which is perhaps an adaptation to a later situation) in the Vibhāṣā (Vi_2 331c1 ff.; Vi 774a14ff.; cp. Mizuno 1932, 1071), who both substantiate their thesis that there is mind (Vi_2; Vi: subtle mind, but cp. H 1975a, (36) note 17) in *nirodhasamāpatti* by the argument that otherwise entering *nirodhasamāpatti* would mean death (TSi 345b18f.; Vi_2 331c3f.; Vi 774a16f.). The Sūtra passage of § 2.1 is, however, not expressly quoted. The TSi opponent quotes instead a n o t h e r Sūtra passage (see n. 58), which states the inseparability of life-force, bodily heat and *vijñāna*; and in the case of Buddhadeva (/ the Dārṣṭāntikas, etc.), too, the fact that his (/their) thesis is combined with the one that there are no living beings without corporeal matter may, in view of Vi

431b11f. (Vi_2 325a3f.), point to the same exegetical starting point (or to the verse *āyur uṣmâtha vijñānam* ...: see n. 165), or even to the Naḍakalāpikā(-)sūtra (see § 7.3) which is in fact adduced at AKBh 434,19f. (cp. also Vi 431b9f.; Vi_2 325a2) in order to prove the view that there is corporeal matter even in *ārūpyadhātu*. Cp. also Bareau 1955, 94 (thèse 37); 174 (thèse 2o).

155. Cp., e.g., Vi 774a18; AKBh 7o,1f.; 73,3f.; Prak 694a2o-22; H 1975a, (35)f.

156. Cp. the definition of *nirodhasamāpatti* at ŚrBh 46o,11ff. (... *ya evaṃ* ... *cittacaitasikānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ nirodha iyam ucyate nirodhasamāpattiḥ*); cp. also Y_m 78b2 (Y_t dzi 171b5f.; Y_c 34oc9f.): *nirodhasamāpattiḥ katamā / ākiṃcanyāyatanavītarāgasya vihārasaṃjñāpūrvakeṇa manasikāreṇa cittacaitasikānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ nirodhaḥ* /; Y_t zi 192a3 (Y_c 652b26-28).

157. Vasumitra's *citta* in *nirodhasamāpatti* is qualified as a "not quite clear (*aparisphuṭa*) *manovijñāna*" at AKVy 167, 6, but in view of the lack of any specification in AKBh this may well be a statement *expressis verbis* of what was at best implicit in Vasumitra's view (cp. also the remark, on Hts.'s rendering 細心 ["subtle *citta*"], in H 1975a, (38) note 25). The same may even hold good for Vasubandhu's having, at KSi § 25 (Muroji 27,14f.) and PSVy 19a1 (Muroji 28,14f.), an opponent (**kecit*; not: *Vasumitra*!) identify Vasumitra's *citta* in *nirodhasamāpatti* as a *mano vijñāna*, since Vasumitra's (PSVyṬ 139b4; see Muroji p. 3o, note) reply to Ghoṣaka's (PSVyṬ 139b3; cp. AKBh 72,22) objection does not refer to the specific part of his argument - which is, significantly enough, missing in AKBh 72,22ff. - that as a *mano vijñāna* this *citta* must be conditioned by *dharmas*, i.e. have a definite object; instead, Vasumitra's reply only refutes the general part of that objection, viz. that the presence of a *vijñāna*, involving *sparśa*, would by necessity entail

vedanā and *saṃjñā* and thus contradict *(saṃjñā-vedita-)nirodha-samāpatti* as a state where the latter are, *per definitionem*, absent. Anyway, within the limits of the traditional *vijñāna* system of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, the *citta* in *nirodhasamāpatti* (which was also advocated by btsun pa dGa' ba'i sde (*Nandasena?) according to PSVyṬ 139b7 [Muroji p. 32, note]) could hardly be classified but as a *manovijñāna*, as was made explicit not only by Vasubandhu (or the opponent (*kecit*), his mouthpiece, provided that this opponent is not merely a literary device) but, obviously, already by Asaṅga (MSg I.52).

158. The doctrine that the *citta* which continues to exist in *nirodhasamāpatti* is a *manovijñāna* is elaborately refuted in texts like MSg I.52-54; KSi §§ 25ff. (Muroji p. 27,14ff.); PSVy 19a1ff. (Muroji p. 28,14ff.); Si 18a18ff. Cp. also Ghoṣaka's objection (see n. 157).

159. Hsien-yang 505b21f., though clearly not wishing to deny, here or elsewhere, the specific character of ālayavijñāna, yet states that it may be taken to be virtually included in the traditional group of six *vijñānas* because it stores the Seeds of all of them (藏彼種故).

160. See n. 149 ($MĀ_c$ passages); S 1987, chart VIII.1.

161. M I 296. - This seems to imply that the origin of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* is not connected with *nirodhasamāpatti* but, as the name suggests, with *pratītyasamutpāda* (cp. also KSi § 37 [Muroji p. 47,17-19 (+ 45,19-22)]), especially with the moment of conception or Linking up (*pratisandhi*); cp. Cousins 1981, 24f.; I disregard the - rather weak - possibility that the Mahīśāsakas, who may, perhaps, be credited with having introduced *bhavāṅgavijñāna* (see n. 68), had a version of our Sūtra different from that of the Theravādins and similar to that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. On the other hand, the Milindapañha (299,14f.; 300,4f.) indicates the function of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* as a "gap-bridger" when asserting that a

person in [deep] sleep, where [conscious] states of mind do not arise, has retreated into *bhavaṅga*. But though it is tempting to assume this for *nirodhasamāpatti* also, which is in fact referred to in the following sentence of the Milinda-pañha (cp. H 1975a, (34)f.), the wording of the text, not mentioning *bhavaṅga* in this case, is not necessarily in favour of such an assumption. Actually, as Collins (1982, 245f.) has shown, some passages in later Theravāda texts indicate that, according to this school, in *nirodhasamāpatti* even the otherwise continuous flow of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* is interrupted, personal continuity being guaranteed only by the body or the corporeal life-force (for which see VisM XIV.59) - a fact which precludes attainment of *nirodhasamāpatti* in the incorporeal sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*) (Collins, 246 + 305 note 34; cp. Vi 778c1, and Y_t zi 76b2ff. treated in n. 131). It would seem that the Theravādins, by excluding the patently "saṃsāric" *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* from *nirodhasamāpatti*, have somehow preserved a reminiscence of the original status of this state as a kind of mystical anticipation of Nirvāṇa-after-death (see n. 199). On the other hand, my *Initial Passage* (and, less explicitly, already the Sūtra by which it was called forth) treats *nirodhasamāpatti* as a special situation i n l i f e, which, though still actual as a dogmatic issue, appears to have altogether lost its original soteriological significance (cp. also Griffiths 1983, 570ff.).

162. See n. 149 and ASBh 13,14f.

163. See n. 199.

164. Cp., e.g., Sn 1037 = DN I 223,17 (*viññāṇassa nirodhena etth' etaṃ uparujjhati*). But passages like MN I 329 = DN I 223,12 (*viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ*) may perhaps represent a different view; cp. also P. Harvey in: Buddhist Studies, Ancient and Modern, ed. by Ph. Denwood and A. Piatigorsky, London 1983, 39ff.

165. MN I 296: ... *yadā kho ... imaṃ kāyaṃ tayo dhammā jahanti: āyu usmā ca viññāṇaṃ*,[1] *athâyaṃ kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti, yathā kaṭṭhaṃ acetanaṃ*;[2]
MĀ$_c$ 789a1-7 and 791c9-16; AKṬU tu 9b1f.: SĀ$_c$ 150b4ff.; cp. also ŚrBh 376,4f. (AKBh 73,19f.; AKVy 668,16f.; cp. SN III 143):

āyur uṣmâtha vijñānaṃ yadā kāyāṃ jahaty amī /
apaviddhas tadā śete yathā kāṣṭham acetanam //

1. Uneven pāda of a śloka (position of *ca*!): = SN III 143,4.
2. Even pāda of a śloka: see pāda *d* of the verse *āyur uṣmâtha* ...

166. Cp. S 1987, §§ 0.5; 1; 5.1.5.0; 6.2.2.2.0-1; etc.

167. Cp. T 1571 (Dharmapāla's commentary on the Catuḥśataka), p. 228c8ff., where the continuous presence of subtle mind (微細心, **sūkṣmaṃ cittam*) even in unconscious states like sleep and swoon is shown to be true by the argument, among others, that even in such states it supports (任持, **dhāraṇa*) the body, i.e. keeps it alive (though there is no reference to a Sūtra). Cp. also the opponent at TSi 345b6ff. (especially 8f.), who bases his view that mind is present in *nirodhasamāpatti* on a Sūtra passage (see n. 154) which is systematically related to the one quoted in n. 165 but does not seem to have contained the word '*vijñāna*' in its Mūlasarvāstivāda version (see n. 58).

168. See n. 156.

169. The fact that a passage contains a less developed view than another one does not, of course, *eo ipso* imply that it is chronologically older. Even a contemporaneous or later source may advocate a more conservative theory due to geographical distances, difference of milieu, or personal option.

170. KSiṬ 93b4; AKVy 167,16; Sthiramati, Abhidharmakośaṭīkā (Tj 5875 [mDo-'grel vol. to]) 266a1f. (*sṅon gyi mDo sde pa rnams*); cp. AK$_p$ II,212; Bareau 1955, 158 (thèse 18); Mimaki

1979, 199,22ff. (S a u t r ā n t i k a chapter of the Blo-gsal-grub-mtha'). Yet, Vasubandhu himself (AKBh 72,18-21) merely ascribes this theory to "others" (*apare*) and, in the end, connects it with the "Former Teachers" (*pūrvācāryāḥ*) - a designation which appears to refer, consistently, to the early Yogācāra masters, especially to the Yogācārabhūmi (cp. H 1986), as is, in the present case, supported by the passage quoted in n. 172.

171. KSi § 23: (Muroji p. 25,2-5): "[After *nirodhasamāpatti*, mind arises again] from its Seeds which have survived in the material sense-faculties (**rūpiṣv indriyeṣu*); [for] the Seeds of mind and mental factors subsist, according to the circumstances, in the mind series as well as in the series of the material sense-faculties" (*de'i sa bon dbaṅ po gzugs can la gnas pa las te / sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba dag gi sa bon ni sems kyi rgyud daṅ / dbaṅ po gzugs can gyi rgyud gñis* (KSiṬ) *la gnas pa yin te / ci rigs su sbyar ro*); AKBh 72,18-21 (*sendriyaḥ kāyaḥ* instead of *rūpīṇīndriyāṇi*: cp. n. 172); PSVy 2oa7 (Muroji p. 26,1o-12: *lus kyi dbaṅ po'i rgyun* = **kāyêndriya-santati* or *-santāna*; cp. 2ob1: *lus kyi rgyun*; 2ob2 and 4: *lus kyi dbaṅ po la*; see also n. 172). Cp. Griffiths 1986, 63ff.

172. Y_t zi 15b5ff. (= Y_c 583b21ff.): "The m a t e r i a l s e n s e - f a c u l t i e s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r b a s e s (*rūpīṇīndriyāṇi sādhiṣṭhānāni*), and mind (*vijñāna*): these two are, in short, called 'containing all Seeds'. The [Seeds] accompanying[1] the m a t e r i a l s e n s e - f a c u l t i e s are the Seeds of these material sense-faculties and of all other material factors as well as of all kinds of mind and mental factors. The [Seeds] accompanying mind are the Seeds of all kinds of mind and of other immaterial factors as well as of the material sense-faculties."

(*dbaṅ po gzugs can rten daṅ bcas pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / rnam par śes pa gaṅ yin pa 'di gñis ni mdor na sa bon thams cad*

pa śes bya'o // dbaṅ po gzugs can daṅ ldan pa ni / dbaṅ po gzugs can de dag daṅ / de las gźan pa'i chos gzugs can rnams kyi sa bon kyaṅ yin la / sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos thams cad kho na'i sa bon kyaṅ yin no // rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan pa ni rnam par (D) *śes pa rnam pa thams cad po de'i sa bon yaṅ yin la / de las gźan pa'i chos gzugs can ma yin pa rnams daṅ / dbaṅ po gzugs can rnams kyi sa bon yaṅ yin no //*)

Cp. S 1969, 817; H 1986, 860.

1. Ch. 隨逐 ..., suggesting, for ... *daṅ ldan pa, -anugata* or *-upagata* in an a c t i v e sense; cp. n. 402(1c).

There seems to be a certain hesitation as to whether the Seeds accompanying corporeal matter are contained in the (subtle) material sense-faculties o n l y (cp. also Y_t zi 215a5f. [see n. 495] and 228b7 [Y_c 666b5f.]) or even, as in PSVy 20a7ff. (see n. 171), o n l y in the sense of touch (which pervades the whole body [VGPVy 421a3] and is invariably present from the moment of conception onward [cp. Y 24,10f.]), or whether, as in the passage quoted above, they are a l s o contained in the b a s e s (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the sense-faculties, i.e. their gross, visible supports, e.g. the eye-balls (cp. AKBh 13,1; 16,11; 21,5ff.). Since the support of the sense of touch comprises the whole body, *adhiṣṭhāna* can, in this context, be equated with the body (*kāya*): cp., e.g., SAVBh tsi 170a2f. (ad MSABh 151,5); TrṬ 17b6 (ad TrBh 19,7).

The idea that not only mind but also the m a t e r i a l sense-faculties contain (or are) the Seed(s) of mind is, moreover, clearly implied in a statement of the V a - s t u s a ṃ g r a h a ṇ ī (Y_t 'i 252a4f. = Y_c 814b11-13) according to which the S i x S e n s e s (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*) are the support of the Seeds (or: the support in the sense of being Seed: cp. § 6.1.2.*1* + n. 775 and § 7.1B.2.1.3.*b* + n. 1014) (**bījāśraya?*) of the six kinds of *vijñāna* (*rnam par śes pa'i tshogs drug po rnams kyi ni ... skye mched drug*

ni rgyu yin ... / 'di lta ste / skye mched drug ni de dag gi sa bon gyi gnas yin pa ...). In the Śrāvakabhūmi, the (still less precise, or more archaic?) formulation that the Seeds of mind are in the body is met with (ŚrBh 431,14f.: *asty* [ms.] *eṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ vijñānānām asmin kāye caturmahābhūtike* (ed. *cā°*) *bījaṃ ...*).

172a. Y_t zi 16a2-4 (cp. S 1969, 818 note 41).

172b. Y_t zi 16a4-6.

173. The fact that this theory is, as far as I can see, not met with in its fully explicit form in the *Basic Section* but only in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī is not a cogent counter-argument; for even if we disregard, in view of Vasubandhu's reference to the *pūrvācāryas* (see n. 170), the ascription, by later authors, of this *bīja* theory to "certain Sautrāntikas", as well as the less explicit but (as far as the Seeds of mind are concerned) substantially equivalent formulation of the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī (see n. 172), the fact that the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī was compiled after the *Basic Section* (cp. § 1.6.6) does not exclude that some of the materials compiled are fairly old (cp. § 1.6.7). Actually, the compiler of VinSg himself finds it necessary to state that this *bīja* theory presupposes that ālayavijñāna is not introduced (see n. 131); and in view of the analogous cases (see ib.), of the fact that the introduction of ālayavijñāna in the *Basic Section* appears to be a rather late event (see § 6, especially 6.8), and of the obvious relation of this theory to my *Initial Passage*, I do not hesitate to take this systematical statement of the compiler historically, viz. in the sense that this *bīja* theory was devised when ālayavijñāna had not yet been introduced. Thus, even if this *bīja* theory, not being documented in the *Basic Section*, may have escaped the attention of the compiler(s) of this Section, this does by no means exclude that it was nevertheless known to the real author of the *Initial Passage*.

174. AKṬU tu 9b6: *dbaṅ po* (text: *du*) *gźan du 'gyur ba* (read *gyur pa?*) ...*-r mi 'gyur ro*; KSi § 24 (Muroji p. 27,11): *dbaṅ po dag ma gyur pa* (*apariṇata*) *yin źiṅ*; PSVyṬ 139b1 (Muroji p. 28, note): *dbaṅ po rnams yoṅs su ma gyur pa yin*; $SĀ_C$ 15ob14: 諸根不壞 ; $MĀ_C$ 789a1of. = 791c19: 諸根不敗壞 ; MN I 296 and SN IV 294: *indriyāṇi vippasannāni*.

175. It may be difficult to decide whether this step was, as Griffiths (1986, 1o6) seems to suggest, in fact favoured by Vasumitra's assumption of (some kind of) mind in *niro-dhasamāpatti* (see § 2.3 + n. 152).

176. The addition of an a t t r i b u t e *apariṇateṣu*, especially in a predicative function (with a causal nuance), is easily accounted for by the wording of the Sūtra (see n. 174).

177. Y_t dzi 172a7: *de'i dbaṅ po gzugs can yoṅs su ma gyur pa rnams l a ... kun gźi rnam par śes pa med pa ma yin te /*.

178. Y_C 34oc28ff.: 不變壞諸色根中、有 ... 阿賴耶識 .

179. Cp. PW s.v. *lī-* + *ā-* (3). - Cp. Suguro 1982, 6off. (see § 7.1B.1); cp. also H 1978a, 216, rendering *ā-lī-* in MSg I.2-3 by 埋没している ("to be buried, to remain obscure"), though I for one should not apply this meaning to t h a t passage (see ns. 136 und 137).

18o. As for a slight shift of meaning, see § 3.3.1.3.

181. *kun gźi rnam par śes pa źes kyaṅ bya ste / 'di ltar de lus 'di la grub pa daṅ bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis kun tu sbyor ba daṅ rab tu sbyor bar byed pa'i phyir ro //*.
Cp. also the partly quotation in YVy 115b6: *'di ltar de ni lus de la 'brel ciṅ rab tu 'brel ba<s?> na kun gźi źes bya'o*.
The Chinese versions (cp. n. 183) indicate that this explanation is "etymological" like that of *citta* and probably also that of *ādānavijñāna* (for which see n. 352). Thus, it may correspond to something like:
**ālayavijñānam ity apy ucyate, yaduta tasyāsmin kāya ālaya-*

na-pralayanatām[1] *upādāya ekayogakṣemārthena*.
Cp. Yokoyama 1979, 119; Funahashi 1976, 55f.

1. Or *ālīyanapralīyanatām* (Wackernagel II,2, Nachträge, 934 (ad 201).

182. Cp. PW s.v. *lī- + pra-*: "sich verstecken, sich versteckt halten; sich auflösen, ... verschwinden".

183. Cp. also the Chinese renderings of Hsüan-tsang (T 676, p. 692b17: 攝受藏隱 "appropriates and lies hidden"), Bodhiruci (T 675, p. 669a25: 住著 "dwells in and sticks to"), Dharmagupta (T 1596, p. 273c12: 隱藏普遍 "lies hidden and pervades") and Paramārtha (T 1595, p. 157b23: 藏隱 "lies hidden"; cp. T 1610, p. 803a9f.: 阿梨耶者、依隱為義). Cp. also Weinstein 1958, 57; Yūki 1935, 74 (身に蔵隠せられてゐる); Yokoyama 1979, 118f. (*(kakure)-hisomu*); Takasaki 1982, 27 (*kakurete iru*); Suguro 1982, 65f.

184. This term is explained at Y 24,16f.: *cittavaśena ca tan* (= *kalala-rūpaṃ*) *na pariklidyate* (see n. 250), *tasya ca* (sc. *kalala-rūpasya*) *anugrahopaghātāc cittacaittānām* (Y_m) *anugrahopaghātaḥ / tasmāt tad anyonyayogakṣemam ity ucyate*. Cp. also Funahashi 1969, 38; Yokoyama 1979, 132ff.; 1979a, 5ff.; Takasaki 1985, 50 note 8.
On the somewhat different use of *yogakṣema* as a quasi-synonym of *artha*, *hita* and especially *nirvāṇa*, see AN III 403; Norman 1969, 128.

185. PSk_t 17a4 (see n. 140).

186. S 1969a, 130.

187. AKBh 154,12: *āśrayo hi sendriyaḥ kāyaḥ*; AKVy 45,6; 395,2f. (*āśraya* = *śarīra*); ŚrBh 399,11 *āśraya-daurbalya* = 400,19 *kāya-daurbalya*; S 1969a, 92f. Cp. also n. 796.

188. Cp. n. 39.

189. ASBh 45,6: *tad-* (= *vijñāna-*)*viyukta āśrayaḥ pūtībhavati*; $MSgU_t$ 240a6f. (H 1975, (18)): *gźan du na ni* (i.e. if ālayavijñāna did not appropriate the body) *śi ba'i ro*

bźin du 'jig par 'gyur ro //; KSiṬ 103b2: *lus ni rnam par śes pas zin pa'i phyir ma śi'i* (D) *bar du rul bar mi 'gyur ro*. Cp. also n. 250.

190. Cp. the **indriyamahābhūtopādātṛ vijñānam* of Y_t 'i 311a7 (see n. 80).

191. E.g. YVy 98b2 (see n. 817(d)), explaining *upādātṛ* at Y 11,4f. as implying an etymology of ālayavijñāna. Cp. also the rendering of ālayavijñāna by *kun tu len pa'i rnam par śes pa* in ASVy (e.g. 162b7 = AS 12,1; 163a1ff. = ASBh 11,11ff.).

192. According to MSg I.13B, the traditional interpretations of *'ālaya'* are: *a*) the five *upādāna-skandhas* (i.e. the skandhas as the object of Clinging (i.e. of *upādāna* = *chandarāga*: cp. AS 2,5ff.; M I 300)); *b*) **sukhā vedanā sarāgā* (i.e. this *vedanā* as the object of Clinging, or *vedanā* as the object plus *rāga* as the action of Clinging [cp. $MSgU_t$ 246a7f.; H 1975, (30)]); *c*) *satkāyadṛṣṭi* (as the action of Clinging).

193. Vi 746c11-14: **若法為欲界阿賴耶所蔵、摩摩异多所執、名欲界繫。** ... **阿賴耶者、謂愛。摩摩异多者、謂見。** I cannot follow Funahashi (1969, 37f.; 1977, 74f.; cp. 1976, 40f.) who seems to perceive, in the expression **阿賴耶所蔵**, an indication of the aspect of being stored or hidden in the body, or of Seeds being stored, i.e. of an essential aspect of the notion of ālaya-vijñāna. But in view of the fact that in this passage *ālaya* is parallel to and even quasi-synonymous with *mamāyita*, and is subsequently explained as *tṛṣṇā* (i.e. as the emotional or affective aspect of spiritually negative Clinging, whereas *mamāyita* is taught to mean *dṛṣṭi*, i.e. the intellectual aspect of Clinging), I think that Funahashi has been misled by the Chinese phraseology (**所蔵**) and that the passage rather means that those dharmas which are clung to (**ālīna*, or **ālīyante*) by attachment (*ālaya*) to the *kāmadhātu* (etc.) are *kāmadhātu-pratisaṃyukta* (etc.).

194. See n. 203 and CPD s.v. *ālaya* 2(c).

195. Y_m 84b7 (= Y_t dzi 186b4): *ālayaḥ katamaḥ / atīte apekṣā, anāgate abhinandanā, pratyutpanne adhyavasānaṃ /.*

196. *'upādāna'* in this sense is closely related to the Abhidharma term *'upātta'* (cp. Yūki 1935, 160f.; Suguro 1977, 130; Yokoyama 1979a, 3f.; Takasaki 1985, 42f.). The term *'upātta'* characterizes living, organic matter in contradistinction to inanimate, dead matter; cp., e.g., Y_t zi 228a3 ff. (Y_c 666a11ff.) stating that only the matter (*rūpa*) of the sense-faculties (*indriya*) and the matter connected with them (i.e. corporeal matter) which mind and mental factors have made their support and not abandoned (*gnas su byas śiṅ ma spaṅs pa*) - thus not hair, nails and teeth, etc. - is *upātta*, and that this means that its being affected by certain external or internal causes leads to pleasant or unpleasant sensations. Similarly, Y_t zi 41b1f. (Y_c 593c29f.) reads: "[Appropriated (*upātta*) matter] is [matter] which occurs/grows in coalescence with mind (**vijñāna-saṃmūrcchitam* (see n. 239) *(pra)vartate*; Ch. (生長) seems to have read **(pra)vardhate*) in the sense of sharing its destiny (**ekayogakṣemārthena* (cp. n. 184)), and which is the basis of the origination of feelings" (*de* (= *zin pa'i gzugs*) *yaṅ rnam par śes pa daṅ 'dres pa grub pa daṅ bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis* (D) *'jug pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / tshor ba rnams skye ba'i rten du gyur pa gaṅ yin pa'o //*). As for the first part of this definition, see also Y_c 880a1ff., whereas the second part stands in isolation at AS 29,23f.: *vedanotpattyāśraya<rūpa>ta upāttaṃ draṣṭavyam / rūpaskandhaikadeśaḥ* (ASBh 43,16: *sādhiṣṭhānendriyasaṃgṛhītaḥ*). Cp. also AKBh 23,16 f.: *upāttam iti ko 'rthaḥ / yac cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenôpagṛhītam anugrahopaghātābhyām anyonyānuvidhānāt, yal loke sacetanam ity ucyate*; NA 352b6ff.; Vi 712b8ff., especially c7ff.

Upādāna in the sense of biological appropriation is ex-

pressly distinguished from *upādāna* in the sense of spiritually negative Clinging in Yüan-ts'ê's commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (SaṃdhṬ ti 269b7ff.; the Chin. original is not accessible to me). Yüan-ts'ê makes it clear that spiritually negative Clinging - i.e. when a person who is under the sway of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* believes that there is Self - is abandoned when pure insight (i.e. *darśanamārga*?) has arisen, whereas biological appropriation - which is the source of pleasant and unpleasant sensations [in the body] - continues until [the attainment of final] Nirvāṇa.

197. Cp., e.g., Y 2o8,14ff.; Sh. Miyamoto in: IBK 44/1974, 969ff. - As for the equivalence of *ālaya* with t h i s kind of *upādāna*, cp. the fact that AS 2,5ff. (cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 181f.) seems to make use of the Y passage quoted in n. 195 in order to explain why *upādāna* is defined as *chanda* + *rāga*: **anāgatābhilāṣād vartamānādhyavasānāc ca* (reconstr. slightly modified by me). Cp. also Suguro 1977, 131 (above, 2ff.); Y. Sasaki 1982, 19o (below, 15ff., especially 18: 執着という意味で).

198. Cp., e.g., AKBh 7o,15f.; Vi 779c29ff.; ŚrBh 46o,11ff.; 5o8,15f.; TrBh 24,16f.; VisM XXIII.18.

199. Cp. de la Vallée Poussin 1937, 189f.; S 1981, 214ff.; 1987, § 8.1.4; Vetter 1985, 68; Bronkhorst 1986, 95; 97; 1o2; Griffiths 1986, 13ff., especially 19 and 28ff.; 149f. note 28 (with further references).

2oo. VisM XXIII.3o (without *iva*!) + Paramatthamañjūsā (*anupādisesanibbānaṃ ... viya*; cp. Griffiths 1986, 29f. and 157); AKBh 232,2of.: *nirodhasamāpatti-vyutthitaḥ parāṃ cittaśāntiṃ labhate, nirvāṇa-sadṛśatvāt samāpatteḥ / sa hi g a t a - p r a t y ā g a t a i v a n i r v ā ṇ ā d bhavati;* AS 95,16ff. (reconstr.; read **śāntavimokṣavihāraṃ samatikramya m o k ṣ â n u s a d ṛ ś a -vihāra-samṛddhau yaś citta-caitasikānāṃ (dharmāṇāṃ) nirodhaḥ*; cp. AS_t 133a3-5 and ASBh 125,11ff.).

2o1. Cp., e.g., *kāma* (cp. ŚrBh 449,15: *dvividhāḥ kāmāḥ: kleśakāmā vastukāmāś ca*), *upadhi* (see CPD s.v.), *parigraha* (see PTSD s.v.).

2o2. Thus, probably, in the expressions *'ālayārāma'*, etc. (see n. 71; cp. ns. 2o3 and 2o4; I find that "delighting in attachment" (CPD; cp. SpK I 195,23f. and 196,5 [*t a ṇ h ā l a y a* beside *kāmālaya*]; Ps II 174f.) is rather far-fetched, the natural interpretation being no doubt "delighting in o b j e c t s - o f -attachment"); cp. also VisM XVI.28: *ālaya* = *taṇhā v a t t h u* (= *dukkha*, from the ultimate point of view).

Cp. also the frequent use of *ālaya* in the sense of "house, dwelling; nest, lair; abode", etc. (see CPD s.v. *ālaya*, 1), which, as A. Wezler kindly informed me, is adduced in Kāśikā ad Pāṇ 3,3,118 as an example for the use of the suffix *(gh)a* in the sense of the l o c u s (*adhikaraṇa*), i.e. the place where one crouches or hides. Analogously, the Buddhist meaning of *ā-lī-* would yield a noun *ālaya* = "that to which one sticks or clings". Cp. also n. 137.

2o3. Cp. Mp III 128 (ad AN II 131: *ālayārāmā ... pajā*): "*'ālaya'* - in the sense of what is c l u n g t o by craving and wrong views - are the five objects of sensuality, or the whole process of existence (i.e. saṃsāra)" (*taṇhā-diṭṭhīhi allīyitabbaṭṭhena ālayo ti pañca kāmaguṇā, sakalam eva vā vaṭṭam*); Spk I 195 (cp. Ps II 174): *ālayārāmā ti: sattā pañca-kāmaguṇesu allīyanti, tasmā te* (sc. *kāmaguṇā*!) *'ālayā' ti vuccanti*; Paramatthamañjūsā ad VisM XVI.28: "With regard to *ālaya*, i.e. to the five objects of sensuality, o r to all *kāmas* [in the sense of] things [desired], o r to the three [spheres of] existence" (*ālaye pañca-kāmaguṇa-saṅkhāte sakala-vatthu-kāma-saṅkhāte bhava-ttaya-saṅkhāte vā*). Cp. also Funahashi 1969, 33; 1976, 12; 1977, 74.

2o4. Vism-mhṭ S[e] III 368,14 (quoted in CPD s.v. *ālaya-rāma*): *pañc'upādāna-kkhandhā ālaye*; MSg I.13B: *yaṅ kha cig ni ...*

ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lṅa po dag ni kun gźi źes bya'o sñam du sems so //.

2o5. Cp. $MSgU_t$ ad I.13 (246a6; H 1975, (3o)): *de dag la bdag ñid du 'dzin pa'i phyir ro//*. The view that the *upādānaskandhas* are the object of the wrong notion of 'I' and 'Mine' is of course canonical (cp., e.g. MN I 3oo; SN III 127f.): cp. also Y_t zi 112b6f. = Y_c 621b6f., etc.

2o6. Hsien-yang 5o5b21f. (see ns. 159 and 778) may not be unambiguous.

2o7. Cp. n. 1o1.

2o8. Y 2o7,13 (etc.): *nāmarūpabīja-parigṛhīta-bījabhūtaṃ* (sc. *ṣaḍāyatanam*). Cp. n. 147(*b*).

2o9. Y 2oo,17f. (etc.): *nāmarūpabījam* ... *ṣaḍāyatanabījôpagatam* (etc.).

21o. See § 6.2.2.*d*.

211. E.g. Y 55,14; cp. Yokoyama 1979a, 13f.; Suguro 1982, 63f.

212. See n. 195.

213. See below.

214. Murakami 1978, 461f.; for the cosmological term *'pralaya'* cp. also Frauwallner 1953, 363f.

215. Cp. also S 1969a, 128.

216 Cp. also Hattori 1985, 1o4.

217. Cp. the use of *-parigṛhīta* at $BoBh_D$ 68,7 (quoted in n. 147(*a*)).

218. Cp. Y_m 95b5f. = $ŚrBh_m$ 2A6,5f. (Y_t dzi 213b7ff.; Y_c 355c13-16):

ākāśānantādhimokṣaḥ vijñānānantādhimokṣaḥ ākiñcanādhimokṣaḥ naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñādhimokṣaḥ[1] *s ū k ṣ m a s ū k ṣ m a - s v a r a s a v ā h i - c i t t â dhimokṣaś ca: itîme pañcâdhimokṣāḥ anupūrveṇa suparikarmakṛtāḥ s a ṃ j ñ ā v e d a -*

y i t a n i r o d h a s a m ā p a t t i -parama-vihāra-nirhārāya saṃvarttante /

1. Y_m *-saṃjñāmokṣaḥ*; ŚrBh$_m$ *-saṃjñāyatanādhimokṣaḥ*, but *-āyatana-* is not represented in Tib. nor in Chin.

This passage, which may be pre-ālayavijñānic or not, at any rate appears to imply the existence of an e x t r e m e l y s u b t l e form of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti*.

The earliest e x p l i c i t statement of the subtleness of ālayavijñāna or *ādānavijñāna* seems to be Saṃdh V.7 (§ 3.9.1 + n. 321); cp. also Y_t zi 4b5f. and 5a7 (subtleness of the object and of the mental associates of ālayavijñāna) and §§ 5.7 and 5.9.

219. Cp. n. 172; PSVy 2ob1f. (Muroji p. 26,18-2o): "In the case of this assumption the Seed(s) of *manovijñāna* would exist in two series: one [of them] would [exist as a residue] impressed (**bhāvita*) on the mind series (*citta-santati* or *-santāna*), and another one [as a residue] impressed on the body series (*kāyasantati*)" (*rnam par rtog pa 'di la yid kyi rnam par śes pa'i sa bon rgyud gñis la yod par 'gyur te / gcig ni sems kyi rgyud la[s] bsgos pa'o // gcig ni lus kyi rgyun la'o //*); KSiṬ 94a4f.: "In *kāma-* and *rūpadhātu*, [the Seeds of mind exist,] in conscious states (*sacittikā avasthā*), in both *citta-* and *rūpasantati*. In unconscious states, in *rūpasantati* [only]. In *ārūpyadhātu*, in *cittasantati* only" (*'dod pa daṅ / gzugs kyi khams sems daṅ bcas pa'i gnas skabs na ni / sems kyi rgyud daṅ / gzugs kyi rgyud la'o // sems med pa'i gnas skabs na ni gzugs kyi rgyud la'o // gzugs med pa'i khams na ni sems kyi rgyud kho na la ste /*).

22o. Cp. the fact that, according to somewhat later sources, in *nirodhasamāpatti* even the occurrence of the subtle Ego-feeling of *kliṣṭa-manas* is excluded (MSg I.7A.4; AS 11,1;[1] 13,11; ASBh 9,2of.; Tr 7), not to speak of gross mental acts of Clinging to Self. As for the fact that passages like Y_t zi 6a5-7 do not take into consideration the absence of *manas*

in *nirodhasamāpatti*, see n. 657.

1. In this passage, *tadekatyānāṃ ca sthāvarāṇāṃ* has to be added with AS_t 60b4, AS_c 665c7, $ASVy_t$ 160b5f., $ASVy_c$ 700b8f. and 11; ASBh 9,20 and $ASBh_t$ 10a6.

221. Cp. S 1973, 165f.; 1976, 238-240. As for the Bodhisattvabhūmi, cp. also Willis 1979, 36; Hotori 1982, 26.
The absence of *vijñaptimātratā* throughout Y (except the quotation of Saṃdh (see § 1.6.3 + n. 108)) does not of course exclude the occurrence, especially in Mahāyānist chapters like the Bodhisattvabhūmi of the *Basic Section* as well as of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, of a somehow illusionist ontology according to which dharmas or (by nature conceptually structured) phenomena (*nimitta*) arise from designations (*prajñapti*) or conceptions (*vikalpa*) and, though not necessarily mere mental images, are yet ultimately essenceless (in the sense of *dharmanairātmya*) (S 1973, 166f.).
On the other hand, most parts of the Yogācārabhūmi do not involve such views but presuppose, more or less explicitly, the traditional ontology according to which dharmas (including material ones) are really existent, though impermanent and devoid of Self or Person (in the sense of *pudgalanairātmya*). Cp., e.g., the prose explanation of the Paramārthagāthās ($ŚrBh_W$ 174,15): *pudgalanairātmyaṃ paramārthaḥ* / (Y_m); or ŚrBh 490,21ff. (Y_t wi 225b5ff.; Y_c 474b7ff.; cp. also Y_t zi 70b2-4 = Y_c 605a9ff.): *tasyaivaṃ bhavati* - *indriyamātram <i>ha upalabhe*(?)[1] *v i ṣ a y a m ā t r a ṃ tajjam anubhavamātraṃ cittamātra<m>/ a h a ṃ m a m e - t i* (?)[2] *n ā m a m ā t r a ṃ darśanamātram upacāramātraṃ, nāta uttari nāto bhūyaḥ / tad evaṃ sati skandhamātram etan, nāsty eṣu skandheṣu nityo dhruvaḥ śāśvataḥ svā<mi>bhūtaḥ kaścid ātmā ... / iti hi śūnyā ete saṃskārāḥ ā t m a v i - r a h i t ā ḥ .../*
It is self-evident that *cittamātra* in this context has no idealist implication but merely contrasts with *ātman*.

1. $ŚrBh_m$ *aha upalabhate*; Y_t *bdag gis ... mthoṅ ba* (**aham upalabhe* ?); Y_c 我於今者 (*iha*?) 唯有 ...

2. Cp. Y_t *bdag daṅ bdag gi źes bya ba ni*; Y_c 我我所 . ŚrBh$_m$: *hatā ātmeti*. Y_t zi 70b3 (*bdag bdag ces bya ba'i* ...; Ch.: 我我) suggests *ātmātmeti*.

I do not think Kajiyama (1985, 345) is right in drawing from the fact, frequently expressed in the traditional layers of Y and related texts, that dharmas or *pratyayas* lack activity (*nirīha, niśceṣṭa*: e.g. Y 203,15; 230,17f.; PG 1 (see n. 1394); AS 27,17f. and 22; ASBh 33,21) the consequence that from the point of view of ultimate Truth they must, in the sense of (Mādhyamic) *śūnyatā*, also lack r e a l i t y . The texts always stress that though inactive the *pratyayas* are nevertheless e f f i c i e n t in the sense that effects derive from them (Y 230,18: *pratyayasāmarthyasadbhāvāc ca*; cp. PG 1; AS 27,22f.). The fact that they do not carry out any activity or undertake any effort is not due to their unreality but to their m o m e n t a r i n e s s , as is explicitly stated in PG 5 (*kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, asthirāṇāṃ* (Y_m) *kutaḥ kriyā*). Cp. also Y_t 'i 290a7f. (= Y_c 829c15ff.): "Because *saṃskāras* are impermanent – they had no [existence in the] past nor [have they any in the] future, and even in the middle they exist only for a moment (*kṣaṇamātra*) –, from the point of ultimate truth (*paramārthataḥ*) no activity, action or function (*pravṛtti*) is found in them" (*'du byed rnams ni mi rtag pa ñid de* </> *sṅon gyi mtha' yaṅ med / phyi ma'i mtha' yaṅ med / dbus kyi mtha' na yaṅ skad cig tsam źig yod par zad pa'i phyir spyod pa daṅ byed pa daṅ 'jug pa don dam par* (D) *mi dmigs* ...).

222. Cp. § 8.4 and S 1972, 154ff. Most earlier texts (cp., e.g., MSg I, especially I.5 and I.34ff.; cp. Suguro 1983, 5,5f.) and even comparatively late authors like Sthiramati do not consistently use an idealist phraseology but in certain contexts rather follow pre-idealist patterns, and occasionally it would even be difficult to reconcile their statements with the idealist system (cp., e.g., § 5.15.1). This does not however mean that I subscribe to the – mainly

American - fashion of altogether denying idealism (in the sense that objects, including material objects, are considered to be mere mental representations and - explicitly or implicitly - denied to exist outside mind) even in texts like Saṃdh VIII.7-8 (Wayman 1984, 134) or Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā (cp., e.g., Willis 1979, 33ff.; Paul 1981, 317 note 40). This is, however, not the right place for a detailed discussion of the matter, but the reader may refer to the convincing arguments in Griffiths 1986, 82f. and 177 note 19.

223. Cp. § 10.3.1.3.

224. This has already been clearly recognized by de La Vallée Poussin (1934-35, 167). Cp. also the important and perceptive remarks on this point in Suguro 1983, 1ff. Otherwise Griffiths (1986, 106), who still seems to assume, as a matter of course, idealism even for the Yogācārabhūmi and seems to regard it as an essential precondition for the formation of the ālayavijñāna concept, without, however, adducing any unequivocal textual evidence for this.

225. Cp. also § 10.3.2.

226. For the sake of convenience, I call the first part of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, viz. the one which deals with the proofs of the existence of ālayavijñāna, the *Proof Portion*. As for the second part (on the different aspects (*prabheda*) of ālayavijñāna), I refer to its first half, which treats of the functioning (*pravṛtti*) of ālaya-vijñāna, by *Pravṛtti Portion*, and to its second half, which discusses ālayavijñāna's cessation (*nivṛtti*), by *Nivṛtti Portion*. For the sake of convenience, I use the latter term in such a way as to include the paragraph Y_t zi 10a8-b6 (H 1979, 43f. [§ II]), since this paragraph, though strictly speaking a textual unit on its own, is, from the doctrinal point of view, closely affiliated to the *Nivṛtti Portion* proper.

Proof Portion: Y_t zi 2b2-4a4 Y_c 579a14-c22 = Chüeh-ting 1018c9-1019a24; quoted at ASBh 11,16-13,20; ed. in H 1978, 7ff. (with Jap. transl.; cp. also Griffiths 1986, 130ff.: with English transl.).

Pravṛtti Portion: Y_t zi 4a5-8a4 - Y_c 579c23-581a24 = Chüeh-ting 1019a25-1020a13; ed. in H 1979, 25-37 (§§ I.1-4; with Jap. transl.).

Nivṛtti Portion: Y_t zi 8a4-10a6 and 10a8-b6 = Y_c 581a25-c27 and 582a4-12 = Chüeh-ting 1020a13-b28 and c3-13; ed. in H 1979, 37-44 (§§ I.5 and II; with Jap. transl.).

(A synoptic ed. of the Chin. versions of the whole *VinSg ālay. Treatise* is found in Ui 1965, 543ff.)

227. Y_t zi 3b8ff. (ASBh 13,12-15; H 1978, 14 [§ vii]; Griffiths 1986, 136f.): *kena kāraṇenâsaty ālayavijñāne 'cittā samāpattir na sambhavati / tathāhy asaṃjñi-samāpannasya vā nirodha-samāpannasya vā vijñānam eva kāyād apakrāntaṃ syāt , nânapakrāntaṃ; tataḥ kālakriyaîva bhavet / yathôktaṃ bhagavatā - vijñānaṃ câsya kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavatîti //.*

228. See § 9.

229. SacAcBh § 5 (see App. I); cp. also Y_t zi 10b2f. (Y_c 582a6f.; H 1979, 43f. [§ II.2.a]); Tr 16.

230. Shu-chi 364a15f. (+ 13) states that according to the Sarvāstivādins swoon and deep sleep are not entirely unconscious. Cp., perhaps, also Y 12,6f. (+ 14,1ff.) where falling asleep or into a swoon and waking from it are listed among what one will have to understand as specific functions of *m a n o v i j ñ ā n a* (see §§ 6.2.4.a and 6.3.2).

231. AKBh 156,3: *na ca paṭuvijñāne cyutyupapattī yujyete*; cp. also 151,21 (*sâvasthā* (sc. *upapattibhavaḥ*) *mandikā*) and 156,6 (no rebirth or death in an u n conscious state: *nâpy acittasya sā* (sc. *cyutir upapattir vā*)); Si 16c25ff.; death: Y 16,3 (*sūkṣme punaḥ saṃjñāpracāre*) and 18,1 (*mriyamāṇasya*

avispaṣṭasaṃjñāvasthām asaṃprāptasya [Y_m]); ASBh 21,18 (*aparisphuṭāyāṃ maraṇāvasthāyām*). According to the Vibhāṣā (Vi 625a9+13; 667b17f. + 24 and 29) mind is faint throughout the embryonic state.

232. Vi 310b15f.; AKBh 155,19ff.; cp. VGPVy 376b3-5. - Similarly the Theravādins: cp., e.g., Vibh 414 (*manoviññāṇa-dhātu* as the only *viññāṇa-dhātu* at the moment of *upapatti*); as for death, see Kv XV.9, presupposing that death does not occur in unconscious states nor when one has sense-perception; cp. also Kv-a 155,18 (*pañcahi pi ñāṇehi na cavati na upapajjati*) and Shu-chi 365a19ff. - According to VGPVy 416b1-4 the Sautrāntikas , too, regarded mind at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) to be a *manovijñāna* (cp. also PSVy 20b7; PSkBh 195b8f.: *mDo sde pas smras pa - yid kyi rnam par śes pa ma'i mṅal du mtshams sbyor ba* ...; cp. also 194b7).

233. Y 12,8: *cyavate upapadyate* [Y_m] (in a list which ought to be taken as referring to the specific function of *m a n o v i j ñ ā n a* (see §§ 6.2.4.*a* and 6.3.2); cp. also Yokoyama 1979a, 17,14f.

234. Cp. Shu-chi 364a20ff.

235. At the moment of death: VisM XIV.123. At the moment of Linking up: XIV.111-114; though the text does not, as in the case of the *cuti-citta*, expressly proclaim the *paṭisandhiviññāṇa* to be nothing but a special case of *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*, the subsequent *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* is nevertheless qualified as being entirely similar to the *paṭisandhi-citta*, having the same object and being *vipāka* of the same karman (VisM XIV.114). Cp. Cousins 1981, 25; Collins 1982, 244.

236. "Only" is, however, not to be taken to exclude *kliṣṭa-manas*: cp. Shu-chi 364a21f.; 366b18f.

237. Si 16c24ff.; Shu-chi 364a17ff.; 366b19.

238. DN II 63: *viññāṇaṃ ca hi Ānanda mātu kucchi(smi)ṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ sa(m)muc-*

ā(h)issatha; $DhSk_D$ 34,19f.: *vijñānaṃ ced Ānanda mātuḥ kukṣau* (AKVy 669,2 and AD 46,4: *kukṣiṃ*) *nāvakramiṣyad* (AKVy and AD: *-krāmed*), *api nu nāmarūpaṃ kalalatvaṃ hi* (AKVy: *kalalatvāya*) *saṃmūrcchiṣyat* (AKVy: *saṃmūrcchet*); cp. also NA 485b27f.; $MSgU_C$ 392c3f.; PSVy 20b5f.; $MĀ_C$ 579c17f.; etc. (cp. n. 64). - The Pāli version may perhaps be taken to mean "... would then *nāmarūpa* (animated matter, i.e. the embryo) ... arise by coagulation [of semen and blood] (or: by coalescence [of pre-embryonic matter and mind])?".

239. As for the meaning of *saṃmūrch-*, cp. MSg_L, vol. II, p. 13*f.; J. May, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti (Paris 1959), 259 n. 935 (1. l'engourdissement du *vijñāna*; 2. la coagulation de la semence et du sang pour former un embryon); Nagao (1982, 194; 198 note 3), Y. Sasaki (1982, 192) and Takasaki (1985, 44,17) prefer (附着,) 凝結する ("to coagulate"), even when *vijñāna* is the subject of *saṃ-mūrch-* (see end of § 3.3.1.1 + ns. 242-244), whereas Yokoyama (1979, 162) suggests 凝結して増大する ("to coagulate and increase"); cp. also MW s.v.: "to congeal into a fixed form, t o c o a g u l a t e ; to acquire consistency";[1] "to increase"; "to become senseless". The Tibetan equivalents vary; if *vijñāna* is the subject, either *brgyal ba* ("to faint") or *'jug pa* ("to enter") is used, the latter interpretation being obviously deduced from the ordinary wording of the canonical source (see n. 238) where *v i j ñ ā n a* is said to e n t e r (*ava-kram-*) the womb (cp. also Pr 552,4 where *saṃmūrcchite* represents *sanniviṣṭe* of MK XXVI.2c). In Y 230,8 (= Y_t dzi 135b7), where *śukraśoṇita* is the subject, Tibetan uses *'dres par 'gyur* ("to get mixed", cp. Sv II 502,9f.: *samuccitaṃ* (sic!) *m i s s ī b h ū t a ṃ*). This meaning is also supported by Hsüan-tsang's usual rendering of *saṃ-mūrch-* by 和合(依託) "to unite with (and become dependent on)" and can be connected with the statement of Y 24,14-16 that embryonic matter has coalesced with mind and mental factors [and vice versa] in the sense that

they share each other's destiny (*tat punaḥ kalalarūpaṃ taiś cittacaitasikair dharmair anyonyayogakṣematayā saṃmūrcchitam ity ucyate*); cp. also MSgBh$_t$ 159b2; MSgU$_t$ 257b7: *khu chu daṅ khrag daṅ lhan cig grub pa daṅ bde ba gcig pas 'dres par 'gyur te* ("[*vijñāna*] becomes fused with blood and semen by sharing (or: so as to share ?) their destiny (*ekayogakṣema*)"); SaṃdhVy co 81a6f.; PSVy 21b1 + PSVyṬ 144b4f.

1. Cp. Y 37,17: *saṃmūrcchayanti kaṭhinīkurvanti* [but text uncertain]; Saṅghabh I,7,20ff: *tadyathā payasaḥ pakvasya śītībhūtasya upari vāyunā saraḥ* (or *śaraḥ*: "film") *saṅgacchati saṃmūrcchati santanoti*).

239a. See n. 244.

240. Y$_t$ 'i 313a6f. (Y$_c$ 839b25ff.): "This vijñāna ... is the condition [of *ṣaḍāyatana*] also at the moment of Linking up [a new existence] (*pratisandhi*); for when v i j ñ ā n a has entered the mother's womb, *nāmarūpa* arises, (and in dependence upon *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana* arises)" (*rnam par śes pa de ni ... ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe yaṅ rkyen yin te / 'di ltar ma'i mṅal du rnam par śes pa bźugs pa las ni miṅ daṅ gzugs 'byuṅ ṅo //...*).

241. Y 230,7f.: *vijñānapratyayaṃ* (Y$_m$) *mātuḥ kukṣau ś u k r a - ś o ṇ i t a r ū p a ṃ nāma-parigṛhītaṃ k a l a l a t v ā - y a s a ṃ m ū r c c h a t e*; Y 24, 14-16 (see n. 239). Cp. also PSVy 21b1.

242. Y 24,4f. (see § 6.3.1); 24,18ff. (*yatra ca kalaladeśe tad vijñānaṃ saṃmūrcchitaṃ ...*).

243. Saṃdh V.2 (see n. 508); MSg I.34 (*rnam par śes pa yaṅ ma'i mṅal du nur nur po ñid du brgyal lo*); MAVṬ 40,1 (*śukraśoṇite vijñānasaṃmūrcchanāt*; cp. SAVBh tsi 170a4f.). Cp. also Pr 552,4 (*mātuḥ kukṣau vijñāne saṃmūrcchite*).

244. SAVBh tsi 170a5f.: "If, Ānanda, *v i j ñ ā n a* did not 'faint' (*sammūrch-*, i.e. merge) into the mother's womb, the unclean substance of father and mother would not become (*samvarteta* (?), cp. Pr 552,7) *kalala*, etc." (*mdo las kyaṅ/ dGa' bo gal te ma'i mṅal du r n a m p a r ś e s p a b r g y a l b a r ma gyur na pha ma'i mi gtsaṅ ba las nur nur po la sogs par mi 'gyur ro źes bśad do //*).
Yet, I wonder if Sthiramati's quotation is one literally and not rather a somewhat imprecise quotation from memory[1] of a version like that of Śamathadeva (AKṬU tu 157a1: *Kun dga' bo gal te rnam par śes pa ma'i mṅal du źugs par ma gyur na / khu ba daṅ khrag gi nur nur po'i naṅ du mṅon par brgyal bar 'gyur ram /*). Śamathadeva's version, if correctly translated into Tibetan, would even make *vijñāna* the subject of both entering the womb a n d "fainting" or merging into proto-embryonic matter: "If, Ānanda, *vijñāna* had not entered the mother's womb, would i t then 'faint'/merge (**abhi-sammūrch-*: cp. $DhSk_D$ 33,21) into *kalala* [consisting of?] semen and blood (**śukraśoṇita-kalal(atv)e(?)*)?" But **śukraśoṇita-kalal(atv)e* looks extremely suspect and may simply be a corruption of **śukraśoṇitaṃ kalalatve* (*śukraśoṇitam* being substituted for the original *nāmarūpam* (DhSk, etc.: see n. 238) probably for the dogmatic reason that b e f o r e having coalesced with *vijñāna*, i.e. before the state of *kalala*, corporeal matter is, strictly speaking, n o t yet l i v i n g or "animated" matter, hence n o t yet *n ā m a r ū p a*). Or *khu ba daṅ khrag gi* may be a mistake for *khu ba daṅ khrag n i*. This would mean that in this version too it is not *vijñāna* but proto- (or, more precisely, pre-)embryonic matter that coagulates to the state of *kalala*.

1. Note also the fact that the quotation has the form of a negative statement and not, as in the Sūtra, of a rhetorical question.

245. Y 24,4f. (see 6.3.1).

246. Y 24,4f. (original wording: see § 6.3.3); 24,7f. (see § 6.3.1 (b)): Y_t 'i 288a8f. (see n. 788); cp. also Y 25,1 and 4,11f. (see § 6.1.1 (d)γ).

247. In later Yogācāra texts, passages can be found which expressly stress that the merging of (ālaya)vijñāna into semen-cum-blood and the formation of the first sense-faculty are s i m u l t a n e o u s . Cp., e.g., SaṃdhVy co 8ob1-3, stating that the mixture of blood and semen over which a film (*śara*) has formed (i.e. which has started to coagulate) and into which ālayavijñāna merges (*saṃmūrch-*) (Y 24,3-5) is called *'sādhiṣṭhānaṃ rūpīndriyam'*. Shortly afterwards, the text confirms that this mixture of blood and semen called *'sādhiṣṭhānaṃ rūpīndriyam'* and the merging of ālayavijñāna into it are strictly simultaneous (SaṃdhVy co 8ob4), i.e. that precisely at the moment when blood-and-semen have started to coagulate and intermediate existence ceases (Y 24,6f.), *vijñāna* containing all Seeds (i.e. ālayavijñāna) merges into blood-and-semen, and the latter is, due to its being appropriated by ālayavijñāna, called *'sādhiṣṭhānaṃ kāya-rūpīndriyam'* (SaṃdhVy co 8ob4-6). This means that the (coagulating) mixture of blood-and-semen on the one hand and ālayavijñāna moving away [from the previous corporeal basis] and entering [the new one] on the other occur simultaneously in one single moment (SaṃdhVy co 8ob6f.: *khu ba daṅ khrag 'dus pa de daṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa 'pho źiṅ 'jug pa de ni skad cig gcig gi gnas skabs kho nar lhan cig 'byuṅ bas* ...). Cp. also VGPVy 376a4f. (see n. 348). On the other hand, some Yogācārabhūmi passages would seem to admit of being taken as regarding *vijñāna* to precede, by one moment, the formation of *nāmarūpa*, i.e. proto-embryonic matter including the sense of touch (cp. § 7.3.4.1.3.c + n. 1130). In $MSgU_t$ 240a7f. (H 1975, (18)), the second kind of *upādāna* of MSg I.5 (cp. § 3.9.2.5 and n. 1477(G)) is referred to rebirth in the *ārūpyadhātu* a n d to the (or: a?) state when the material sense-faculties have not, or not y e t ,

arisen (*dbaṅ po gzugs can rnams ma byuṅ ba*: 若色等根未已生起): this may be taken to imply that at the very moment of *pratisandhi* there is only semen-cum-blood (cp. ib. 240a8) but not yet any material sense-faculty, but it may, perhaps, also be understood as referring to the state of *nāmarūpa*, when the material sense-faculties are not yet c o m p l e t e (cp. n. 1477(*F.a*)). Anyway, the matter requires more detailed investigation.

248. Y 24,2ff. (see § 6.3.1) and 24,10-12 (*tāni ca tasya kalalasyêndriya-mahābhūtāni kāyendriyeṇaîva sahôtpadyante* ...). As for the idea that at the moment when "reincarnation" has just happened, the only material sense-faculty that is already present is that of touch, cp. also MAVṬ 38,7f; < **nāmarūpāvasthāyāṃ* ... *cakṣurādy-āyatanâbhāvāt / asti* > *ca tasyām avasthāyāṃ kāyāyatanam mana-āyatanaṃ ca* ...; cp. also Vibh 415ff. and Kv XIV.2 (+ Kv-a 147f.) confirming that for the Theravādins, too, womb-born living beings at the moment of reincarnation have only the faculty of touch.

249. See n. 184.

250. Cp. Y 24,16: *cittavaśena ca tan* (= *kalalarūpaṃ*) *na pariklidyate*. According to MW, *klid-* has also the meaning "to rot, to putrefy", as is confirmed by the way it is rendered in Tibetan (*rul ba*) and Chinese (爛壞); cp. also AKBh-I s.v. *klid-*.

251. Cp. ns. 189 and 196; see also n. 348.

252. Cp. the Tib. rendering *brgyal ba* (see n. 239).

253. Cp., besides the context of rebirth (Saṃdh V.2), the use of the present/active mode of expression (*sbyor bar byed pa*) in the Tibetan translation, and the fact that at Y 24,14ff. (see n. 239) it is in the context of *pratisandhi* that we meet with the same idea of the *ekayogakṣematā* of mind and corporeal matter as in Saṃdh V.3. Cp. also YVy 98b1f. (see n. 817(*c*)).

254. See n. 374.

255. Y 199,4-7 (see ns. 374 and 1125) = Y_t 'i 285a7ff.; the latter passage reads *rnam par smin pa las byuṅ ba'i rnam par śes pa* (Y_c 827c15f.: 異熟生識) = **vipākajaṃ vijñānam* ("mind resulting from [the process of karmic] Maturation": see n. 399) instead of *vipāka-vijñānam* ("mind which is [the result of karmic] Maturation") in Y 199,7.

256. Cp. also ASBh 40,2f. (in a passage closely related to Y 18,1ff.): *upapattipratisandhiḥ punar nityam anivṛtāvyākṛta evêti veditavyam*; similarly for the Intermediate State (ASBh 39,20f.): *antarābhava-pratisandhi-kṣaṇaḥ punar nityam anivṛtāvyākṛta eva, v i p ā k a t v ā t .*

257. VisM XIV.111-113.
According to VGPVy 416a8f., the S a u t r a n t i k a s , too, considered mind at the moment of Linking up as resulting from (karmic) Maturation (*vipākaja*, see ns. 399 and 255): "The Sautrāntikas ... say that the *pratisandhi-citta*, because it belongs to the moment of Linking up [a new existence], results from [karmic] Maturation, as does the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*: cp. n. 248)" (... *mDo sde pa rnams kho nas "ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i sems ni ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba sbrel ba'i skad cig mas bsdus pa yin pa'i phyir lus kyi dbaṅ po bźin te rnam par smin pa las skyes pa yin no" źes bya ba* ...).

258. AKBh 151,16ff.: *upapattibhavaḥ* (= *pratisandhikṣaṇaḥ*: AKBh 124,20) *kliṣṭaḥ*; cp. VGPVy 416a7f.

259. a) Y_t zi 224b3f. and 8f., expressly excepting the first *citta* of [a new existence at the moment of] Linking up (*ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i sems daṅ po*) from what is [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*) (cp. n. 402). In contradistinction to the description of death and rebirth in the Manobhūmi of the *Basic Section*, where the Intermediate State (*antarābhava*) is described in detail (Y 18,21ff.), this passage, like the *Pratītyasamutpāda Analysis* (see § 7.3.1; cp. n. 255) of the

Vastusaṃgrahaṇī and the Savitarkādibhūmi (see n. 1158), does n o t mention *antarābhava*.

b) Another Yogācārabhūmi passage according to which the *pratisandhi-citta* is n o t *vipāka* is found in the Śrāvakabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t zi 274b8ff. = Y_c 684b10ff.). This passage would rather seem to advocate a view similar to that of the Vaibhāṣikas:

"When someone dies in this [world-sphere, viz. the *kāmadhātu*,] (**itaś cyutasya*) and is reborn (**upapadyamānasya*) on a higher [level] (Y_c: 欲界没生上地時), viz. in the first dhyāna, [or on a still higher level] up to the Summit of [Mundane] Existence (*bhavāgra*), then [his *maraṇacitta* (?) which is] a good or neutral state-of-mind belonging to the *kāmadhātu* is followed (**kāmadhātv-avacara-kuśalâvyākṛta-cittasyânantaram*, cp. Y_c 欲界善心無記心無間) by a defiled (*kliṣṭa*) state-of-mind of the [respective] higher sphere (cp. AKBh 103,19f. + AKVy 240,25f., and AKBh 104,12f.); for e v e r y w h e r e (i.e. in the case of all levels of rebirth) L i n k i n g u p (*pratisandhi*) i s c a r r i e d o u t b y a d e f i l e d s t a t e - o f - m i n d ".

(*'dod pa na spyod pa'i sems dge ba daṅ / luṅ du ma bstan pa daṅ ldan pa 'di nas śi 'phos pa'i mjug thogs su goṅ* (D) *du* (D) *bsam gtan daṅ por skye ba nas srid pa'i rtse mo'i bar du skye ba la ni goṅ ma'i sa pa'i ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems 'byuṅ ste / 'di ltar thams cad du yaṅ ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems kyis ñiṅ mtshams sbyor bar byed pa'i phyir ro //*. My translation partly follows the Chinese version; cp. also Y_t zi 275a4f.: *sa goṅ ma dag nas śi 'phos nas sa 'og ma dag tu skye ba la* (D) *ni sa goṅ ma pa'i dge ba daṅ / ñon moṅs pa can daṅ / luṅ du ma bstan pa'i sems thams cad kyi mjug thogs su sa 'og ma pa'i ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems kho na 'byuṅ ste /*.)

c) Occasionally, however, the term *'pratisandhi-citta'* appears to be used for the state-of-mind by which Linking up (in the sense of the beginning of a new existence) is c a u s - e d (e.g. MSgU$_t$ 257a6 [ad MSg I.33]; cp. MSgU$_t$ 257b4f. [ad MSg I.34]), i.e., according to MSg I.34, the last *citta* of the *antarābhava* which is a defiled one. From this point of view, the above-quoted passage Y$_t$ zi 274b8ff. would seem to admit of being interpreted in a different way, viz. - provided that *antarābhava* is left out of account - as referring to the l a s t t w o states-of mind of the p r i o r existence only, in the sense of a combination of Y 16,1ff. (see § 3.3.2.1 + n. 261) and Y 18,1-3 (see ib. + n. 265) as proposed at ASBh 54,13f. (see n. 269; cp. also ASBh 39,12f. confirming that the *maraṇacitta* of a person to be reborn in the *rūpa-* or *ārūpya-dhātu* is *rūpa-* and *ārūpyâvacara,* respectively). Nevertheless, I consider the interpretation proposed in *b* to be the most natural one.

260. Y 24,4f. (see § 6.3.1); for further references, see n. 33.

261. Y 16,1ff.; cp. Hsien-yang 574a26ff.; AS 42,14ff.; cp. also Y$_t$ zi 274b8 (see n. 259 (*b* and *c*)) and 275a4f., the latter passage - if interpreted in line with n. 259(*b*) - implying that the *maraṇacitta* of a person who is reborn from a higher into a lower level of existence may be good, defiled (*kliṣṭa*) or neutral.

262. Cp. AKBh 151,24: *anye trayo bhavāḥ* (Sc. *pūrvakāla-, antarā-* a n d *m a r a ṇ a - b h a v a* (= *carama-kṣaṇa*: AKBh 124, 21)) ... *kuśalâkuśalâvyākṛtāḥ*; 48,23f.; Vi 961b15ff.

263. As for Āryas, see Y 18,5ff. and ASBh 39,16ff.

264. Or *ātmabhāva-sneha* (Y 18,21; Ch. om. *-bhāva-*), *ātmabhāvâbhilāṣa* (Y 19,6f.; Ch. om. *-bhāva-*).

265. Y 18,1-3: *sarvasya ca mriyamāṇasya avispaṣṭasaṃjñāvasthām asaṃprāptasya* (Y$_m$) *dīrghakālābhyasta ātmasnehaḥ samudācarati / tatas tadvaśād ahaṃ na bhavāmîty* ("[under the influence

of the fear] 'I am going to cease to exist!'") *ātmabhāvābhinandanā bhavati*. Cp. ASBh 39,11f.: ... *pratisandhiṃ badhnataḥ ... ātmabhāvatṛṣṇā-saṃprayuktaṃ maraṇacittaṃ veditavyam*.

266. Cp. ASBh 39,14f.: *sā punar ātmabhāva-tṛṣṇā sahajā 'nirūpitālambanā* (or: < *'na>bhinirūpitā°*?) *n i v ṛ t ā v y ā k ṛ t ā* (Tib., Ch.) *ca*; 40,1f.: *antarābhava-cyuti-cittaṃ tu n i t y a ṃ k l i ṣ ṭ a ṃ , m a r a ṇ a b h a v a v a t .*

267. See n. 231.

268. Y 16,3f.

269. Thus Tun-lun (T 1828, 321c5: 此自體愛既是隱沒); cp. also ASBh 39,14 (see n. 266).

According to ASBh 54,13f., the statement that the mind of a dying person may be good or bad (see n. 261) does not refer to mind at the moment of death (*cyuticitta*) proper – which is associated with *ātmasneha* (sic, cp. n. 265) and is thus always defiled – but to the preceding state: *"kuśalādicittasya maraṇam"* (cp. AS_G 31,19) *ity ātmasneha-saṃprayuktāc cyuticittād arvāg-avasthām* (ed. *cittāpavargā°* but ms. clearly *cittād arvvāg a°*; cp. Tib. *sṅa rol gyi*) *adhikṛtya veditavyam*. According to Tun-lun (T 1828, 321b10ff., quoted T 2266, 393b13ff.), at the time of death one has to distinguish between t h r e e phases:

1. mind at the very moment of death, which has to be determined, with Si 16c24ff., as consisting in the "eighth *vijñāna*" (i.e. in ālayavijñāna);

2. a state of mind of reduced consciousness (cp. T 1828, 321b15f. and c5) immediately p r e c e d i n g the very last moment, viz. a *manovijñāna* which is associated with Self-love and thus morally neutral but obscured [by Defilements] (*nivṛtâvyākṛta*), and which "moistens" (i.e. causes to sprout) the new existence;

3. the fully conscious (利) state of mind preceding this

dim defiled state of mind; this is the state in which the dying person's mind can be good, bad or neutral (see n. 261).

27o. One may argue that Y 18,21ff. (*anantara-samutpannatvāc ca tasyâtmabhāva-snehasya*[1] ... *antarābhavasya* ... *prādurbhāvo bhavati*) implies that the *ātmabhāvâbhinandanā* of Y 18,2, occurring immediately before the beginning of the Intermediate State, i.e. at the very moment of death, must fall within the range of indistinct consciousness taught to follow upon the arising of *ātmasneha* at Y 18,1f. (cp. n. 265). But it may equally well be that Y 18,21ff. simply did n o t e n v i s a g e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a dying person lapsing, at the end, into a state of faint consciousness (for actually neither Y 18,1 nor 16,3f. explicitly says that this happens o f n e c e s s i t y).

1. I.e.: "immediately after this attachment to [the (or: a) basis of] personal existence has arisen". For this idiom, cp. also ŚrBh 432,2o: *tasyânantarotpādāt* ("immediately after the arising of this [sign]").

271. VisM XIV.123.

272. Y_t zi 224b3 (see n. 4o2).

273. Y_t 'i 138a5ff. (S 1969a, 46f. [§ 4.B.1] + p. 128f.; cp. n. 281[end]).

274. Y_t zi 4a3 (= ASBh 13,18): *na ca manovijñānaṃ kadācin na pravartate* (see n. 281).

275. E.g. Y 2o2,2o: *āyuṣaḥ kṣayād vijñānam upāttaṃ kāyaṃ vijahāti*; cp. 18,16: ... *cyutikāle* ... *vijñānam āśrayaṃ muñcati*; 211,9-11: *cyutiḥ katamā?* ... *yā vijñānasyâśrayād apakrāntiḥ*.

276. AKBh 156.14f.

277. See ns. 278 and 279.

278. Y 18,16ff.: *tataś cyutikāle akuśalakarmakāriṇāṃ* (Y_m) *tāvad ūrdhvabhāgād* *v i j ñ ā n a m* *āśrayaṃ muñcati, ūrdhvabhāgaś câsya* (Y_m *-ḥ câsya*) *śītībhavati* / *sa* (read: *taṃ* ?) *punas*

tāvan muñcati yāvad dhṛdayapradeśam // sukṛtakāriṇāṃ punar adhobhāgād v i j ñ ā n a m *āśrayaṃ muñcati, adhobhāgaś câsya śītībhavati tāvad yāvad dhṛdayapradeśaṃ / hṛdayapradeśāc ca* v i j ñ ā n a s y a *cyutir veditavyā / tataḥ kṛtsna evâśrayaḥ śītībhavati //*

279. AK(Bh) 156,14ff.; Vi 359b8ff.; Vi_2 266a12ff.; cp. also the Sūtra quoted in T 1833, 885c2ff.

280. AKBh 156,20f. - Cp. the refutation, by later Yogācāras, of the possibility that t a c t i l e p e r c e p t i o n (*kāyavijñāna*) is the *vijñāna* which keeps the body appropriated throughout life (PSVyṬ 155a2-4) and gradually withdraws from it in the process of dying (VGPVy 426b4-6), by pointing out that even during life tactile perception does n o t always p e r v a d e the body or the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*, co-extensive with the body).

281. Y_t zi 4a2-4 (= ASBh 13,16ff.; H 1978, 15 [§ viii]; Griffiths 1986, 137): *kena kāraṇenâsaty ālayavijñāne cyutir api na yujyate / tathāhi cyavamānasya vijñānam ūrdhva-dehaṃ vā śītī-kurvad*[1] *vijahāti, adho-dehaṃ vā / na ca manovijñānaṃ kadācin na pravartate / ato 'py ālayavijñānasyaîva dehôpādāyakasya*[2] *vigamād deha-śītatā upa<la>bhyate dehâpratisaṃvedanā ca, na tu manovijñānasya / ...*

1. ed. *śītīkurvan*; ms. *śīti-* but indistinct at the end.
2. ed. *-dānakasya* but ms. *-dāyakasya* (cp. also Y 168,2), *upādāyaka* being formed in analogy to *dāyaka* (for which cp. Wackernagel I p. 208).

I have to admit difficulties in understanding the purport of the argument *na ca manovijñānaṃ kadācin na pravartate*. Griffiths (1986, 137f.) understands it to mean that *manovijñāna* never functions w i t h o u t a n i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t , i.e. he seems to take *'pravartate'* in the sense of "coming forth", "manifesting itself in a [cognitive] act", i.e. in the same sense as *'pravṛtti'* in

'pravṛtti-vijñāna'; and he presupposes that in the process of dying no conscious experience occurs (ib., 1o4); and this implies that the continuation of life until the very moment of death cannot be attributed to *manovijñāna* but only to ālayavijñāna which is not intentional (ib., 138; 1o4). However, in this interpretation, the gradualness of the body's growing cold would not be material to the argument. Besides, I do not know whether the verb *'pravartate'* is in fact ever used in such a pregnant sense. At any rate, later exegetical tradition points in another direction: According to *Asvabhāva (MSgU$_t$ 261a2f. = MSgU$_c$ 394a6f.; cp. T 1828, 596a16ff.), the gradual growing cold of the body cannot be explained as being due to *manovijñāna* because this *vijñāna*, in contrast to ālayavijñāna, [can]not [be imagined to] be, at that time, absent in one [part of the body and nevertheless present in another] (*de'i tshe gaṅ na yaṅ yid kyi rnam par śes pa med pas* (P, D; Ch. and Y$_t$ zi 4a3 suggest *pa*) *ni ma yin no*; 爾時意識無處無有，（阿賴耶識 有處無有）).
Later sources, too, take the argument to mean that *manovijñāna* functions throughout the process of dying, until the very last moment of life (VGPVy 427a1: *srog tha ma chad pa tshun chad rtag tu yid kyi rnam par śes pa yod pas*; YidKun 73,2 [Kelsang/Odani 1986, 95]: *'chi ba'i skad cig ma tshun chad du yid śes mi 'byuṅ ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro*). But as Tsoṅ-kha-pa (YidKun 73,2) aptly remarks, ālayavijñāna too is not interrupted before life ceases. Yet, due to its somatic, spatial nature ālayavijñāna can be conceived of as present in one part of the body while at the same time absent in another, whereas (as had already been pointed out by *Asvabhāva) *manovijñāna* cannot; for unlike ālayavijñāna, *manovijñāna* is not based on the body but only on *manas* (VGPVy 426b6f.) or, at best, on the heart (*sñiṅ kha* = **hṛdaya*: PSVyṬ 155a4f.); nor is the body based on *manovijñāna* (VGPVy 426b7); nor does *manovijñāna* pervade the body (YidKun

73,5 and 8)[3] or have parts (*yan lag, *avayava*) so that it could be taken to gradually shrink (*źum pa, *saṃ-kuc-?*), or cease part by part (*cha śas kyis* [D] *'gag pa*), and thus abandon that area (*phyogs, *pradeśa?*) of the body from which its parts have vanished (VGPVy 427a2f.). Hence, if *manovijñāna* is taken to be the *vijñāna* that keeps the body alive, it can do so only by its p l a i n e x i s t e n c e as such (*yod pa tsam gyis*: VGPVy 426b8; YidKun 73,8); but since *manovijñāna* exists throughout the process of dying (see above) and since its plain existence does not admit of any gradation or distribution, the g r a d u a l n e s s of the growing cold of the body in the process of dying cannot be explained as being due to *manovijñāna* but necessarily calls for the assumption of a "somatic" form of mind like ālayavijñāna.

3. Si 17a17 seems to express a different view, but the exegetes had difficulties with the passage: cp. Shu-chi 365c14-16 and especially T 1833, 885c15-26.

As for another, more general reference, in the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī, to ā l a y a vijñāna as the principle which abandons the body at the moment of death, see Y_t 'i 138a7f. (S 1969a, 46f. [§ 4.B.1] and 128f.: **tadanantaram ālaya-vijñānam āśrayaṃ vijahāti* (or *muñcati*)).

282. See Collins 1982, 240ff.: *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* as a "gap bridger" in deep sleep, etc. (cp. VisM XIV.114), between conscious processes of perception and cognition (cp. VisM XIV.115ff.), and at death and rebirth (cp. n. 235).

283. Cp., e.g., VisM XIV.115f.

284. See § 1.3.5 + n. 76 and § 7.3.6.3.

285. Y 4,7 etc. (see § 6.1.1 + 6.1.3) and, for *manovijñāna*, Y 11,9f. (+ § 6.2.4). As for the meaning of the term *'bījāśraya'*, see n. 775.

286. As for the non-occurrence of the term *'pravṛtti-vijñāna'*, see § 6.8.

287. Y 24,2ff. (see § 6.3.1 + 6.3.3).

288. Cp. Y 61,8: *sarvatra vijñānasantāne sarvo bījasantānaḥ sahacaro* (?) *vyavasthāpyate.*

289. Y 25,2o.

29o. Y 25,3 and 12; 26,1o and 11f.

291. I.e. Y 4,7 etc. (see § 6.1.1), 24,4f. (§ 6.3.1), 1o9,15 (§ 6.4.1) and 192,8 (§ 6.5.1). The passage Y 11,4f. (see § 6.2.1), being a later addition (see § 6.2.3-4), has to be set apart and will be discussed later (§ 3.1o.3).

292. Viz. good, bad and neutral: Y 1o9,13-15 (see § 6.4).

293 See § 9.2.

294. Or: experiences of the body a s the body? But, if I understand the purport of the present passage correctly, this should not point to a discursive or conceptual act but on the contrary to the purely somatic character of this experience.

295. Y_t zi 3b6-8 (= ASBh 13,8ff.; H 1978, 13 [§ vi]; Griffiths 1986, 136): *kena kāraṇenâsaty ālayavijñāne kāyiko 'nubhavo na yujyate / tathāhy ekatyasya yoniśo vā 'yoniśo vā cintayato vā 'nuvitarkayato vā samāhitacetaso vā 'samāhitacetaso vā ye kāye kāyānubhavā utpadyante 'nekavidhā bahunānāprakārās, te na bhaveyur; upalabhyante ca / tasmād apy asty ālayavijñānam.* Cp. n. 43.

296. Somewhat differently interpreted in Griffiths 1986, 1o2f.

297. Hsien-yang 487a3-6 (+ 1of.) quoted at ASBh 61,1ff.: *prītiḥ katamā / yā parivṛttāśrayasya pra*[1]*vṛttivijñānāśritā cittatuṣṭiḥ cittaudbilyaṃ cittaharṣaḥ cittakalyatā*[2] *sātaṃ veditaṃ vedanā-gatam / sukhaṃ katamat / yat* (read: *yaḥ* ?) *parivṛttāśrayasyâlayavijñānāśrita āśrayānugraha*[3] *āśrayahlādaḥ sātaṃ veditaṃ vedanāgatam.*

1. ed., ms.: *pari-*, but Tib.: *'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa*, Ch. = Hsien-yang: 轉識 .

2. ed.: -*kalpatā*.

3. ed.: -*grahata*, but -*ta* deleted in ms.

298. According to the explanation of the ASBh (61,5ff.: see n. 365), the *ā ś r a y a* is not the body but ā l a y a v i - j ñ ā n a ; but this would seem to be a reinterpretation in terms of later developments (see § 3.10), after the idea of ālayavijñāna sticking in the body (= *āśraya*) had become obsolete.

299. Cp. n. 47.

300. Cp. ŚrBh 450,12-14 (corrected with the help of $ŚrBh_m$, Tib. and Ch.): *(īpsitābhilaṣitārthasaṃprāpteḥ prītau câdoṣadarśanāt) sarvadauṣṭhulyāpagamāc ca vipula-praśrabdhi-citta-kāya-karmaṇyatayā prītisukham* ("[the first dhyāna is] joy and well-being because it is amply characterized by smoothness of mind and body, i.e. Ease, on account of ... the disappearance of all Badness (i.e. uneasiness)"; cp. also 451,19f.: ... *-sarvadauṣṭhulyāpagamāt tatprātipakṣika-praśrabdhi-citta-kāya-karmaṇyatā-sukhânuga*[1]*-tvāt prītisukham /*); 283,6-8 (cp. n. 1330): *tatra ... yo dauṣṭhulyasahagata āśrayaḥ, so 'nupūrveṇa nirudhyate, praśrabdhisahagataś câśrayaḥ parivartate* ("... [gradually] comes to take its place"); Y_t 'i 312b3f. (Y_c 839a27ff.; see n. 475).

1. See CPD s.v. *anuga* (*b*): "followed by".

301. The ālayavijñāna portions of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī apart, I for one have not, so far, noted any contrary statement.

302. Especially Vaibhāṣikas (explicit statement: Vi 47b29ff.), Sautrāntikas (cp. Si_p 184, note 2), and Theravādins (cp. VisM XIV. 110-124) (cp. Mizuno 1932, 1074), the only exception pointed out by the sources being the (or some) Mahāsāṅghikas (see n. 314).

303. Explicit statement: Y_t 'i 312b8f. (Y_c 839b14): "... and because in one and the same series(-of-personality), there is no simultaneous occurrence of two *vijñānas*" (*rgyud gcig*

la rnam par śes pa gñis cig car gnas pa yaṅ med pa'i phyir ro). Cp. also Y 58,13f. (see S 1967, 124f. + note 56); Y_m 135b1f. (Y_t dzi 299a3; Y_c 386a25f.): *tat* (= *cittaṃ*) *punar ... ekaikaśaḥ pravarttate, dvitīya-citta-sahāya-virahita-tvāt, sahaiva* (ms. *-heva* ?) *sarvacittāpravartanāc ca.*

304. Y 25,20.

305. Y 61,8 (See n. 288).

306. Comm. ad PG 33-34 (see App. II): ... *duḥkha<ṃ>* ... *ālaya-vijñānamayam / ... tac ca duḥkhaṃ s a r v a k ā l ā n u - ṣ a k t a t v ā t kṣaṇamātram apy anupaśāntam.*

307. See § 6.7.4.

308. Y_t zi 3a1f. (ASBh 12,10f.; H 1978, 8f.[§ i(e)]); 3b4 (ASBh 13,2f.; H 1978, 12 [§ iv, end]). The term 'pravṛttivijñāna' is, however, not used but in Y_t zi 2b5 (ASBh 12,2; H 1978, 8 [§ i(a)]).

309. Cp. Y_t zi 3b6-8 (see n. 295) and 4a2-4 (see n. 281).

310. Y_t zi 3a3-5 (ASBh 12,14-16; H 1978, 10 [§ ii]; Griffiths 1986, 133): *sacet kaścid vaded - "yady ālayavijñānam asti, tena dvayor vijñānayor yugapat pravṛttir bhaviṣyati", sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ - adoṣa eva bhavān doṣa-saṃjñī; tathāhi bhavaty eva dvayor vijñānayor yugapat pravṛttiḥ.*

311. Y_t zi 3a4-8 (ASBh 12,16ff.; H 1978, 10f. [§§ ii (2nd half) and iii]; Griffiths 1986,133f.).

312. Saṃdh V.4-5.

313. See § 1.6.4.

314. Vi 47b1f. (cp. also 719c2f.); Vi_2 35b4f.; cp. TSi 280b11f.; cp. also, e.g., Si_P 184 note 2; 186; 411 note 1; Bareau 1955, 73; Yūki 1935, 85; Mizuno 1957, 447; 1978, 132ff.

315. It would, in this connection, be interesting to investigate systematically whether the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra contains any further clues with regard to its canonical substratum or

doctrinal affiliation. I do not know whether the issue of six (instead of five) *gatis* (see n. 326; Weinstein 1958, 52f.) is of any significance in this context. On the other hand, it should also be noted that Saṃdh does n o t use, or mention, the term '*m ū l a v i j ñ ā n a*' ascribed to the Mahāsāṅghikas in MSg I.11.2, etc. On the other hand, the view that mind (*citta*) p e r v a d e s t h e b o d y , ascribed to certain Mahāsāṅghikas in doxographical sources (Bareau 1955, 74), shows a striking coincidence with a characteristic and fairly archaic feature of ālayavijñāna/ *ādāna-vijñāna* (see §§ 2.13.2; 2.7-8; 3.3.1.2-3; 1.3.1(7) + n. 38).

316. Y_t 3a6f. (ASBh 12,20f.; H 1978, 11 [§ iii]); Saṃdh p. 56,6ff. and 12ff.

317. Saṃdh V.6.

318. Ib. V.1.

319. Ib. V.2 (see n. 508) and V.7 (see n. 321).

320. Cp. § 2.13.3.

321. Saṃdh V.7 (cp. TrBh 34,3f.; Si_P 173):
ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo /
bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśito mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ //

322. See §§ 2.1 (+ n. 146), 3.2.1 (+ n. 227) and 6.6; Y_t zi 39a3ff. (see n. 131); 76b2ff. (see ib.); 10b3 (see n. 229); 10b6 (see n. 588).

323. See § 3.4.2 + ns. 285 and 287.

324. That the two texts are related is clear not only from the close similarity of their subject-matter and their common emphasis on the idea of "basis" but also from common details of phraseology (see ns. 326 and 327; cp. also n. 354). As § 3.9 tries to show, this connection can be explained consistently and plausibly as dependence of Saṃdh on the *Basic Section* of Y, whereas an attempt to take it the other way

round would entail serious difficulties since it would, apart from the problem mentioned in § 1.6.4, presuppose a retrogression of doctrinal development and a secondary dis-section of the treatment of the functions of subliminal mind.

325. Saṃdh V.2.

326. Saṃdh p. 55,4-8: ... *'gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gaṅ daṅ gaṅ dag sems can gyi ris gaṅ daṅ gaṅ du'aṅ ... lus mṅon par 'grub ciṅ 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba* ...; cp. Y 30,6f.: *yeṣāṃ ca sattvānāṃ yasmin sattvanikāya ātmabhāvasya prādur-bhāvo bhavati,* ...; there is no difficulty in regarding the Saṃdh phrase as an enlarged borrowing from Y.

327. Cp. Y 24,4f.: *yatra tat sarvabījakaṃ vipākasaṃgṛhītaṃ* ... *-vijñānaṃ saṃmūrcchati.*
Saṃdh V.2 (see n. 508), speaking of **sarvabījakaṃ cittam* only, gives the impression of presupposing the earlier ver-sion of Y 24,1ff. (see § 6.3.3) - which in view of the twofold *upādāna* and of **vipacyate* at Saṃdh V.2 should in this case have included *'vipākasaṃgṛhīta'* and *'āśrayopādātṛ'* as attributes already of *'sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam'* -. Yet, V.3, referring to the designation of this Mind[-containing-all-Seeds] (now *v i j ñ ā n a* , as at Y 24,5 etc.) as 'ā l a y a vijñāna', shows that Saṃdh V knew the final version (also?).

328. Cp. Y 25,8f.: *tasmiṃś ca punaḥ kalale vardhamāne samasamaṃ n ā m a r ū p a y o r v ṛ d d h i s , tadubhayor vistīr-ṇataratôpagamāt,* i.e. both corporeal matter a n d m i n d can be said to "grow" or "increase"; cp. also Y 25,17: *vijñānam u p a c ī y a t e* . This may be explained as an increase of distinctness and diversity, but in the case of the "somatic" *vijñāna* pervading the body one may perhaps take it even literally, in the sense of a kind of spatial enlargement corresponding to the growth of the body. But one should, of course, also consider the possibility that in Saṃdh, as in Y 25,8f., "growing and thriving" is to

be taken, *ad sensum*, as referring to the whole organism formed by the coalescence of mind with proto-embryonic matter.

329. Saṃdh V.2 (p. 55,5-7).

33o. Saṃdh V.2 (p. 55,14f.: see n. 52o).

331. Y 2oo,1-3 = Y_t 'i 285b7 - 286a1 (see n. 1135).

332. Y 25,3ff.; cp. also 2o,14.

333. Y 24,1ff. (see § 6.3.1).

334. Perhaps because the (*Basic Section* of the) Yogācārabhūmi, though extensively made use of by the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, may have belonged to a somewhat different ambience (e.g. another Vinaya school) (cp. § 1.6.4 and n. 315), or simply because the Yogācārabhūmi, as a Śāstra, could not too openly be followed by a Sūtra.

335. Sasaki 1982, 19o; 192.

336. Cp. ASBh 11,12f.: *punaḥ punaḥ pratisandhibandhe ātmabhāvopādānād ādānavijñānam*; KSi § 33 (Muroji p. 39,26f.): *de yaṅ yaṅ srid par ñiṅ mtshams sbyor bar byed pa dag na lus ñe bar len pa'i phyir len pa'i rnam par śes pa źes bya'o*.

337. *ātmabhāva-parigraha*: see n. 1477; *vipāka-* or *vipākaphala-parigraha*: see n. 1477(*D.b*); *abhinirvṛtti-vijñāna-phala-parigraha*: Y 2oo,15; *upapatty-āyatana-parigraha*: LAS 111,15.

338. E.g. AS 97,19 = ASBh 129,6: *yathākāmam āśrayasyôpādāna-sthāna-parityāgānām*; AS 48,7f. (unreliable retranslation) = AS_t 97a6f.: *yaṅ srid pa ñe bar len te*; MSg I.5: *lus* (**ātmabhāva*, cp. Hts. 自體) *thams cad ñe bar len pa*; ASBh 11,12f. (see n. 336); AKBh 468,17: *skandhāntarôpādāna*; 472,1: *skandhāntara-tyāgôpādāna*. Cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 18o and 184ff.; Takeuchi 1985, 267ff., especially 269,16ff.

339. Cp., e.g., SN II 94; NidSa 7.2: *kāyasya ... <ādānam a>pi nikṣepaṇam api*; Thg 575d: *ādiyanti punabbhavaṃ*.

340. BoBh$_D$ 265,6f.: *sve ... ātmabhāve yathākāmâdāna-sthāna-cyuti-vaśavartitā*; MSABh 186,1; AS 27,9: *punarbhavādāna*. Cp. also VisM XX.47: *ādānan ti paṭisandhi*.

341. There seems to be a similar situation in Y$_m$ 84b5 (Y$_t$ dzi 186a8; Y$_c$ 346a13) where *ādāna* is used as a kind of code for the skandha *vijñāna* (*ādānaṃ katamat / yo vijñānaskandhaḥ /*). In view of the preceding items (*deśin* = *rūpa*, *avasthā* = *vedanā*, *kalpa* = *saṃjñā*, *ceṣṭā* = *saṃskāra*), *ādāna* in this passage seems to aim at the t y p i c a l function(s) of *vijñāna* in general (not, it should be noted, of a peculiar kind of *vijñāna*!). It may therefore express taking possession of a new existence but at the same time a l l u d e to biological appropriation as well as to "seizing", i.e. cognitive grasping (*grahaṇa*, *upalabdhi*), of objects.
In the case of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, one might also, in view of the second *upādāna* on which the reincarnation of *ādānavijñāna* is based (see § 4.4.2), consider the nuances of spiritually negative C l i n g i n g and of r e c e i v i n g or c o n t a i n i n g Impressions or Seeds to be alluded to; but it should be noted that the Sūtra's own explanation of the term *'ādānavijñāna'* does not supply any confirmation of such an assumption.

342. Perhaps because *upādāna* in the sense of biological appropriation was derived from the Abhidharma term *'upātta'* (see n. 196). - Takasaki (1985, 38,7f.) seems to take *'ādāna'* as an equivalent of *'upādāna'* in the sense of biological appropriation but does not give any example, nor does Takeuchi, who (1985, 267,5f.) asserts that, from the point of view of meaning and use, *'ādāna'* and *'upādāna'* are largely indistinguishable.

343. *'Ādāna'* does not seem to be current in the sense of spiritually negative clinging, although there are exceptions in the Pāli tradition: cp. Nidd II 86,21: *ādānaṃ vuccati taṇhā*; but (in contrast to CPD) in most of the Sn verses concerned

ādāna is, especially if used in the pl., in my opinion better taken in an objective sense, i.e. as "possessions": cp. Sn 364 where *ādānesu* is used beside *upadhīsu*; cp. Pj II 363f.: *ādānan ti ādātabbaṭṭhena te yeva* (sc. *upadhī*) *vuccanti*; similarly Sn 1103 *ādānataṇhā* "greed for possessions", 1104 *ādānasatte* "attached to possessions": cp. Pj II 599: *ādātabbaṭṭhena ādānesu rūpādisu satte* (= *sakta*; cp. 599,19 *ādānasatte = ādānābhiniviṭṭhe*, and 599,20 *ādānasaṅga-*). Cp. also Sn 620 = Dhp 396 (UV XXXIII.15) *akiñcanaṃ anādānaṃ*.

344. MSg I.5 (see Sasaki 1982, 179f.; Takeuchi 1985, 267ff.; cp. also the different Tibetan rendering of this passage in PSkViv 95b3-5 [see n. 1477(*G.c*, footn. 8)]; PSVy 24b2f. (Muroji p. 40,3-5): *len pa'i rnam par śes pa yaṅ de yin te / ris mthun pa gźan du ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba nas nam ma śi'i* (P) *bar du des lus bzuṅ ba'i phyir ro*; PSkVai 54a2f. (on PSk_t 17a4 *len pa'i rnam par śes pa yaṅ de yin te / lus* (Ch. 身) *len pa'i phyir ro*, which is ambiguous): "[ālayavijñāna is called *'ādānavijñāna'* because it is] this [ālayavijñāna] that, arising from previous *saṃskāras*, takes hold of a [new] existence (*bhava*) when merging (*saṃ-mūrch-*) into semen-cum-blood (i.e. at the moment of conception), and [because it is] this same [ālayavijñāna] that is regarded as appropriating the body until death" (*de yaṅ sṅon gyi 'du byed kyi rgyu las 'byuṅ ba ste / khu ba daṅ khrag gi naṅ du brgyal ba'i dus na srid pa len te / de ñid śi ba la thug gi bar lus len par byed par 'dod* ...).

345. See n. 352. At any rate, the second element (*blaṅs pa*) is, by SaṃdhVy co 83a6f., referred to biological appropriation: "Being appropriated by this [*vijñāna*], this material body is made one's own (**ātmasātkṛta*) with the effect (?) that it becomes [something] to be included among entities [constituting] living beings (*sattva-dravya*)" (*des zin na gzugs kyi lus 'di sems can gyi dṅos po<r?> bgraṅ ba ñid du 'gyur bar bdag gir byas pa ste*).

346. Cp. n. 336.

347. Cp., however, § 5.15.2.

348. Cp., besides Saṃdh V.3 (see n. 352), Y_t zi 2b4ff. (ASBh 12,1ff.; H 1978, 8f. [§ i, especially (a)]; 4b7 (H 1979, 27 [§ B.2]): *daṅ po pa'i len pa'i skad cig*; KSi § 33 (Murooji p. 39,26f.: see n. 336), where at any rate Hts.'s (784c27) rendering 身 (and not 自體) suggests that *lus ñe bar len pa* either represents **k ā y ô p ā d ā n a* or, in case it represents **ātmabhāvôpādāna*[1], should, according to Hts., be referred to "taking hold" of a new b o d y in the sense of starting its b i o l o g i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n ; this is, probably, also true of PSVy 24b3 (see n. 344) where this aspect is combined with that of k e e p i n g the body appropriated throughout life.

1. As e.g. in AS_c 670a6 = AS 24,12; cp. also 諸根等 for *ātmabhāva* in $ASVy_c$ 701b2 = ASBh 11,12f. (see n. 336).

Cp. also PSkBh 200a6: "... When ālayavijñāna has merged, in the mother's womb, into semen-cum-blood, [it means that] the body has been taken hold of (i.e. biologically appropriated) by that *citta* (sc. ālayavijñāna)" (... *ma'i mṅal du khu ba daṅ khrag gi naṅ du kun gźi rnam par śes pa brgyal ba'i dus na sems des lus blaṅs te /*; VGPVy 376a4 f.: *ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba sbrel ba'i skad cig ma la ... lus kyi dbaṅ po raṅ gi ṅo bo'i sgo nas ñe bar len pa ...*, i.e. something like **pratisandhibandhakṣaṇe ... kāyendriyasya svarūpata upādānam* (whereas the corporeal basis of the whole existence, including a l l sense-faculties, is, at that moment, [only v i r t u a l l y] taken hold of in so far as its S e e d s [are already there]); cp. also ib. 376b3ff. where the distinction of two kinds of *upādāna* in MSg I.5 (one referring to the moment of Linking up, the other to biological appropriation throughout life) is accounted for by the fact that the S a r v ā s t i v ā d i n s attribute the latter to all the six kinds of *vijñāna* but the former to

manovijñāna exclusively; yet the function of *upādāna* as such is obviously presupposed to be, in both cases, essentially the same.
With regard to *upādāna* in the sense of taking hold, i.e. starting the biological appropriation, of corporeal matter, cp. also the Sūtra passage quoted in AKBh 127,7f., viz.: *dīrgharātraṃ yuṣmābhir, bhikṣavaḥ, kaṭasiḥ* (v. l. *kaṭasī*) *saṃvardhitā r u d h i r a b i n d u r u p ā t t a ḥ,*[2] which obviously refers to death and to the moment of conception, respectively.

2. AKṬU tu 153a7; $SĀ_c$ 240c8f. (?) (cp. Honjō 1984, 34f.).

349. MSg I.5; cp. I.34-35 (see Sasaki 1982, 179f.; Takeuchi 1985, 168-171); cp. also Si 14c7f. (see Yokoyama 1979a, 1).

350. $MSgU_t$ 240a7f. (H 1975, (18)); cp. also Saṃdh V.2 (end) (see n. 520) and Y_t zi 4b2f. (see n. 521).

351. As is explicitly stated in Saṃdh V.2 (end) and Y_t zi 4b2f. (see n. 350).

352. Saṃdh V.3: ... *des lus 'di bzuṅ źiṅ blaṅs pa'i phyir ro //*, which I should, though with considerable hesitation in view of the disparity of the Chinese versions, trace back to something like **(tad ādānavijñānam ity apy ucyate,) anenâsya kāyasyâttopāttatāṃ upādāya* (??). Anyway, *lus* = **kāya* is rendered probable by the fact that all Chinese versions, including that by Hts., have 身 (but cp. n. 348).

353. One possibility (but nothing more than that) is that the specification with reference to *ārūpyadhātu* at the end of Saṃdh V.2 was added (perhaps by the author himself) only after the rest of V.2-3 had already been composed.

354. It is worth noting that, just as in the (corresponding portions of the) first two chapters of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi (cp. § 6.8), so also in the Vth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (as well as, according to Lamotte's index and Taishō index vol. 9, in the other chapters) the term 'p r a v ṛ t t i - v i j ñ ā n a' is n o t used.

354a. The Seed aspect of *ādānavijñāna* is indicated only by the attribute *'sarvabīja(ka)'* at Saṃdh V.2 and V.7.

355. Saṃdh V.4-5; cp. Y_t zi 189b2f. (Y_c 651b15-17; see n. 357) and Y_t zi 7b1-3 (H 1979, 35 [§ 2, 5th line ff.]); in the latter passage, the similes are, however, merely used to illustrate the s i m u l t a n e i t y (*saha-bhāva*) of ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñānas.

356. Y_t zi 5b3ff. (Y_c 580b9ff.; Chüeh-ting 1019b23f.; H 1979, 30 [§ 3.b.A]): *'di la kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni rnam pa gñis kyis 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa'i rkyen gyi bya ba byed de / sa bon gyi dṅos po daṅ rten byed pas so* (**bījabhāvata āśrayadānataś ca*; cp. YVy 98a4f. *gnas sbyin par byed pa...r ro*); cp. also Y_t zi 6a1f. (H 1979, 31 [§ 3.b.B.1]): *ji lta ji ltar kun gźi rnam par śes pa l a b r t e n p a 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa ... 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba, de lta de ltar r a ṅ g i r t e n l a r t e n d e d a ṅ l h a n c i g s k y e b a d a ṅ ' g a g p a s bag chags sgo bar byed do.*

357. The omission of *manas* in Paramārtha's version (Chüeh-ting 1019b27: 有阿賴耶識時、意識得生) may not warrant the conclusion that it is a later interpolation; but in view of the conspicuously "intrusive" character of two of the three other references to the new *manas* in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (cp. § 9.1 and n. 1351) (and its complete absence in the *Nivṛtti Portion*) it may be difficult to exclude the p o s - s i b i l i t y that *manas* was - during or even before the process of compilation - inserted into a version (or at least into raw materials) of this passage (viz. Y_t zi 5b5-7: see n. 358) which did not originally contain it and was hence closer to the situation presented by Saṃdh V.4-5. Such a possibility is, moreover, perhaps supported by a parallel passage in the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya, where, by the way, the connection with Saṃdh V.4-5 is still more palpable, viz. Y_t zi 189b2f.: *de la kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni gnas yin*

no // 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa ni gnas pa yin te / de yaṅ rnam pa bdun te / mig gi rnam par śes pa nas / yid daṅ yid kyi rnam par śes pa'i bar te / chu'i chu bo daṅ rlabs lta bu'am / me loṅ daṅ gzugs brñan lta bu yin no //, corresponding to something like **tatrālayavijñānam āśrayaḥ, pravṛttivijñānam āśritam - tac ca saptavidhaṃ: cakṣurvijñānaṃ yāvan mano manovijñānaṃ (ca ?) -, udakaugha-taraṅga-vad ādarśa-pratibimba-vad vā.* Here, the omission of *manas* by Hts. (Y_c 651b16) is, to be sure, secondary (cp. H 1979a, 30lf.)[1] since he, too, says that *pravṛttivijñāna* is of s e v e n kinds. But if the original version of the material had contained seven *pravṛttivijñānas* including *manas*, would one not expect their enumeration to be abbreviated as *cakṣurvijñānaṃ yāvan m a n a ḥ ?* The present, quite unusual form of abbreviated enumeration would, however, become understandable if one assumes that it started from a sequence *cakṣurvijñānaṃ yāvan m a n o v i j ñ ā n a m ,* to which *manas* was added only afterwards, though, in view of its significance in the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya, probably at (if not even before) the compilation of this chapter.

1. Cp. also Hsien-yang 480c1f., which seems to have taken over the sequence of Y_c 651b15f. while corroborating *manas* before *manovijñāna*.

358. Y_t zi 5b5-7 (H 1979, 30 [§ 3.b.A.2]): ... *kun gźi rnam par śes pas zin pa'i dbaṅ po gzugs can rnams la brten nas / rnam par śes pa'i tshogs lṅa po dag 'byuṅ bar 'gyur gyi, ma zin pa dag la[s] ni ma yin no // rnam par śes pa'i tshogs lṅa po dag gi gnas mig la sogs pa daṅ 'dra ba yid daṅ yid kyi rnam par śes pa'i gnas kun gźi rnam par śes pa yod na / yid daṅ yid kyi rnam par śes pa yaṅ 'byuṅ bar 'gyur gyi, med na ni ma yin no //*
As is well-known, in MSg I.7A.2 (as well as in Hts.'s version of the above-quoted passage, viz. Y_c 580b13-17) it is not ālayavijñāna but the new *m a n a s* that, perhaps by mediation of Y_t zi 6b2 (see n. 1298), comes to function as

the specific *sahabhū-āśraya* of *manovijñāna*.

As for later developments of the theory of *sahabhū-āśraya*, see Si 19c12ff. (Si_p 23off.).

359. Y_t zi 4b2f. (see n. 521); 5a1f. (H 1979, 27f. [§ C.3-5]; see § 5.6.3.5.*b*); 7a2 (H 1979, 34 [§ 4.b.A.3, end]).

360. Y_t zi 5b5f. (see n. 358): *kun gźi rnam par śes pas zin pa'i dbaṅ po gzugs can rnams*; cp. also 4b2 (see § 4.5 + n. 531): ... *upādānaṃ* ... *sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpam*.

361. Although the way in which the cognitive function of ālaya-vijñāna is conceived of in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (as well as in the *Proof Portion*) would seem to d e r i v e , at least partly, from its original feature of sticking in the body (see §§ 5.8.4 and 5.4.2), in the *Pravṛtti Portion* this feature will no longer have been felt to be e s s e n - t i a l to ālayavijñāna, for this text expressly considers, in this connection, also the case of an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* (see § 5.6.3.5). It should, however, be noted in this connection that the precise purport of Y_t zi 5a1f. is uncertain (see § 5.6.3.5.*b*).

362. As for the *Nivṛtti Portion*, it seems that in one of its layers ālayavijñāna is conceived of as Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*, cp. § 4.7) sticking in the body (see n. 1337).

363. Or, as one may also put it, ālayavijñāna has taken the place of unspecified "mind" included in the definition of the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) as *ṣaḍāyatana* (see § 3.11.2 + n. 376) or *savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ* (see n. 375). If one starts from the theory of Seeds presupposed by my *Initial Passage* (see § 2.5), one might say that ālayavijñā-na was first conceived of as a hypostasis of the Seeds of mind i n c o r p o r e a l m a t t e r but has become at this stage the f u n d a m e n t a l s t r a t u m o f m i n d i t s e l f .

364. Y 11,4f. (see § 6.2.1-2).

365. E.g. ASBh 61,7: *āśrayam ... ālayavijñānasvabhāvam*; Si 2ob 17f.; cp. also the equation of the *dauṣṭhulyāśraya* (originally: the body, or body-and-mind) with ālayavijñāna (see n. 133o). Yet, the old idea of ālayavijñāna as sticking in, or pervading, the body and being dependent on it is not entirely absent from later texts: cp. the passages collected in n. 38, especially Si 2ob27f. and c1 (ālayavijñāna based on the material sense-faculties).

366. AKBh 4o,13.

367. $MSgU_t$ 251a2f.:
"ālayavijñāna [which is] the fundamental element of a living being (*maulaṃ sattva-dravyam*), consisting in [the Result-of]-Maturation (**vipākātmakam*), produced by the Impression of previous good and bad deeds and by Clinging to the concepts of object and subject (**pūrvakuśalâkuśala-karma-vāsanā-grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpâbhiniveśa*[1]*-nirvartitam*(?); cp. Tr 19 [see n. 419]) ..."
(... *sṅon gyi dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las kyi bag chags daṅ gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin par rnam par rtog pa la mṅon par źen pa rnams kyis rnam par smin pa'i bdag ñid sems can gyi rdzas kyi dṅos gźi kun gźi rnam par śes pa bsgrubs* (D: *bsgrub*) *pa* ...; cp. $MSgU_c$ 388c29ff.: ... 業熏習 ... 執著種子所生有情本事 ...).

1. Ch add. *-bīja-*.

368. Y 25,15f.: *tatra cātmabhāve bālānām aham iti vā mameti vāsmīti vā bhavati / āryāṇāṃ punar duḥkham ity eva bhavati /*; cp. also Y 212,18: *ātmabhāve ātmagrāha-*. Cp. AKBh 337,4: *ahaṃkāravastv ātmabhāvaḥ*.

369. On the various shades of meaning of this term see n. 1477(*E*).

37o. Cp. also Y 26,16f.; PG 34 (see App. II).

371. Cp. especially passages like MN III 18f. (SN II 252; cp. $SĀ_c$ 118c26ff.): *kathaṃ ... passato imasmiṃ ... saviññā-*

ṇ a k e kāye ... ahaṃkāra-mamaṃkāra-mānânusayā (Skt.: *a h a ṃ kāra m a m a kār â s m i mānâbhiniveśânuśayāḥ*: $SĀ_c$ 245c23f., quoted at AKBh 142,10) *na honti? yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ ... "n' etaṃ m a m a , n' eso ' h a m a s m i , na m' eso attā" ti ... passati*; cp. also MN III 19f. (etc.): *rūpaṃ* (etc.) ... *aniccaṃ ... / ... yaṃ panâniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ "etaṃ m a m a , eso ' h a m a s m i , eso me attā" ti?*

372. PSkBh 199b4 (on PSk_t 17a4 *lus kyi kun gźi daṅ rgyu ñid*): *tshor ba daṅ / 'du śes daṅ / 'du byed daṅ / rnam par śes pa ste / miṅ gi phuṅ po bźi daṅ / gzugs kyi phuṅ po ste phuṅ po lṅa la lus* (= **ātmabhāva*, cp. n. 140) *źes bya ba'o //*; cp. PSkVai 53b3: *lus ni miṅ daṅ gzugs so //* TrBh 19,16f.: *āśraya* = *ātmabhāva* = *sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ nāma ca* = *nāmarūpa* (TrBh 19,18) = the five skandhas (TrṬ 18b4). Cp. also AKVy 168,14 explaining *āśraya* by *s a n t ā n a* ; AKBh 63,18-20 along with 64,1 and 5f.; 93,22 along with 92,25.

373. In spite of the heterogeneity of the materials of this part of the text (see § 7.1B.2.1.2), the passages using *ātmabhāva* as a key term would appear to be so closely related that it seems admissible to elucidate them by one another.

374. Primarily, the term *'vipāka'* refers to the result of *karman*, and in this sense ālayavijñāna or the *vipākavijñāna* at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) are frequently taught to be the result of previous karman; cp., e.g., Y 199,5-7: *saha* (Y_m) *pratisandhibandhāc ca tasya vijñānasya* (= *pratisandhiphala-vijñānasya* [199,4] = *vipāka-vijñānasya* [199,7]) *yat tad-upapatti-saṃvartanīyam* (Y_m)[1] *k a r m a , tad dattaphalaṃ bhavati v i p ā k a t a ḥ* ; Y 192,8: *ālayavijñāna-vaipākyaṃ karma* (see § 6.5); ASBh 11,11f.: *pūrva-karma-nirmitatvād* (ed. and ms.: *-tvāt*) *vipākavijñānam*; KSi § 33 (Muroji p. 39,29-31); PSVy 24b3f. (Muroji p. 40,5-7). However, the term *'vipāka'* is sometimes also used to denote the result of karman a n d D e f i l e m e n t s (*kleśa, āsrava*);

cp., e.g., Y_t zi 226a2 (Y_c 665b6f.): *snon byas pa'i las d a ṅ ṅ o n m o ṅ s p a r n a m s kyi rnam par smin pa*; Y_t zi 224a4 (Y_c 664c6): *rnam par smin pa daṅ bcas pa'i chos rnams* (= **savipākā dharmāḥ*) *ni mdor bsdu na z a g p a r n a m s daṅ / zag pa daṅ bcas pa rnams* (= ** ā s r a v ā ḥ sāsravāś ca*) *so //*. And it is in accordance with this occasional use that in the *Basic Section* of Y the [basis-of-]personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) or [Result-of-]-Maturation (*vipāka*) containing all Seeds - in Y 4,11f. identified with Mind-containing-all-Seeds (see § 3.11.4.1), which in its turn came to be superseded by ālayavijñāna (see § 6.1.3) - is conceded to be the result also of good and bad karman, but is taught to be p r i m a r i l y (*prādhānyena*) the result of delight in wordly existence (*prapañca-(abhi)rati*, cp. n. 1405) (Y 25,12f. (see n. 1408); 4,11f. (see ib.); 17,2f.; 18,21f.; PG 28 (see App. II)).

1. Y_t dzi 116a2: *skyes nas myoṅ bar 'gyur ba* = **upapadya-(saṃ)vedanīyam*.

375. Cp. Y_t 'i 314b8 (Y_c 840a25f.): *rnam par śes pa daṅ bcas pa'i lus* (= **savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ*) *skye mched drug gis bsdus pa*.

376. ŚrBh 384,8f.: *tatrâtmabhāvaphalaṃ* (= the result consisting in *ā.*) *yad etad v i p ā k a j a ṃ ṣ a ḍ ā y a t a n a m*; cp. S 1969a, 43 and 89.

377. Cp. Y 25,12: *sarvabījakāyām ātmabhāvābhinirvṛttau*. Cp., in this connection, also the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī passage (Y_t 'i 252a4f.: see n. 172) according to which the S i x S e n s e s (*ṣaḍāyatana*) are the S e e d - b a s i s of the six *vijñānas*.

378. Y 26,10.

379. Y 25,3.

380. PG 29f. (see App. II).

381. Cp. Comm. ad PG 29 (see App. II).

382. Y 11,11-13: *ālambanaṃ katamat / sa<rva>dharmā <ā>lambanaṃ / niṣkevalaṃ tu vedanāskandhaḥ saṃjñāskandhaḥ saṃskāraskandho 'saṃskṛtaṃ cânidarśanam apratighaṃ ca rūpaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ sarvabījāni ca /*

383. Y 4,11f. (see § 6.1.1(d)γ).

384. Cp. Vi 96a28 ([certain] Mahāsāṅghikas; cp. Bareau 1955, 69 (thèse 54); Theravādins: Kv XVI.8; cp. XII.4; Dhs 180; Bareau 1955, 232 (thèse 161). Cp. also Y_t zi 224b3ff. (see § 3.12.2.1).

385. Especially in Mahāyānasūtras: cp., e.g., KP § 98; Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (trsl. E. Lamotte, Louvain 1962), 197; Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra (Die tibetischen Übersetzungen ..., hrsg. v. J. Nobel, Leiden 1944), 238,14 and 21f. - Cp. also UV 33.57 *arūpiṇam ... cittam ... anidarśanam* (but the Mūlasarvāstivāda version lacks *citta*!). In the Pāli canon, *arūpi* and *anidassana* seem to occur together only once, and as qualification of *ākāśa* at that (MN I 127); but *anidassana* qualifies *viññāṇa* at MN I 329 and DN I 223.

386. SN II 94; NidSa 7.3-4; AKBh 27,6: *ahaṃkārasanniśrayatvāc cittam ātmety upacaryate*; cp. 27,10: *ātmabhūtasya cittasya*; cp. also AS 71,17f. (*citta = ātmavastu*); 2,1 + ASBh 1,18 (*-ātma[sva]vastu vijñānam*); MAVBh 50,12 (*ātmābhiniveśavastu cittam*); SAṬ 66b6 (*bdag ni med kyi / sems kho na la bdag tu 'dogs par zad do //*). Cp. ASBh 1,19: *loke prāyeṇa vijñāne ātmagrāhaḥ, śeṣeṣu ātmīyagrāhaḥ*. Cp. also the fact that *citta* is sometimes called the king or lord among the skandhas, e.g. Vi 141b27ff.; cp. also Dharmasamuccaya XI.1; 28; 34; 74; (cp. G. Roth in: IIJ 14/1972, 100). Cp. also the "etymology" of *manas* at Y 70,6-8: *dīrgharātram etad bālaiḥ ... mamāyitam "etan mama, eṣo 'ham asmi, eṣa ma ātmā" iti ... iti "mana" iti /*.

387. PG 33-35 (see App. II).

388. Cp. the confirmation of this assumption by the list of equivalents for *bīja* (in the sense of the *ātmabhāva* containing all Seeds: cp. § 3.11.4.2) in Y 26,18f. (see n. 391), where b o t h *duḥkha* a n d *satkāyadṛṣṭy-adhiṣṭhāna* and *asmimānâdhiṣṭhāna* (see § 7.1B.2.1.3.*c*) figure.

389. Comm. ad PG 33-34 (see App. II).

390. Comm. ad PG 33-34 (... *duḥkha<ṃ>* (see n. 1472) ... *ālayavijñānamayam*) and ad PG 37 (*ālayavijñānasaṃgṛhītasya duḥkhasya*) (see App. II).

391. Y 26,18f.: *bījaparyāyāḥ punar dhātur gotraṃ prakṛtir hetuḥ satkāyaḥ prapañca ālaya upādānaṃ duḥkhaṃ satkāyadṛṣṭy-adhiṣṭhānam asmimānâdhiṣṭhānaṃ cêty evaṃbhāgīyāḥ paryāyā veditavyāḥ* //. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see § 7.1B.2.1.3.

392. See § 7.1B.2.1.3.*b* + ns. 1014-1016.

393. See § 7.1B.2.1.3.*a*.

394. Saṃdh V.7 (see n. 321).

395. To be sure, the fact that ordinary people do n o t , by themselves, develop a s p e c u l a t i v e view of ālayavijñāna as Self (because they have no conceptual knowledge of it) does n o t *eo ipso* exclude that they have a spontaneous, non-conceptual feeling of Ego or of identity towards it. Yet, if the Sūtra was familiar with such a view, it is strange that it does not refer to it anywhere. Besides, it appears that the explicit formulation of the idea of ālayavijñāna as the specific object of a spontaneous feeling of Ego or of identity is closely connected with the introduction of *m a n a s* as another kind of *vijñāna* (see § 7.1A.2.2.*c*) which is, however, not yet found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (cp. n. 942).

396. See § 7.1A.2.2.*c*,α + ns. 944 and 945.

397. MSg I.3 (see n. 137).

398. See n. 374.

399. In the older materials (like the ŚrBh passage quoted in n. 376), the term *vipākaja* may still be used in the sense of "arisen from [the process of] Maturation", i.e. as equivalent to *vipāka* as the result of Maturation (cp. AKBh 25,10ff.: *tatra vipākahetor jātāḥ vipākajāḥ* ...), whereas later on (and already in the Yogācārabhūmi passages referred to in § 3.12.2.1-2) *vipākaja* is distinguished from *vipāka* and taken to designate what (secondarily) results from *vipāka* (as the primary result).

400. Y 4,7 (see § 6.1.1), 11,5 (§ 6.2.1) and 24,4f. (§ 6.3.1). Cp. also Y_t zi 2b7 (see n. 415).

401. Cp. Suguro 1982a, 105,15ff.; cp. also the use of *vipāka-saṃgṛhīta* at Y_t zi 225a1 (see n. 402 (2a)), qualifying sensations (*vedanā*) falling under the category of *vipāka*, which, however, also includes, according to the same text (see n. 402 (1a)), states-of-mind (*citta*) and is even used to characterize the Seeds [of pleasant and painful sensations] they contain (Y_t zi 225a2: *de'i sa bon rnam par smin pas bsdus pa*, i.e. **tad-bījaṃ vipākasaṃgṛhītam*). Cp. also Y 25,17 (*vedanā vipāka-saṃgṛhītā*: see n. 412).

402. Y_t zi 224b3ff. (Y_c 664c19ff.):

(1a) *de la 'chi ba'i* (D: *ka'i*) *sems tha ma ni rnam par smin pa yin no // ñiṅ mtshams sbyar ma thag pa'i sems kyaṅ rnam par smin pa yin no // de phan chad raṅ bźin du gnas pa'i sems thams cad kyaṅ rnam par smin pa yin no // de la dge ba daṅ ñon moṅs pa can ma yin pa'i sems daṅ / luṅ du ma bstan pa'i sems mṅon par 'du byed pa daṅ bcas pa med pa gaṅ yin pa de ni raṅ bźin du gnas pa źes bya'o //* ...

(1b) (224b6) *rnam par smin pa de ni thams cad du yaṅ ma bsgribs la luṅ du ma bstan pa kho na yin par brjod par bya'o //*

(1c) (224b6-8) *rnam par smin pa sa bon thams cad pa de las spaṅs pa daṅ / ma thob pa ma gtogs pa dge ba'am / mi dge ba'am / luṅ du ma bstan pa'i chos gaṅ dag raṅ gi sa bon daṅ ldan par skye ba de dag thams cad ni rnam par smin pa las skyes pa yin par brjod par bya'o //*

(2a) (224b8f.) *khams gsum thams cad na yaṅ 'chi ba'i* (D: *ka'i*) *sems tha ma daṅ / ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i sems daṅ po'i 'og ma gñis pa ni sdug bsṅal yaṅ ma yin bde ba yaṅ ma yin pa'i tshor ba daṅ ldan pa yin par blta bar bya ste / ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i sems daṅ po ma gtogs pa de dag ni thams cad du yaṅ rnam par smin par bsdus pa yin par blta bar bya'o //*

(2b) (225a1f.) *de las gźan pa bde ba daṅ / sdug bsṅal gyi tshor ba dag ni rnam par smin pa las skyes pa yin par rig par bya'o //*.

(1a) The last *citta* [of an existence, viz. the one] at the moment of death, is *vipāka*. The *citta* immediately following upon [the moment of] Linking up (*pratisandhi*) is also *vipāka*. Thereafter, all 'unaltered' (**prakṛtistha*) *cittas* are also *vipāka*. 'Unaltered' are called those *cittas* which are neither good (*kuśala*) nor defiled (*kliṣṭa*), [i.e. those which are neutral, but] with the [additional] exception (**anyatra*, **-varjya*?) of those which are neutral (*avyākṛta*) but active (**sābhisaṃskāra*) (Ch.: 及除加行無記之心).

...

(1b) This [primary result of] Maturation (*vipāka*) is, in all cases, to be designated as exclusively neutral and non-obscured [by Defilements] (*anivṛtâvyākṛta*).

(1c) All [other] good, bad and neutral dharmas - except for those which have been abandoned or have not [yet] been obtained - which, conforming to (?) their respective Seed (**svabījānugatāḥ*?; cp. Ch. 自種子為因 , and ns. 172, 438 and 57o), arise from this [primary result of] Maturation containing all Seeds (*sarvabīj(ak)o vipākaḥ*),

are to be designated as *vipākaja*.

(2a) In all [kinds of existences in] the three world-spheres (**triṣu dhātuṣu sarvatrâpi*), the last *citta*[, viz. the one] at the moment of death, and the second [*citta*] which follows upon the first *citta* which links up [a new existence], are to be regarded as associated with neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation (*vedanā*), and these [sensations], except for [that of] the first *citta* which links up [a new existence], are, in all kinds of existences], to be regarded as comprised in [the category of] *vipāka*.

(2b) [All] other sensations[, especially those which are] pleasant (*sukha*) or painful (*duḥkha*), are to be regarded as *vipākaja*.

403. I.e. those which remain in the "natural", inactive state represented by mind in the second moment of an existence.

404. Y_t zi 224b3-5 (see n. 402 (1a)). Cp. the division of *avyākata* into *kiriya* and *vipāka* in Theravāda Abhidharma.

405. Y_t zi 224b6-8 (see n. 402 (1c)).

406. As for emphasis on *vedanā* in connection with *vipāka*, cp. also the (more radical) position of the Dārṣṭāntikas according to whom o n l y *vedanā* is *vipāka* (Vi 96a25f.).

407. Y_t zi 224b8f. (see n. 402 (2a)).

408. Y_t zi 225a1f. (see n. 402 (2b)); cp. also 225a3ff.

409. This fact will, in view of the well-documented opinion of other schools like the Theravādins (see n. 384), hardly be explicable as a mere omission.

410. Y 4,11f. (see § 6.1.1).

411. Y 24,3-5 (see § 6.3.1).

412. Y 25,16ff.: *prakṛtyā ca garbhāvasthāyām aduḥkhāsukhavedanā-pratiṣṭhitaṃ vijñānam upacīyate / saiva ca tatra vedanā vipākasaṃgṛhītā / tadanyat tu sarvaṃ veditaṃ vipākajaṃ vā viṣayapratyayaṃ vā*.

413. Though presumably differing in detail, especially with regard to the first moment of a new existence, for at least in other passages of the *Basic Section* (Y 24,4f.; 199,4+7) this moment too is taken to be *vipāka*.

414. Cp., in this connection, VGPVy 42oa8: *rnam par smin pa'i rnam par śes pa dbaṅ po daṅ lhan cig / las gcig gis 'phaṅs pa'i phyir ...*

415. Y_t zi 2b7 (ASBh 12,5f.; H 1978, 8f. [§ i(c)]): *api ca ṣaṇṇāṃ vijñāna-kāyānāṃ sā jātir nôpalabhyate yā 'vyākṛtā* (ms.) *vipāka-saṃgṛhītā syāt /*

416. Y 192,8 (see § 6.5, especially 6.5.4) and comm. ad PG 33-34 and 37 (see § 6.7.4.2).

417. Y_t zi 6a3f. (Y_c 58ob24-26; Chüeh-ting 1o19c3f.; H 1979, 31f. [§ 3.b.B.2]): *de'i bag chags kyi rigs gźan ni phyi ma la kun gźi rnam par śes pa de* (sic P and SaṃdhVy co 76b8; D: *de dag*) *ñid kyi rnam par smin pa yoṅs su 'dzin pa'i phyir 'jug par 'gyur ro //*; Hts.: ... 彼熏習種類、能引攝當來異熟無記阿賴耶識 ; Pa.: ... 未來世、令阿賴耶識受果報 . The original may have been something like this: **anyā tad-vāsanā-jātir āyatyāṃ tasyaîvâlayavijñānasya vipākasya* (or *-ka-*?) *parigrahāya vartate.*[1] Cp. Y 25,2off.: *sa ca bīja-santāna-prabandho 'nādikālikaḥ ... śubhâśubha-karma-viśeṣa-paribhāvana-yā punaḥ punar v i p ā k a phala- p a r i g r a h ā n*(?)[2] *navībhavati /.*

1. If the original had **vipākasya*, one may also follow Hts.'s version and take the passage to mean that the other kind of Impression leads to future taking possession of [a new arrangement of] ālayavijñāna itself a s the Result-of-Maturation.

2. Y_m *-haṃ ni<...?>*; Tib. *-'i phyir*; Ch. 望 ...

418. Y_t zi 5b7f. (Y_c 58ob17ff.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b27-29; H 1979, 31 [§ 3.b.B]): *de la 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa ni rnam pa gñis kyis kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i rkyen gyi bya ba byed de / ... /* (2) *tshe* (om. P) *phyi ma la de mṅon par 'grub pa'i sa*

bon yoṅs su 'dzin pa skyed par byed pas so (≈ **āyatyāṃ tad-abhinirvṛtti-bīja-parigraha-janana*(?)*taḥ*).

419. Tr 19: "When [the present ālayavijñāna which is the result of] the Maturation of previous [karman] is exhausted, the Impression of [not yet retributed] karman along with the Impression of the two false conceptions (cp. n. 367) generate it (= ālayavijñāna) [anew] as another [result of] Maturation" (*karmaṇo vāsanā grāha-dvaya-vāsanayā saha / kṣīṇe pūrvavipāke 'nyaṃ*[1] *vipākaṃ janayanti tat //*).

1. Lévi's ed. has *'nyad*, but in a leaf from a TrBh ms., hidden between the photos of the Ratnagotravibhāga manuscripts kept in Patna, the reading is, in both the pertinent passages it contains (corresponding to TrBh 37,7 and 9), *'nyam/'nyaṃ*.

420. TrBh 37,7f.: *ālayavijñāna-vyatirekeṇânyasya vipākasyâbhāvāt*.

421. Y_t zi 5a5f. (Y_c 580a29-b2; H 1979, 28f. [§ 2.b.A+B.1]).

422. Y_t zi 190a3ff. (Y_c 651c7ff.):
"The sensation which is associated with ālayavijñāna is always neither-painful-nor-pleasant (*aduḥkhāsukha*) and *vipāka*, and it arises (**(pra-)vṛt-*) continuously, without interruption ..., as long as life lasts. The other sensations - [all] the three kinds (viz. pleasant, painful and neither-pleasant-nor-painful sensations associated with the pravṛtti-vijñānas) - must be regarded as brought about [by additional factors] (**abhinirhṛta*?), not innate (or spontaneous) (**a-sahaja*), and [therefore] arising only occasionally (**kādācitka*)."
(*kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i tshor ba gaṅ yin pa de ni rtag tu sdug bsṅal yaṅ ma yin bde ba yaṅ ma yin pa daṅ / rnam par smin pa'o // de yaṅ ma śi'i bar du ... rgyun mi 'chad par rgyun gyis 'jug pa yin no // de la de las gźan pa'i tshor ba rnam pa gsum gaṅ yin pa de ni bsgrubs pa daṅ* (D) / *lhan cig skyes pa ma yin pa daṅ / res 'ga' 'byuṅ ba yin par rig par bya'o //*).

the Seeds as quasi-entities and does not emphasize their being mere denominations of the capacities of dharmas (cp. § 7.1B.2.1.3.*b*). And since the *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam* - provided that I am right in taking it as the homogeneous successor of the *vijñāna* of the *Pratītyasamutpāda Analysis* of the Savitarkādibhūmi and Vastusaṃgrahaṇī (see § 7.3, especially 7.3.6.3.1-3) - will have to contain not only the Seeds of the mental elements but also the Seeds of the c o r p o r e a l factors of the next existence (cp. § 3.13.2 + n. 441) and is even stated to contain the Seeds of liberating insight (*bodhi*: Y 25,1f.), it will also deserve (much more than the original ālayavijñāna) to be called "containing a l l Seeds". When, afterwards (see §§ 6.1.3-4, 6.3.3-4 and 6.8), ālayavijñāna was engrafted on this Mind-containing-all-Seeds, it a u t o m a t i c a l l y inherited the attribute '*sarvabījaka*' though this qualification did not entirely fit in with the original character of ālayavijñāna. But the inheritance of this qualification will certainly have contributed to developments taking ālayavijñāna as (not merely the sum of Seeds but rather) a veritable entity by itself (cp. § 3.10 and § 5) to be regarded as the container or support o f Seeds, and as containing the Seeds not only of mind and mental factors but also of corporeal matter or even of all dharmas (§ 3.13.4ff.).

429. See § 2.1.

430. See n. 285.

431. Y 5,15: *sarve ca* (sc. *caitasā dharmāḥ*) *svabījan nirjātāḥ* ...

432. Y 109,14f. (see § 6.4) is not unambiguous, but will, in view of the related paragraph of the *Proof Portion* (see n. 434), more probably have to be referred to *vijñānas* (and mental factors) only.

433. Cp. § 6.1.2.*1* + n. 775.

434. Y_t zi 3a8ff. (ASBh 12,25ff.; H 1978, 12 [§ iv]).

435. I.e. if we disregard, in this context, the Mahāyānist elements, i.e. the final surmounting of all diversity (Saṃdh V.6) and the **nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* (see § 4.4.2).

436. Yet, the etymology of *'citta'* in Saṃdh V.3 (*sems źes kyaṅ bya ste / 'di ltar de ni gzugs daṅ sgra daṅ dri daṅ ro daṅ reg bya daṅ chos rnams kyis* (cp. Y_t 'i 58a8) *kun tu bsags pa daṅ ñe bar bsags pa yin pa'i phyir ro //,* ≈ **cittam ity apy ucyate, ... tasya rūpa-śabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavya-dharmâcitôpacitatām upādāya*) may not fit in with this statement, provided that the passage has in fact, as Yūki (1935, 17o) suggests, to be taken to mean, in the sense of slightly later sources (especially Y_t zi 189b4; MSg I.9; AS 12,1f.), that ālayavijñāna is an accumulation of or filled/covered with the Impressions (*vāsanā*) or Seeds (*bīja*) of the objects of perception and cognition. Yet, strikingly enough the wording of the passage does not include a word for Impressions or Seeds (cp. Yūki 1935, 169,17), which means that this interpretation may need reconsideration.

437. Cp. Saṃdh V.4-5 (see § 3.9.3), though in these paragraphs no mention is made of Seeds (cp. Suguro 1983, 15,16; but cp. *sarvabīja(ka)* at V.2 and V.7). As for the body and the material sense-faculties, they are only taught to be taken possession of and appropriated by *ādānavijñāna* (Saṃdh V.2 [see § 4.4.2 + n. 5o8] and V.3 [see n. 352]) and to be the place where it sticks or hides (Saṃdh V.3 [see § 2.8]).

438. Y_t zi 5b4f. (Y_c 58ob11f.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b24f.; H 1979, 3o [§ 3.b.A.1]): *de la sa bon gyi dṅos po ni 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa dge ba daṅ mi dge ba daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba gaṅ ci yaṅ ruṅ ste / de dag thams cad ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i sa bon daṅ ldan pa yin no* (**ālayavijñāna-bījânugata*(??); Hts.: ... 用阿賴耶識爲種子 ; Pa.: ... 因阿羅耶識以爲種本 ; cp. n. 4o2 (1c)).

redactor - obviously due to the compiler himself and which at the same time show remarkable agreements with undisputed works of Asaṅga, this would no doubt considerably enhance the possibility that it was indeed by Asaṅga that at least VinSg was compiled.

452. Y_t zi 17b6 (Y_c 584a27ff.): *sa bon rnam par gźag* (D; P: *bźag*) *pa'i tshul 'di ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa rnam par ma bźag* (D; P: *gźag*) *pa la rig par bya'o // rnam par bźag pa la ni mdor bsdu na de la chos thams cad kyi sa bon yod par rig par bya ste / ...*

453. Cp. MSg I.1-2; I.14; II.2 (dharmas replaced by **abhūtaparikalpa-saṃgṛhītā vijñāptayaḥ*); II.32 (dharmas explicitly equated with pravṛttivijñāna(s)).

454. MSg I.3 (see n. 137) and I.2+27 (see n. 136).

455. This is what the canonical explanation of the Noble Truth of Suffering (SN V 421, etc.) obviously intends to point out. Cp. also passages like MN I 91 (etc.): *app'-assādā kāmā bahu-dukkhā bah'-upāyāsā*; AKBh 329,20f.: ... *duḥkham evâryasatyam ucyate / sukhasyâlpatvāt*; similarly Vi 402c2f. + 13-16; cp. also *Catuḥsatyaśāstra (T 1647), 386a19ff.: The Sūtra declares the [five] *upādānaskandhas* to be unsatisfactory/painful (*duḥkha*) (see n. 458) because pain torments more [than pleasure makes happy] (苦盛逼故) and because there is much more pain [than pleasure] (苦最多故).

456. Cp., e.g., MN I 232f.; SN IV 216f. Cp. S 1977, 918f.

457. S 1977, 919 + 928 notes 10 and 11.

458. SN V 421 (etc.): *saṅkhittena pañc' upādānakkhandhā dukkhā* (Skt. e.g. ŚrBh 251,16f. and 255,3: *saṃkṣepataḥ pañcôpādānaskandhāḥ duḥkham*).

459. Cp., e.g., Y_t zi 70b7ff. (Y_c 605a20-22): *skye ba'i sdug bsṅal daṅ / mdor na ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lṅa sdug bsṅal ba źes bya ba'i bar du gaṅ gsuṅs pa'i rnam pa, de dag las*

... *du źig 'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal ñid kyis bsdus* (D) *śe na / smras pa / tha ma gcig go /*; Y_t zi 22ob6f. (Y_c 663b 12f.): *'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal ñid de'i dbaṅ du mdzad nas bcom ldan 'das kyis "mdor na ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lṅa po dag sdug bsṅal ba" źes gsuṅs te*; Y_t zi 246a5 (Y_c 672c2): *tha ma mdor na ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lṅa sdug bsṅal ba źes* (D) *bya ba gcig pus ni 'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal ñid yoṅs su bstan to //*; AS 38,5f. (which I should, with the help of AS_t 88b5f. and ASBh 49,18f., restore to **yad uktaṃ "saṃkṣepataḥ* (see n. 458) *pañcôpādānaskandhā duḥkham" iti, anena saṃskāraduḥkhatā paridīpitā bhavati*). Cp. also ŚrBh 257,6f.: *saṃskāraduḥkhatā punaḥ sarvatragā upādānaskandheṣu*.

According to ŚrBh 255,3ff., however, the statement *"saṃkṣepataḥ pañcôpādānaskandhā duḥkham"* refers to *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* as well as *vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā*, and even points out the five *upādāna-skandhas* as the recipient (*bhājana*) of *duḥkha-duḥkhatā*. Cp. also Y_t zi 169a3-5 (Y_c 642b17-19) where the unsatisfactoriness of the five *upādānaskandhas* is declared to be based on the fact that they are essentially characterized (**-svabhāva*) by *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* and on the fact that they are the recipient (*-bhājana*) of *duḥkha-duḥkhatā* and *vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā* (which usually are taken to be characteristic of painful and pleasant sensations, respectively: see S 1977, 92o).

46o. E.g. Y_t zi 246a5ff. (Y_c 672c3ff.); Hsien-yang 548c1off., especially 15f.; cp. S 1977, 923f.

461. E.g. ŚrBh 257,12ff.: *ye skandhā anityā udaya-vyaya-yuktā* <*ḥ*> ($ŚrBh_m$) *sopādānāḥ ... dauṣṭhulyopagatā ayogakṣemapatitā avinirmuktā duḥkha-duḥkhatayā vipariṇāma-duḥkhatayā* <*ca?*> *asvavaśavartinaś ca, iyam ucyate saṃskāra-duḥkhatayā duḥkhatā /*; ŚrBh 49o, 5-9 + 14-16 (see n. 49o);
Y_t zi 22ob5f. (Y_c 663b9ff.):
"What is *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*? This disposition (**sanniveśa?*),

of conditioned entities (*saṃskāra*) produced by Actions and Defilements entailing rebirth (**paunarbhavika-karma-kleśa*), which is favourable to the arising, in any [basis-of-]personal-existence (**teṣu teṣv ātmabhāveṣu*), of all [kinds of] Defilements and Suffering (**sarva-kleśa-duḥkhôtpatty-anukūla*), and which falls under [the category of] Omnipresent Badness (*sarvatraga-dauṣṭhulya*) - it is [therefore also] called 'B a d n e s s' -: this is *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*."
(... *'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal ñid gaṅ źe na / yaṅ 'byuṅ ba'i las daṅ / ñon moṅs pas bskyed pa'i 'du byed rnams kyi lus de daṅ de dag la ñon moṅs pa daṅ / sdug bsṅal thams cad 'byuṅ ba daṅ mthun pa kun tu 'gro ba'i gnas ṅan len du gtogs pa gnas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni gnas ṅan len źes bya ste / de ni 'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal ñid yin no //*);
Y_t zi 71a6f. (Y_c 605b1f.): *rnam pa tha ma* (sc. *saṃkṣepataḥ pañcôpādānaskandhā duḥkham*: Y_t zi 70b7f. (see n. 459)) *daṅ sdug bsṅal tha ma* (sc. *dauṣṭhulya-duḥkha*: Y_t zi 71a4) *yaṅ gcig gis gcig bsdus so //*;
AS 37, 21f.: **saṃkṣepataḥ* (see n. 458) *pañcôpādānaskandhāḥ* (i.e. *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* [AS 38,5f.: see n. 459] = *paramārtha-satyena duḥkham* [AS 38,9]) *kim upādāya duḥkham? dauṣṭhulya-duḥkhatām upādāya* /; MAVBh 50,9f.: *dauṣṭhulyaṃ hi saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*; ASBh 86,8: *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā-lakṣaṇena dauṣṭhulyena*. Cp. S 1977, 925.

462. *kleśa-pakṣ(y)aṃ dauṣṭhulyam*, e.g. ŚrBh 272,4; 451,19; 500, 18f.; 507,7f.; $BoBh_D$ 18,16; 196,17; etc.; Y_t 'i (VaSg) 222a1f.; 261b4.

463. *dauṣṭhulya* = *a k a r m a ṇ y a t ā* : e.g. Y_t zi 202b2 (see S 1969a, 154f.); cp. also ŚrBh 451,19f. (*karmaṇyatā* as the opposite of *dauṣṭhulya*). Cp. also the specific aspect of **gurutva* (Y_t zi 202b3: *lci ba ñid*; cp. VisM XX.116: *gārava*, and ASBh 92,14f.: *āhāra-dauṣṭhulya* = *aty-alpa-bahu-bhojanena prayogâyogyatā*).

464. Cp. ASBh 92,16: *svapna-dauṣṭhulyaṃ* = *middhakṛtam āśraya-jāḍyam*; ASBh 92,19: *pariśrama-dauṣṭhulyam* = *atigamanâdi-kṛto 'ṅga-mardaḥ* (EDS: "stiffness of the limbs", but also "pain in the limbs", thus clearly involving the nuance of uneasiness); cp. ŚrBh 271,16f. and Y_t zi 2o2b3 (*sra ba ñid*; cp. VisM XX.116 *kakkhaḷatā*).

465. Cp. ASBh 92,17f.: *jarā-dauṣṭhulyam* = *bhūta-vipariṇāmakṛtā 'vidheyatā*; cp. also Y_t zi 2o2b3 *dbaṅ (b)sgyur ba med pas mi bzod pa ñid* (Y_c (657a22) 不自在轉無堪能, suggesting "incapability (*akṣamatā*) due to lack of control") and ŚrBh 257,14+16 (*dauṣṭhulyopagatāḥ* ... *asvavaśavartinaś ca*: see n. 461); Y 9o,18f.: *dauṣṭhulya-duḥkhena* ... *duḥkhitāḥ*, ... *asvatantratvāt*.

466. Cp., apart from the notion of *dauṣṭhulya-duḥkha* (e.g. $BoBh_D$ 169,15; Y 9o,18f. and 2o; Y_t zi 71a4; AS 37,22 [see n. 461]), ASBh 92,17: *vyādhi-dauṣṭhulyam* = *dhātu-vaiṣamya-kṛtā 'svasthatā* (ms.: *aprasva°*); Y_t zi 2o2b3: *sgyid lug pa* (**avasāda*?); cp. also VisM XX.116 (*passaddhi* (i.e. *praśrabdhi*, = antonym of *dauṣṭhulya*!) characterized by lack of *daratha* ("affliction"); SAVBh mi 3oob1f.: *dauṣṭhulya-kāya* (MSA XIV.2o) = *kāyâkarmaṇyatā* (= *lus lci ba* (see n. 463) *daṅ mi bde ba'o*) + *cittâkarmaṇyatā* (= *sems mi bde źiṅ dge ba la mi 'jog pa'o*).

467. Cp. ŚrBh 257,14 (*dauṣṭhulyopagatā ayogakṣema-patitā avinirmuktāḥ duḥkhaduḥkhatayā vipariṇāmaduḥkhatayā* <*ca*?>); 49o,5ff. (see n. 49o).

468. The term '*dauṣṭhulya*', especially its use in the Yogācārabhūmi, requires more detailed investigation. Preliminary attempts: Wogihara 19o8, 29f.; S 1969a, 154ff.; S 1977, 925; cp. also BDJT 16o3-16o5.

469. Y 26,16f.: *ataś ca sakalam āśrayaṃ dauṣṭhulyopagatatvād dauṣṭhulyasvabhāvatvāt tathāgatā duḥkhataḥ prajñāpayanti yaduta saṃskāraduḥkhatayā* /. Cp. also Y 99,5f.: ... *kathaṃ traidhā-*

tukāvacarāṇāṃ sattvānāṃ āśrayo draṣṭavyaḥ / tadyathā saparidāho gaṇḍo, dauṣṭhulyānugatatvāt /.

470. Even in later texts, *dauṣṭhulya* is sometimes only i n p a r t or a l t e r n a t i v e l y defined as Seeds (*bīja*), Impressions (*vāsanā*) or evil propensities (*anuśaya*). Cp., e.g., ASBh 92,5ff. (several kinds of *d.*, of which only some are defined as Impressions, etc., whereas the majority is specified otherwise (for examples see ns. 464-466)); TrBh 27,15f. (*d.* = *akarmaṇyatā* a n d [TrṬ$_J$ 480,39: o r] *bījas*); MAVṬ 167,9ff. (*d.* = *duḥsthitatā* o r *akarmaṇyatā* o r *bījas*); 215,19ff. (*d.* = *vāsanā-paripuṣṭi* o r *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*); Si 52c7f. (*d.* = *bījas* o r *akarmaṇyatā*).

471. ŚrBh 490,7f.: *skandhāḥ* ... *d a u ṣ ṭ h u l y a -sahagatāḥ* ‹*sukha*›-*duḥkha*- *b ī j â nugatāḥ* (see n. 490) ...;
Y$_t$ 'i 2b4-7 (Y$_c$ 696c18ff.): "Just as ... Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) and Ease (*praśrabdhi*), though in fact existing in body and mind, cannot be stated to be either something else (**anya*) or nothing else (**ananya*) than body and mind; and just as Seeds (*bīja*), though in fact existing in (!) good, evil and neutral dharmas, cannot be stated to be something else or nothing else than these [dharmas]; ..."
(*'di lta ste dper na ... lus daṅ sems la g n a s ṅ a n l e n daṅ śin tu sbyaṅs pa dag yod kyaṅ / lus daṅ sems las de dag gźan pa'am / gźan ma yin par brjod par mi bya ba daṅ / dge ba daṅ mi dge ba daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa'i chos rnams la s a b o n yod kyaṅ / de dag las gźan pa'am / gźan ma yin par brjod par mi bya ste / ...*); cp. also BoBh$_D$ 265,5 (BoBh$_W$ 384,4ff.): *s a - v ā s a n ā n ā ṃ sarva-kleśa-pakṣyāṇāṃ dauṣṭhulyānāṃ*, though in this passage *vāsanā* should perhaps be understood not as Seed but as the *kleśavāsanā* of the Arhat (cp. S 1969a, 55 and 157).

472. Y$_m$ 66b4 (Y$_t$ dzi 145a3f.; Y$_c$ 331b7f.): *tatra laukikena dhyānena tat-pakṣyaṃ* (i.e. *daurmanasyêndriya-pakṣyaṃ*, etc.) *dauṣṭhulyaṃ prajahāti, na tu bījasthānam asyôddharati.*

473. $BoBh_D$ 18,16f. ($BoBh_W$ 27,4f.) *sarva-kleśa-pakṣasya dauṣṭhulyasyâśrayagatasya*; 253,23 ($BoBh_W$ 368,5) *dauṣṭhulyam āśrayād apakarṣati*; cp. 265,5f. and 280,1f.; ŚrBh 283,7 *dauṣṭhulya-sahagata āśrayaḥ*; 500,19 *dauṣṭhulyasanniśraya-* (read *-lyam āśraya-*?) *-sanniviṣṭam*; Y 26,16 and 99,5f. (see n. 469); Y_m 69a4 (Y_t dzi 151a2) *apagata-sarva-dauṣṭhulye āśraye*; Y_t 'i 222a2 (Y_c 802b9; see n. 480).

474. Y_t 'i 261b4 (Y_c 818a16f.): *rgyud* (but Y_c 所依) *la gnas pa'i ñon moṅs pa'i phyogs su gtogs pa'i gnas ṅan len*.

475. Cp. Y_t 'i 312b3f. (Y_c 839a27ff.; cp. n. 300):
"Due to the fact that the Basis (*āśraya*) has been transmuted (**pari-vṛt*), [i.e. due to the fact that] the Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) in it has been removed (**prati-pra-śrabh-*), in this [very] life one's Six Senses (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*, = *āśraya*) which are stricken with *avidyā-dhātu* cease to exist, and another [set], which is furnished with *vidyā-dhātu*, arises."[1]
(*gnas yoṅs su gyur ciṅ de'i naṅ gi gnas ṅan len śin tu sbyaṅs pa'i phyir tshe 'di la de'i* (D; P om.) *ma rig pa'i khams daṅ ldan pa'i skye mched drug gaṅ yin pa de ni 'gag la rig pa'i khams daṅ ldan pa ni skye'o //*).

1. Ch. differs: "When in this life ..., this is called 'Transmutation of Basis', because the Badness affiliated to it (sc. to *avidyā*?) is removed."

476. E.g. ŚrBh 271,17ff. *kāya-dauṣṭhulyaṃ citta-dauṣṭhulyam* or *kāya-citta-dauṣṭhulyam*; 432,21f. + 433,3f.; Y_t 'i 2b5 (see n. 471); cp. also Y_t 'i 134a5 (Y_c 746b24f.): *'jig tshogs la lta ba'i phyogs daṅ mthun pa'i gnas ṅan len daṅ ldan pa'i miṅ daṅ gzugs* (≈ **satkāyadṛṣṭi-pakṣya-dauṣṭhulyânugataṃ nāmarūpam*).

477. E.g. Y_t yi 35b6-8 (Y_c 763c11ff.): *'rajas'* (cp. AS 67,14) = the *asmimāna* which prevents the first *satyābhisamaya* (cp. ŚrBh 497,7ff.) (and the other *darśanaheyāḥ kleśāḥ*); *'mala'* = the *dauṣṭhulya* which is affiliated to them.

478. Y_t 'i 335a8f. (see n. 480: *de skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir*).

479. Y_t yi 46b5 (Y_c 768b9): "... because he (i.e. the Arhat) has got rid of (**-prahāṇāt*) Badness which is the cause of unhappiness (*duḥkha*) in the present [existence]" (*da ltar gyi sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu gnas ṅan len spoṅ ba'i phyir*, Ch. 現在苦因麁重斷故); cp. also Y_t 'i 271a2 *gnas ṅan len las gyur pa ...'i sdug bsṅal* (Y_c 821c24: 麁重所作苦).

480. Y_t 'i (= Vastusaṃgrahaṇī) 222a1f. (Y_c 802b9ff):
"The Badness affiliated to Defilements which sticks in the basis[of-personal-existence] is called 'evil propensity', for it is like a seed (*bīja*) from which the actual outbursts (*paryavasthāna*) [of Defilements] originate."
(*ñon moṅs pa'i phyogs su gtogs pa'i gnas ṅan len gyi* (sic P and D) *rten du gnas pa ni bag la ñal źes bya ste / kun nas dkris pa skye ba'i sa bon lta bu yin no //*; the first part is, in view of Ch. ... 麁重隨附依身 , probably based on a misreading of a presumable original **kleśapakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyam āśraya-sanniviṣṭam anuśaya ity ucyate*);
Y_t 'i 335a8f. (Y_c 849a3-5):
"The Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) affiliated to [*kāmacchanda, vyāpāda* and *vihiṃsā*], which is present in the basis[-of-personal-existence] because *kāmacchanda*, etc., have not yet been abandoned, and which is like seeds, is called 'disposition (*dhātu*) to *kāma*[*cchanda*]', etc., respectively, because it leads to the arising of these [Defilements] (Ch.: because like seeds it engenders these [Defilements])."
(... *'dod pa'i 'dod chags daṅ / gnod sems daṅ / rnam par 'tshe ba ma spaṅs pa'i phyir gnas la yod pa de'i phyogs daṅ mthun pa gnas ṅan len sa bon lta bu gaṅ yin pa de skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ni ci rigs par 'dod pa daṅ / gnod sems daṅ / rnam par 'tshe ba'i khams źes bya ste /*);
Y_t yi (Paryāya-saṃgrahaṇī) 50b2 (Y_c 770a6): *ñon moṅs pa'i phyogs kyi gnas ṅan len sa bon daṅ mthun par gyur pa ni bag la ñal te.*

Cp. also ŚrBh 49o,7f. (see n. 471) where *<sukha->duḥkha-bījānugata* may (but of course need not) be taken as an explication of *dauṣṭhulya-sahagata* (cp. ASBh 44,9: *duḥkha-vipariṇāma-duḥkhatayor dauṣṭhulyenânugatatvāt tena duḥkhatādvayenâvinirmuktatvāt* ...), and ŚrBh 5o7,7f. *sarva-kleśapakṣya-* (ms. *-kṣyaṃ*) *-dauṣṭhulya-bījā-samudghātāt* ("Badness which is [like] a seed", as in the above-quoted passages? Or "Badness and Seeds", as in ns. 471 and 472?).

481. Y 26,11ff.: ... *yāni bījāni kleśapakṣyāṇi, tatra dauṣṭhulyānuśayasaṃjñā / yāni ca punar vipākapakṣyāṇi tadanyāvyākṛtapakṣyāṇi ca, teṣu dauṣṭhulyasaṃjñaiva, nānuśayasaṃjñā.*

482. Cp. also Y_t zi 118b2 (Y_c 623a22f.): *de* (sc. *ñon moṅs pa*) *ñid kyi s a b o n ma spaṅs śiṅ yaṅ dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la ñal źes bya ste / g n a s ṅ a n l e n kyaṅ de yin no //*; 215a5f. (see n. 495).

483. Y 26,11-14 (see n. 481) + 16f. (see n. 469).

484. Comm. ad PG 33-34: *duḥkha<ṃ> saṃskāra-duḥkhatā-saṃgṛhītaṃ ālayavijñāna-mayam* (see App. + n. 1472); cp. also comm. ad PG 37: *ālayavijñāna-saṃgṛhītasya duḥkhasya*. Cp. also ASBh 44,8ff. and 55,13-15 (see n. 489).

485. See § 6.7.

486. See n. 226.

487. See n. 548.

488. Cp. AKBh 329,1of.: *sarve tu saṃskārāḥ saṃskāraduḥkhatayā duḥkhāḥ / tāṃ tv āryā eva paśyanti /*; cp. also PG 33-34 (*tad ā r y ā duḥkhato viduḥ*) + comm. (*duḥkha<ṃ> saṃskāraduḥkhatā-saṃgṛhītam*); Y_m 88a2 (Y_t dzi 194a5ff.; Y_c 349a9ff.): *tribhiḥ sthānaiḥ sattvānāṃ duḥkhasya duḥkha-saṃgraho bhavati / saṃyogajaṃ, viyogajaṃ, s ā t a t a ñ ca / ... tṛtīyaṃ sarvā[1]sv avasthāsu varttamānasya d a u ṣ ṭ h u l y a - s a ṃ - g ṛ h ī t a m , tathā-sambhūtatvāt saṃskārāṇāṃ / yatr â - r y ā < ṇ ā > m e v a d u ḥ k h a b u d d h i r bhavati, na pṛthagjanānām /*; Y_t zi 61a8f. (see n. 6o2).

1. Y_m: *-tvā-*; Y_t *(gnas skabs) thams cad (du)*.

489. ASBh 44,8ff.: *aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā ''layavijñāna-saṃprayuktā tadvedanīyāś ca saṃskārā duḥkha-vipariṇāma-duḥkhatayor dauṣṭhulyenânugatatvāt tena duḥkhatādvayenânirmuktatvād ekadā duḥkhāvasthāṃ bhajante ekadā sukhāvasthāṃ, na nityakālam aduḥkhāsukhāvasthā eva bhavanti; tasmād ... ayogakṣematvāt saṃskāraduḥkhatā veditavyā /*; 55,13-15: *kleśadauṣṭhulya-prabhāvitatvād aduḥkhāsukha-vedanā-prabhāvitatvāc ca ālayavijñānaṃ viśeṣeṇa saṃskāra-duḥkhatâvasthaṃ.*

49o. Cp., e.g., ŚrBh 257,7ff.: *saṃkṣepatas tu yā* (ms.) *ca duḥkha-duḥkhatā yā ca kleśa-saṃgṛhītā vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā* (Tib., Ch.; cp. ŚrBh 256,12ff. and 17ff.; S 1977, 921) *yā ca sādhiṣṭhāna-sukha-vedanā-saṃgṛhītā* (ms.) (sc. *vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā*: cp. ŚrBh 256,7ff. and 15f.), *tāṃ sthāpayitvā ye tad-anye skandhā aduḥkhâsukha*[1]*sahagatāḥ ..., iyam ucyate saṃskāra-duḥkhatā //*; 49o,5ff.: *tatrâyogakṣemākāreṇa aduḥkhāsukha-sthānīyeṣu skandheṣu duḥkhākāram avatarati / tathā hy aduḥkhāsukhasthānīyāḥ skandhāḥ <sāsravāḥ?*[2]*> sopādānā dauṣṭhulya-sahagatāḥ <sukha>-duḥkha*[3]*-bījânugatā avinirmuktā duḥkha-duḥkhatayā vipariṇāma-duḥkhatayā ca ... / evam ... aduḥkhāsukha-sthānīyeṣu saṃskāreṣv aduḥkhāsukhāyāṅ ca vedanāyāṃ saṃskāra-duḥkhatām avatīrṇṇo bhavati ... //*. Cp. S 1977, 92o.

1. = ms.
2. Thus Tib. and Ch., but missing in ms.
3. Thus Tib. and Ch.; ms. *aduḥkha-*.

491. See comm. on PG 37 (... *ālayavijñānasaṃgṛhītasya duḥkhasya ... viśoṣaṇaṃ darśayati*: see App. II; cp. also § 7.1B.2.1.4.2.*b*).

492. Y 1o9,13-15 (see § 6.4.1). Cp. Y_t zi 3a8ff. (*Proof Portion*: see n. 434); Y_t zi 5b4f. (*Pravṛtti Portion*: see n. 438); Y_t zi 19ob3 (Y_c 651c25 [Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya]): *de dag* (sc. the four k l e ś a s of the new *manas*) *ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i sa bon las byuṅ ba kho na yin pas ...*

493. See n. 462.

494. Y 26,11f. (see n. 481).

495. Y_t zi 215a5-7 (Y_c 661b26ff.):
"The Seeds of Defilements (*kleśabīja*) ... in pellucid matter (*rūpaprasāda*, i.e. *indriyarūpa*) and in mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) ... are called '*anuśayas*', and they are also [called (Y_c)] 'Badness' (*dauṣṭhulya*). Therefore as long as these [Seeds of Defilements = Badness] are not altogether eliminated, those [dharmas] are under the sway (and favourable to the arising) of Cankers by way of latent tendency (**anuśayataḥ sāsrava*)."
(*daṅ ba'i gzugs daṅ / sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos ... la ñon moṅs pa'i sa bon ... gaṅ yin pa de ni bag la ñal źes bya ste / gnas ṅan len kyaṅ de yin no // de'i phyir ji skad* (P, D; read *srid*?) *du de ma lus par ma spaṅs pa'i bar du des na de dag bag la ñal las zag pa daṅ bcas pa źes bya'o //*).
Y_t zi 78a6f. (= Y_c 608a13f.; cp. Hsien-yang 506b1f.): *zag pa daṅ bcas pa rnams don gaṅ gis yin* /(D) ... *gnas ṅan len daṅ rjes su 'brel ba'i* (D: *pa'i*) *don ... gyis so* // (**kenârthena ... sāsravāḥ ... / dauṣṭhulyānubandhārthena ...*); ASBh 23,18f. (see n. 545); Y_c 880a12-14 (no Tib.): **言有漏者、謂、若諸法** ... **諸漏麁重之所隨縛** .

496. E.g. $BoBh_D$ 35,24 (see n. 540); SĀ$_c$ 92b11 quoted AKBh 197,13; DBhS 48,10; Vi 543a28; 544c13 (quoted from the Vijñānakāya); (*sāsrava* +) *sopādāna* + *dauṣṭhulyasahagata*: ŚrBh 490,7 (see n. 490); cp. ŚrBh 257,13f. (see n. 461).

497. SĀ$_c$ Nos. 39 (9a6f.; cp. AKBh 333,6f.; PSVy 50b8; JP_H 1031c13) and 1175 (316a3; cp. Hsien-yang 549a7; Vi 903a11f.), corresponding to SN Nos. 22.54 (*viññāṇaṃ sāhāraṃ*) and 35.204 (IV 195; *viññāṇaṃ* only), Cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 187 and 196 note 36ff.

498. On *vijñāna* compared to a seed see $MPPU_L$ 1151ff.

499. Y_t 'i 2o1a2 = Y_c 794b6 (ad $SĀ_c$ No. 39 [see n. 497]; cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 188): *yaṅ srid par skye ba'i myu gu 'byuṅ ba la ni ... / ñ o n m o ṅ s p a ' i* (D) *s a b o n d a ṅ l d a n p a 'i rnam par śes pa ni rgyu'o //*; cp. also Y_t 'i 311b6; 312a6; 314b4 (see n. 5o4).

5oo. Y_t 'i 311a5ff. (Y_c 838c6ff.); cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 183.

5o1. Cp. SN II 11; $SĀ_c$ 1o1c26f. (not quite precise); AKBh 153,7; Y 1o9,16f.

5o2. Y_t 'i 311b2f. (Y_c 838c18-2o):
"The *vijñāna* which appropriates the gross elements of the sense-faculties is the cause of the continuance (*sthiti*) of the gross elements of the sense-faculties endowed with life-force (*āyus*) and [bodily] heat (*uṣman*), and this continuance [of the gross elements of the sense-faculties] is[, in its turn,] the cause of [the continuance of life which is characterized by the fact] that *vijñāna* does not withdraw from the body (**vijñānasya kāyād anapakrāntiḥ*)."
(*dbaṅ po'i 'byuṅ ba chen po len par byed pa'i rnam par śes pa ni dbaṅ po'i 'byuṅ ba chen po tshe daṅ bcas pa daṅ drod daṅ bcas pa de rnams kyi gnas pa'i rgyu ste / gnas pa de ni rnam par śes pa lus daṅ mi 'bral ba'i rgyu yin no //*).
On the mutual support (*ādhāra = sthiti-hetu*) of *āyus*, *uṣman* and *vijñāna* see AKBh 73,21ff.

5o3. See n. 5o1.

5o4. Y_t 'i 311b5f. (Y_c 838c27-29):
"Through these three (viz. searching after the other three kinds of "nourishment", i.e. [real] food, pleasant touch and hope for pleasant things) one actualizes karman and *kleśas* leading to rebirth (**paunarbhavika*), and [thereby] causes one's *vijñāna* to be subject to (*-upaga*) karman and *kleśas* and [to remain] under the sway of Clinging (*sopādāna*) in this life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), and to be favourable to rebirth in the future (*āyatyāṃ punarbhava*)."

(*des gsum po de dag gi sgo nas yaṅ srid par skye ba'i las daṅ ñon moṅs pa bsgrubs* (D) *nas tshe 'di la rnam par śes pa ni* (D: *de*) *las daṅ ñon moṅs par ñe bar 'gro ba daṅ len pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ phyi ma la yaṅ srid par skye ba la phan 'dogs par byed do //*);

cp. Y_t 'i 312a5f. (Y_c 839a14ff.); 313a3f. (Y_c 839b20f.); 314b4f. (Y_c 840a17ff.; cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 188f.):

"By these two Defilements (*saṃkleśa*; Ch. 煩惱 = *kleśa*), [viz. *nandī* and *rāga* (cp. $SĀ_c$ No. 374 = SN No. 12.64),] *vijñāna* becomes polluted (*saṃkliṣṭa*) in this life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), and ... thrives (**vardhate*, cp. Ch. 增長) as a Seed of rebirth in the future."

(*kun nas ñon moṅs pa 'di gñis kyi<s> tshe 'di la rnam par śes pa kun nas ñon moṅs pa can du 'gyur te / ... phyi ma la yaṅ srid par skye ba'i sa bon gyi tshul gyis* [*bźin*: om. D] *skye bar 'gyur ro //*).

Cp. also Y_t 'i 167b3f. (Y_c 781c12f.):

"*Vijñāna* is understood to be similar to an object for magic (*māyā*, cp. MSABh 59,5: *māyā*[1] = *ma*[2]*ntra-parigṛhītaṃ bhrānti-nimittaṃ kāṣṭha-loṣṭâdikam*) [which under the influence of an incantation successively appears as various other things], in so far as *vijñāna*, being under the sway of Clinging (*sopādāna*), [successively] imitates (**anu-vṛtti* or *-vartana*, i.e. unites itself with) various personalities (*ātmabhāva*) [based on, or consisting of,] the four entities attached to which *vijñāna* persists [in saṃsāra] (*vijñāna-sthiti*, i.e. the remaining four skandhas)."

(*rnam par śes pa la ni len pa daṅ bcas pa'i rnam par śes pa daṅ / rnam par śes pa'i gnas bźi daṅ / lus sna tshogs kyi rjes su 'jug pa'i sgo nas sgyu ma lta bur rtogs pa*; my rendering is, however, closer to Chin. which presents a more plausible analysis of the presumable Sanskrit compound **sopādānavijñāna-caturvijñānasthiti-vicitrātmabhāvânuvṛttitaḥ* (or the like)).

1. Word repeated from MSA! Therefore against Tib. not to be read as *māyā-*.

2. Thus S. Lévi in his translation of MSA(Bh) (109 note) and Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī (ed. Thakur, Patna 1959) 484,6.

505. See n. 499.

506. Cp. Y_t zi 5b8 + 6a3f. (see § 3.12.5 + ns. 417 and 418) and 8b1f. (H 1979, 38 [§ 5.b.A.4(b)]; see § 4.7.1 + n. 548).

507. See n. 226.

508. Saṃdh V.2: ... *der daṅ por 'di ltar len pa rnam pa gñis po* – *rten daṅ bcas pa'i dbaṅ po gzugs can len pa daṅ / mtshan ma daṅ miṅ daṅ rnam par rtog pa la tha sñad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags len pa* – *la <b>rten nas*[1] / *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems rnam par smin ciṅ 'jug la rgyas śiṅ 'phel ba daṅ yaṅs par 'gyur ro* (* ... *vipacyate saṃmūrcchati vṛddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vipulatāṃ āpadyate*) //.

1. The old Tib. translation in Stein Tib. No. 194 (see H 1984), fol. 44b4f. (breaking off in the middle of the sentence) has *blaṅs pa* instead of *la brten nas*, which suggests *(*dvividham upādānam*) *upādāya* for the original Sanskrit.

509. See n. 172.

510. *'Prapañca'* is used both in the sense of the process of proliferation, especially conceptual proliferation, or even of (emotionally involved) proliferating or diversifying conceptual activity, as also in that of what is the result of such a process ("diversity") or the object of such an activity (cp. also ns. 514, 532(*b*), 1405 and 1425). The rephrasing of the present Saṃdh expression at Si 10a15 (相名分別習氣), omitting *'prapañca'*, would seem to support an interpretation in the "resultative" or "objective" sense of "diversity" (which of course includes, though only as an element of diversity, the subjective entity *vikalpa*), for taken in this sense *prapañca* would consist of *nimitta*, etc., so that the word *'prapañca'* is virtually redundant. On the other hand, VinSg (see § 4.5), replacing *'prapañca'* by *'abhiniveśa'*, gives relief to

and corroborates the aspect of an emotionally involved mental activity or attitude.

511. In this context: objective phenomena as they are experienced or imagined, admitting of being associated with names, and being (co-)conditioned by subjective conceptual activity (*vikalpa*), which has become habitual so that it permeates all (ordinary) perceptions and cognitions.

512. According to Takasaki (1982, 28) the twofold *upādāna* corresponds to *nāma-rūpa* (as the *pratyaya* of *vijñāna* = *sarvabījakaṃ cittam* in the sense of the ten-membered *pratītyasamutpāda*; cp. also n. 1143). This would be quite natural in the context of rebirth but is not explicitly stated, and hence does not seem to be focussed upon by the text.

513. Cp. Pr 212,18: *upādīyata ity upādānam*. Cp. also the interpretation of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (see § 4.5) and Takasaki (1982, 27; 1982a, 50) who even renders *'upādāna'*, in the case of both *upādānas* of the present passage, as "material" (素材).

514. As for quasi-synonymity of *'prapañca'* and *'upādāna'*, cp. AN IV 68f. and Y 26,18 (*p r a p a ñ c a* , *ālaya* and *u p ā d ā n a* : see n. 391). Cp. also the fact that the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī replaces *'prapañca'* by *' a b h i n i v e ś a '* (see § 4.5 + n. 532).

515. As would, primarily at least, hold good for the *prapañca(abhi)rati* of the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi (PG 28, etc.: see App. II + ns. 1408 and 1405(*C–H*)).

516. Cp. the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī passage quoted in § 4.3.1 + n. 499 according to which *s o p ā d ā n a -vijñāna* means *vijñāna* containing the S e e d s of the *kleśas* (≈ *upādāna* in the sense of spiritually negative Clinging). The use of 'x' in the sense of 'x-*vāsanā*' is explicitly vindicated in PSVy 20a8: *yid kyi bag chags la yaṅ yid ces laṅ 'ga' brjod de / ji ltar las kyi bag chags la yaṅ las źes bya ba ... bźin no //*.

517. According to SaṃdhVy co 81a4f., *parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā* is the *apekṣāhetu* of ālayavijñāna's reincarnation. In $BoBh_D$ 69,5f. (= $BoBh_W$ 97,16f.), the *apekṣāhetu* is defined as that with an eye to which or motivated by which one desires and takes hold of something (*yadapekṣaṃ yaddhetukaṃ yasmin vastuni arthitvam* *u p ā d ā n a ṃ* *ca bhavati, ayam asyocyate 'pekṣāhetuḥ*; cp. Y 1o7,13f.). However, the i l l u s t r a t i o n s added by BoBh do not fit this definition but imply a concept according to which *apekṣāhetu* is the cause or i n s t r u m e n t required for some action, as e.g. the hands are required for seizing or the feet for walking. In the present case, it would seem reasonable to understand *prapañcavāsanā* as the *apekṣāhetu* of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) in the sense of its being the latent d r i v e due to which a new existence is taken hold of. Cp. also TrBh 19,11ff. where *upādāna* in the sense of (*ātmādi-* and *rūpādi-dharma-vikalpa-*)*vāsanā* seems to be understood as "that due to the existence of which (something, viz., in the given case, the actual *vikalpa*) is "appropriated" (by ālayavijñāna as a result)" (*t a t s a d b h ā v ā d* *ālayavijñānenâtmādivikalpo rūpādivikalpaś ca kāryatvenôpāttaḥ*; cp. TrṬ 18a7f.: *de las tshig gi don 'di 'byuṅ ste / de yod na ji skad brjod pa'i 'bras bu len par byed de / de bas na bag chags "len pa" źes bya ba'o //*). I cannot follow Takasaki (1985, 37,17) interpreting *upādāna*, in this TrBh passage, not only as "material" (素材 : cp. n. 513) arousing the *vikalpas* but also as "what is apprehended" (*upādeya*) in the sense of the o b j e c t (所緣).

518. The same would seem to hold good also for Takasaki's interpretation (see n. 513).

519. Cp. SaṃdhVy co 81a4 (*mṅon par źen pa'i bag chags kyi<s> phyi mar ñiṅ mtshams sbyor bar byed pas ...*).

52o. Saṃdh V.2 (end): *de la gzugs can gyi khams na ni len pa gñi ga yod la / gzugs can ma yin pa'i khams na ni len pa gñis su*

med do //. Takeuchi (1985, 277,6) takes the last sentence to mean that in *ārūpyadhātu* b o t h *upādānas* are lacking; but this would presuppose *len pa gñis med do*, whereas the text as it stands, viz. *len pa gñis* *s u* *med do*, means that in *ārūpyadhātu* the *upādāna* does not exist a s t w o, i.e. is not twofold (**advaya?*) but only one (cp. also n. 521).

521. Cp. Y_t zi 4b2f. (Y_c 58oa6f.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b3f.; H 1979, 26 [§ 1.b.A.1]): *gzugs can ma yin pa na ni bag chags len pa kho nar zad do* (≈ **arūpiṇi* (sc. *dhātau*) *vāsanôpādānam eva*); SaṃdhVy co 81b2: *de na gzugs med pa'i phyir rten daṅ bcas pa'i dbaṅ po gzugs can ni med kyi / bag chags 'ba' źig la bltos nas skye'o //*.

522. Cp. Yokoyama 1979a, 13ff.; Suguro 1982, 63f.

523. See n. 147.

524. See § 3.9.2.5 + ns. 337-34o.

525. The grammatical analysis of the compound would in this case be analogous to that of *'-rūpîndriya-upādāna'* (for which see § 4.4.2.1).

526. Cp., e.g., Nagao 1978, 384; Yokoyama 1979a, 8f.; Takasaki 1985, 41.

527. PSkVai 46a8: *s a b o n ñ e b a r l e n p a 'i kun gźi rnam par śes pa* (**bījopādāyakam*(?) *ālayavijñānam*); Si 1oa14-16; 13c1o; 14c7f. (**以能執持諸法種子、** ... **故說此識名阿陀那**).

528. The reliability of the corresponding expression in Hsien-yang 48oc5f. (**此識能執受** ... **熏習** : see n. 536) is difficult to assess (see n. 538).

529. See n. 517.

53o. See n. 226.

531. Y_t zi 4b2 (Y_c 58oa5f.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b1f.; H 1979, 26 [§ 1.b.A.1]); Skt. preserved in TrBh 19,7f.: *tatrâdhyātmam upā-*

dānaṃ parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ ... ca.

532. a) This looks like an adaptation to the terminology of Saṃdh VI-VII (and Y_t 'i 19b6ff.). Moreover, the terminology of the VinSg passage, though, to be sure, of Mahāyāna provenience, would a l s o - more easily than the expression used in Saṃdh V.2 - admit a traditional, Śrāvakayānist interpretation in the sense that *parikalpita-svabhāva* may be taken as the fictive *ātman* (and *ātmīya*) and other "wholes" and permanent things (see § 10.3.2). From this point of view, the fact that Hsien-yang 480c6 (**prapañcavāsanā*, see n. 536) and especially Si 10a15 (**nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-prapañca-vāsanā*, see n. 510) return to the terminology of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra may indicate an intention to stress the Mahāyāna position (if I may, in spite of problems of origin, use this label for the ontology of *dharmanairātmya*). It may however also have been motivated by the fact that - especially in the system ascribed to Dharmapāla, according to which not all kinds of mind and mental factors but only *manas* and *manovijñāna* and their associates were regarded as *parikalpaka* (Si 45c25ff.) - the *parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā* is, in spite of Y_t zi 30a5ff. (see n. 553), not easily interpreted as comprising a l l Seeds that ālayavijñāna contains (see § 4.5.2) and makes its object (see §§ 5.6.3.2; 5.6.4.2; 5.16).

b) The equivalence of the *-abhiniveśavāsanā* of VinSg with the *-prapañcavāsanā* of Saṃdh V.2 is explicitly stated at SaṃdhVy co 81a3. Cp. also ASBh 92,5f. (*sarvadharmanāmābhiniveśavāsanā = prapañcavāsanā*). *'Abhiniveśa'* is used as a synonym of *'prapañca'* at Akutobhayā tsa 82a1; cp. also MAVṬ 146,3f. beside 144,6f. (cp. n. 729); Hsien-yang 579c4 (quasi-synonymity of concepts including 執著 (**abhiniveśa*), 為作 (**abhisaṃskāra*), 戲論 (**prapañca*) and 取 (**upādāna*).
Cp. also the not infrequent equation of *prapañca* with *tṛṣṇā* or *kleśa*, both in non-Yogācāra (see Ñāṇananda 1971, 11f.;

1o8ff.; AN IV 68f.; Vibh 392f.; Vi 344a12f.; 42oc15f.) and Yogācāra texts, e.g. Y_m 84b2 (= Y_t dzi 185b8): *prapañcaḥ*[1] *katamaḥ / kleśā<ḥ> sakleśāś ca skandhāḥ*; Y_m 128b2 (= Y_t dzi 288b3f.; cp. ŚrBh 233,16f.): *sarvêñjita-manyita- prapañcit âbhisaṃskṛta- tṛṣṇā -gataiḥ*. This material would seem to show that *prapañca* (as a subjective act) is a wrong attitude that has both an intellectual and an appetitive or emotional aspect (cp. also n. 14o5(*A*)), and that in this sense *prapañca* is, though focussing on the somewhat different aspect of conceptual proliferation (Ñāṇananda 1971, 4), closely related to *abhiniveśa* and even *upādāna* (in the sense of spiritually negative Clinging).

1. Y_m *pañcamaḥ*, but *prapañcaḥ* in the uddāna (Y_m 84a1).

533. E.g. Saṃdh VII.1o.

534. E.g. Y_t 'i 137b6f. (cp. S 1969a, 44f.).

535. *'abhiniveśa'* and *'upādāna'* may, of course, also be used as quasi-synonyms (c.p., e.g., SN No. 12.15, or Hsien-yang 579c4 (see n. 532(*b*)).

536. Hsien-yang 48oc3ff.:
"ālayavijñāna is produced by *kleśas* and predominant karma committed at a former time (i.e. in a former life) as its conditions (*pratyaya*), and by the beginningless Impressions of [saṃsāric] diversity/diversification (*anādikālikaprapañca-vāsanā*) as its [homogeneous] cause (*hetu*) ...; it appropriates/contains and perceives the material sense-faculties along with their bases and the *prapañcavāsanā*."
(阿賴耶識者、謂、先世所作增長業煩惱為緣、無始時來戲論熏習為因所生、…。此識能執受了別色根根所依處及戲論熏習。)

537. This term indicates that in the Hsien-yang *prapañcavāsanā* is clearly distinguished, namely as the fundamental cause of diversity as such, from (the Impression of) spiritually negative Clinging (represent-

ed, in this passage, by the *kleśas*) as a specific condition of r e b i r t h . Cp. n. 831.

538. In view of the absence of another version it is, however, difficult to decide to what extent Hts.'s rendering of this passage is faithful to the original.

539. Cp. definitions of *s ā s r a v a (t v a)* in terms of being the o b j e c t of *āsravas* = *kleśas* (e.g. VisM XIV.10; Y_t zi 215a8ff. [Y_c 661c2ff.]: *zag pa'i dmigs pa las zag pa daṅ bcas pa* = **āsravālambanataḥ sāsrava*; Y_c 880a12-14 [no Tib.]: 言有漏者、... 諸漏所緣; r e j e c t e d in VGPVy 386b2-4), or in terms of being the o b j e c t i v e b a s i s (**vastu?*) o f *s a t k ā y a -* or *ā t m a - d ṛ ṣ ṭ i* (Vi 392b26f.: 若法是有身見事 ..., 是有漏義; cp. also Vi 92b20).

540. Cp. $BoBh_D$ 35,24ff. (= $BoBh_W$ 52,10ff.):
"When an object which is under the sway of Cankers and Clinging has for a long time habitually, obstinately and intimately been conceived of as one's Self or one's own, [and when], due to this habit of wrong apprehension, the [corresponding] wrong idea arises in dependence upon the [occurrence of] its object [because the latter is] liable to give rise to [such] a wrong view (cp. CPD s.v. *āsavaṭṭhānīya*), then this is called the idea of 'I' and 'Mine'" (*yad vastu s ā s r a v a ṃ s o p ā d ā n ī y aṃ dīrghakālam ātmato vā ātmīyato vā saṃstutam abhiniviṣṭaṃ paricitaṃ, tasmād asadgrāhasaṃstavāt svaṃ dṛṣṭisthānīyaṃ vastu pratītyôtpadyate vitatho vikalpaḥ, ayam ucyate aham iti mamêti ca vikalpaḥ /*).

541. On *s ā s r a v a* see, besides ns. 539 and 542-547, also n. 495 and, e.g., de la Vallée Poussin 1932, 114ff.; AK_P I, 6f.; J. Katō 1973; Odani 1977. *Sāsravatva* based on the *ahaṃkāra* of *kliṣṭa-manas*: MSg I.7A.6; Si 25c20ff. (Si_P 285 ff.). On the use of *sāsrava* with reference to the skandhas of an Arhat (not relevant to the present context), see ASBh 24,1f. and S 1969a, 157.

542. Cp. ASBh 23,15f.: *ā s r a v a - t a d ā t m a t a ḥ* (= AS 18,4) *āsravāṇāṃ sāsravatvam, āsrava-svabhāvena yuktatvāt.*

543. Cp. ASBh 23,16f.: *ā s r a v a - s a ṃ b a n d h a t a s tat-sahabhuvāṃ citta-caittānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ ca (sāsravatvam), āsrava-saṃprayuktatvād āśrayatvāc* (Tib.; ms. *āsravatvāc*) *ca yathākramam.*

544. Cp. ASBh 23,18: *ā s r a v a - b a n d h a t a ḥ kuśala-sāsravāṇāṃ (sāsravatvam), tad-vaśena* (i.e. *āsrava-vaśena*) *punarbhava-nirvartanāt.*

545. Cp. ASBh 23,18f.: *ā s r a v â n u b a n d h a t o* ... *(sāsravatvam),* ...*-āsrava-dauṣṭhulyânuga*[1]*<ta>*[2]*tvāt.* Cp. also n. 495.

1. Thus the ms.; cp. Tib. *daṅ ldan pa* and Ch. 所隨逐; ed.: *-śraya-*.
2. Cp. ASBh 23,2o.

546. As an exception, ASBh 23,2of. mentions the *nirvedhabhāgīyas.*

547. Cp. AS 18,5: *āsravānukūlyataḥ (sāsravam)*; Y_c 88oa12-14 (no Tib.): 言有漏者、... 能生諸漏.

548. Y_t zi 8b1f. (Y_c 581b4-6; Chüeh-ting 1o2oa18-2o; H 1979, 38 [§ 5.b.A.4]);
... *kun gźi rnam par śes pa de ñid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir* (a) *da ltar gyi dus na sdug bsṅal gyi bden pa'i raṅ bźin daṅ /* (b) *ma 'oṅs pa'i dus na sdug bsṅal gyi bden pa skyed par byed pa daṅ /* (c) *da ltar gyi dus ñid na kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa skyed par byed pa'aṅ yin no //*
(≈ **tad evâlayavijñānaṃ sarvabīja(ka)tvād* (a) *varttamāne 'dhvani duḥkhasatya-svabhāvam,* (b) *ānāgate 'dhvani duḥkhasa-tya-janakaṃ,* (c) *varttamāne 'dhvani samudayasatya-janakaṃ ca*).

549. Y_t zi 8a4f. (Y_c 581a25f.; Chüeh-ting 1o2oa13f.; H 1979, 37f. [§ 5.b.A]): *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni mdor na kun nas ñon moṅs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin no //*; cp. also Y_t zi 9a3f. (see § 1o.1 (o) and § 11.2.4).

550. See n. 568.

551. Y_t zi 9b5 (Y_c 581c11f.; Chüeh-ting 1020b14f.; H 1979, 41f. [§ C.2(b)]), were being permeated by Badness is presented as one of the characteristics of ālayavijñāna in contrast to **āśrayaparivṛtti*: *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni gnas ṅan len daṅ ldan pa yin la gnas gyur pa ni gnas ṅan len thams cad daṅ gtan bral ba yin no //.*

552. See n. 568 and the fact that ālayavijñāna is entirely absent in Arhats, etc. (see § 4.9).

553. Y_t zi 30a5-8 (Y_c 589a9ff.; Chüeh-ting 1025c9ff.):
"What is the brief characterization of Seeds (*bîja*)? [They are] the Impression of sticking to the Imagined Character of all dharmas (**sarva-dharma-parikalpita-svabhāvâbhiniveśa-vāsanā*) [- an Impression] which exists in ālayavijñāna. ... This [Impression] is also called 'Omnipresent Badness' (**sarvatraga-dauṣṭhulya*). (Question:) If this Impression (*vāsanā*) comprises all Seeds and is also called 'Omnipresent Badness', ..."
(*sa bon mdor bsdus pa'i rnam par bźag pa gaṅ źe na / chos thams cad kyi* (D) *kun brtags pa'i ṅo bo ñid la mṅon par źen pa'i bag chags kun gźi'i rnam par śes pa la yod pa gaṅ yin pa ste / ... de yaṅ kun tu 'gro ba'i gnas ṅan len yin par brjod par bya'o // gal te bag chags des sa bon thams cad bsdus la* (D: *pa*) */ de yaṅ kun tu 'gro ba'i gnas ṅan len ces bya bar gyur na / ...*).
Cp. also ASBh 92,5-7: *sarvatragam abhilāpadauṣṭhulyaṃ yā cakṣurādi-sarvadharma-nāmâbhiniveśa-vāsanā ''layavijñāne sanniviṣṭā 'nādikālānusṛtā, yā 'sāv ucyate prapañcavāsanêti, yataś cakṣurādayo dharmāḥ sanāmābhiniveśāḥ punaḥ punaḥ pravartanta iti /.*

554. Y_t zi 9b4 (Y_c 581c9f.; Chüeh-ting 1020b12f.; H 1979, 41f. [§ C.2(a)]), characterizing ālayavijñāna as *sopādāna* in contrast to **āśrayaparivṛtti* which is *nirupādāna*: *kun gźi rnam*

par śes pa ni ... len pa daṅ bcas pa yin la / gnas gyur pa ni ... len pa med pa yin te /.

555. Cp. Y_t zi 9b3ff., especially 9b8ff. (Y_c 581c17ff.; Chüeh-ting 1o2ob19ff.; H 1979, 42f. [§ 5.b.C.3]), where the state of the Arhat who has got rid of all Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) due to having eliminated its principle, viz. ālayavijñāna, is characterized as follows:
"The characteristic of ālayavijñāna eliminated is that as soon as it is eliminated (**samanantara-prahīṇe tasmin* or **saha(-?) tat-prahāṇāt* (?): cp. n. 1248) a twofold *upādāna* (→ 1.a, 1.b) is abandoned and the body [is no longer fraught with Badness but only] continues [a while], similar to a *nirmāṇa* (→ 2). [I.e.:] (1.a) Because [ālayavijñāna, as][1] the cause which gives rise to rebirth (*punarbhava*), i.e. Suffering, in future, has been abandoned, t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n (*upādāna*) of rebirth in the future is abandoned. (1.b) Because [ālayavijñāna comprising][2] all causes of pollution (*saṃkleśa*) in this life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*) has been abandoned, Clinging (*upādāna*)[3] to the basis (*āśraya*) of pollution [4] (i.e. to the animated, sensible body consisting of or furnished with the Six Senses, in so far as it is conceived of and felt as one's self or own) in this life is abandoned; (2) and, being free from all Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*), [this basis, i.e. the body furnished with or consisting of the Six Senses[5]] continues [for some time], being merely (*-mātra*) the condition of physical life (*jīvitapratyaya*)."
(*kun gźi rnam par śes pa de'i spaṅs pa'i mtshan ñid ni de spaṅs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gñis spoṅ ba daṅ / sprul pa lta bu'i lus kun tu gnas pa ste / phyi ma la sdug bsṅal yaṅ 'byuṅ bar byed pa'i rgyu spaṅs pa'i phyir / phyi ma la yaṅ 'byuṅ bar byed pa'i len pa spoṅ ba daṅ / tshe 'di la kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i rgyu thams cad spaṅs pa'i phyir / tshe 'di'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i gnas len pa*[3] *thams cad spoṅ ba daṅ / gnas ṅan len thams cad daṅ bral źiṅ srog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun tu gnas so //*).

1. Cp. Y_t zi 8b1f. (H 1979, 38 [§ 4(b)]); see n. 548.
2. Cp. Y_t zi 8b2 (H 1979, 38 [§ 4(c)]); see n. 548.
3. So to be read in accordance with Hsüan-tsang (一切雜染所依之取) and because t w o kinds of *len pa* had been announced. Y_t and SaṃdhVy co 78b2: *gnas ṅan len*; SaṃdhVy co 105b7: *gnas na len pa*.
4. Or: Clinging to the basis (i.e. the animated body ...) [which (viz. Clinging) constitutes] Pollution.
5. To be supplied from the preceding sentence (which has to be interpreted accordingly), on the lines of the introductory *sprul pa lta bu'i lus* (身) *kun tu gnas pa ste* of which the present passage is obviously the explanation. Cp. MN III 107f. (*imam eva kāyaṃ ... saḷāyatanikaṃ jīvitapaccayā*) and AS 42,12 (*yad aśaikṣāṇāṃ jīvitendriyapratyayaṃ ṣaḍāyatanam*).

556. Hsien-yang 480c12-14; cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 189; 1982a, 133.

557. The passage translated in n. 555 would even seem to presuppose that it is still the polluted basis-of-personal-existence as a whole, especially the body, that is considered to be clung to (as Ego or as Mine).

558. Y 25,1f.: *tat punaḥ sarvabījakaṃ vijñānaṃ parinirvāṇadharmakāṇāṃ paripūrṇabījam, aparinirvāṇadharmakāṇāṃ punas trividhabodhibījavikalam*.

559. Y_t zi 3b2f. = ASBh 12,28f. (H 1978, 12 [§ iv]; Griffiths 1986, 134f.).

560. See §§ 10.3.1.*1* and 10.3.2.

561. Y_t zi 9a3ff., especially b2f. (see § 10.1).

562. See § 11.2.

563. Y_t zi 8b4-6 (Y_c 581b10-12; Chüeh-ting 1020a20ff.; H 1979, 39 [§ B.1]): *kun gźi rnam par śes pa thar pa'i cha daṅ mthun pa daṅ / ṅes par 'byed pa'i cha daṅ mthun pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba rnams kyi sa bon yoṅs su 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa* (**yad ālayavijñānaṃ mokṣabhāgīya-nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla-bījaparigṛhītam*) ... (continuation see n. 566).

The *n i r v e d h a b h ā g ī y a*-*kuśalamūlas*, which immediately precede and introduce *darśanamārga*, consist of

uṣmagata, etc. (cp., e.g., Vi 35a6f.; AKBh 274,22; 346,1f.; ŚrBh 324,10ff.; AS 65,20f.; Si_p 575ff.). The *mokṣa-bhāgīyas* seem to comprise all preparatory wholesome factors accomplished with the intention to attain salvation (Si_p 564f.), such as almsgiving, morality, or reciting/memorizing Sūtras (Vi 35a21ff.), or *kuśalo dharmacchandaḥ*, etc. (ASBh 118,15ff.; cp. ŚrBh 8,15ff.), up to the four *smṛtyupasthānas* (cp. AKVy 528,12f.). They have to be distinguished from "good dharmas conducive to merit" (*puṇyabhāgīya-kuśala*) which serve the purpose not of liberation but of intramundane happiness (AKBh 274,18ff.; AD 218,1ff.; Vi 34c27ff.).

564. Cp. Y_t zi 9a4 (*so so'i skye bo!*), and perhaps 8b6-8 speaking, probably with reference to the *puṇyabhāgīya-kuśala-mūlas* (see n. 1344), of "the other mundane *kuśalamūlas*" (though the expression is, to be sure, not unambiguous since an interpretation as "the other, viz. the mundane *kuśalamūlas*" does not seem to be entirely impossible. For according to ASBh 23,19-24,1 the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* may, in a sense, even be established as *anāsrava* because they are opposed to [the *āsravas* not because of actually eradicating them but] in so far as they are averse to all [mundane] existence (*sarva-bhava-vaimukhyena tatpratipakṣatvāt*).

565. See § 4.8.2.

566. Y_t zi 8b4-6 (H 1979, 39; as for the initial portion of the text, see n. 563): ... *de ni kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa'i rgyu* (*samudayasatya-hetu*) *ma yin te / thar pa la sogs pa'i cha daṅ mthun pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba rnams ni 'jug pa daṅ 'gal ba ñid yin pa'i phyir ro* (**pravṛttivairodhikatvān mokṣādibhāgīyānāṃ kuśalamūlānām*) //.

567. Cp. the express statement, to this effect, of MSg I.45 (see n. 574).

568. Y_t zi 9b6 (Y_c 581c12f.; Chüeh-ting 1020b15-17; H 1979, 41f. [§ C.2(c)]): *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni ñon moṅs pa rnams*

kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu daṅ lam gyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin la / ≈ **ālayavijñānaṃ kleśa-pravṛtti-hetur mārgâpravṛtti-hetuś* (cp. Y_c 聖道不轉因) *ca*. Cp. also Hsien-yang 480c9f.: "The function (*karman*) [of ālayavijñāna] is to increase the defiled (**kliṣṭa*) pravṛttivijñānas, etc., and to diminish (or: to prevent the arising and growth of?) the pure pravṛttivijñānas, etc." (能增長有染轉識等為業、及能損減清淨轉識等為業).

569. See § 4.7.2 (+ n. 553).

570. Y_t zi 30a8f. (Y_c 589a14ff.; Chüeh-ting 1025c14ff.; cp. S 1969a, 166):
"[Objection (continued from n. 553):] ... In this case, what is then the Seed from which the supramundane dharmas arise? [A Seed incorporated in ālayavijñāna is out of the question, for it is included in Badness, and] what has the nature of Badness cannot be the Seed from which the [supramundane dharmas] arise![1]
Answer: Supramundane dharmas arise from (-*anugata*?)[2] [their] *ālambana-pratyaya*, viz. *tathatā*, as their "Seed"; they do not arise from a Seed accumulated [by way of] Impression (**vāsanâcita-bīja*)."
(*de ltar na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams skye ba'i sa bon gaṅ yin / de dag skye ba'i sa bon gyi dṅos po gnas ṅan len gyi raṅ bźin can yin par ni mi ruṅ ṅo źe na / smras pa / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni de bźin ñid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon daṅ ldan par skye'i*[3] </> *bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon daṅ ldan pa ni ma yin no //*).

1. In the Tib. version, *dṅos po* is odd. In view of Y_c (... 麁重自性種子為種子生、不應道理) it would seem that Tib. has misconstrued a presumable original like **dauṣṭhulya-svabhāvasya tadutpattibījabhāv(asy)āyogāt*.

2. Cp. ns. 172, 402 and 438. Y_c here: 從 ...

3. D wrongly *skye ba'i*.

Strictly speaking, such a use of the term 'Seed' (*bīja*) in the sense of *ālambanapratyaya* means that a Seed proper, in the sense of *hetupratyaya*, is denied to exist in the case

of supramundane dharmas (or at least of the first of them), as is made explicit at VGPVy 430b6ff.

According to Y_t zi 9b6f. (Y_c 581c13-15; Chüeh-ting 1020b17-19; H 1979, 41f. [§ C.2(c)]), **āśrayaparivṛtti* (in this paragraph of the text probably to be identified with *tathatā* (see n. 1337) freed, or partly freed, from Impurities) is the cause of the coming forth (*pravṛtti*) of the [supramundane] Path (*mārga*), yet not in the sense of being the cause which generates the latter [for the first time] (*janana-hetu*: cp. AKBh 102,24; ASBh 3,4) but only in the sense of the cause which supports [its continuance] (*pratiṣṭhā-hetu*: cp. Y 217,4 and, though in a somewhat different sense, AKBh 102,25 and ASBh 3,4 (cp. Y 53,1ff.); H 1979, 23 note 49). Cp. also Y_t zi 30b6f. (Y_c 589a28ff.; Chüeh-ting 1025c23f.): *'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos skyes pa rnams kyi* (D) *rjes su 'jug pa ni gnas gyur pa'i stobs bskyed pa las rig par bya ste /* (≈ **lokottarāṇāṃ dharmāṇām utpannānām anuvṛttir āśrayaparivṛtti-balādhānād veditavyā*).

571. Y_t zi 30b3ff. (Y_c 589a21ff.).

572. Cp., e.g., Yūki 1935a; Takeuchi 1950-51; Frauwallner 1969, 332; Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 490f.
Since MSg I.45-49 is a kind of excursus, which m a y (but of course need not) reflect a slightly later stage in the development of the author's thought (cp. § 5.12.4 + ns. 710 and 711), the theory of supramundane purification in MSg may have started from a simpler view (MSg I.44) in which ālayavijñāna's receiving Impressions or Seeds leading to supramundane insight was not yet felt to involve difficulties, as may also be true of the Abhidharmasūtra (for which see Keenan 1982, 11ff., though in view of the Abhidharmasūtra verses quoted at MSg I.2 and I.27 [see n. 136] I should prefer to understand the *anādikāliko dhātuḥ* of the famous verse quoted at MSg I.1 as virtually referring to ālayavijñāna).

573. Cp. MSg I.45: *bag chags de med na sa bon gaṅ las 'byuṅ ba brjod dgos so .../.*

574. MSg I.45: *sa bon thams cad pa rnam par smin pa'i rnam par śes pa ni kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i rgyu yin na de'i gñen po 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems kyi sa bon du ji ltar ruṅ /,* ≈ **kathaṃ punaḥ sarvabījakaṃ vipākavijñānaṃ saṃkleśahetubhūtaṃ tat-pratipakṣa-lokottara-citta-bījatvena yujyate* (cp. S 1985, 156 note 29).

575. Cp. MSg I.45: *'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems ni ma 'dris pa ste / de bas na de'i bag chags ni med pa ñid do //.*

576. MSg I.46: *saṅs rgyas kyi byaṅ chub la brten nas* (**buddhānāṃ bodhim āgamya*, cp. Y 30,15).

577. Cp. MAVṬ 101,11: *dharmadhātu-prativedha-prabhāvitatvād buddhavacanasya.*

578. MSg II.26(3.d): ... *theg pa chen po'i dam pa'i chos bstan pa ste / ... de ni ... chos kyi dbyiṅs rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa yin pas ...*; cp. RGV I.145; MAVBh 35,14f.; MAVṬ 101,13f.; 229,5f.

579. MSg I.45: *chos kyi dbyiṅs śin tu rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa thos pa'i bag chags*; I.48 (see n. 582); MAVṬ 186,6f.

580. MSg I.46:
"When *śruta-vāsanā* arises in a basis[-of-personal-existence] (*āśraya*, i.e. in the stream-of-personality (*santāna*: $MSgU_t$ 262a2) or mental series (**citta-santāna*: VGPVy 432a4) of a living being), it abides in the *vipākavijñāna* [of this living being] by way of existing together with it [without being a part of it], like milk and water [when they are mixed]."
(... *thos pa'i bag chags ... gaṅ yin pa gnas gaṅ la 'jug pa de lhan cig 'dug pa'i tshul gyis rnam par smin pa'i rnam par śes pa la 'jug ste / 'o ma daṅ chu bźin no //*);
MSg I.49: ... *kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ / kun gźi rnam par śes pa ma yin pa chu daṅ 'o ma bźin du lhan cig gnas pa ...*

In view of the fact that the latter passage (I.49) uses 'ālayavijñāna' instead of the 'vipākavijñāna' of the former (I.46), I hesitate to follow Nagao (1982, 223f.) who with VGPVy[1] and the later system[2] concludes from MSg I.46 that in MSg 'vipākavijñāna' is used in a wider sense than 'ālaya-vijñāna', and who seems to find it odd that the Bhāṣya takes the salvific *śrutavāsanā* to subsist in or on ālayavi-jñāna ($MSgBh_t$ 163a1f.: *thos pa'i bag chags ... kun gźi rnam par śes pa la gnas pa*).

1. 432a5f.: *kun gźi'i rnam par śes pa <ma> smos pa ni ma khyab pa'i phyir te </> 'di ltar de ni sa brgyad pa la sogs pa la gnas pa'i byaṅ chub sems dpa'i rgyud daṅ / dgra bcom pa daṅ / raṅ saṅs rgyas rnams kyi rgyud la med kyi </> rnam par smin pa'i rnam par śes pa ni yod do //.*
2. See § 4.1o.2 + n. 6o8.

A wider extension of the term 'vipākavijñāna' could only be proved if one could point out a passage expressing or at least implying that in the case of Arhats, etc., subliminal mind continues to exist but is no longer called 'ālayavijñāna' but only 'vipākavijñāna'. Yet, I for one have found no such passage in MSg. MSg I.46 is not concerned with Arhats, etc., but with the process of salvation, especially with its preparatory phase preceding even the first supramundane *citta*, i.e. preceding the attainment of the state of Ārya, let alone of Arhat, etc. Actually, MSg does not seem to be interested in the theory of the Arhat except that it points out the superiority of Tathāgatas over (ordinary) Arhats. In this sense, MSg I.61D[3] states that in the case of Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas (before death) ālayavijñāna is free from the whole *kleśāvaraṇa* but not, as in the case of Tathāgatas, also from *jñeyāvaraṇa*, and this might seem to imply that even in the Arhat ālayavijñāna (!) somehow continues to exist. On the other hand, at MSg I.48 (MSg_L 2o,12-14) the vipākavi-jñāna (!) containing all Seeds is stated to have become free from [all] Seeds and [hence] to be completely eliminated

(**prahīṇa*) when the Transmutation of Basis is accomplished (*gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na*), and there is no reason to restrict this statement to Tathāgatas only since a few lines earlier (MSg_L 2o,5ff.) both Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas/Pratyekabuddhas had been mentioned. And since the immediately preceding sentence had spoken of a gradual decrease of vipākavijñāna itself (and not merely of Seeds contained in it), the resulting complete "evacuation" and elimination of vipākavijñāna should be regarded as c o i n c i d i n g[4], and n o t as two alternatives (Arhat ⟷ Tathāgata) or (with $MSgBh_c$ [Pa.] 175a4-6) as two successive steps.

3. = MSg_L I.61.4. The paragraph, though contained in all Chinese versions, is not commented upon in MSgBh nor in MSgU (cp. Nagao 1982, 269)!

4. Cp. also the equivalence of expressions characterizing ālayavijñāna/vipākavijñāna as c o n t a i n i n g or as b e i n g Seed(s); see § 5.12.2 + n. 7o3.

Thus, I for one fail to perceive, in MSg, a clear-cut difference of the extension of the terms 'ālayavijñāna' and 'vipākavijñāna', and it seems to me that they are better taken to refer to precisely the same entity, and that the choice of one term or the other is rather a matter of a s p e c t s to be emphasized in a given case:

' Ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a ' is, of course, used when subliminal mind is envisaged as "what is clung to" as Self (MSg I.3; 13C; 58+59.3). This term is also preferred when the c a u s a l function of subliminal mind is prominent, i.e. when it is primarily viewed as the cause or Seed of Pollutive dharmas (I.3; 8-9; 19.1; 32; 58) or of false representations (II.2; III.12), a preference found even in connection with the mutual causality of subliminal mind and Pollutive dharmas in the sense of *hetupratyaya* causality (I.14; 17).

On the other hand, the term ' v i p ā k a v i j ñ ā n a ' is preferably used with reference to subliminal mind as the result of karmic Maturation (I.62) merging with

embryonic matter at the moment of conception (I.34), as the principle constitutive of affiliation to a specific (level of) existence (I.4o-41; cp. I.21), or as the principle of biological appropriation (I.35; 5o-51), and also when subliminal mind is primarily viewed as a neutral recipient or support of Impressions including *śrutavāsanā* (I.43-44; I.46).

Yet, since these aspects are not mutually exclusive and characterize one and the same entity, one will not be surprised to meet with occasional exceptions to the usage described above. Thus, ' ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a ' is once used in the biological context, viz. with reference to mind withdrawing from the body in the process of dying (I.42); and at I.49 'ālayavijñāna' denotes subliminal mind as that with which the *śrutavāsanā* coexists (though this time with additional emphasis on the heterogeneity of the two elements). On the other hand, ' v i p ā k a v i j ñ ā n a ' once occurs in the context of the mutual dependence of subliminal mind (/*abhilāpavāsanā*, i.e. *hetupratyaya* causality!) and pravṛttivijñānas/dharmas (II.32B; MSg_L: II.32.1), and even in the context of subliminal mind as the cause of Pollution (I.45) which is gradually reduced and finally eliminated by the salvific *śrutavāsanā* (I.48, discussed above). Besides, in situations covering aspects of both sets, both terms are used indiscriminately (e.g. I.29 beside I.56).

581. MSg I.46: *de ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa ma yin te /*; I.48: *thos pa'i bag chags ... kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i gñen po yin pas kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i ṅo bo ñid ma yin pa ...*; III.1 (see n. 582).

582. MSg I.45: *thos pa'i bag chags kyi* ($MSgBh_t$; om. MSg_t) *sa bon las de* (= *lokottaraṃ cittam*) *'byuṅ ṅo //*; I.46: *thos pa'i bag chags ... de'i gñen po'i* (i.e. *ālayavijñānapratipakṣasya* = *lokottarasya cittasya*) *sa bon ñid yin pa'i phyir ro //*; I.48: *thos pa'i bag chags ... 'jig rten pa yin yaṅ*

'jig rten las 'das pa chos kyi dbyiṅs śin tu rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa yin pas (**lokottara-suviśuddha-dharmadhātu-niṣyandatvena*) *'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems kyi sa bon du gyur pa'o //*; cp. also III.1: *maṅ du thos pas bsgos pa'i gnas / kun gźi rnam par śes pas bsdus pa ma yin la / kun gźi rnam par śes pa ltar / tshul bźin yid la byed pas bsdus pa...'i yid kyi brjod pa rnams kyi sa bon yin pa'o //* (**bāhuśrutya-bhāvita āśraya*[1] *ālayavijñānâsaṃgṛhīta ālayavijñānavad bījabhūto yoniśo-manasikāra-saṃgṛhītānāṃ ... manojalpānām /*). Cp. also AS 28,9f. (*hetupratyayaḥ katamaḥ / ālayavijñānaṃ kuśalavāsanā ca*) + ASBh 35,21f.; Si 8b13-15.

1. MSgBh$_t$ 192a1: *bdag ñid kyi ṅo bo* (= **ātmabhāva*, cp. Hts. 自體); MSgU$_t$ 295a8: *sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i rgyud* (= **citta-caitta-santāna*).

583. Si 8b4f. (Si$_p$ 1o2ff.: Candrapāla); 9a7ff. (Si$_p$ 1o7ff.: Dharmapāla); cp. also Si 11a6-8; 45b29ff. VGPVy 431a2; YVy 112b5ff.; YidKun 38,5ff.

584. Especially LAS VI (pp. 22off.).
Cp., e.g., Brown 1981, 271ff.; Y. Shimizu in: IBK 25.1/1976, 162f., and in: ŌsG 128/1976, 111ff.; E. Kan in: IBK 25.2/1977, (21) ff.

585. Cp. also the stanza from the Abhidharmasūtra quoted at MSg I.1, RGVV 72,13f. and TrBh 37,12f.; see Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 494f.

586. Y$_t$ 1ob3f. (Y$_c$ 582a8f.; Chüeh-ting 1o2oc7-9; H 1979, 44 [§ b̲]: "One has pravṛttivijñāna(s) but no ālayavijñāna: an Arhat, Pratyekabuddha, Bodhisattva not liable to turn back, or Tathāgata, [as far as they are] in a conscious state (*sacittikāyām avasthāyām*)" (*'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan la / kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ mi ldan pa ni sems yod pa'i gnas skabs na dgra bcom pa daṅ / raṅ saṅs rgyas daṅ / phyir mi ldog pa'i byaṅ chub sems dpa' daṅ / de bźin gśegs pa'o //*).

587. Cp. Y_t 'i 2o1a4f. (Y_c 794b12f.) where it is said that by attaining Arhatship one "decomposes" (**pūtīkaroti* (?)) and destroys this *vijñāna* (i.e. *vijñāna* furnished with the Seeds of Defilements = *sopādāna-vijñāna*, see § 4.3.1 + n. 499) with its Seeds (*de yaṅ de'i 'og tu dgra bcom pa thob nas rnam par śes pa sa bon daṅ bcas pa de rul bar byed ciṅ med par byed de /*).

588. Y_t zi 1ob5f. (Y_c 582a1o-12; Chüeh-ting 1o2oc11-13; H 1979, 44 [§ d]): "One is devoid of both [pravṛttivijñāna(s) and ālayavijñāna]: an Arhat, Pratyekabuddha, Bodhisattva not liable to turning back, or Tathāgata, when they have entered *nirodhasamāpatti*, or in the state of Extinction where no Possessions (i.e. skandhas) remain (*nirupadhiśeṣe nirvāṇadhātau*)" (*gñi ga daṅ mi ldan pa ni dgra bcom pa daṅ / raṅ saṅs rgyas daṅ / phyir mi ldog pa'i byaṅ chub sems dpa' daṅ / de bźin gśegs pa 'gog pa la sñoms par źugs pa daṅ / phuṅ po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ṅan las 'das pa'i dbyiṅs na'o //*).

589. Paramārtha's rendering of **āśrayaparivṛtti* by 阿摩羅識 (*amala-vijñāna* or *-jñāna*; cp. Iwata 1971, especially 5o) is obviously an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n, which, interesting though it is in itself, is better left aside in ascertaining the original import of the text.

59o. Y_t zi 9b7f. (Y_c 581c16f.; Chüeh-ting om.; H 1979, 41f. [§ C.2(d)]): *gnas gyur pa ni dge ba daṅ luṅ du ma bstan pa'i chos thams cad*[1] *la dbaṅ byed pa'o*[2] *//*

1. SaṃdhVy co 1o5b5: *chos rnams*

2. SaṃdhVy: *dbaṅ du byed pa yin no*

The older layer of the *Nivṛtti Portion* material (see n. 1337) appears to characterize the state of Transmutation of Basis only in a negative way by stating that the *āśraya* (i.e. the body furnished with or consisting of *ṣaḍāyatana*: see ib.) is f r e e d from all B a d n e s s (*dauṣṭhulya*).

591. Cp. Y 27,1-3: *parinirvāṇakāle* (i.e. when attaining Arhatship?) *punar viśuddhānāṃ yogināṃ parivṛttāśrayāṇāṃ sarva-kliṣṭa-dharma-nirbīja āśrayaḥ parivartate* (i.e. a Basis which is free from all Seeds of defiled dharmas replaces the old one which contained such Seeds[1]) / *sarva-kuśalâvyākṛta-dharma-bījeṣu ca pratyayān vikalīkaroti, adhyātmapratyaya-vaśitāṃ* (Y_m) *ca pratilabhate* /.

1. Tib. and Ch.: "the Basis containing all Seeds of defiled dharmas is Transmuted" (**-dharma-bījâśrayaḥ* ...?), but probably a *lectio facilior*.

592. SacAcBh (see App. I) § 5.

593. Y_t zi 189a7ff., especially 190a6ff. (Y_c 651b6ff., especially c15ff.).

594. Y_t zi 189b5 (see n. 946).

595. Y_t zi 190b5: *mi slob pa la ni rnam pa thams cad du kun tu mi 'byuṅ ṅo //*, ≈ **aśaikṣasya sarvathā na samudācaranti* (sc. the Defilements of the new *manas*).

596. Y_t zi 190a6f.: *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni ñon moṅs pa gaṅ daṅ yaṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa ma yin no //*. Direct association (*saṃprayoga*) of ālayavijñāna with actual Defilements is, of course, not asserted by any Yogācāra source, including the *Nivṛtti Portion*, but the fact that the matter is explicitly stated in the present context appears to be significant.

597. See § 4.8.5.

598. See ns. 556 and 568.

599. Tr 5a: *tasya* (= *ālayavijñānasya*) *vyāvṛttir arhattve*.

600. Y_t 'i 138a5ff.(Y_c 748a14ff.; S 1969a, 46ff. [§ 4]): *dgra bcom pa ... sems gaṅ la gnas nas phuṅ po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ṅan las 'das pa'i dbyiṅs su yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'da' źe na / smras pa / ... 'gog pa la sñoms par 'jug la / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa 'gog par byed ciṅ / de'i 'og tu kun*

gźi rnam par śes pa'i gnas spoṅ bar byed de (≈ **ālayavijñānam āśrayaṃ muñcati*: see S 1969a, 128f.) / *kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa rgyu med pa mi skye bas* / ...

601. Cp. also Y_t 'i 207b8f. (Y_c 796c29f.): "All Paths (*pratipad*) of the Arhats are easy[1] (*sukha*) and quickly realized (*kṣiprābhijña*) because [Arhats] have destroyed all Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*)" (*dgra bcom pa'i lam thams cad ni mṅon par śes pa sla ba daṅ myur bar rig par bya ste / gnas ṅan len thams cad bcom pa...'i phyir ro //*).

1. Tib.: easily, but cp. Y_t dzi 197a6; AKBh 382,7.

602. E.g. $BoBh_D$ 169,4f. ($BoBh_W$ 246,25f.): *traidhātukâvacara-kleśa-pakṣya-dauṣṭhulya-duḥkham;*
Y_t zi 168a4f. (Y_c 642a12ff.):
"... All conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) belonging to the three world-spheres (*traidhātuka*) are, because of being permeated by (or stricken with) Badness affiliated to Defilements (**kleśa-pakṣya-dauṣṭhulyânugatatvāt* or *-ôpagatatvāt*), unwieldy (*akarmaṇya*) and not under one's control (*asvavaśavartin*, cp. ŚrBh 257,16). ... Therefore, they are called 'unsatisfactory on account of being permeated by Badness' (**dauṣṭhulyânu-* (or *-ôpa-*) *-gatatvād duḥkha*)."
(... *khams gsum pa'i 'du byed thams cad ni ñon moṅs pa'i phyogs daṅ mthun pa'i gnas ṅan len daṅ ldan pa'i phyir las su mi ruṅ ba daṅ dbaṅ sgyur ba ma yin la* / ... *de'i phyir gnas ṅan len daṅ ldan pa'i phyir sdug bsṅal yin źes bya'o* //);
Y_t zi 61a8ff. (Y_c 601b22ff.):
"What is 'latent tendency' (*anuśaya*)? [Answer:] Badness affiliated to Defilements (**yat kleśapakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyam*), [which means] the fact that conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) are in a bad state or condition (cp. MAVṬ 167,9f.: *duḥ-*

sthitatā). On account of this [bad state] (cp. Y_c) the Noble Ones (*ārya*), having comprehended (*abhisametya*) them to be characterized by Suffering (*duḥkha*) in the sense of *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*, continue to regard all *saṃskāras* as unsatisfactory (**duḥkhataḥ*)."
(*de la bag la ñal gaṅ źe na / ñon moṅs pa'i phyogs daṅ mthun pa'i gnas ṅan len gaṅ yin pa ste / 'du byed rnams kyi ñes par kun tu gnas pa ñid daṅ / ñes par źugs pa ñid do* (Y_c: ... 不安隱性、 又持諸行令成苦性) // *'phags pa rnams kyis gaṅ 'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal ñid kyis sdug bsṅal bar mṅon par rtogs nas / 'du byed thams cad la* (om. P) *sdug bsṅal bar gzigs śiṅ gnas pa* ...);
Cp. also passages deriving happiness (*sukha*) from the disappearance of Badness affiliated to Defilements, e.g.: $BoBh_D$ 18,15-17 ($BoBh_W$ 27,2ff.): *saṃbodhisukham* ... *dṛṣṭe* ... *dharme sarva-kleśa-pakṣyasya dauṣṭhulyasyâśrayagatasyâtyantoparamāt sukham*; ŚrBh 451,19f. (cp. n. 300): *-kleśa-pakṣa-sarva-dauṣṭhulyâpagamāt* ... *prītisukham*. Cp. also $BoBh_D$ 10,4 ($BoBh_W$ 14,26: ... *duḥkha-bahulān dauṣṭhulya-bahulān kleśa-bahulān*) where *dauṣṭhulya* figures as a kind of intermediate notion or connecting link between Suffering and Defilements.

Cp., finally, the fact that the Defilements (*kleśa*) themselves are sometimes (e.g. ŚrBh 256,17ff.; cp. S 1977, 921) expressly declared to be acutely painful (*paryavasthānata eva duḥkhāḥ*) because involving mental uneasiness or displeasure (*caitasikaṃ duḥkha-daurmanasyam*).

603. See n. 481.

604. S 1969a, 156-158.

605. Y_t 'i 139b6f. (Y_c 748c6f.; S 1969a, 54f.): *dgra bcom pa phuṅ po'i lhag ma daṅ bcas pa'i mya ṅan las 'das pa'i dbyiṅs la gnas pa'i* ... *rnam par smin pa daṅ / gnas ṅan len gyi sgrib pa* (**vipāka-dauṣṭhulyâvaraṇa*, the first part of which has to

be taken not as a dvandva but as a tatpuruṣa: S 1969a, 156) *ma 'gags pa ...*

606. In the case of a Tathāgata, however, this solution would not work because he has even eliminated *vipākadauṣṭhulya* (Y_t zi 107b5f.: see S 1969a, 156f.). In the later school, however, this problem becomes irrelevant due to the introduction of an altogether different theory of the Nirvāṇa of the Tathāgata (infinite *apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* (starting with the attainment of Enlightenment) instead of the old dichotomy of *sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* (attained with Enlightenment/Arhatship and ceasing at death) and *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* (after death)).

607. Cp., e.g., S 1969a, 129f.

608. Si 13c13ff.; cp. also VGPVy 432a5f. (see n. 580, footn. *1*); YidKuṅ 48,6ff., especially 8f. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 74).

609. Cp., e.g., MN I 292: *vijānāti vijānātī ti kho ..., tasmā viññāṇaṃ ti vuccati*; cp. also SN III.87; $SĀ_c$ 11c9; YVy 86b6; ŚrBh 143,11 = Pañcav 197,11 (cp. AS 3,1; VisM XIV.82): *vijānana(-)lakṣaṇaṃ vijñānam*.

610. AKBh 11,7: *viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñānaskandha ity ucyate*; Y 11,8: *vijñānaṃ katamat? yad ālambanavijñaptau pratyupasthitaṃ*; cp. Y 4,5 etc. (cp. Prak 693a5 ff.; AS 12,7ff.): *cakṣurvijñāna* etc. = ... *rūpaprativijñapti* etc., and Y 5,16 and 12,1f.: *cakṣurvijñāna* (*/manovijñāna*) = *sva-* (*/sva-para-*) *-viṣay â l a m b a n a v i j ñ a p t i*; MAV I.8c: *arthadṛṣṭir vijñānam*; PSk_t 16b8 (PSk_D § 25): *rnam par śes pa gaṅ źe na / dmigs pa rnam par rig pa'o* (= **ālambanavijñaptiḥ*); PSkVai 53a8f.; Tr 2b + 8bc: (*cakṣurādivijñānam* [TrBh 18,18] =) *vijñāptir viṣayasya* = *viṣayasyôpalabdhiḥ* (= *grahaṇam, pratipattiḥ*: TrBh 25,2f.). Cp. M. Takemura 1976, 75ff.; Suguro 1983, 13 and 15; Griffiths 1986, 95f.

611. The view that the mental factors (*caitta*) are not entities on their own but only conceived on the basis of specific

states (**avasthāviśeṣa*) of the *citta* is expressly rejected in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (Y_t zi 80b2ff.; see S 1969, 820f. [note 46]).

612. Y 57,10f. and 59,16-22.

613. According to Y 59,17f., *sparśa* is the apprehension of the agreeable (*śubha*), disagreeable (*aśubha*) or neutral (*ubhaya-viparīta*) character of the object; cp. Y 207,16f.: *cakṣuḥsaṃ-sparśaḥ katamaḥ / trikasamavāyajā viṣayaṃ śubhādyarthataḥ udgrahaṇātā </> evam avaśiṣṭānaṃ sparśānāṃ prativiṣayaṃ la-kṣaṇanirdeśo 'vagantavyaḥ* (corr. acc. to Y_m). According to AS 6,3 and ASBh 5,3f., *sparśa* is the distinct apprehension (*pariccheda*) of such modifications of the sense-organs as are suitable to the arising of pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feelings (*vedanā*); cp. TrBh 20,2ff.; Si 11b16ff. (Si_P 143ff.).

614. I.e. the recognition or identification of the typical feature(s) of the object, which is the basis of, or even includes, the conceptual and verbal determination of the latter (cp. S 1981, 215 note 51).

615. Cp. TrBh 19,2-4: *yadi pravṛttivijñānavyatiriktam ālayavijñā-nam asti, tato 'syâlambanam ākāro vā vaktavyaḥ / na hi nirālambanaṃ nirākāraṃ vā vijñānaṃ yujyate* (cp. also KSiṬ 105b1-2; PSkBh 181b7-182a1) and TrBh 19,26f.: *tatrâlayākhyaṃ vijñānam ity uktam* (see Tr 2a)*; vijñānaṃ câvaśyaṃ caittaiḥ saṃprayuktam: ity ato vaktavyaṃ katamaiḥ katibhiś ca tac caittaiḥ ... saṃprayujyate*. Cp. also Mizuno 1932, 1086; Nagao 1978, 373; Ui 1958, 170 and 181; Griffiths 1986, 95f.; cp. also Suguro 1983, 21,3-5.

616. See n. 683.

617. Cp. also $MĀ_c$ 789a15f. and 791c24; Y_t dzi 272a4-6 (Y_c 376b16-18).

618. Y 192,8 (see § 6.5.1).

619. See § 1.3.5 + n. 76 and § 7.3.6.3.3; cp. Y 24,4f. and 7f. (see § 6.3.1 and 3); cp. also Y 24,18f. + 25,1f.

620. Cp. the fact that *vedanā* is one of the four entities attached to which mind persists [in saṃsāra] (*vijñāna-sthiti*: cp. n. 1112).

621. Y 25,16f. (see n. 412).

622. See n. 294.

623. Y_t 'i 271a2f. (Y_c 821c23ff.) and 4: *gnas ṅan len las gyur pa...'i sdug bsṅal ... ñams su myoṅ bar 'gyur ro // ... lus daṅ sems śin tu sbyaṅs par mi 'gyur te / des na gnas ṅan len gyi sdug bsṅal ñams su myoṅ bar 'gyur ro //*.

624. Y_t zi 220b8ff. (Y_c 663b15ff.): "And this Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) is clear and manifest only in [states of] neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation (*aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā*). ... In [states of] pleasant and painful [sensation], this Suffering [constituted by] Badness (*dauṣṭhulya-duḥkha*) is not easily ascertained because[1] one's mind is agitated by attachment (*anunaya*) and aversion (*pratigha*) [respectively]" (*gnas ṅan len de yaṅ sdug bsṅal yaṅ ma yin bde ba yaṅ ma yin pa'i tshor ba la ni gsal ba daṅ mṅon pa yin pas ... // bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal la rjes su chags pa daṅ khoṅ khro ba dag gis rnam par dkrugs pa'i sems kyis* (D: *kyi*) *gnas ṅan len gyi sdug bsṅal de ni yoṅs su bcad* (P, D; read *gcad*?) *par sla* (P: *pas bla*) *ba ma yin te /*).

1. The Skt. original may have contained a bahuvrīhi (*-cittena* or *-cittasya*) construed as the agent but including a causal nuance (cp. Y_c: 愛恚 ... 擾亂心故).

625. Cp. S 1984, especially 439ff. - Unfortunately, this article contains a number of misprints. I take the opportunity to correct the most disturbing ones:

436,23: word order of

436, note 24: n. 1+m

438,15: in the sentence

439,25: definition of

439, note 30, 4th line: of the 1st person sg. is rendered almost certain by the fact that in the Saṃdhinirmocana
444,19 and note 43a 2nd line: Bh_{Pa}
447,4: the fact that
448,11: Msg II.7
449,16: or,
449 note 49: U_c

Apart from this, I have to admit that the article was written in all too great a haste and that I have overlooked several pertinent contributions, like Kawasaki 1976, 158, and, especially, M. Takemura 1976, 78ff, and Hotori 1980, 76. Another important discussion of Saṃdh VIII.7 to which the interested reader is referred is found in Suguro 1982c, 170ff. (cp. also Suguro 1983, 16f.).

It was only after the publication of the article that, thanks to the kindness of Prof. N. Hakamaya, I could get the wording of the crucial passage in the Tunhuang version of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Stein Tib. No. 194: see H 1984; now also H 1986a and 1987). It runs like this (fol. 31b,4-5; see H 1987, 336):

rnam par rig pa tsam gyi phyir te / gzugs brñan de la dmyigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam du rab du bsgoms pa ste / byams pa ṅas rnam par rig pa źes bśado //

Provided that this translation keeps more or less close to the word order of the original, this would seem to correspond in Skt. to something like

**vijñaptimātratvāt* [/] *tasya pratibimbasya* </> *ālambana(ṃ?)vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṃ Maitreya mayā vijñānam uktam* /,

though *uktam* and *mayā* (and the position of the latter) as also the absence or presence of particles (*hi, iti*) are questionable. The Tun-huang translation seems to punctuate b e f o r e **tasya pratibimbasya,* but according to all other versions (except perhaps, Pa.'s rendering at MSg II.7) punctuation should f o l l o w upon these words.

As for *ālambana-/ālambanaṃ*, I find it difficult to decide on which of these readings the Tun-huang translation is based. But if the vocative *byams pa* (Maitreya) has maintained its original position in the sentence, I feel that the reading *ālambanaṃ* would be odd from a stylistic point of view. For, though admitting that more systematic investigation of this matter is required, as far as I can see a pattern "subj.—pred.noun—voc. ..." does not occur, whereas a pattern "pred.noun—voc.—subj." is quite common. And I doubt that it is possible to take the passage to mean "I have taught *v i j ñ ā n a* to be an o b j e c t constituted by mere cognition/representation".

626. See Y_t zi 10a6-8 (Y_c 581c28ff.; Chüeh-ting 1020b28ff.; H 1979, 43 [§ 6]).

626a. Cp. also Suguro 1983, 21,3-5.

627. The *Pravṛtti Portion* seems to have made copious use of both Saṃdh V and Saṃdh VIII.37.1 (cp. also Suguro 1983, 19ff.) The following passages appear to be more or less closely related:

Y_t zi	H 1979	Saṃdh
4b2f.	§ 1.b.A.1	V.2
4b3f.	§ 1.b.A.2	VIII.37.1.1
4b8ff.	§ 1.b.C	VIII.37.1.3-7
6a5ff.	§ 4.b.A.1	V.4
6b3f.	§ 4.b.A.2(2nd part)	VIII.37.1.2
6b6ff.	§ 4.b.A.3	VIII.37.1.9-13
7a3f.	§ 4.b.A.4	VIII.37.1.14-16
7a7ff.	§ 4.b.B.2	V.5

In addition, there seems to be a certain (though not very concrete) relationship between parts of the *Nivṛtti Portion* and Saṃdh VIII.37.2-5:

Y_t zi	§ 1o.1	Saṃdh
9a4	(1a)	VIII.37.2
	(*sems gnas par bya ba'i phyir*)	(*gnas pa*)
9a8	(2b)	VIII.37.3
9b2	(3b)	VIII.37.4-5

628. Cp. Y_t zi 4b4 (*rtag tu rgyun mi 'chad par ... snod ... rnam par rig pa ste*); 4b7 (see n. 13o8). However, **sthira* may just as well be construed with **bhājana*: cp. Y_t zi 4b6 (*dmigs pa de ni rtag tu yod pa yin te*); 4b4 (*snod kyi rgyun*); cp. also **eka*(?) as an attribute of **bhājana* at Y_t zi 189b5 (see n. 653).

628a. Taking Saṃdh VIII.37.1 in isolation, one will hardly hesitate to take *vijñapti* in its traditional meaning of "making known" or "[function of] perception/cognition", i.e. in its surface value, so to speak; but I admit that VIII.37.2, mentioning *vijñaptitathatā* (i.e. *vijñaptimātratā*: Saṃdh VIII.2o.2.3), suggests that VIII.37.1 too should, with "hindsight", be understood in an "idealist" sense. According to Suguro (1983, 17f.) this implies that *vijñapti* (and even *vijñāna*) at VIII.37.1 acquires the meaning of "representation", particularly of "objectified representation"[1] (対象化された表象). Even if such an assumption may be discussible in the case of Saṃdh VIII.37.1,[2] it is not justified to extend it to the *VinSg ālay. Treatise*, as Suguro seems to do (1983, 19 [*Proof Portion*: see § 5.6.2] and - as one aspect - 2of. [*Pravṛtti Portion*: see § 5.6.3]): cp. n. 631a and §§ 5.13.2 and 1o.3.1.*4*.

1. In using the term 'representation' ('Vorstellung'), I do not of course want to suggest reference to an external object (cp. B. C. Hall in: JIABSt 9.1/1986, 14).

2. At least in the early sources of the *vijñaptimātra* doctrine, the "objective" meaning of *vijñapti* (cp. § 1o.3.1.*4*) does not appear to be as dominant and as neatly distinguished from the traditional "subjective" one as

Suguro's remarks may suggest. Cp., e.g., the "idealist" rephrasing (?) of § v of the *Proof Portion* (see n. 630) at MAV I.3 (*artha-sattvâtma-vijñapti-pratibhāsam prajāyate / vijñānaṃ ... //*: cp. Suguro 1983, 19,14f.; H 1978, 23), where the expression for "objectified representation" or "mental image" is *'pratibhāsa'* (cp. Suguro 1983, 13,15ff.), not *'vijñapti'*, the latter being used rather to denote the cognitive act (which is, in this passage, envisaged in so far as it too may be a content of consciousness). Cp. also DhDhV 15,13 (= 49,6): *-indriya-viṣaya-vijñapti-bhājanalokâ saṃprakhyānāt* And **vijñapti mātr(asy)â(py a)nupalambha* at DhDhV 17,9 is equivalent to *upalambhânupalambha* (DhDhVV: *vijñaptimātrânupalambha!*) at 15,9 = 49,1, a fact which indicates that even in the context of the spiritual practice of *vijñaptimātratā* *'vijñapti'* has not lost its "subjective" aspect of "perception/cognition" (cp. also MAVṬ 248,1 [same context!]: *arthopalabdhir vijñaptir iti kṛtvā*). This is, however, not the right place for entering into a detailed treatment of the meaning(s) of *'vijñapti'* in the Yogācāra school. (Most recent contribution, with detailed discussion of earlier attempts: H. Yoshimura 1987 [received only after the completion of the present study]).

629. Saṃdh VIII.37.1.1: *brtan pa daṅ snod* (Y_t 'i 86a6: *snod kyi*) *rnam par rig pa* <*mi rig pa*>*'i ni 'di lta ste / len pa'i rnam par śes pa'i'o //*. This would seem to go back to something like **asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapter yadutâdānavijñānasya*.

As for *mi rig pa* (= *asaṃvidita* according to Tr 3a; cp. also ASBh 21,9[1]), cp. the quotation of the passage at Y_t 'i 86a6, Jñānagarbha 96,4 (96,3: *ma rig pa*), SaṃdhVy co 253b8 and 254a1 and 3, and the Chinese versions of Hsüan-tsang (T 676, p. 702b25: 不可覺知堅住器識) and Bodhiruci (T 675, p. 679a26: 不覺不知不動器世間識). The Chinese versions also show that *brtan pa* is not *āśraya* (Lamotte) but **sthira* or the like (cp. also Nozawa 1957, 408, and Yokoyama 1979, 176, preferring **dṛḍha*). This is also confirmed by Jñānagarbha, who (95,18) gives *g-yo ba* "fickle" as its antonym. The Tibetan rendering of the compound **sthira-bhājana-vijñapti* by *brtan pa daṅ snod rnam par rig pa* seems to be due to commentatorial exegesis referring *brtan pa rnam*

par rig pa to ālayavijñāna in so far as it is able to receive and support Impressions (*vāsanā*) (Jñanagarbha 95, 14ff.; SaṃdhVy co 254a2).

1. ASBh$_t$ 2oa7 has *ma rig pa*. Since *'asaṃvidita'* means "which is not (fully) recognized, or recognizable" (cp. n. 732), *mi rig pa* would seem to be the more adequate rendering.

63o. Y$_t$ zi 3b4ff. = ASBh 13,4ff. (H 1978, 13 [§ v]; Griffiths 1986, 135f. and 1o1f.): *kena kāraṇenâsatyāṃ yugapad vijñāna-pravṛttau karma na saṃbhavati / tathāhi samasataś caturvidhaṃ karma - bhājana-vijñaptir āśraya-vijñaptir aham iti vijñaptir viṣaya-vijñaptiś cêti / etā vijñaptayaḥ kṣaṇe kṣaṇe yugapat pravartamānā upalabhyante / na caîkasya vijñānasyaîkasmin kṣaṇe idam evaṃ-rūpaṃ vyatibhinnaṃ karma yujyate //*

631. Cp. § 5.6.3.2 and ns. 187 and 796.

631a. According to Suguro (1983, 19,8ff.), the four *vijñaptis* of this passage should not be referred to the eight *vijñānas* but, being similar to the fourfold contents of mind at MAV I.3[1] (see n. 628a, footn. 2), belong rather to the tradition of *vijñaptimātratā*[2] (which establishes sets of *vijñaptis* independent of the eight *vijñāna* pattern: cp., e.g., MSg II. 2; see also § 5.13.2); and he concludes that therefore *'vijñapti'* should, in this passage, be understood in the "idealist" sense of "objectified representation" (cp. n. 628a). This assumption would presuppose that *'karman'* here means "object", as it in fact may in standard Sanskrit. But I do not know whether it is used in Y with this meaning. I therefore, and in view of the non-occurrence of *'vijñaptimātra(tā)'* in Y, prefer to understand both *'karman'* and *'vijñapti'* in the sense they have at Y 5,16 and 12,1ff., viz. in the sense of "function" and "[act of] perception/cognition [of an object]" (cp. n. 61o), respectively. Besides, the context clearly shows that the passage is concerned with

the *v i j ñ ā n a* theory, for it expressly aims at proving the s i m u l t a n e o u s o c c u r r e n c e o f *v i j ñ ā n a s* (which is the subject-matter of Saṃdh V(.4-5), rightly classified by Suguro [1983, 15] as a text of the *v i j ñ ā n a* theory n o t mentioning or presupposing *vijñaptimātratā*). Hence, the purport of the argument is to show that in view of the fact that several cognitive functions - too many to be ascribed to one and the same *vijñāna* - are simultaneously experienced, one has to accept a simultaneous occurrence of s e v e r a l *v i j ñ ā n a s* to which they belong. To be sure, the text does not specify these *vijñānas* (for in the context of proofs of the existence of ālayavijñāna this would, if the first two cognitive functions in fact appertain to the latter, involve a *petitio principii*![3]); but the experiential facts - real or alleged - on which the argument is based can easily be derived from the fact that historically the argument already p r e - s u p p o s e s the existence of the full-fledged *vijñāna* theory including ālayavijñāna and *manas* (cp. § 9.1), and I for one do not perceive any need for assuming an external stimulus (except, of course, from Saṃdh V and VIII.37.1, only that the aspect of *vijñaptimātratā* appears to have been deliberately suppressed or at any rate left inexplicit, as in the case of the *Pravṛtti Portion*: see § 1o.3.1).

1. It should, however, be noted that the four *vijñaptis* of the present passage (viz. Y_t zi 3b4ff.) do not include an element corresponding to the *vijñapti* of MAV I.3, i.e. do not refer to the cognitive act itself as a content of consciousness; for *viṣaya-vijñapti* would rather be equivalent to the *a r t h a -pratibhāsaṃ vijñānam* of MAV I.3, and it is only on a different level (viz. in so far as a l l t h e f o u r *vijñaptis* are declared to be e x p e r i e n c e d (*upalabhyante*)) that in the *Proof Portion* the cognitive act itself is presented as a content of consciousness. On the other hand, the *bhājanavijñapti* of the *Proof Portion* has no proper equivalent at MAV I.3. To be sure, it too may be taken to be, in a sense, represented by the *arthapratibhāsaṃ vijñānam* (cp. MAVṬ 17,13f.: see n. 763) in so far as the "objects" (*artha*) may be regarded as being, strictly speaking,

nothing but those elements of the surrounding world which are actually perceived. But primarily, *arthapratibhāsaṃ vijñānam* will correspond to *viṣaya-*, not to *bhājana-vijñapti*, as seems to be confirmed by MSA XI.44 (cp. Takasaki 1976, 15) containing *artha-* and *pada-nirbhāsa* side by side (cp. also MSA XIX.49, MAVBh 48,9, DhDhV 15,13 = 49,6 and the other materials collected in Takasaki 1976: *bhoga* beside *pratiṣṭhā*, *viṣaya* beside *bhājana*).

2. Suguro (1983, 2o) even envisages a dependence on the appearances of *deha*, *bhoga* and *pratiṣṭhā* current in LAS (cp. Takasaki 1976), but such a dependence is not probable, not only for general considerations (see n. 1o2) but also for the special reason that the present passage of the *Proof Portion* does not at all reflect the s p e c i f i c t e r m i n o l o g y of LAS (a terminology which, to my mind, was more probably taken over by LAS from the early Yogācāra treatises [cp. MAV I.17 and, especially, MAVBh 48,9: see § 5.13.1]).

3. In this connection it is interesting that Tsoṅ kha pa, apart from one interpretation distributing the four *vijñaptis* of Y$_t$ zi 3b4ff. to ālayavijñāna, *manas* and the ordinary *vijñānas* (YidKun 7o,9ff. and 71,4-6), also proposes another one which explains them as aspects of a concrete everyday experience, viz. the elements of experience involved in walking on a dangerous mountain footpath, *bhājanavijñapti* referring to the path (to which in such a situation special attention must be paid), *āśraya-vijñapti* to the lifting and putting down of the feet (which has to be done carefully and consciously), *aham iti vijñapti* to the notion of 'I' (involved in the constant preoccupation "may I not stumble"?), and *viṣayavijñapti* to earth, stones, etc., on the side of the path (YidKun 7o,7-9; Kelsang/Odani 1986, 93).

632. From the chronological point of view, § v of the *Proof Portion* (layer B.2 in § 9) may, but need not necessarily, be slightly earlier than § I.1 (H 1979, 26f.) of the *Pravṛtti Portion*. In view of its having integrated the new *manas* (see § 9.1), most occurrences of which in the *Pravṛtti Portion* look somehow intercalated (see ib.), the former passage may even be slightly later than the latter. In this case, it should have replaced the *upādāna-vijñapti* of the *Pravṛtti Portion* (see § 5.6.3.2) by *āśraya-vijñapti* probably because only the perception of one's corporeal basis-of-existence - but not the perception of Impressions - can, somehow, be understood as being actually e x p e r i e n c e d (see § 5.7).

633. Y_t zi 4b1f. (Y_c 58oa3f.; Chüeh-ting 1o19a29f.; H 1979, 26 [§ 1.b.A]: *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni dmigs pa rnam pa gñis kyis 'jug ste* (see n. 13o7) / *adhyātmam upādānavijñāptito bahirdhā 'paricchinnākārabhājanavijñaptitaś ca* (= TrBh 19, 5f.).

634. On the - both syntactically and semantically - ambiguous term *aparicchinnākāra* see Yokoyama 1979, 176ff.; cp. also H 1979, 71. Unfortunately, the passage in the Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ of VinSg (see n. 653) is also doubtful. But there can hardly be any doubt that the text itself, explaining *aparicchinnākārabhājanavijñapti* as *r t a g t u r g y u n m i ' c h a d p a r* (**sadâvicchedena*) *'jig rten daṅ snod* (*lokabhājana*) *kyi rgyun rnam par rig pa ste* (Y_t zi 4b3f. = H 1979, 26 (§ 1.b.A.2)), takes *aparicchinnākāra* to mean "in an uninterrupted manner". For this meaning of *aparicchinna* cp. MW s.v. and SAVBh mi 3oob7 where - in another context - *aparicchinna* is explained as "it is not the case that (he) sometimes (knows them) and sometimes (does) not (know them); rather (he) always (knows them)" (*bar 'ga' śes bar 'ga' mi śes pa ni ma yin gyi / dus thams cad du ... śes pa*). Interpreted in this way, *aparicchinnākāra* would perfectly correspond to **sthira* (*brtan pa*) in Saṃdh VIII.37.1 (see n. 629) which may have been felt to be liable to be misunderstood as "permanent".

Yet, such an interpretation of *aparicchinnākāra* would not seem to be corroborated by the parallel in the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya (see n. 653) except if, disregarding Chinese, *bye brag med pa* in that passage were taken to represent Skt. *abhinna*. Besides, one might ask why, in reformulating the wording of Saṃdh VIII.37, our passage has ignored **asaṃvidita*. Perhaps because this qualification was realized to be valid for *upādānavijñapti* as well, and is therefore dealt with in the next paragraph of the text (H 1979, 27 [sentence B.1]: *dmigs pa de ni ... yoṅs su gcad par dka' ba'i phyir phra ba yin no* ≈ **tad ālambanaṃ sūkṣmam ...*

duṣparicchedatvāt), which from the point of view of compositional structure one would expect to concern both *vijñaptis* (thus in fact Sthiramati, PSkVai 46b6f.)? But if this is true, one cannot but state that in this same paragraph (sentence B.2) the object of ālayavijñāna is said to be always present (*rtag tu yod pa*) and uniformly perceived throughout life (see § 5.6.3.4). If this refers to both *vijñaptis*, the qualification of *bhājanavijñapti* alone as taking place in an uninterrupted form does not seem to be more justified than its qualification as not clearly discerned or discernible would have been. If, however, paragraph B is understood as referring to *bhājanavijñapti* only (or at least primarily), it would suggest an interpretation of *aparicchinnākāra* as "in an uninterrupted and not clearly discerned (or discernible: see n. 732) form", i.e. as an attempt to combine the two attributes of *bhājanavijñapti* at Saṃdh VIII.37, viz. **sthira* and **asaṃvidita*, into one single expression (see in fact ASBh 21,9f. for an equation of *asaṃvidita* and *aparicchinnākāra* with reference to *bhājanavijñapti*). Such an interpretation would fit a stage of development - to be placed, perhaps, between Saṃdh and the final redaction of our VinSg chapter, the history of the composition of which seems to be more complicated than what one might expect in view of its apparent formal consistency (cp. § 11) - at which the applicability of those attributes to *upādānavijñapti*, if not *upādānavijñapti* itself, had not yet been recognized.

If, however, *aparicchinnākāra* were to be interpreted in a sense not applicable to *upādānavijñapti*, the lamp simile (see § 5.6.3.3) would suggest to take it to mean (also) something like "in such a way that it is not clearly or sharply delimited": As the flame of a lamp would illumine the surrounding space in such a way that the light it emits will gradually vanish the farther it spreads, without any clear limit between light and darkness being discernible, so

too the perception of the external world - which does not seem to be taken in an idealist way in this text (cp. § 10.3.1.*3-4*) - would be conceived of as gradually vanishing with increasing distance. Cp. the explanation of PSkBh 182b5: "It is a perception of the surrounding world in such a way that its extent is not delimited [in the form that one could say:] 'So much is perceived; beyond that there is no perception'" (... *'di tsam tshun chad ni dmigs kyi de phan chad mi dmigs źes tshad chad pa med par snod kyi 'jig rten rnam par rig pa'o //*), although I admit that this explanation may just as well refer to the later view that ālayavijñāna perceives the w h o l e *bhājanaloka* (Si 10c16-18), an interpretation which to my mind would not, however, easily fit the lamp simile of the *Pravṛtti Portion*.

635. See n. 633.

636. Y_t zi 4b2 (see n. 531).

637. Y_t zi 4b3f. (Y_c 580a7-9: Chüeh-ting 1019b4f.; H 1979, 26 [§ 1.b.A.2]): *de la phyi rol gyi snod rnam pa yoṅs su ma bcad pa rnam par rig pa ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa naṅ gi len pa'i dmigs pa gaṅ yin pa de ñid la brten nas / rtag tu rgyun mi 'chad par 'jig rten daṅ snod kyi rgyun rnam par rig pa ste /* ("The perception, in an uninterrupted (and/or indistinct, not clearly delimited) form, of the Receptacle outside (**bahirdhā aparicchinnākāra-bhājana-vijñapti*) is the continuous, uninterrupted perception of the continuous flow (**prabandha?*)[1] of the Receptacle [consisting in][2] the [external] world (*loka-bhājana*: cp. ŚrBh 486,9) [- a perception arising] on the basis of ālayavijñāna [in so far as it] has the *upādāna* within as its object").

1. Not represented in the Chin. versions (see H 1979, 72 note 16).

2. Tib. has wrongly taken the cpd. as a dvandva.

638. Cp. SN II 86f.; $SĀ_c$ 80a12f.

639. Y_t zi 4b4f. (Y_c 58oa9ff.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b5-7; H 1979, 26f. [§ 1.b.A.3]): _'di lta ste / dper na mar me 'bar ba_ (_*pra-dīpa-jvālā_) _ni sñiṅ po daṅ snum gyi rgyus ni naṅ du 'jug par 'gyur la / phyi rol du ni 'od 'byuṅ bar byed pa bźin du naṅ gi len pa'i dmigs pa daṅ / phyi rol gyi dmigs pa 'di la yaṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i tshul de daṅ 'dra bar_ <_b_>_lta bar bya'o_ (_*tadvad atrâpy adhyātmam upādānālambane bahirdhā-lambane câlayavijñānasya nayo draṣṭavyaḥ_) //.

64o. Y_t zi 4b6 (Y_c 58oa15; Chüeh-ting 1o19b8f.; H 1979, 27 [§ B.2]): _dmigs pa de ni rtag tu yod pa yin te / lan 'ga' gźan du 'gyur la / lan 'ga' gźan du 'gyur ba ma yin no_ ("it is not now this, now that") //.

641. Y_t zi 4b7f. (H 1979, 27 [§ B.3]): _kun gźi rnam par śes pa de ni dmigs pa la skad cig pa_ (_*ālambane kṣaṇikaṃ_) _yin par blta bar bya ste / skad cig pa'i rgyun gyi rgyud kyis 'jug pa yin gyi / gcig pa ñid ni ma yin no //._

642. See § 1o.3.1._4_ + n. 13o8.

643. Y_t zi 4b7 (see n. 13o8).

644. See § 4.4.3 + n. 52o.

645. Y_t 4b2f. (see n. 521).

646. Y_t zi 4b8ff. (Y_c 58oa18ff.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b1off.; H 1979, 27f. [§ C.1-5]): _kun gźi rnam par śes pa de yaṅ 'dod pa'i khams na ni rgyu_ (see n. 647) _chuṅ ṅu'i dmigs pa can du brjod par bya'o_, etc. - This passage is moulded upon Saṃdh VIII.37.1.3-7 which, however, is not specifically concerned with ālaya- (or ādāna-)-vijñāna and has _nimitta_ instead of _upādāna_, i.e. specifies the objective or objectified content in general which is experienced at the various stages.

647. Hakamaya's alteration of _rgyu_ to _rgya_ (H 1979, 27f. and 47 note 19) has to be rejected in view of Hts. 執受 and Pa. 取 unambiguously confirming _upādāna_ (which is occasion-

ally rendered as *rgyu* [MSg I.5; cp. MSg_N 89 and PSkViv 95b3] or *len rgyu* [see n. 653]); cp. also SaṃdhVy co 75b4ff.

648. Cp. Y 76,11ff.

649. Cp. Y 76,19ff.

650. Y 77,7.

651. Cp. AKBh 434,11ff.; Bareau 1955, 62 (thèse 25); 94 (thèse 37); 96 (thèse 53); 174 (thèse 20); 195 (thèse 13). Cp. Si 10c26f. (Si_P 137), and perhaps also Y_t zi 41b8f. (Y_c 594a 11ff.), pointing out that even in the *ārūpyadhātu* there is s u b t l e matter proceeding not from karman but from *samādhi*.

652. Cp. T 1828, 598b29ff., especially c10ff.; T 1829, 174c28ff.; Shu-chi 327c16ff.; T 2266, 341b25. - Mind in *ākiñcanyāyatana* is stated to be subtle (微細) at TSi 344a25f.

653. Y_t zi 189b4f.: *de* (= *kun gźi rnam par śes pa*) *yaṅ dus rtag par len rgyu*[1] *la dmigs pa daṅ / bye brag med par ram* (sic!) *gcig tu snod la dmigs pa yin no* (= Y_c 651b21f.: 於一切時緣執受境緣不可知一類器境), which may go back to something like **tac ca nityakālam upādānālambanam aviviktaikabhājanālambanaṃ ca*. But **avivikta-* is admittedly quite doubtful since *bye brag* (= *viveka* at PV III.146) may also correspond to *viśeṣa* or *bheda* which, however, would hardly fit the Chinese. If **avivikta* (or **aviveka*) is correct, the passage would mean that ālayavijñāna perceives the surrounding world without clearly discerning (or: delimiting?) it, or without making distinctions (i.e. as an undifferentiated whole).

1. *len rgyu* seems to be an attempt to combine both meanings of *upādāna*, viz. "appropriation" and "cause", the latter meaning probably referring to the Impression (*vāsanā*) of Sticking to the Imagined Character [of reality], since this Impression is the cause of taking possession of a new existence (see § 4.4.2.2 + n. 517); cp. also n. 647.

654. Hsien-yang 480c5-7: 此識 能執受了別 色根根所依處 及戲論熏習。於一切時 一類生滅。 不可了知。又能執持了別 外器世界。

655. In view of the corresponding passages in Saṃdh VIII.37 (see n. 629), in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (see n. 633) and in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (see n. 653), one may consider the possibility that what is, in Chin., represented by 於一切時一類生滅 不可了知 ("it arises-and-ceases all the time [as a series of] uniform [moments], and it cannot be clearly ascertained") originally belonged to what f o l l o w s , viz. to the perception of the surrounding world.

656. See n. 630.

657. Cp. § 4.9. Cp. also the fact that *nirodhasamāpatti* is not mentioned in Saṃdh V (see § 3.9.1) nor in the *Pravṛtti Portion* nor in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (note that the latter texts - in contexts where one may expect them to do so [viz. Y_t zi 6a5ff., 7b7f. and 190b1ff.] - do not yet point out the (systematically inevitable) absence of the new *manas* in *nirodhasamāpatti*, which probably means nothing else but that they did not pay special attention to this state).

658. TrBh 19,10 and 22; Si 11b3f.

659. Y_t zi 4b5f. (see n. 1171); Si 11b4f.

660. Saṃdh VIII.37.1.1 (see n. 629); Tr 3ab (see n. 737).

661. Y_t zi 4b1 and 3 (see ns. 633 and 637); KSi § 36, etc. (see § 5.14.1 + n. 733; cp. also n. 732); Jñānagarbha 96,1-3; SaṃdhVy co 254a1-3. Cp. Y_t 189b5 (see n. 653); cp. also ASBh 21,9f. (but see n. 755).

662. Y_t zi 4b5f. (see n. 659); cp. ASBh 21,9 (*durvijñāna*).

663. Y_t zi 4b5f. (see n. 659); Si 11b4f.

664. PSkBh 182b5ff.: *dper na ñin par srin bu me khyer 'phur ba ni de la 'od med pa ma yin gyi ñi ma la sogs pa'i 'od bźin du de'i 'od gsal bar snaṅ ba ma yin pa daṅ 'dra bar kun gźi rnam par śes pa yaṅ naṅ gi ñe bar len pa... la dmigs pa'i tshe na yaṅ mi gsal bar dmigs pa'am / phra bar dmigs pa'am / źan par dmigs pa daṅ / phyi'i snod kyi 'jig rten la dmigs pa*

na yaṅ mi gsal bar dmigs pa daṅ / phra bar dmigs pa daṅ / źan par dmigs pas ...

665. For a different attempt, see Nagao (1935 =) 1978, 373ff., trying to explain the threefold object of ālayavijñāna by recurring to Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā and MAV I.3, and presupposing a substantial agreement of the sources concerned. Against this, my own attempt starts from what I consider to be the earliest sources and takes the differences between the pertinent statements of the various sources seriously.

Though not categorically denying the possibility that there is some (direct or indirect) historical connection between ālayavijñāna and *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa*, I find it difficult for the moment - and not only for the general reason indicated in n. 68 - to derive the specification of the object of ālayavijñāna from, or by the same principle as, the determination of the object of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa*. To be sure, both kinds of *vijñāna* are taken to apprehend, in a sense, the existence to which they belong and the cause of this existence, and they are taken to do so in a uniform manner throughout a given existence. But by and large ālayavijñāna apprehends these objects together, whereas for *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* they are alternatives.[1] Moreover, ālayavijñāna apprehends the existence to which it belongs in concreto, viz. in the form of corporeal matter and of the surrounding world, while *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* does so only by way of a symbol (or prognostic), i.e. some characteristic visible feature of this existence;[2] and as for the cause, ālayavijñāna apprehends the Impression of Clinging (or of saṃsāric diversity/diversification) which persists in the new existence, whereas *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* apprehends previous karman or some characteristic object or ideational image symbolizing it.[3] Accordingly, the object of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* is determined by, and entirely similar to the object of, the last conscious mind process before

death in the preceding existence, while in the Yogācāra sources such a relation is, as far as I can see, nowhere indicated, the choice of the object of ālayavijñāna appearing, instead, to be derived from its functions in the present existence. Yet, I admit that the matter requires more careful investigation.

1. Cp. VisM XIV.111-114 (*kamma-kammanimitta-gatinimittānaṃ aññataraṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā*); XVII.136ff.

2. Cp. VisM XIV.111-114 (cp. footn. 1) + Paramatthamañjūsā (cp. S 1986, 206 + 222 notes 22-24); XVII.136ff.; Collins 1982, 245; Nārada 1975, 182 + 190f.; Paramārtha, T 1618 (Hsien-shih-lun, *Khyātivijñāna-śāstra), 881b1ff. (= Ui 1965, 371,14ff.).

3. Cp. ib., except for the Paramārtha passage.

666. Cp. TrBh 18,24 explaining *'ālaya'* (in *'ālaya-vijñāna'*) as *sthāna*, and Tr 3b using *'sthāna'* in the sense of *bhājana(loka)* (TrBh 19,21).

667. Cp. Y 26,18 (see n. 391) + § 7.1B.2.1.3.*a*-*b*.

668. Cp. Si 19b9f., expressly stating that the cpd. 'ālaya-vijñāna' is a karmadhāraya and not a tatpuruṣa.

669. See § 4.4.2-3. - If in connection with *vāsanā*, *'upādāna'* could be taken to mean "what is received by or contained in [ālayavijñāna]" (cp. § 4.4.3), one may consider the possibility that ālayavijñāna was understood to cognize not only what it appropriates but also what it contains (cp. Nagao 1978, 384).

670. Saṃdh V.2 (see § 4.4.3 + n. 520) and Y_t zi 4b2f. (see n. 521).

671. There is, of course, no surrounding world (which is material!) in the *ārūpyadhātu* (cp. T 2266, 341b25); and even according to the dominant current of the later school, the ālayavijñāna of a living being reborn in the *ārūpyadhātu* does not develop an image of the surrounding world of the material world-spheres (Si 10c20f. and 25ff.; cp. YidKun 14,1ff. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 44-46); divergent opinion: Si 10c16-18).

672. Cp. the parallel situation in the case of k a r m a n, which produces a new (basis of) personal existence (*ātma-bhāva*) as its main result (*vipāka-phala*) but at the same time is also responsible for the origination of the surrounding world (*bhājanaloka*) as a kind of by-effect (*adhipati-phala*) (see § 1o.3.1.3).

673. See § 5.6.3.3 + n. 639.

674. See n. 627.

675. Cp. Ui 1965a, 341,13ff.

676. The additional inclusion of the Impression (*vāsanā*) would seem to have been stimulated by Saṃdh V.2 and made necessary by the special case of rebirth in the *ārūpyadhātu* where a corporeal basis of personal existence as well as a surrounding world are lacking (see § 5.8.3 + n. 671). But cp. also n. 669.

677. Cp. the simile of the radiating jewel in Y_m 75a7 (Y_t dzi 164b6): *tadyathā maṇer bahir ābhā bhavati, maṇis tu nâbhā*. Cp., perhaps, also Śaṅkara, Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (Madras 1952), 6o,1off., illustrating the outward functioning of the luminous substance of mind (*citta-sattva*) through the sense-organs with the simile of a lamp covered by a screen(?) and emitting light (*bahiḥ prakāśayati*) through holes in that screen.

678. Cp. Y_m 75a7 (Y_t dzi 164b6f.): *yathā tu pradîpasya bahir ābhā, sa ca pradîpa ābhā* (ms.: *ābhāḥ*), ...

678a. See n. 631a, footn. 1.

679. Y_t zi 5a7f. (H 1979, 29 [§ B.3-4]): *kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa'i tshor ba gaṅ yin pa, de ni gcig tu sdug bsṅal yaṅ ma yin bde ba yaṅ ma yin pa ...*

68o. Y_t zi 5a5f. (H 1979, 28 [§ 2.b.A]): *'di la kun gźi rnam par śes pa ... sems daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa kun tu 'gro ba lṅa po yid la byed pa daṅ / reg pa daṅ / tshor ba daṅ / 'du śes*

dan / sems pa rnams dan mtshuns par ldan no // (≈ *... *ālayavijñānam ... pañcabhiḥ sarvatragaiś cittasamprayuktaiḥ samprayuktam - manasikāreṇa, sparśena, vedanayā, samjñayā, cetanayā ca* (or: *manasikāra-...-cetanābhiḥ*)/).

681. MN I 3o1.

682. $SĀ_c$ 15oa25; AKṬU tu 9a5; Vi 127a17; Vi_2 1ooc6f.; PSVyṬ 122b7f.; $MSgBh_t$ 167a7f.

683. MN I 296 (= SN IV 294): *yo ... saññāvedayitanirodham samāpanno, tassa ... c i t t a - s a ṅ k h ā r ā n i r u d - d h ā paṭippassaddhā*; cp. AKṬU tu 9b5; $SĀ_c$ 15ob13.

684. Y_t zi 5a7 (Y_c 58ob2f.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b18; H 1979, 29 [§ B.2]): *(chos de dag kyan) ... 'jig rten gyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyan rtogs par dka' ba'i phyir phra ba ... (yin no //)*. Cp. Y_t zi 19oa6 (Y_c 651c12).

685. Y_t zi 19oa3f. (Y_c 651c7f.): *kun gži rnam par śes pa dan mtshuns par ldan pa'i tshor ba gan yin pa, de ni rtag tu sdug bsnal yan ma yin bde ba yan ma yin pa...'o //*.

686. Hsien-yang 48oc7f.: 與不苦不樂受等[1] 相應 ; cp. also 5o4b12f.

1. 等 may be Hts.'s addition.

687. Cp. § 1.6.1 (and the reserves in n. 98).

688. Cp., e.g., Frauwallner 1951, 156 (= 1982, 645); Nagao 1982, 17.

689. Cp. especially the *pratyayavijñāna* of MAV I.9 (see n. 693), the *bījas* as a special layer of personality (MSA XI.44), or the *dauṣṭhulyakāya* in MSA XIX.51 (all of them identified by the Bhāṣya with ālayavijñāna; cp. Nozawa 1957, 76f.). Cp. also expressions like *padārthadehanirbhāsa* (MSA XI.44; see Takasaki 1976), which are, however, not usually connected with ālayavijñāna by the Bhāṣya (for an exception see § 5.13.1 + n. 72o) but only by (*Asvabhāva and) Sthiramati (cp. Aramaki 1967, (43)ff.; Suguro 1983, 24f.; for details see § 5.15.3.2-3).

690. This discrepancy does not favour Suguro's (1985, 365) view that in the case of these texts the commentary by Vasubandhu and the verses may have originated simultaneously (同時に成立した).

691. DhDhV 17,1ff. (cp. DhDhVV 39,17ff.):
de bžin ñid mi šes pa thog ma med pa'i dus can las te / yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa[1] *sa bon thams cad pa ste /* (2*mi bden pa*2) *gñis su snaṅ ba'i rgyu daṅ / de la brten* (3*pa tha dad pa*3) *yaṅ yin te / ...*

1. Thus D; P and DhDhVV 39,18: *pas*.
(2 ... 2) DhDhVV 40,1: *med pa*.
(3 ... 3) DhDhVV 40,2 f.: *pa'i rgyud gźan*.

692. DhDhVV 40,1.

693. Cp. also the dichotomy, at MAV I.9ab, of *vijñāna* (comprised in *abhūtaparikalpa* according to MAV I.3-4 and I.8) into a causal one (*pratyaya-vijñāna*; MAVBh: = ālayavijñāna) and an experiencing one (*aupabhogikaṃ*, sc. *vijñānam*; MAVBh: = *pravṛttivijñāna*). Likewise remarkable in this connection is the structural parallelism, to DhDhV 17,1ff. (see n. 691), of MAV V.16 where the position of *sarvabījakaḥ abhūtaparikalpaḥ* is occupied by *jalpamanaskāra* taught to be "perfumed by [the Impression of verbal or conceptual] speech in terms of the [dichotomy of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*]" (*taj-jalpa-paribhāvita*) and thus to be "the basis of this" (*tad-āśraya*), i.e. the "cause of the appearance of the dichotomy [of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*]" (*dvayaprakhyānakāraṇa*, as in the DhDhV passage quoted in n. 691). In this case, it is only Sthiramati (MAVṬ 218,14) who points out the functional identity of this *jalpamanaskāra* with ālayavijñāna. Cp. also MSg II.2 (beginning).

694. See n. 693.

695. Cp. S 1969, 819f. (note 45) and 821 (note 48, b-c). - I do not feel convinced by Okada's (1981, 636f.) view that the

Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra made independent use of a pre-existing pattern of arrangement.

696. There may be a reference to *nirodhasamāpatti* at DhDhV 16,9 (cp. the parallel passages at AS 102,12 + ASBh 139,17 and MSg VIII.2.3, but otherwise DhDhVV 37,13ff.; for details see H 1985), but this passage, apart from being based on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (Y_t 'i 29a5ff., especially 8f.; H 1985, 48f.), is not concerned with *nirodhasamāpatti* itself but merely wants to distinguish *n i r v i k a l p a - j ñ ā n a* from other states including *nirodhasamāpatti*.

697. Cp., e.g., MAV I.3-4; DhDhV 11,10ff. (§ IV); MSA XIV.32.

698. MSg II.13 (details obscure: cp. Suguro 1982a, 98f.; for discussions of the passage see, e.g., Ueda 1982, 139ff., and Nagao 1982, 313ff.).

699. MSg II.13: *g a ṅ d u y a ṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i rnam par rig pa ni don gyi rnam par rig par ' j o g p a , der yaṅ ...*

700. AS 30,21 (see n. 424).

701. MSg I.2; 8-9; 11.3; 14ff.; 21; etc., etc.; II.2; 32; III.1; 12.

702. AS 3,3f. and 8f. (see n. 445); 12,1 (see n. 450); 32,9 (see ib.); cp. also 28,9 (see n. 582).

703. On the alternation of qualifying something as c o n t a i n i n g or as b e i n g the Seed of something else see § 7.1B.2.1.3.*b* and, for MSg and AS, S 1985, 142 + 156f. (notes 29-30).

704. MSg I.5; I.35.

705. MSg I.7A(4) and (implicitly) I.7B(1); cp. VIII.2.3; AS 22,21; 58,19 (reconstr.; probably: **... nirodhasamāpatter ... vyutthitasya ca*); 69,16ff.; 95,16ff. (see n. 220).

706. As 11,1 (see n. 220 + footn.); 13,9ff. (reconstr.; read *bhavā°*, *°saṃjñāpūrvakeṇa manasikāreṇa*: AS 10,22ff.); especially: MSg I.50ff.

707. MSg I.52.2: *(gaṅ yaṅ 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa la yid kyi rnam par śes pa yod pas sems daṅ bcas pa sñam du sems pa de'i ltar* (D) *na yaṅ sems de mi ruṅ ste //* ... *dmigs pa daṅ rnam pa* (D) *mi dmigs pa'i phyir* ...

708. MSg I.52.1-6 and 53 are missing in the oldest Chinese translation (Buddhaśānta: T 1592, 100b5) as well as in one of the two quite obviously juxtaposed (and variously re- and misarranged) versions of the Bhāṣya, viz. MSgBh$_t$ 166b5[1]-167a6[2] + 166a3[3]-b5[4] + 167a6[5] (+ 167a6-b5[6]); MSgBh$_c$ [Dharmagupta] 283 a1-21[7] + 282c7-11[8] (+ 282c11-22[9]); MSgBh$_c$ [Pa.] 177a16-b10.

1. *rnam par śes pa daṅ bcas pa* ... (ad I.49; Bhāṣya ad I.50 begins in 166b8: *'gog pa la sñoms par* ...).
2. (*gaṅ yaṅ* [167a5]) ... *yin no sñam du sems pa* (= beginning of the Bhāṣya on the introductory phrase of I.52 which in this version was the introduction to I.54!).
3. *gaṅ yaṅ gaṅ dag* ... (= repetition of the Bhāṣya on the introductory sentence of I.52, followed by the Bhāṣya on I.54 (see 2!)).
4. ... *ñid du 'gyur /*.
5. *-s de bas na de ltar ni mi 'thad do //* (= end of Bhāṣya ad I.54).
6. *'di ltar na* ... *'dod do //* (additional argument!).
7. Bhāṣya ad I.50+51, followed (283a7ff.) by Bhāṣya on the introductory phrase of I.52 which in this version introduces I.54, and (283a9ff.) by Bhāṣya on I.54.
8. Repetition of the last part of Bhāṣya ad I.54.
9. Additional argument (= MSgBh$_t$ 167a6-b5).

By the way, the s e c o n d version of the Bhāṣya ad I.50ff. (MSgBh$_t$ 163b7-166a3), which includes a commentary on I.52-53, seems n o t t o k n o w I.54; for MSgBh$_t$ 166a2f.,[10] following upon the explanation of MSg I.53, marks the e n d of the discussion of the view that *nirodhasamāpatti* is *sacittikā* [by way of a *manovijñāna*], and the subsequent sentence ("now the second position will have to

be explained")[11] obviously introduces the commentary on I.55. It would thus seem that first I.54 was, in a revised version of the basic text, r e p l a c e d by I.52.1-6 + I.53 (as is also supported by the fact that I.54 is substantially represented by I.52.3), and that only afterwards, perhaps due to the juxtaposition of explanations of both versions in the Bhāṣya, the basic text, too, was reorganized in terms of a j u x t a p o s i t i o n of both versions.

10. *sems daṅ bcas pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa brtag pa rdzogs so //.*

11. *da ni gaṅ yaṅ phyogs gñis pa de'i don brjod par bya ste /.*

709. MSgBh$_t$ 164b2f. (MSgBh$_c$ [Dharmagupta] 282b3f. and MSgBh$_c$ [Hts.] 335a5f.): *kun gźi rnam par śes pa yod par 'dod pa la* (D: *las*) *ni skyon* (P, D: *rkyen* but Ch. 過 and 妨難) *'di dag yod par mi 'gyur te / de'i rten ñe bar gzuṅ bas rab tu phye ba'i phyir ro* (**tasyâśrayopādānaprabhāvitatvāt*).

710. MSg I.7A(4) is part of a later addition (H 1978a, 229f.; 248 note 57). As for MSg I.7B (verse 1c), see S 1985, 148f. What is, however, most important is that even the crucial passage MSg I.50-55 (proving the existence of ālayavijñāna by showing that it is indispensable in *nirodhasamāpatti*) does not (apart from the fact that a part of it is of later origin: see n. 708) form an organic part of the systematical scheme (stated in advance at MSg I.29) in accordance with which the proofs for the existence of ālayavijñāna are arranged in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, i.e. it does not form part of the demonstration that *saṃkleśa* and *vyavadāna* would be impossible without ālayavijñāna; for this demonstration is complete with MSg I.44 (I.45-49 being a kind of supplement to the proof from the viewpoint of *lokottara-vyavadāna*), and yet it is s u m m e d u p only at MSg I.56, i.e. a f t e r the *nirodhasamāpatti* argument.

711. I.e. by way of a revision of his first draft; cp. S 1985, 148.

712. One can, of course, not exclude the possibility that the *nirodhasamāpatti* argument was familiar to the author from the outset and that he made use of it already in his first draft but did not succeed in integrating it organically into his own pattern of demonstration.

713. I.e. provided that AS was, as I tend to suppose, composed after MSg.

714. See MSg I.1–2 and I.27.

715. Cp. MSA XI.44.

716. See § 5.11.1–2 + ns. 689, 691 and 693.

717. But cp., at any rate, § 5.12.3 + n. 709. Cp. also MsgBh$_t$ 159b6f. proving that the *vijñāna* which coalesces with (/ "faints into") proto-embryonic matter at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) cannot be a *manovijñāna* [but only ālayavijñāna] by pointing out that it is without an object (*brgyal bar gyur pa de la ni dmigs pa med de / de'i phyir 'di ni yid kyi rnam par śes pa ñid du mi ruṅ ṅo //*).
On the other hand, MSgBh seems to take ālayavijñāna as an actual cognition of an object not only when commenting upon MSg II.13 (see n. 698) (MSgBh$_t$ 174b2ff.; Iwata 1981, 106f. [§ 15]) but also when explaining MSg III.12 where the Bhāṣya seems to state that the fact that the word *'nimitta'* is used a second time[1] has the purpose of showing that the Seeds (*bīja*) – mentioned by the next word of the text – are the object (*ālambana-nimitta*) [of ālayavijñāna] (MSgBh$_t$ 195b6f.: *yaṅ rgyu mtshan smos pa ni de'i sa bon de dag gi dmigs pa'i rgyu mtshan bstan pa'i don to //*; MSgBh$_c$ [Hts.] 352b25f.: 復擧相者、為欲顯示 即彼種子 是所緣相 ; similarly MSgBh$_c$ [Dharmagupta] 297b11f.); ≈ **punar nimittagrahaṇaṃ tasya*[2] *teṣāṃ bījānām ālambananimittatva*[3] *-udbhāvanārtham*).[4]
It is, however, noteworthy that the sentence under discussion (viz. MSgBh$_t$ 195b6f.) is found in yet one more (see n.

708) passage in which a piece of MSg is commented upon twice; for the explanation of MSg III.1ff. to which our sentence belongs is preceded, in $MSgBh_t$ (189a6-191b8),[5] by another explanation of MSg III.2-13 (which, by the way, does not comment upon III.12!). Our sentence may therefore, like the commentary on MSg I.52-53 (see n. 708), form part not of the original version of MSgBh but of a later commentary or of a revised or supplementary version of MSgBh. But I have to admit that this point (which may be relevant also to the "Vasubandhu problem") needs more careful investigation into the whole piece of text involved.

1. This second occurrence of *'nimitta'* is not found in the Tibetan version of the basic text (*kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i sa bon rgyu mtshan daṅ bcas pa thams cad*), but it is confirmed by $MSgBh_t$ 195b5 and by the Chinese versions including Buddhaśānta (T 1592, 105a21f.) who has 同相一切阿梨耶識因種子 which would seem to correspond to **sa-nimitta-sarvâlayavijñāna- n i m i t t a -bīja°*, i.e. "all Seeds, in ālayavijñāna, of the phenomena (i.e. actual *vijñaptis*), along with the phenomena [themselves]", but appears to be understood by the Bhāṣya as "all Seeds in ālayavijñāna which are [at the same time] the object (of ālayavijñāna), along with ...".

2. Not represented in Hts. and Dharmagupta.

3. *-tva-* is not represented in Tib.

4. Paramārtha ($MSgBh_c$ [Pa] 207a18f.) seems to take the sentence to mean that the *nimittas* (= sense-objects) are the objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of the Seeds, which is however - as far as I can see - an unusual idea.

5. In $MSgBh_c$ [Dharmagupta, Hts., and also Pa.] the two sets of explanations do not appear *en bloc* but stand distributed to the individual paragraphs of MSg III, the relevant portions being variously combined or juxtaposed.

718. See n. 101.

719. *a*) Cp. MSABh XI.32 (63,5): *svadhātuta iti sva b ī j ā d ālayavijñānataḥ*; XI.44 (66,5): *b ī j a -parāvṛtter ity ālayavijñāna-parāvṛttitaḥ;* XIX.49 (169,6): *bījanimittam* (=) *yat teṣāṃ b ī j a m ālayavijñānam*;[1] XIX.51 (169,23): *dauṣṭhulyakāyasya* (=) *ālayavijñānasya*; cp. also I.18 (7,20). At XIX.76 (174,16), ālayavijñāna is equated with *citta* and

stated to b e the o b j e c t of *manas* in the sense of continuous feeling of Ego, but nowhere is it itself taken to cognize an object.

1. Note that in all these passages ālayavijñāna i s the Seed. Cp. n. 703.

b) MAVBh I.9 (21,3f.): *ālayavijñānam anyeṣāṃ vijñānānāṃ pratyayatvāt* (MAVṬ 32,21: *h e t u pratyayabhāvena*; cp. ib. 33,12) *pratyaya-vijñānam*; III.22 (48,8f.): see n. 720.

c) DhDhVV 26,16: *gnas ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa ste / ... rnam par śes pa'i b a g c h a g s rnams ni de la gnas pa'i phyir ro //*; 40,1, equating the **sarva b ī j a k o 'abhūtaparikalpaḥ* (see § 5.11.2 + n. 691) with ālayavijñāna.

d) TSN 6-9: *citta* is divided into ālaya- and pravṛtti-vijñāna; the former is the cause (*hetu*) and is called *'citta'* because it is an accumulation of (or filled, covered, "set" with) the S e e d s [into which] the Impressions of Pollution (i.e. pollutive factors) [turn] (*saṃkleśa-vāsanā-bījaiś citatvāt*); ālayavijñāna, also called *'mūlavijñāna'*, is, by nature, [the result of karmic] Maturation (*vipākātmaka*) and thus called *'vaipākiko 'bhūtakalpaḥ'*, i n c o n t r a s t t o pravṛtti-vijñāna which is *abhūtakalpa* in the sense of arising (*vṛtti*) as the representation or appearance (*vitti*) of either an o b j e c t (*dṛśya*) or a p e r c e p t i o n / c o g n i t i o n (*dṛś*) [of an object]. The text thus takes ālayavijñāna as the result of Maturation containing all Seeds but n o t as an actual cognition of an object. In TSN 29f., *mūlavijñāna* (i.e. ālayavijñāna) is stated to be the c a u s e due to which False Imagination (*asat-kalpa*) appears as the two (viz. object and subject), and it is compared with an incantation (*mantra*) due to which a piece of wood falsely appears as an elephant.

720. MAVBh 48,8-10 (ad MAV III.22bc): *"hetur" bījasaṃgṛhītam ālayavijñānam / "nimittaṃ" pratiṣṭhā-deha-bhoga-saṃgṛhītaṃ /*. Cp. Nozawa 1957, 77f.; Yeh 1975, 669f.; Takasaki 1976, 18; H 1979a, (73).

721. I.e. if, as is probable, in the second sentence of the passage quoted in n. 720 the word 'ālayavijñānam' is to be supplied. Thus expressly MAVṬ 161,13. Cp. also some of the parallels from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra collected in Takasaki 1976, 3ff., especially Nos. A.2 (LAS II.125 = X.435), B.1 (LAS 42,4f.), B.3 (LAS 56,7f.), and B.4 (LAS 62,14f.). If, however, Suguro (1983, 25,3f.) is right in desisting from supplying 'ālayavijñāna', even in this passage ālayavijñāna would be limited to its Seed aspect.

722. Cp. ASBh 137,9-11; H 1979a, (73)f. - On the difficulty of establishing *bhoga* as a category on its own besides *pratiṣṭhā* and *deha* see MAVṬ 161,18ff. (MAVṬ$_t$ 112b3-5 [D: bi 268a4f.]): *bhoga* is nothing else but the surrounding world and the body in so far as they are e x p e r i e n c e d by the other perceptions/cognitions, though not as their object proper but only as an influencing factor (*adhipati*: cp. MAVṬ 146,6-9 [see n. 769]), hence indirectly, i.e. by way of corresponding mental images; o r *bhoga* means objects e n j o y e d or consumed, like food and drink.

723. Cp. § 10.3.1.*4*.

724. Cp. MAVBh I.3 (18,26f.): *"nāsti câsyârtha"* (= MAV I.3c) *iti artha-sattva-pratibhāsasyânākāratvāt*, i.e.: "'It has no object', because [the *vijñāna* which] appears as object(s) or as [corporeal] living being(s) (MAVBh 18,23f.: as the five sense-faculties) has no mode-of-apprehension", i.e. no intentional structure: cp. MAVṬ 18,23 (*anākāratvād: agrāhakatvād ity arthaḥ*) and 18,18 (*grāhyarūpeṇa prakhyānāt*). In this passage, it is n o t in the Bhāṣya but only in the Ṭīkā (17,13f.: cp. § 5.15.3.3 + n. 763) that what appears as object(s) and corporeal matter is expressly identified with ā l a y a vijñāna.

725. Cp. MSA XI.44-45; 40; 24; MAV I.3; MSg II.1ff., especially 5 and 9.

726. E.g. TSN 8-9 (see n. 719(*d*)); MSg II.32: *vipākavijñāna* = *vāsanā*, contrasted with *pravṛttivijñāna* = *dharmas* having the nature of *v i j ñ a p t i s* comprising an objective and a subjective element (**sa-nimitta-darśana*, cp. MSg II.11).

727. Cp. also MAVṬ 17,13f. (ad MAV I.3): see n. 763; perhaps also MSg II.13 (see n. 698) and MSgBh on this passage (cp. n. 717).

728. Otherwise, however, YidKun 14,2ff. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 44), taking the object of (= objective image in) ālayavijñāna to be also the object of the sense-perceptions.

729. This holds good for the external objects and the body. As for the subtle and imperceptible (material) sense-faculties, their representation (*cakṣur-vijñapti*, etc.) creates the impression of having been transformed into a kind of supporting substance or centre of the corresponding representations of object (*rūpa-vijñapti*, etc.: *nimitta*) and perception (*cakṣurvijñāna-vijñapti*, etc.: **darśana*) at MSg II.11. On the other hand, the sense-faculties are o b j e c t s of ā l a y a vijñāna in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (see § 5.6.3.2) and at Hsien-yang 480c5 (see § 5.6.4.2), and i m a g e s in ālayavijñāna according to passages like Si 10a17f. and 11a8f. In the mind-only system of the Viṃśatikā which presupposes a "one-layered" series of mind (S 1967, 112f.), the sense-faculties are reduced to the S e e d s from which the respective perceptions arise (Vś verse 9 [see n. 761]; cp. also § 5.15.3.2 and S 1967, 116ff.; cp. also ib., 126). In his M a d h y ā n t a v i b h ā g a ṭ ī k ā , Sthiramati seems to accept the view that ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a a p p e a r s a s corporeal matter including the sense-faculties (see n. 763), but at the same time he seems to follow the V i ṃ ś a t i k ā in taking the sense-faculties proper to be S e e d s , more precisely to be ālayavijñāna

in so far as it has been "pre-disposed" (*ākṣipta*) by karman imbued with (*paribhāvita*) [emotionally involved] proliferous conceptual activity (*prapañca*) [concerned with] sense-faculties - or in so far as it has been perfumed (*vāsita*) by karman [qualified by] Sticking to (*abhiniveśa*) sense-faculties (MAVṬ 144,6f. [*anye!*]) -, and has thereby developed in such a way that it is the Seed of such (images of) sense-faculties (MAVṬ 146,3-5).

730. See n. 101.

731. KSi § 36 (Muroji p. 45,6): *'o na de'i dmigs pa daṅ / rnam pa ci yin źe na /*; PSVy 24b6 (Muroji p. 46,1).

732. Cp. PSkVai 46b4, explaining *aparicchinnālambanākāra* as *'di'i dmigs pa daṅ rnam pa yoṅs su gcad* (D; P: *bcad*) *p a r m i n u s s o* . Cp. Wackernagel II,2, p. 578.

733. KSi § 36 (Muroji p. 45,7): *dmigs pa daṅ / rnam pa ma chad pa yin no //*; PSVy 24b6 (Muroji p. 46,2; cp. Matsuda 1982, (65)): *dmigs pa daṅ rnam pa yoṅs su ma chad pa'o //*; PSk_t 17a1 (Muroji p. 44,7f.; PSk_D § 26, but mistranslated): *de yaṅ dmigs pa daṅ rnam pa yoṅs su ma chad pa'o //*; Skt.: TrBh 19,4f. Cp. also Griffiths 1986, 181 note 45.
The characterization of the actual cognitive aspect of ālaya-vijñāna in Vasubandhu's KSi, PSk and PSVy is, in spite of Sthiramati's attempt to combine them (TrBh 19,4-8), essentially different from that of the *Pravṛtti Portion*. For while in the *Pravṛtti Portion* the term *'aparicchinnākāra'* is used to qualify - in whatever manner (see n. 634) - the perception of an object which, in its turn, is unambiguously specified (viz. as the surrounding world), Vasubandhu's term *'aparicchinnālambanākāra'* means that no such specification of the object can be given at all, not to speak of the mode of its apprehension.

734. KSi § 36 (Muroji p. 45,8ff.); PSVy 19a1f.; TrBh 19,22ff.; Si 11b5ff. See also de la Vallée Poussin 1934-5, 159 + note 1.

735. KSi § 25ff. (Muroji p. 27,14ff.).

736. In the V i ṃ ś a t i k ā , ālayavijñāna is ignored (cp., e.g., S 1967, 112ff.; Suguro 1983, 6.

737. Tr 3ab: *asaṃviditakopādisthānavijñaptikaṃ ca tat*; the word *asaṃviditaka* reminds of Saṃdh VIII.37 (see n. 629).

738. Tr 3cd: *sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṃjñā-cetanânvitam*. As in the *Pravṛtti Portion*, the sensation of ālayavijñāna is stated to be neutral (Tr 4a: *upekṣā vedanā tatra*), i.e. neither-painful-nor-pleasant.

739. Cp. also Takasaki 1985, 39ff.

74o. See § 5.6.3.1-2 + ns. 633 and 531.

741. TrṬ (see n. 13o5) interprets: are representations or images in ...; but cp. § 1o.3.1.4 and Takasaki 1985, 36,13-16. Of course, in Tr "cognizing" should, even though the wording of Tr 3ab in itself is ambiguous in this regard, certainly be understood in line with the mind-only theory, i.e. as an intra-mental act of manifestation not based on or referring to an external object. To be sure, the notion of "act" is, strictly speaking, incompatible with momentariness (cp. PG 5 [+ n. 1394] and n. 221) - and the act should thus, strictly speaking, be reduced to *tadākārotpatti* (cp. n. 764; Saṃdh VIII.7[1]) -; but this would also hold good for the use of *vijñapti* in the Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* (n. 61o) where its use as an action noun designating the function (*karman* in the sense of *kriyā*: see n. 631a; cp. Y 5,7) of *vijñāna* can hardly be doubted; cp. also Dignāga's justification, of the use of the action noun *'pramāṇa'* with reference to cognition/perception, by pointing out that cognition, though in fact merely arising in the form of its object, appears a s i f performing a cognitive function (Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) I.8cd; cp. PV III.3o7-3o9).

1. Quoted in Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī (ed. A. Thakur, Patna 1959) 478,3f.: *na hi, Maitreya, tatra kaścid <dharmo kaṃcid> dharmaṃ pratyavekṣate, api tu tathā samutpannaṃ tac cittaṃ yat tathā khyāti.*

742. TrBh 19,1of.: *asaṃviditaka upādir yasmin asaṃviditakā ca*[1] *sthānavijñaptir yasmin, tad ālayavijñānam asaṃviditakopādisthānavijñaptikam* /

1. Cp. Ui 1979a, 55 (from behind).

743. Sthiramati (TrBh 19,22: see n. 744) uses, in this context, Vasubandhu's term '*aparicchinnālambanākāra*' (see § 5.14.1), but in Sthiramati the term does not involve that the object cannot be specified at all.

744. TrBh 19,21f.: *sthānavijñaptir bhājanalokasaṃniveśavijñaptiḥ / sâpy aparicchinnālambanākārapravṛttatvād asaṃviditêty ucyate* /.

745. TrBh 19,1o (see n. 742) and 19,16ff. (*upādiḥ = āśrayopādānam = tasya* (sc. *āśrayasya*: objective genitive) *upagamanam ekayogakṣematvena*), implying that in this context Sthiramati takes *upādi* = *upādāna* as an a c t i o n belonging to, or performed by, ālayavijñāna, and n o t as an o b j e c t c o g n i z e d by it.

746. Cp. TrBh 19,14 (see n. 748): *so* (sc. *upādiḥ* = *vāsanā*) *' s m i n n* (sc. *ālayavijñāne*) ...

747. TrBh 19,2of.: *tat punar upādānam idaṃtayā pratisaṃvedayitum aśakyam ity ato 'saṃvidita* (sc. *upādiḥ*) *ity ucyate*.

748. TrBh 19,14f.: *so 'sminn* (cp. n. 746) *"idaṃ tad" iti pratisaṃvedanākāreṇâsaṃviditaḥ* ...

749. Viz. Saṃdh VIII.37.1.1 (see § 5.6.1) + Saṃdh V.2 (see § 4.4.2). - I for one do not perceive anything indicating that Sthiramati himself was aware of the incoherence between his introductory remarks and his own explanation of the line Tr 3ab, let alone that he attempted to resolve it. Therefore, in contrast to Takasaki (1985) who attempts a - fairly speculative - harmonization, I prefer to leave the incoherence as it stands and to take it as the expression of a juxtaposition of two different exegetical traditions, one of which is based on the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay*.

Treatise, whereas the other may be based on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and perhaps also be motivated by the intention to harmonize the present line with Viṃśatikā verse 9 (see § 5.15.3.2).

750. Cp. n. 222.

751. TrBh 19,7f.; 19,16f.: *āśrayopādānaṃ côpādiḥ / ... āśraya ātmabhāvaḥ sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ n ā m a c a /*; cp. H 1979, 71 (note 10); Takasaki 1985, 40. – When, at TrBh 19,7f., Sthiramati supplements the definition of *upādāna* which is taken from the *Pravṛtti Portion* by adding *nāman*, this would, if the text is taken literally, imply that *naman*, too, is the object of ālayavijñāna's c o g n i - t i v e function, but in view of his subsequent explanation of Tr 3ab this is of course not what Sthiramati intends.

752. See n. 517; otherwise Takasaki 1985, 41, but not supported by the wording of the text.

753. TrBh 19,18f.: *ārūpyadhātau tu rūpavītarāgatvād rūpavipākānabhinirvṛtter n ā m o p ā d ā n a m e v a /*. Cp. Takasaki 1985, 40,15, who however tries to devaluate the statement by pointing out that *vāsanā* is available as another object; but see n. 752. As for Takasaki's own explanation of the addition of *nāman*, see Takasaki 1985, 47ff.; cp. also ib., p. 53 note 32.

754. See § 3.9.2.5 + ns. 337 and 338.

755. I have so far not come across any reference to ālayavijñāna as an actual cognition of an object in the A b h i d h a r - m a s a m u c c a y a b h ā ṣ y a (of which, in my opinion, Sthiramati is n o t the author: see S 1969a, 101 note y[1]). Even in a passage like ASBh 21,9f. which, clearly alluding to Saṃdh VIII.37.1.1, speaks of an un- or subconscious perception of the surrounding world, ālayavijñāna is, curiously enough, not mentioned. And at ASBh 137,8ff. (cp. also 21,5f.) it is (as at MSg II.20) only equated with the

mūlavikalpa (in the sense of b e i n g the S e e d of all other *vikalpas*) but n o t with the *nimittavikalpa*, i.e. representations or images appearing as (or: perceptions in so far as they appear as) body, foundation (i.e. surrounding world) and (objects-of-)enjoyment (*deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhā-pratibhāsā vijñaptayaḥ*; cp. § 5.13 + n. 720!).

1. Cp., on this problem, also de Jong 1973, 340f. (= 1979, 602f.), with further references; Yoshimoto 1977, 89; H 1977a, 256f.

756. Because Sthiramati himself refers the reader to it at TrBh 39,4.

757. PSkVai 46b4-6: *'di ltar kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni dmigs pa gñis la 'jug pa ste / naṅ gi ñe bar len pa'i rnam par rig pa daṅ / phyi rol gyi snod la rnam par rig pa rnam pa yoṅs su ma chad pa'o // de la naṅ gi ñe bar len pa ni kun brtags pa'i ṅo bo ñid la mṅon par źen pa'i bag chags daṅ / gnas daṅ bcas pa'i dbaṅ po'i gzugs so //* (Skt. must have been more or less the same as TrBh 19,5-8, but without *nāma*).

758. Cp., e.g., SAVBh mi 207b5f. = Hayashima 1978, 106,5f. (ad MSA XI.40): *gnas su snaṅ ba* (*padābhāsa*: MSABh 65,2) *ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa snod lta bur snaṅ ba ste / sa gźi chen por snaṅ ba'o //* (in contrast to *padābhāsa*, *dehābhāsa* and *arthābhāsa* are n o t referred to ālayavijñāna!); tsi 242a 2f. (ad MSA XIX.49): *snod kyi 'jig rten ni kun gźi rnam par śes pas dmigs par bya ba'i yul yin pa ...*; tsi 248a3f. (ad MSA XIX.55): *dus thams cad skad cig ma re re la yaṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa las sa gźi chen po lta bur snaṅ bar 'gyur na ...* ("continuously in every moment ālayavijñāna comes to produce an appearance of (or, if *las* [P,D] is a misrendering: comes to appear as) the Wide Earth (*mahāpṛthivī*)"); mi 143b5 = BShK 2, 87,13f. (ad MSA IX.45): *rten* (*pratiṣṭhā*) *gyi sgras ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ / de'i dmigs par* (P,D: *pa'i*) *bya ba'i yul snod kyi 'jig rten sa gźi chen po la bya ste /* (cp. also 143b7f.). Cp. also Suguro 1983, 24,13f.

I wonder if SAVBh mi 143b6 (BShK 2, 87,16f.: *lus daṅ loṅs spyod daṅ / gnas lta bur yaṅ kun gźi ñid de ltar snaṅ bas na kun gźi la rten źes bya'o //*) is an exception; but since the passage is intended to give another reason for the fact that, according to Sthiramati, besides its object (viz. the surrounding world) ālayavijñāna also is itself called 'foundation' (*pratiṣṭhā*), I suppose it should mean something like: "ālaya[vijñāna] is called 'foundation' (because it is the support of Impressions (*vāsanā*) ..., and) because it is ālaya[vijñāna] that appears as the [surrounding world which is the] foundation o f the body and of the [objects-of-] enjoyment (**deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhā-*)." But I have to admit that this is doubtful.

759. Cp. SAṬ 80a4f. (ad MSA IX.45): *rten* (*pratiṣṭhā*) *du gyur pa ni sa* (**pṛthivī*) *ste* (D) / *de gźan du gyur na* (**asyāḥ parāvṛttau*) ... / *'di ni k u n g ź i r n a m p a r ś e s p a ' i d m i g s p a gźan du gyur pa yin te* (**iyam ālayavijñānālambanaparāvṛttiḥ*); 101a5 (ad MSABh 65,2): "'Appearing as the Foundation' (*padābhāsaḥ*) means appearing as the earth, etc.; [by this the text] shows that [it is] ālayavijñāna [in so far as it is] the perception (or: a representation, image) of the Foundation (**pada-vijñapti*) [that] appears as the [earth, etc., i.e. as the surrounding world]" (*gnas su snaṅ ba źes bya ba ni sa la sogs par snaṅ ba ste / kun gźi rnam par śes pa gnas kyi rnam par rig pa la der snaṅ ba ñid du ston to //*; like the corresponding passage of Sthiramati's commentary (see n. 758), *Asvabhāva, too, does n o t mention ālayavijñāna in the case of *artha-* and *dehâbhāsa*); 180a2 (ad MSABh 169,5: *pratiṣṭhā-nimittaṃ bhājanalokaḥ*): "The [Foundation = surrounding world] is the *nimitta*, i.e. object, of ālayavijñāna (**s(ā) ālayavijñānasya nimittam, ālambanam ity arthaḥ*); for ālayavijñāna is called (cp. SAṬ 80a5) a perception (or representation) of the Foundation (*sthāna-vijñapti*) [at Tr 3b]" (*de ni kun gźi* (D) *rnam par śes pa'i rgyu mtshan dmigs pa yin no źes bya ba'i*

tha tshig ste (D)/ *'di ltar kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni gnas rnam par rig pa 'byuṅ ba yin no //*). Cp. also Suguro 1983, 24,13f.

760. SAṬ 80a5; 180a2 (see n. 759); SAVBh mi 143b7f. (BShK 2, 88,3ff.); tsi 242a3f.

761. Vś 5,25ff., especially 27ff.: *rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabījāt pariṇamaviśeṣaprāptād utpadyate, tad ... bījaṃ ... tasyā vijñapteś cakṣur-...-āyatanatvena ... bhagavān abravīt.*

762. SAṬ 79a6ff. and SAVBh mi 141b5ff. (BShK 2, 81,8ff.), replying to the objection that it is difficult to see how there can be a renewal (*parāvṛtti*) of the (material) sense-faculties (MSA IX.41) in a system for which matter (*rūpa*) does not exist (*gzugs med na*).

763. MAVṬ 17,13f.: *a r t h a - s a t t v a - pratibhāsam ālaya-vijñānaṃ sasaṃprayogam* (18,5: *artha* = *rūpa*, etc. [here obviously viewed as constituting the surrounding world, in contrast to SAVBh mi 207b6 (cp. n. 758) where *arthābhāsa* would seem to refer to the images of sense-objects in ordinary perception; cp. also n. 769, but also n. 631a, footn. 1]; 18,6ff.: *sattva* = the five material sense-faculties [probably comprising, in this context, all corporeal matter]); 33,9f.: "Since [ālayavijñāna] makes known the (world of?) living being(s) (i.e. corporeal matter) and the surrounding world by way of appearing as these, it is [actually] a *vijñāna*" (*s a t t v a - b h ā j a n a - l o k a -vijñāpanāt tannirbhāsatayā vijñānam*); 146,6f. <*ya ālayavijñānasya s ā d h ā r a ṇ ā r t h a - prati>bhāso yaś ca s a t t v a-pratibhāsaḥ* ...; 161,14ff.: <... *pratiṣṭhā* (= MAVBh 48,9) * *b h ā j a n a l o k a ḥ; tad-ā>bhāsam ālayavijñānam* / ... *dehaḥ s e n d r i y a ṃ ś a r ī r a ṃ; tad-ābhāsam ālayavijñānam*. Cp. also Suguro 1983, 24,10ff. As for the sense-faculties, cp., however, also n. 729.

764. See n. 763, underlined words, especially MAVṬ 33,9f.; 18,9: *tadākārotpattitām upādāya vijñānaṃ tad-ābhāsam*. Cp. also SAVBh mi 207b5f. and tsi 248a3f. (see n. 758).

765. Cp. also the view of Tsoṅ-kha-pa (YidKun 13,8ff.; Kelsang/Odani 1986, 43f.) for whom the Seeds are n o t r e a l l y an object of ālayavijñāna's cognitive function. The consequence that then in the ārūpyadhātu ālayavijñāna will have no object proper is not regarded by Tsoṅ-kha-pa as a serious defect because the arising-and-continuance of ālayavijñāna depends on karmic impulse but not on the presence of an object proper or content (*snaṅ ba'i dmigs pa*) (YidKun 15,5 ff.; Kelsang/Odani 1986, 45). In other words: According to Tsoṅ-kha-pa, the specific nature of ālayavijñāna e x e m p t s i t f r o m b e i n g r i g i d l y s u b j e c t e d t o t h e A b h i d h a r m i c d e f i n i t i o n o f *v i j ñ ā n a*.

765a. Nagao (1978, 382,18ff.) notes two passages where the Seeds are missing, but at least in one of these cases they are lacking because of the nature of the context.

766. Si 10a14ff.; 11a3-5; Yokoyama 1979a, 14f.

767. Si 19c12ff.

768. Si_p 230: Nanda. Cp. also de La Vallée Poussin 1934-35, 167. It should however be noted that Nanda differs from the Viṃśatikā (and the Ālambanaparīkṣā) by advocating the simultaneity of several *vijñānas* and by taking the sense-faculties to be Seeds in *vipākavijñāna*, i.e. *ā l a y a vijñāna*.

769. Cp. especially Si 40c14-21 and 27ff. (Si_p 445f. and 447f.): distinction between a " n e a r " (親) object, i.e. the "image (相 , *nimitta*) part" of a given perception or cognition, and a " r e m o t e " (疎) object, i.e. the prototype (質) on which this image is based, preferably the corresponding element in the "image part" of ālayavijñāna (Shu-chi 501c16ff.).

Cp. also MAVṬ 146,5ff.:
"The appearance of the visible, etc., in Forthcoming Mind is the 'external' Basis [of the latter]. The appearance of the object(s) common [to all people] (i.e. of the surrounding world) in ālayavijñāna ... is also called the 'external' Basis [of Forthcoming Mind], because [this appearance in ālayavijñāna] is an influencing condition for the arising of this Forthcoming Mind [in so far as the latter] appears as an object ..., but not because it is - as one may [falsely] think - its object."
(... *pra<*vṛttivijñānasya rūpādi-pratibhāsaḥ*[1] *bāhyam āyatanam*[2] */ ya ālayavijñānasya sādhāraṇārtha-prati>bhāso ..., so 'pi grāhya-...pratibhāsasya pravṛttivijñānasyôtpattāv adhipati pratyayatvād bāhyam āyatanam ucyate, na tu tadviṣayatvād iti /*).

1. Ed.: *°saṃ*
2. Ed.: *bāhyāya°*.

770. Cp. VGPVy 427b4ff.:
"So far the interpretation [of MSg I.42] in terms of admitting external things. [But] for [one who advocates] the view that [all] objects of cognition (*jñeya*) are internal, [it is as follows:] When ālayavijñāna arises in such a way that the whole body appears as oneself, then the whole body is [biologically] appropriated (*upātta*). When a part of the body appears as oneself and another part as external, then the part which is characterized (*-*ākāra*) as appearing as oneself is appropriated, the one which is characterized as [appearing as] external is not appropriated ..."
(*'di ni re źig phyi rol gyi don khas blaṅ ba'i* (D: *blaṅs pa'i*) *tshul yin* (D: *can*) *no // śes bya naṅ gi yin par lta ba la ni gaṅ gi tshe kun gźi'i rnam par śes pa lus mtha' dag* *<bdag> tu snaṅ bar skye ba de'i tshe lus thams cad zin pa*

yin la / gaṅ gi tshe lus kyi phyogs la la ni bdag tu / la la ni phyi rol gyi rnam par snaṅ ba de'i tshe gaṅ źig bdag tu snaṅ ba'i rnam pa can de zin pa yin la / phyi rol gyi rnam pa can ni ma zin pa...).

Cp. also VGPVy 376a6ff., where "[biologically] appropriated" (*upātta*) is stated to mean "made one's own (**ātmasātkṛta*) so as to prevent decay" (*'jig pa'i gags su bdag gir byas so*) or, more precisely, "that which, if benefited or injured, a p p e a r s a s the basis of pleasure and pain, etc." (*phan pa daṅ gnod pa dag gis bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal la sogs pa'i rten ñid du snaṅ ba*), whereas that which a p p e a r s a s not made one's own (*bdag gir ma byas par snaṅ ba*) is unappropriated (*anupātta*).

I am not sure whether this is identical with what Takasaki (1985, 46f.) wants to suggest. But I think that the "appearing as oneself", of the living body, in the first VGPVy passage can n o t be equated with the *ātma-vikalpa* (of TrBh 19,12ff.) because biological appropriation continues even in Arhats, who, however, have completely eradicated *ātmavikalpa*.

771. Si 10c16ff. (Si$_{P}$ 136ff.). Cp. also YidKun 14,1ff. and especially 16,2ff. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 44ff.).

772. Si 11a11ff. (Si$_{P}$ 138f.). Cp. also YidKun 18,7ff. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 48).

773. Si 40c21ff. (Si$_{P}$ 446f.).

774. Cp. AS 12,7f.; Prak 693a5.

775. Cp. the fact that at Y 6,8 etc. the *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam* of Y 4,11 ((d)γ in § 6.1.1), i.e. the *bījāśraya* of (1)/(1A), is represented by *b ī j a* o n l y (*mano b ī j a yoḥ pūrvavad vibhāgaḥ*). Cp. also Y 105,6f. (*kiṃpūrvā, kiṃ pratiṣṭhāya ... / svabījapūrvā, bījāśrayaṃ sthāpayitvā tadanyam āśrayaṃ pratiṣṭhāya* (Y$_{m}$) ...) where *bījāśraya* resumes the preceding *svabīja*. Cp. also Suguro 1982, 64.

776. See n. 428.

777. See § 3.11.4.2 + n. 392.

778. I.e. not at all, except for Y 11,4, to be treated in § 6.2, and perhaps (viz. in case that 蔵 represents **ā-lī-/ ālaya* and hence implies an etymological nuance) Hsien-yang 505b21f. (see n. 159).

779. See ns. 138-140.

780. See § 3.11.2-3; cp. also n. 172.

781. E.g. Y 52,16; 61,8; cp. 55,14.

782. MSg I.23; 30ff.; 43f.

783. Y_t zi 3a8-b4 = ASBh 12,25ff. (H 1978, 12 [§ iv]; Griffiths 1986, 134f.).

784. Let alone the central argument of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, viz. that Impressions (*vāsanā*), turning into Seeds (*bīja*) or reinforcing them, can only be received by a s i m u l t a n e o u s recipient (e.g. MSg I.15; 23.1; 30; 32; 43f.).

785. As for the first problem, the Vaibhāṣikas do not seem to have felt any difficulty in an immediate sequence of opposite (e.g. good and bad) states of mind (cp. AKBh 103,18ff.), whereas the Theravādins appear to have precluded the possibility of such a sequence by intercalating a neutral state of mind (cp. Paṭṭhāna [Nālandā-ed.] I 5,1ff. and 6,4ff.).

786. PG 28-29 (see App. II).

787. See § 3.11.3.

788. Y_t 'i 288a8f. (Y_c 829a5f.): "Mind-containing-all-Seeds (**sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*) which is ... under the sway of (*-*upaga*) those Deeds (*karman*) and Defilements (*kleśa*) comes, at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) [a new existence] in future, to settle down (**pratiṣṭhāṃ labh-* [Y 230,9], cp. Ch.: 一切種子識 ... 住於名色) in *nāmarūpa*" (... *las daṅ ñon moṅs pa de daṅ ldan pa sa bon thams cad daṅ ldan pa'i rnam par śes pas ni phyi ma la ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe*

miṅ daṅ gzugs la gnas thob (P,D: *thod*; but cp. Y_t dzi 135b7) *par 'gyur ro //*).

789. Cp. Y 198,22 (read *karmopagam* [Y_m]); cp. also my preliminary remarks on *apuṇyopaga*, etc., in my review of the 2nd fascicle of SWTF (in: ZDMG 137/1987, 152f.).

790. See § 7.3.6.3.3.

791. Y 25,15f. (see § 3.11.2 + n. 368); PG 29-30 (see § 3.11.3 and App. II).

792. Y 26,18 (see § 3.11.4.2 + n. 391).

793. See n. 137.

794. One should also consider the possibility that we may have to presuppose a situation in which Mind-containing-all-Seeds, arising, in the beginning of a new existence, as the result of previous karman and delight in wordly existence (see n. 374), was regarded to be the basis-in-the-sense-of-Seed (*bījāśraya*) of all perceptions and cognitions in an i n d i r e c t way, i.e. as the s t a r t i n g p o i n t of the new existence, which contains, in nuce, all elements of the latter and from which they evolve o n e o u t o f t h e o t h e r , as seems to be the case, with *nāmarūpa* etc., in the *Pratītyasamutpāda Analysis* of the Savitarkādibhūmi (see § 7.3.6.3.1).

795. Cp. also § 7.3.6.3.4.

796. *'Āśraya'* may be equivalent to *'ātmabhāva'* (see n. 1009), both as " c o r p o r e a l basis-of-personal-existence" (see ns. 187 and 1477(*E.d*)) and as "basis-of-personal-existence" in a more comprehensive sense (cp. n. 1477(*E.c.*)); and *'upādāna'* may be used not only as "biological appropriation" but also as "taking possession of" (= *parigraha, ādāna*: see § 3.9.2.5). This means that *'āśrayopādātṛ'* may also mean "taking possession of a [new] basis[-of-personal-existence]". In fact, *'āśrayopādāna'* seems to be used in this sense at AS 97,19 (see n. 338 and the parallel - and

presumably earlier - formulation at $BoBh_D$ 265,6f. [see n. 34o]). Yet, even in this AS passage, *āśraya*, in view of its being distinguished from *citta* (as the "seat" of *samādhis*) and *jñāna*, is obviously the (animated, sensible) body (*(savijñānakaḥ) kāyaḥ*) or the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*; cp. § 3.11.2 + ns. 375 and 376). Since in the passage under discussion (viz. Y 4,7) the s u b j e c t of the act of *upādāna* is - in contrast to what is implied at AS 97,19, etc. - not a "person" (AS 97,19: Buddhas and advanced Bodhisattvas, cp. ASBh 129,5f.) but (ā l a y a) v i j ñ ā n a , i.e. the mental component of the complex designated as *savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ* or *ṣaḍāyatana* (cp. n. 363), the object of *upādāna* should, at Y 4,7, comprise c o r p o r e a l m a t t e r only. This is not contradicted by the fact that we find, at ASBh 11,12f. (see n. 336), *ādānavijñāna* = ālayavijñāna as the subject of *ātmabhāvopādāna* in the sense of taking possession of a new *ātmabhāva* at the moment of *pratisandhi*. For either in such a passage too the prominent aspect of '*ātmabhāva*' is the c o r p o r e a l basis-of-existence, or '*ātmabhāva*' will have to be understood in the less concrete sense of a [new] personal existence (cp. n. 1477(*E.a-b*)). In the case of '*āśraya*', however, the latter possibility does not exist since this term is restricted to the c o n c r e t e meaning of " b a s i s -of-personal-existence". Thus, in '*āśrayopādātṛ*' at Y 4,7, '*āśraya*' should be taken in the sense of " c o r p o r e a l basis[-of-personal-existence]", and this means that '*upādātṛ*' will refer to, or at least include, b i o l o g i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n , as begun at the moment of conception but probably also as continued throughout life. This seems to be corroborated by the *Proof Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (Y_t zi 2b4ff. = ASBh 12,1ff.; H 1978, 8f. [§ i]; Griffiths 1986, 13off.; cp. also Y_t zi 4a3f. [see n. 281]: *ālayavijñānasya* ... *d e h o pādāyakasya*). Cp. also the fact that Tib. renders, at Y 4,7, *āśraya* by *lus* (cp. Suguro 1976, 39), and

YVy 88a2: "That [ālayavijñāna] is the cause of subsistence is what is expressed by the word *'āśrayopādātṛ'*; for when (i.e. as long as) the body is appropriated by [ālayavijñāna], it will not putrefy" (*gnas pa'i rgyu ñid ni "lus len par byed pa" źes gaṅ smos pa ste / 'di ltar des zin na lus rul bar mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //*).

797. As for the fact that *'ālaya'* is, in spite of YVy 98b2 (see n. 817(*d*)), hardly current in the sense of biological appropriation, see § 2.9.

798. Of course, the fact that the reference to ālayavijñāna is an accretion to the context does not *eo ipso* exclude the possibility that it was in this very accretion that ālayavijñāna was introduced for the first time. But, apart from the preceding considerations, this possibility is, in the present case, improbable also against the background of the picture emerging from a comprehensive evaluation of all the occurrences of ālayavijñāna in the *Basic Section* (see § 6.8).

799. See n. 788.

800. Y 25,1 and 24,7 (see § 6.3.1); cp. also the expression **'sarvabījakaṃ cittam'* in Saṃdh V.2 (see § 3.9.2.1; cp. also Suguro 1983, 15,11-13).

801. In this case, (1A) and (1B) would have preserved an older stage of (1). Of course, the absence of *'āśrayopādātṛ vipākasaṃgṛhītam'* in (1A) and (1B) would, without additional evidence, not be sufficient to prove that these attributes were added only later; for it would be equally reasonable to assume that it was considered superfluous to repeat, in the further occurrences of ālayavijñāna, its q u a l i f i c a t i o n s also (apart, of course, from *'sarvabījaka'* which, according to my view (see § 6.1.3), was there already b e f o r e *'ālaya-'*).

802. Cp. also Suguro 1976, 38f.; 1977, 129 below.

803. Y_t zi 2a3f.: *sa bon gyi gnas kun gźi rnam par śes pa źes gaṅ smos pa ['o] ...*

804. See §§ 2.13.4-5; 3.3.1.4; 3.5; 3.12.1.

805. Y 11,4 *-niṣṭham*, but Y_m *-sanniṣṭam*, to be emended to *-sanniviṣṭam* (*-vi-* having dropped out at the beginning of a new line) with Tib. *-r gnas pa* and Ch. 依附 ... (cp. Y 52,16 beside Y_t dzi 29a7 and Y_c 290a5).

806. This appears to be corroborated by at least most of the explanations of (2) in YVy (98a1ff.) and its parallel in SaṃdhVy (co 83b4ff.), especially YVy 98a6f. ≈ SaṃdhVy co 84a1: "[It is *upādātṛ*] because even matter becomes something included among [entities constituting] living beings: (*sattvasaṅkhyāta*) when it is appropriated by it (sc. ālayavijñāna)" (*des zin na gzugs kyaṅ sems can du bgraṅ ba ñid du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //*); YVy 98b2 ≈ SaṃdhVy co 84a4f. (see n. 817(*d*)); cp. also SaṃdhVy co 83a6-8.

807. The body may be called *'āśraya'* or *'ātmabhāva'* but not, as far as I know, *'āśrayabhāva'*.

808. Y_t dzi 6b1.

809. Y_c 280b7.

810. In my opinion, *-upagata* is here (against Ch.) better taken in an active sense (cp. § 6.2.2.*c*), but cp. n. 816.

811. YVy, in its interpretations of the four attributes *'sarvabījopagata'*, etc., does not supply unambiguous support for this interpretation; the third interpretation (YVy 98a7f. = SaṃdhVy co 84a1f.) may point in this direction but it is too concise to be clear. The other explanations differ. In the second explanation (YVy 98a6; cp. SaṃdhVy co 83b8f.), *'āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa'* is taken to refer to the mutual support of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* (the latter comprising, according to SaṃdhVy co 83a5f., *rūpa* and the three immaterial skandhas except *vijñāna*!), whereas *'āśrayabhāvopagata'* is, if I understand the text correctly, taken to point out that - on the basis of Y_t zi 5b6f. (see n. 358) - ālayavijñāna becomes (?) the support (*gnas kyi*

dños po ñe bar len pa [YVy], ~ *po ñid len pa* [SaṃdhVy]: **āśrayabhāvopādāna*(?)) of the material sense-faculties it has appropriated (YVy 98a3-5). At SaṃdhVy co 83b8, however, the latter function is misreferred to *'āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭam upādātṛ'*, probably under the influence of the first explanation (YVy 98a2f.; SaṃdhVy co 83b4f.), which takes *'āśrayabhāvopagata'* to substantiate *'sarvabījopagata'* (which probably means that ālayavijñāna is equipped with all Seeds because it is their support: cp. SaṃdhVy co 83b6), and *'āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa'* to be substantiated by *'upādātṛ'* (which may mean that ālayavijñāna has become the support of corporeal matter because it appropriates the latter biologically: see SaṃdhVy co 83a6f.). As for the fourth explanation, see n. 817 (*b* and *c*).

812. The expression *'-bījopagata'* is already found in "pre-ālayavijñānic" materials: cp., e.g., Y 200,17f.; 25,3.

813. Cp. G. Schopen in: IIJ 17/1975, 177f.

814. YVy 98b1 (see n. 817(*b*)).

815. See CPD s.v. *upagata* 1.d and *upagacchati* 1.d; Pr 312,8: *hetubhāvam upagamya*; BCAP 172,24; 177,9; 244,13.

816. Cp., e.g., AKBh 97,7 *bījabhāvopagama*; 215,6 *upāsakatvopagama* (SN IV 301: *upāsakattaṃ upagatassa*!); Pr 65,5 *aṅgībhāvopagamāt*; PW s.v. *gam* + *upa* (5).
It should, however, be pointed out that among the examples noted by me there is no instance of the ppp. *'-upagata'* as second member of an accusative tatpuruṣa compound with an abstract noun as prior member. If this is of evidential value, the interpretation of the Chinese translation, viz. "furnished with the nature of basis", may, from the grammatical or idiomatic point of view, be the most probable one. In this case, *'āśrayabhāva-sanniviṣṭa'* would be a grammatical vari-

a n t to *'āśrayabhāvôpagata'*, the latter implying a passive/locative analysis of *'ālaya'* ("that which is stuck to by, i.e. furnished with ..."), in contrast to the active analysis ("sticking to ...") presupposed by the former. On the other hand, *'upagaṭa'* is well documented as second member of accusative tatpuruṣas with a c o n c r e t e prior member (cp. CPD s.v. *upagata*: *āsan'ūpagata*; *vās'-ūpagata* and *vass'ūpagata* beside *vāsaṃ u.* and *vassaṃ u.*; PW s.v. *gam + upa* (1) and (5)). It may therefore be difficult to exclude the possibility that *'upagata'* was, in a text like Y, and in an etymologizing explanation at that, by way of exception also used with an a b s t r a c t prior member. In this case, *'āśrayabhāva-sanniviṣṭa'* would be nothing but a grammatically unambiguous s y n o n y m of *'āśrayabhāvôpagata'*.

817. YVy 98a8-b2 (SaṃdhVy co 84a2ff.):
yaṅ na don gźan du na (1*kun gźi'i don rnam pa bźi ste /*1)
a) 'byuṅ ba daṅ ldan pa'i 'du byed rnams de la 'bras bu'i dṅos por sbyor bar byed pa'am / de dag la de[2] *rgyu'i dṅos por sbyor bar byed pa'i phyir kun gźi źes bya ba daṅ /*
b) sems can rnams de[3] *la bdag tu sbyor ba'i*[4] *phyir kun gźi źes bya ba daṅ /*
c) de[5] *daṅ po kho nar mer mer por źugs pa na grub pa daṅ bde ba gcig pa'i phyir kun gźi źes bya ba daṅ /*
d) des lus zin pa'i phyir (6*kun gźi źes bya ste /*6) *len par byed pa'i don ni kun gźi źes* (7 *bya'o // don bźi po de dag ni tshig bźi po rnams daṅ go rims*7) *bźin du sbyar ro //*

(1 ... 1) SaṃdhVy: *tshig bźi po de dag gis ni kun gźi rnam pa bźi bstan te /*

2. SaṃdhVy: *de'i*

3. SaṃdhVy om.

4. SaṃdhVy: *bar byed pa'i*

5. SaṃdhVy: *de la*

(6 ...6) SaṃdhVy om.

(7 ... 7) SaṃdhVy: *bya ba ste / go rim*

Translation:

"Or, in another sense, [*'sarvabījopagata'*, etc., refer to the fact that] the meaning of *'ālaya'* [in 'ālayavijñāna'] is fourfold:

a) It is called 'ālaya[vijñāna]' because conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*), which originate, stick (*ālīyante*) to it as its effects, and because it sticks to them as their cause.

b) It is called 'ālaya[vijñāna]' because living beings stick (= cling) to it as to their Self.

c) It is called 'ālaya[vijñāna]' because, having, at the very beginning [of a new existence], merged into (**saṃ-mūrch-* or **san-ni-viś-*?) proto-embryonic matter, it shares the destiny [of the latter] (**ekayogakṣema*).

d) It is called 'ālaya[vijñāna]' because the body is appropriated (**upātta*) by it; for *'ālaya'* has the meaning of *upādāna*[1] (**upādānārtho hy ālaya iti* (?)).

1. **'len par byed pa'* may render *'upādātṛ'* (Y_t dzi 6b1 = Y 11,4f.) as well as the action noun *'upādāna'* (Takasaki 1985, 5o note 7).

These four meanings [of *'ālaya'*] have to be referred to the four qualifications [*'sarvabījopagata'*, *'āśrayabhāvopagata'*, *'āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa'*, and *'upādātṛ'*], respectively."

To be sure, it does appear that none of these etymological explanations coincides with the original intention of the basic text; *a* and *b* are obviously taken from MSg I.3 (cp. n. 137), *c* would seem to correspond, substantially, to the explanation of Saṃdh V.3 (see §§ 2.8 and 3.3.1.3). Yet, its over-extension to *'upādātṛ'* apart, where it meets with basic semantical difficulties (see § 2.9), the application of the principle of "etymological" interpretation as such is in accordance with the original purport of the passage.

818. Cp. YVy 98a3 (SaṃdhVy co 83b6): *phuṅ po lṅas bsdus pa'i chos rnams kyi* *b a g c h a g s k y i r t e n* *yin pa'i phyir* ...

819. For the explanations of the commentary, see n. 811.

820. Cp., e.g., NidSa §§ 7.3 and 7.7; Katsumata 1974, 321ff.; Kumoi 1980, 47f.; VisM XIV.82; Prak 692b24f. (Imanishi 1969, 7; cp. T 1555, 993b1ff.) AK II.34ab; Vi 371a17ff. (Vi_2 281b11ff.); ŚrBh 242,4-6: *tatra vijñānaskandhaḥ katamaḥ / yac cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ / te punaḥ ṣaḍ vijñāna-kāyāḥ - cakṣur-vijñānaṃ śrotra-ghrāṇa-jihvā-kāya-mano-vijñānaṃ /*; Y_m 135b1 (Y_t dzi 299a1; Y_c 386a22): *yad idam ucyate cittam iti vā mana iti vā vijñānam iti vā ...*; MSg I.13A (cp. also MSg_L vol. II, 4*); VGPVy 377a6f. and b4 (*yaṅ na sgra tsam źig tha dad par zad do*); Vś 3,3; quasi-synonyms denoting all the e i g h t *vijñānas* of the Yogācāra system: Y_t zi 189b3f.; Hsien-yang 480b26-c2.

821. Cp. especially Vi 371b3ff. (Vi_2 281b18ff.); T 1555, 993b5ff.; VGPVy 377a7ff. (cp. H 1978a, 283f.); cp. Katsumata 1974, 325.

822. See n. 1433.

823. Saṃdh V.3 (see n. 436).

824. Y_t zi 189b4f. (Y_c 651b19ff.): *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni dṅos su na sems yin te / 'di ltar de ni sa bon thams cad kyis kun tu bsags śiṅ ñe bar bsags pa yin no // ... // yid ni dus rtag tu ṅa daṅ bdag gi źes rlom sems kyi bdag ñid can yin no // rnam par śes pa ni yul so sor rnam par rig pa'i mtshan ñid gaṅ yin pa'o //*, corresponding to something like **mukhyatas tv*(?) *ālayavijñānaṃ cittam; tathāhi tat sarvabīja-* (or: *-jair*) *ācitopacitam* (cp. Saṃdh V.3) / ... / *mano nitya-kālam ahaṃ mameti manyanātmakam / vijñānaṃ yad viṣayaprativi-jñaptilakṣaṇam /*.

825. I.e. if we disregard problems of exegetical detail (see n. 436).

826. See n. 821.

827. See n. 824.

828. Thus, e.g., the functions of *cyuti* and *upapatti* (see § 3.3.0 + n. 233). As for the fact that, among the exclusive

objects, the Seeds (*bīja*) are mentioned (see n. 382): since the preceding items (including *ṣaḍāyatana*, for it is only the material sense-faculties that are, later on, regarded as the object of ālayavijñāna) can hardly be understood but as exclusive objects of *mano-vijñāna*, it would be quite arbitrary to take this item, without the slightest indication, in the text, of a difference, to refer to the (later) view that the Seeds are the object of ālayavijñāna (see § 5.16; cp. also §§ 5.6.3.2, 5.6.4.2, and n. 717); the more so since even at Y 11,4-8 ālayavijñāna (= *citta*) is not characterized as a cognition of any object, the function of being actual cognition of objects being reserved rather for, and characteristic of, *vijñāna* (Y 11,8). Therefore, if Seeds are mentioned at Y 11,11-13, it is probably only as another item of imperceptible entities, to be cognized exclusively by *manovijñāna* (and not by sense-perception).

829. Cp., e.g., AKBh 11,25f.; 34,5ff.

830. Cp., e.g., MSg I.7A.2.
At MSg I.6, the new *manas* is determined as the **saṃkleśāśraya* of *vijñāna* (in general); a similar function with regard to *manovijñāna* seems to be indicated at Y_t zi 6b2 (see § 10.3.1.2.*b* + n. 1298; cp. also Y_t zi 190a2 [see n. 1297]), a passage which is, however, intrusive to the main subject matter from the compositional point of view (see n. 1351). At Y_t zi 5b6f. (see n. 358), the basis of *manovijñāna* comparable to the sense-faculties is not *manas* but ālayavijñāna (thus Tib. and Pa. [see n. 357], whereas Hts.'s rendering [see n. 358] has modified the text in the sense of the later system).

831. This would seem to be implied at Si 19c11f. stating that all the eight *vijñānas* necessarily have a *bījāśraya*. Cp. also Hsien-yang 480c3f. (see n. 536) stating that ālayavijñā-

na is produced from previous karman and *kleśas* as its conditions (*pratyaya*) a n d from the **anādikālikā prapañca-vāsanā* as its [homogeneous] c a u s e (*hetu*). Cp. also the attempts of YVy to interpret the statement of Y 4,11f., viz. that Mind-containing-all-Seeds has arisen on the basis of delight in wordly existence (cp. n. 1405) as its cause (*prapañcaratihetum upādāya*), in such a way that this statement is taken to include the Seeds, e.g. by artificially analyzing *'prapañcarati'* as a dvandva in which *'prapañca'* means the Seeds (YVy 89a6f., adducing Y 26,18 where *'prapañca'* is listed among the quasi-synonyms of *'bīja'*; but see § 3.11.4.2). However, in the first two chapters of the *Basic Section* and in related materials, the *sarvabījako vipākaḥ* or *ātmabhāvaḥ* (identified, at Y 4,11f., with the *sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam* which in its turn resumes, in the text as it stands, ālayavijñāna) is only taught to be caused by previous delight in wordly existence (*prapañca-(abhi)rati*) and by good and bad karman (Y 25,12f., etc.; PG 28 [see App. II + n. 1408]; cp. also n. 374). To be sure, the (present) *ātmabhāva* is also taught to contain the Seeds of all (possible, i.e. future) *ātmabhāvas* (Y 25,3ff.; cp. § 3.11.2), which means that a given *ātmabhāva* originates from its Seed [in the preceding *ātmabhāva*] (Y 108,8f.; cp. also 26,4f.: *s v a b ī j a t a ś ca teṣām ātmabhāvānāṃ p a r i p ū r - i r bhavati*; for *antarābhava*: 19,1); but these Seeds can, in that material, hardly be dissociated from the Impressions of karman (see n. 448). This would seem to hold good also for materials like ŚrBh 384,12ff. or Y 200,13ff. and 206,14f. (see n. 1154), etc., where the Seed which *vijñāna* contains or is (cp. § 7.1B.2.1.3.*b*) does not appear to be anything else but the effect-oriented, productive aspect of the k a r m i c Impressions.

832. Cp. AS 12,11f.

833. Y_t zi 10b6ff. (H 1979, 45f. [§ III]).

834. The text is reproduced not as it stands in Y but in accordance with Y_m. A *de facto* quotation in Tibetan, interpersed with glosses, is found in SaṃdhVy co 80a8ff. Cp. also SaṃdhṬ ti 266a1ff.

835. Cp. Y_t (dzi 13a8) *mjug kho nar khu ba s k a b a* (so to be read also at SaṃdhVy co 80b1 instead of *skye bar*) ...; cp. also Y_c (283a2) 濃厚.

836. Y_m *-aṃte*

837. Y_t *k h u b a d a ṅ khrag gi thigs pa gñis*; Y_c: 一滴 ... 精血; cp. SaṃdhVy co 80b1: *pha* [*ma*] *las k h u b a thigs* <*pa*> *cig d a ṅ / ma las khrag thigs pa cig* ...

838 Y_m *taṃ /*

839. Y_m *tṛ*

840. Y_m *-laṃbanaḥ / a-*

841. Y_m *-n*

842. Y_m *-te / sendriyaḥ*

843. Y_m *-ddhaḥ /*

844. Cp. Y 23,2: *tasya mātāpitṛsambhūte śukraśoṇite viparyastaṃ darśan*<*aṃ*> *tadā pravartate*, confirmed by Y_c 282c15-17 and also by Y_t D (tshi 11b4: *pha ma las byuṅ ba'i khu ba daṅ / khrag de yaṅ / de'i tshe phyin ci log tu mthoṅ bar 'gyur ro //* [presupposing perhaps *tasmin* instead of *tasya*]). But P (dzi 12b8f.) differs, reading *'... khu ba daṅ khrag m e d k y a ṅ ...'* (cp. Y 23, note 1), i.e. "although there is not [yet] semen and blood". This would, however, seem to be a deliberate change stimulated by the fact that the present sentence, as it stands in Skt., does not tally well with the following statements of the text which stress that in reality the sexual union of father and mother (and thus the ejaculation of semen) has not yet taken place but is only wrongly perceived by the *antarābhava-sattva*. To be sure, it may not be impossible to interpret Y 23,2, somehow

or other, in the sense that the being of the intermediate state has a hallucination with regard to the parents' blood and semen by perceiving it to be ejaculated though this is not yet the case. But this is hardly the natural way of understanding the sentence. Rather, the natural way is to take it, with Y_c, to mean that the being of the intermediate state forms some wrong idea with regard to the blood and semen that has already been produced (i.e. ejaculated) by father and mother. But in this case, as was stated above, the sentence hardly tallies with the following sentence (Y 23,3-5). Accordingly, Y_c presents an altogether different version of the latter, taking it to mean that the being of the intermediate state fancies the sexual act to be performed not by the parents (with each other) but by himself (with one of the parents). This, however, hardly fits in with the fact that the misconception described at Y 23,3-5 has only the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the being of the intermediate state and of making him (or her) approach the place where the copulation of his (or her) prospective parents will take place. Thus, the sentence under discussion (viz. Y 23,2) is likely to be a heterogeneous or misplaced element, as is also supported by the Vaibhāṣika sources, according to which the being of the intermediate state, perceiving his/her prospective parents' sexual union, feels sexual desire for the parent of the other sex (cp. Y 23,5-7) and hatred against the parent of the same sex (not in Y), approaches their place (cp. Y 23,7f.) and, desirous to usurp his/her rôle in copulation, wants the parent of the same sex to move away (cp. Y 23,8f.). The *antarābhavasattva* then actually has the (erroneous) experience that the parent of the same sex moves away (cp. Y 23,9) and that he himself (or she herself) copulates with the other parent, and when semen and blood are ejaculated, he/she wrongly thinks that it is his own semen or her own blood,

whereupon, infatuated with pleasure, he/she sinks into the mother's womb (Vi 363b20ff.; Vi_2 268b20ff.; AKBh 126,19ff.; NA 477c10ff.).

845. I.e. the *antarābhava(sattva)*'s.

846. Which probably correspond, from the phase of *kalala* onward, to the gross elements of the supports of the sense-faculties (*indriyâdhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūta*: Y 24,11f.).

847. Viz. the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*: Y 24,11).

848. I.e. apart from the fact that the sequence of '*vipākasaṃgṛhīta*' and '*āśrayopādātṛ*' is reversed.

849. Cp. SaṃdhVy co 80a7; see also Y 199,17.

850. Ui 1958, 170f.

851. See § 6.1.2.

852. See § 3.3.1.2 + n. 246.

853. Cp. Y 25,3ff. and 26,10 (though in these passages it is the whole *ātmabhāva* that is stated to be equipped with all Seeds).

854. See n. 374.

855. See § 3.3.1.4.

856. See § 3.3.1.2.

857. See § 3.3.1.4.

858. MSg I.34.

859. Y_t zi 2b5f. (≡ ASBh 12,2ff.; H 1978, 8f. [§ i(a)]; Griffiths 1986, 130): *ālayavijñānaṃ pūrvasaṃskārahetukaṃ / cakṣurādi-pravṛtti-vijñānam punar vartamānapratyayahetukam / yathok-tam: indriya-viṣaya-manaskāra-vaśād vijñānānāṃ pravṛttir bha-vatîti vistareṇa /.*

860. Y_t zi 2b7 (see n. 415).

861. Y 12,8; cp. § 6.2.4.*a* and § 3.3.0 + n.233.

862. Y 198,17ff. (see § 7.3.1 + ns. 1083-1084).

863. See §§ 7.3.2 and 7.3.6.3.1-2.

864. As far as I can see, there is, from the point of view of textual history, no reason for separating (a) and (b) in the text quoted in § 6.3.1. But the question *kathaṃ punaḥ saṃmūrcchati* is perhaps intrusive, for as far as I can see, it does not receive a proper answer in what follows (for at Y 24,14ff. the subject of *saṃmūrch-* is *kalala* *r ū p a* , and mind is called *'cittacaitasikā dharmāḥ'*, and not '(ālaya)vijñāna').

864a. Cp. n. 327.

865. See § 6.3.2 (+ n. 861).

866. Y 25,3, etc.

867. Y 24,10; 24,18f.; cp. 18,16ff.

868. Y 25,1.

869. This fact will, in combination with the somewhat erratic train of thought, suggest that this portion of the text was probably pieced together out of rather small bits, some of which may be interrelated while obviously others are not.

870. **sādhiṣṭhāna-rūpīndriyôpādāna* (see n. 508).

871. **... sarvabījakaṃ cittaṃ* *v i p a c y a t e* ... (see ib.).

872. Incorporated, along with its context, in Hsien-yang 571c1f.

873. See § 6.1.2.*1* + n. 783.

874. At Y 109,3 there is only an introductory *evam*.

875. Y 192,4-6: *puṇyaṃ karma yat sugati-vaipākyaṃ pañca-gati-vedanīyaṃ ca kuśalaṃ / apuṇyaṃ karma yad apāya-vaipākyaṃ pañca-gati-vedanīyaṃ câkuśalaṃ / āniñjyaṃ karma yad rūpârūpya-vaipākyaṃ rūpârūpya-vedanīyaṃ ca kuśalaṃ* [*ca*] /.

876. AS 58,10-14 (merely reconstructed from Chin. and partly unreliable) ≘ AS_t 105a1-3.

877. AKBh 228,3ff.; Vi 596b12ff.

878. Which means that the distinction between *puṇya* and *āniñjya* is not made, both of them being comprised in *kuśala*.

879. AKBh 258,12f., technically defining *janman* as *nikāyasabhāga*; cp. 23o,16f.; cp. also the expression *'nikāyasabhāga-parigraha'* (AKBh 122,15f.), reminding one of *'ātmabhāva-parigraha'* (see n. 1477).

88o. AS 54,14 (ASBh 66,6).

881. AKBh 258,2off.; AS 54,11-13 (unreliable reconstruction) = AS_t 1o2a2-4.

882. AS 54,12f. (see n. 881) = AS_t 1o2a3f. (AS_c 679b3f.): *'phen pa ni gaṅ gis rnam par smin pa 'phen pa'o* (**yena* *v i - p ā k a m* *ākṣipati*) / *yoṅs su rdzogs par byed pa ni gaṅ gis skyes pa na* (D)[1] *'dod pa daṅ mi 'dod pa myoṅ ba'o* //; probably also AS 54,3ff. (AS_t 1o1b7ff.; ASBh 65,1ff.; cp. MN No. 135).

1. I.e. "after having been reborn"; P: *skyes pa*;. $ASVy_t$ 242b1: *skyes pa n i* ; AS_c: 生已.

883. See n. 875.

884. AKBh 227,13f. + 228,1; AS 54,19-21 (AS_t 1o2a7f.): *puṇyam* = *kāma-pratisaṃyuktaṃ* (AKBh: *-avacaraṃ*) *kuśalam, apuṇyam* = *akuśalam*; *āniñjyam* = *rūpārūpyapratisaṃyuktaṃ kuśalam* (cp. ASBh 66,11).

885. Y 25,16ff. (see § 3.12.2.2 + n. 412).

886. See § 6.1.1.(d)γ; cp. also §§ 3.12.2.2 and 6.1.2.2.*a*.

887. See n. 428.

888. See §§ 2.1o and 3.11.8.

889. The (less probable) "active" use of 'ālayavijñāna' as "*vijñāna* that comes to stick to [a new (basis of) personal existence]" would still be fairly close to the use of the term in (3) (see § 3.3.1.3), but the (more probable) "pas-

sive" use as "*vijñāna* that is stuck to [as one's basis-of-personal-existence]" would constitute a decisive modification.

890. Cp. especially PG 28 + n. 1408; PG 31 + n. 1416; PG 34ab + n. 1428 (Y 25,15f.).

891. See §§ 4.1.2-3 and 3.11.4.2, and ns. 469, 481 and 391.

892. It should, however, be noted that (7A) would - always under the proviso that its *'niveśana'* is used in a non-causative sense - imply the view that ālayavijñāna is (in an "existential" sense) stuck to by people as the basis of their personal existence (see n. 1477(*I.b.*α)) whereas in (2) the "de-personalized" idea is expressed that ālayavijñāna itself sticks (in an ontological sense) to the state of basis(-of-"personal"-existence). If it is possible to understand, in (7A) β, *'niveśana'* in a causative sense, the idea would be that people make ālayavijñāna enter, or (in the "existential" sense) stick to, a new *ātmabhāva*, either in the sense of a new basis-of-existence (in the traditional meaning, i.e., primarily, corporeal matter), or in the less concrete sense of a new existence, of which ālayavijñāna itself may be the basis (see n. 1477(*I.b.*β)).

893. The Taishō Index notes only one passage in the Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ (Y_c 354c6) where 轉識 (i.e. Hsüan-tsang's rendering of 'pravṛttivijñāna') is used without 'ālayavijñāna'. But Tib. (Y_t dzi 211a1) lacks an equivalent for *'pravṛtti-'*, which is in fact missing in the original (Y_m 94b2: *ekāntena tatra vijñānasyâ samudācārān nâsaṃjñisattvāḥ* (sc. *vijñānasthitiḥ*)).

894. Suguro 1977, 131 (above, 2f.); cp. § 1.8 + ns. 142 and 143; § 2.9 + ns. 193 and 195.

895. Suguro 1977, 130 (below, 18ff.); see also Suguro 1982, 66 note 1; 1982a, 111 note 13; cp. § 4.10.2 + n. 607.

896. Suguro 1977, 13o (below, 25f.); 1982a, 111 note 13; as one aspect of the meaning of 'ālayavijñāna': 1982a, 1o5,4; 1976, 38, 5-7; 1963, 566,1of.

897. Suguro 1977, 131 (above, 5-7); 133 (below, 22f.).

898. Ibid., 132ff.; 137 (below, 23) - 138 (above, 4); 138 (below, 1ff.). Similarly Ōsaki 1976, 262ff. (see n. 942).

899. Suguro 1977, 131 (below, especially 17ff.); 133 (above, 5ff.); cp. also Suguro 1963, 566, 12-14.

9oo. Suguro 1977, 131 (above 2o-22).
It appears to be due to his view that the different *vijñānas* were, originally, nothing but modes of one and the same mind (a view which seems to be influenced by Ui[1]) that Suguro can also speak of a splitting off (分離独立せしめる) of *manas* from ālayavijñāna (Suguro 1977, 137 [above, 3f.]; cp. 1963, 564,3f.). Cp. also Funahashi's opinion,[2] to my mind rightly rejected by Hakamaya,[3] that even in the pertinent passages of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī the new *manas* is not yet clearly conceived of as a *vijñāna* on its own. *Manas* is unambiguously classified as a *pravṛtti-vijñāna* already in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (Y_t zi 6a5f. = H 1979, 32 [§ 4.b.A.1]: *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa gcig kho na daṅ lhan cig tu 'jug ste / 'di lta ste yid daṅ ṅo //*) and in the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya (Y_t zi 189b2 [see n. 357]).

1. E.g. Ui 1965, 728. Contrary view in S. Katō 1935, and Yūki 1935, 329ff.
2. Funahashi 1967, 185f.; 1976, 115ff.; cp. also Kelsang/Odani 1986, 142; Hattori 1986, 8o.
3. H 1978a, 3o2.

9o1. Suguro 1977, 133 (below, 14-16); cp. 1976, 38,7ff.

9o2. Suguro 1977, 129ff.; 133 (below, 1off.); 1976, 38f.

9o3. Y 11,1ff. (see § 6.2).

9o4. Thus the paraphrase of the passage at SaṃdhVy co 71b6f.

905. Thus expressly YVy 1o2a8f. - Taken by itself, Y 11,8 (*vijñā-naṃ katamat? yad ālambanavijñaptau pratyupasthitam*) would seem to give a g e n e r a l definition of all the traditional forms of mind (i.e. both *manovijñāna* and sense-perception; cp. Y 65,[1+]6), but in the context o f *m a n o b h ū m i* as o p p o s e d to the level of sense-perceptions (treated in the p r e c e d i n g chapter) it appears reasonable to take it as being, i m p l i c i t - l y , intended to refer to *manovijñāna* o n l y . The ambiguity is, of course, due to the fact that the differ-entiating interpretation of *citta, manas* and *vijñāna* is a heterogeneous element in the present context (see § 6.2.3).

906. Cp. Y_t zi 189b3f. as an example for a statement of principle that all (the eight) *vijñānas* may be called *'citta'* o r *' m a n a s '* or *'vijñāna'*.

907. Suguro 1977, 132 (above, 12).

908. Ibid., 133 (above, 7ff.).

909. Y 12,8; cp. § 6.3.2 + n. 861.

91o. Y 24,4f.

911. Suguro 1977, 132 (below, 2off.).

912. See also n. 943.

913. Viz. in the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* and in the Sacittika-bhūmi-viniścaya. As for Y 11,6f., see § 6.2.3 and n. 943. The fact that *'kliṣṭa'* as an attribute of the new *manas* is, apart from Y 11,6f., used only in somewhat later sources (from MSg I.6 onward) but missing in the earliest pertinent documents does not, of course, necessarily signalize a change in the concept itself, since it may (probably under the influence of the phraseology of PG 39: see App. II) just as well have been introduced afterwards merely for the sake of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , viz. as a convenient means for expressly and at the same time briefly distinguishing the new *manas* from the traditional one. This possibility

becomes almost a certainty in view of the fact that - apart from Hts.'s version of the problematic passage Y 11,6f. (see n. 943) - even the earliest pertinent documents, though not using the attribute '*kliṣṭa*', yet clearly define *manas* as consisting of, or being associated with, Defilements (*kleśa*) like the notion of Ego (see § 7.1A.2.2.*c*.α and ζ).

914. S 1979. Unfortunately, I have not so far found the time to finalize the elaborate German version of that paper which I had submitted to Japanese colleagues in connection with a lecture organized by the International Institute for Buddhist Studies (the then Reiyukai Library) in January 1979.

915. The older view (documented in texts like Vin I 14 or SN III 82f.) was obviously that by understanding that none of the five skandhas is one's Self or one's own, one becomes (more or less immediately) detached from them and, consequently, liberated (the passage ends with an "Arhat formula"). This view is, even in the Kṣemakasūtra (see n. 916), clearly presupposed, as a matter of course, by Kṣemaka's interlocutors (SN III 128: *no ce kir' āyasmā Khemako imesu pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu kiñci attaṃ vā attaniyaṃ vā samanupassati, tena hi* (PTS: *tena*) *āyasmā Khemako arahaṃ khīṇāsavo*).

916. SN III 126ff. (No. 22.89); $S\bar{A}_c$ No. 1o3; cp. SHT IV (198o), 8off.; ASBh 62,5ff.; TSi 361b(3-)5; 333b14ff.; AD 237,12-14; Y_t (VaSg) 'i 21oa1ff. = Y_c 797c9f.

917. Cp. G. Sasaki 1957 and 198o.

918. SN III 128: *api ca me ... pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu "asmī" ti avigataṃ*[1], *"ayam aham asmī" ti* (more or less equivalent to *satkāyadṛṣṭi*: cp. n. 92o) *ca na samanupassāmi*; 13o: *kiñcāpi ... ariyasāvakassa pañc' orambhāgiyāni saṃyojanāni* (which include *satkāyadṛṣṭi*!) *pahīnāni bhavanti, atha khv assa hoti yeva*[2] *pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato* (CPD: *aṇu°*) *asmī ti māno asmī ti chando asmī ti anusayo asamūhato*; ASBh 62,5ff.: *nāham ... imān pañcôpādānaskandhān ātmato*

<vâ>tmîyato vā samanupaśyāmi (i.e. there is no *satkāyadṛṣṭi*: cp. AS 7,8f.), *api tv asti me eṣu pañcasûpādānaskandheṣv asmîti māno 'smîti chando 'smîty anuśayo 'prahīṇo 'parijñāto 'nirodhito 'vāntîkṛtaḥ* (or: *'vyantî-*).

1. Text: *adhigataṃ*, as in DhSk$_D$ 55,18 (*astîti vācādhigataṃ*, which is certainly a corruption of *asmîti câdhigataṃ*, cp. 55,26); but DhSk$_c$ 511c18 不離我慢, SN III 46 (Nāl.-ed.; cp. SĀ$_c$ 16b19: 不離 ...) and DN III 249 (Nāl.-ed.: *asmî ti ... vigatam*, confirmed by T 1536, 431a7 遠離我慢) support *avigataṃ*.

2. So to read with v.l. (Nāl.-ed. II 35o note 6) instead of *yo ca*; cp. also Spk II 316,29.

919. Cp., e.g., TrBh 29,1of.: *pañcasûpādānaskandheṣu ... ātmātmîyābhiniveśād yā cittasyônnatiḥ, so 'smimānaḥ*; AS$_t$ 94b3f.; Y$_t$ 'i 222b4f.; DhSk$_c$ 495c2o-22; Vibh 356; ŚA 654a14; no, at least no explicit, reference to the aspect of conceit: AKBh 285,2; TSi 314b1o. With special reference to the *asmimāna* of *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*: MSgBh$_t$ 15ob3 (*ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal te / bdag ñid mtho'o źes pa*); MSgU$_t$ 24ob3f. (*ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal te / ṅa'o bdag go sñam du kheṅs so //*); VGPVy 379a3; cp. TrBh 23,15f. (see n. 92o).

92o. Cp., e.g., AKBh 286,11 (*satkāyadṛṣṭipuṣṭā hi mānavidhā asmimānaś ca*); NA 6o9c22-24; 61oa23; 617c15f.; BoBh$_W$ 51,9f.: *satkāyadṛṣṭim ... mānamūlam* (BoBhVy 86b8: *'jig tshogs la lta ba de ñid kyis ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal yaṅ rgyas par byed pa yin la /...*); AS 7,4: *mānaḥ katamaḥ? satkāyadṛṣṭi-sanniśrayeṇa cittasyônnatiḥ*; Y$_t$ 'i 2o9b4 (Y$_c$ 797b28f.): ... *'jig tshogs la lta ba la brten nas 'du byed rnams la ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal ... gaṅ yin pa'o*; 21oa1ff.; TrBh 28,28f.: *māno hi nāma sarva eva satkāyadṛṣṭisamāśrayeṇa pravartate*; MAVṬ 71,26f.: *satkāyadṛṣṭibalenaîvâsmimānapravṛttitaḥ*; 215,23 + 216,1: *dauṣṭhulyavaśenâsmimānasamudācārād iti ... </ tadvaśenâsmi>māna-samudācārāt*[1] *satkāyadṛṣṭir dauṣṭhulyam ity anye*. With special reference to the *asmimāna* of *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*: MSgBh$_t$ 15ob3; MSgU$_t$ 24ob3 (... *'jig tshogs la lta ba ... // d e ' i d b a ṅ g i s ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal te /*);

VGPVy 379a3; TrBh 23,15f. (*ātmadarśanād yā cittasyônnatiḥ, so 'smimānaḥ*); similarly PSkBh 2o3a1 (with **ātmamāna* for *asmimāna*: see Tr 6cd + TrBh 23,13).

Originally, the unspecified feeling of identity (*"asmī"ti (māno)*) would seem to have been the basic element, compared with which all specified notions of identity - e.g. *"ayam aham asmī" ti*, which seems to correspond, in the Khemakasutta, to *pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu kiñci attaṃ vā attaniyaṃ vā samanupassati*, i.e. *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*; or *"itth' asmī" ti*, etc., in AN II 212, etc. - are derivatory, being occasionally presented as following upon the former[2] or even as presupposing it.[3]

1. Ed. (with MAVṬ$_t$ 143a7): *-rāt /*, but taken with the preceding sentence the argument would be redundant.
2. E.g. SN III 46; IV 2o2f.
3. AN II 212: *"asmī" ti sati ... "itth' asmī" ti hoti ...*; for parallels see n. 1425(*D*), footn. 2).

921. Vi 226a4f. and 6f.; NA 61ob4f.

922. NA 61ob6-8.

923. Vi 226a8ff.; AKBh 285,15-17; 286,4f.; NA 61ob5f.

924. AKBh 286,6-11; cp. AD 239,4ff.; NA 61oc12ff.

925. For the identity of Saṅghabhadra's "Sthavira" with Śrīlāta, see AK$_P$, Index, 14o; Mimaki 1972, 87 note 22; J. Katō 1976, 56; 1977, 116f.; 1978, 117 and 13o.

926. NA 6o9a14ff.; cp. AKBh 284,14ff. Cp. also n. 1445.

927. Y$_t$ 'i 21oa1ff. (Y$_c$ 797c9ff.).

928. Y$_t$ zi 112b6ff. (Y$_c$ 621b6ff.) and 115b2; Y$_t$ 'i 162a5ff. (Y$_c$ 779c1off.); cp. AKBh 29o,19f. and NA 618a17-19.

929. Y$_t$ zi 115b2f.; cp. AKBh and NA, loc. cit.

930. Cp. Y 162,1ff. (especially 5ff.) counting - as what is obviously equivalent to *bhāvanāheya* - two more *kleśas* than the Vaibhāṣika system, these two being, according to what can be inferred from the similar system at AS 52,1ff. (especially 8ff.), i n n a t e *s a t k ā y a d ṛ ṣ ṭ i* and (innate) *antagrāhadṛṣṭi*. Actually, Y 162,11f. says that *satkāya-* and *antagrāhadṛṣṭi* may also arise from n a t u - r a l or spontaneous (*naisargika*) inadvertancy (*smṛtisampramoṣa*) and be either explicit(?) o r inexplicit(?) (*nirdhāritā vā anirdhāritā vā*: Y_m) - a distinction which appears to be more or less equivalent to the dichotomy of "speculative" (*vi-* or *parikalpita*) and "innate" (*sahaja*), as is corroborated by the related passage Hsien-yang 482a13ff.

The principle that spontaneously arising Defilements are *bhāvanāheya* is expressly stated at Hsien-yang 485b13f.

Cp. also the "very subtle (*susūkṣmā*) *satkāyadṛṣṭi*", liable to disappear through *bhāvanā*, of $BoBh_D$ 232,6 (= $BoBh_W$ 339, 16f.; cp. DBhS 39,21ff.), belonging, however, to a different frame of reference.

931. ASBh 62,3ff.: *s a h a j ā s a t k ā y a d ṛ ṣ ṭ i ḥ*[1] *bhāvanāprahātavyā: yām adhiṣṭhāyôtpannadarśanamārgasyâpy āryaśrāvakasyâsmimānaḥ samudācarati / yathôktam: "...* (= quotation from the Kṣemakasūtra, see n. 918) *..." iti /...*

1. Ms. and ed. add *kā* which is, however, not represented in Tib.

932. The text (ASBh 62,9ff.) rather says that the objective basis to which the conception of Self of this innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi* refers is not clearly defined or delimited: *darśanamārgeṇa prahīṇa-parikalpita-satkāyadṛṣṭi-malasyâpy āryaśrāvakasya pūrvâbhiniveśâbhyāsa-kṛtam aparicchinnavastukam ātmadarśanam anuvartate ... /*. Since *'aparicchinnavastuka'* is obviously used to point out a s p e c i f i c aspect of the i n n a t e *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, its meaning must be quite different from that of the term *'anirūpita-vastuka'*; for this

latter term is, at AS 8,11f., applied to *satkāyadṛṣṭi* as a whole, i.e. to all its varieties, and according to ASBh 7,10ff. it means that *satkāyadṛṣṭi* arises only on condition that its objective basis has not (yet) been ascertained correctly (as mere dharmas which are not Self).

933. Cp. the allusion to the term '*vāsanā*' in the paraphrase of the simile of the Kṣemakasūtra at ASBh 62,7ff.: *yathā kliṣṭasya dhātrīcailasyôṣādibhiḥ sudhautasya nirmalasyâpi satas t a d a d h i v ā s a n ā k ṛ t a ṃ gandhamātram anuvartate* /...

934. E.g. on account of the fact that the notion of 'I' can be observed to occur even in good (*kuśala*) states of mind (MSg I.7.6; AKBh 290,16) but, as a form of the cardinal error, does not itself, of course, admit of being qualified as good and hence cannot be directly associated with such states of mind.

935. Being conceived of as [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*), ālayavijñāna cannot be directly associated (*saṃprayukta*) with a n y Defilement (cp. n. 596).

936. Cp. the passage quoted in n. 944.

937. See § 7.1A.2.2.*c*.ε.

938. Katsumata 1974, 327ff., especially 330f.; Ōsaki 1976, 254f. (+ 258). - I must admit that I did not pay due attention to this set in the paper mentioned in n. 914.

939. See n. 820.

940. See n. 821.

941. Saṃdh V.3; cp. n. 436.

942. Ōsaki's (1976, 254,6f., 262ff. and 267; cp. 1975, 202f.) attempt to show that the new *manas* can already be found in Saṃdh is not based on philologically acceptable evidence: There is no mention or indication of *manas* as *sahabhū-āśraya* in Saṃdh V (let alone at AKBh 11,25f., misinterpreted by

Ōsaki [1976, 263]); Saṃdh V.7 does n o t imply a s p o n t a n e o u s conception of *ādānavijñāna* as Self (see § 3.11.6); and Saṃdh VIII.37.1.14 refers, of course, to all kinds of (i.e. o r d i n a r y) defiled mind, not to *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* in the specific Yogācāra sense.

943. I agree with Suguro (1977, 132; 1976, 40) to the extent that at Y 11,6f. the specification of (the second) *manas* as Defiled (*kliṣṭa*) and as associated (*saṃprayukta*) with four Defilements (*kleśa*), viz. *avidyā, ātmadṛṣṭi, asmimāna* and *tṛṣṇā*, is, since it is missing in Hts.'s version, probably a later addition (to a passage which is, however, itself an intrusive and obviously comparatively late element: see § 6.2.3-4). This view receives additional support from the fact that in this passage, in the list of the Defilements associated with *manas*, *a v i d y ā* is placed f i r s t and *satkāyadṛṣṭi* replaced by *ātmadṛṣṭi* – two tendencies to be observed in somewhat l a t e r sources, which moreover tend to substitute *ātmamoha* for *avidyā*: cp. AS 12,3f. (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*, but still *avidyā* in final position); Hsien-yang 480c 23f. (我我所執, which would correspond to **ātmātmīyagrāha*, though the reliability of at least some elements of this initial portion of the Hsien-yang should, in the absence of any other testimony but Hts.'s version, perhaps be consider-ed with caution; cp. n. 538); MAVBh 18,24; PSk$_t$ 17a5 (PSk$_D$ § 27; Muroji p. 44,20f.); verse quoted at TrBh 23,18ff. (exact-ly the same sequence and terminology as at Y 11,7!); cp. Tr 6cd (*ātmamoha* in second position after *ātmadṛṣṭi*). The tend-ency to replace *avidyā* by *ātmamoha* would seem to be due to a wish for greater precision or/and formal unity (cp. also *ātmamāna* for *asmimāna* at Tr 6cd and PSk$_t$ 17a5); the trend to place it in front may be motivated by the dogmatic reason that *avidyā* is the basis of the other *kleśas* (see n. 963). The oldest sources, on the other hand, starting with *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* and *asmimāna* and placing *avidyā* at the end (VinSg [see § 7.1A.2.2.*c*.ζ + ns. 958 and 959] and MSg I.6), follow what I would call the "historical" sequence.

As for the text presupposed by Hts.'s version (Y_c 280b8: 恒行意及 ...,[1] i.e. **yac ca nityam (manaḥ)*[2]), Suguro's view that the *nityaṃ manaḥ* is, as a kind of simultaneous *samanantarapratyaya*, nothing but another facet of the *anantaraniruddhaṃ manas* (Suguro 1977, 132 below) appears to me rather speculative; for why should the author have used the word *'nitya'* if he merely intended to express the idea "simultaneous" or "present"? And against Suguro I find that *'yat ... yac ca ...'* should, in this passage, almost certainly refer to two different entities, as it actually does in the closely related syntactical structure of AS 12,2ff. (*manaḥ katamat / y a n n i t y a kālaṃ manyanātmakam ālayavijñānālambanaṃ* [ms., AS_G] ..., *y a c c a ṣ a ṇ - ṇ ā ṃ v i j ñ ā n ā n ā ṃ s a m a n a n t a r a n i r u d - d h a ṃ vijñānam*). I for one have to admit that the text as it stands in Hts.'s version would not, by itself, enable me to draw any concrete conclusion as to the function of the "continuous *manas*" or the motive for its introduction. I rather think that in this form the text p r e s u p - p o s e s that the new *manas* was a l r e a d y k n o w n (cp. the slightly more informative but, it too, by itself insufficient reference to the new *manas* at MAVBh 48,12: *mano y a n n i t y a ṃ manyanākāram*). Consequently I suppose that if not the whole passage defining *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* (viz. Y 11,3-8), then at least the short reference to the new *manas* (enigmatic by itself and therefore expanded later on) was inserted only a f t e r the introduction of this concept, and this most probably means: after the composition of VinSg (cp. § 6.2.4), or at least of the material on which the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* and the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya are based.

1. The addition 依止性 in some sources seems to have intruded from the preceding definition of *citta*; and yet, although it is corrupt (and may therefore have been omitted a f t e r w a r d s), it may be an o l d (mechanical) blunder which had supplanted an expression, formally similar, like 思量性 (*manyanātmakam*), which

would render the characterization of the new *manas* in the present passage substantially less vague and would also be in agreement with the close parallels in the Sacittika-bhūmi-viniścaya (see n. 946) and at AS 12,2f. (see above).

2. In Hts., this phrase stands in the beginning of the sentence, but this may be a secondary change motivated by the predominance of the new *manas* as against the old one (cp. also AS 12,2ff.).

944. Y_t zi 6a6(f.) (Y_c 580c2ff.; Chüeh-ting 1019c7f.; H 1979, 32f. [§4.b.A.1]):

"That *manas* which has the form of conceiving (1 consisting in 1) the notion of 'I' and the feeling of identity (lit.: conception/conceit 'I am [this]') (**yan mano 'haṃkārâsmimāna-manyanâkāraṃ, tat* ...), (arises continuously ... together with ālayavijñāna)."

(*ṅar 'dzin pa daṅ ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal daṅ / rlom pa'i rnam pa can gyi yid gaṅ yin pa de ni (... dus rtag tu kun gźi rnam par śes pa daṅ lhan cig 'byuṅ źiṅ 'jug ste /)*)

(1 ... 1) Tib. *daṅ* "and", but I prefer to take *manyanā* as an etymologizing generic term to be specified by *ahaṃkāra* and *asmimāna*, in analogy to the subsequent sentence quoted in the following note.

945. Y_t zi 6a7f. (Y_c 580c4f.; Chüeh-ting 1019c8f.; H 1979, 32f. [§ 4.b.A.1]):

"[This *manas* is characterized by 'conceiving' (*manyanā*),] for(?) (1 it has the form of 1) conceiving its object, viz. ālayavijñāna, (2 as 'I am [this]', '[this is my] self' 2)."

(*de ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa la ṅa'o sñam pa daṅ / bdag go sñam du dmigs śiṅ rlom pa'i rnam pa can yin no //*, corresponding, perhaps, to something like **tad dhy(?) asmīty aham ity* (or: *ātmety*)[3] *ālayavijñānâlambana-manyanâkāram*).

(1 ... 1) Or: its mode [of apprehension] consists in ...

(2 ... 2) Construed with **ālambana* by Tib. but taken by me with *manyanā* in accordance with Hts. and Pa.

3. For *bdag go* = *aham iti*, see Y 25,15 = Y_t dzi 14b1; for the pair *ṅa'o sñam pa* and *bdag go sñam pa*, see AKṬU tu 109b7 + 110b3 (corresponding to SA_c No. 984 ≡ AN II 211-213), but I have nowhere found the Skt. original for the second part (*bdag go* ...) of this Sūtra.

946. Y_t zi 189b5 (Y_c 651b22f.): *yid ni dus rtag tu ṅa daṅ bdag gi źes rlom sems kyi bdag ñid can yin no //*, probably going back to **mano nityakālam ahaṃ mamêti manyanātmakam*. Cp. also Y_t 190a7 (Y_c 651c15-17) where *manas* is taught to be associated with (see § 7.1A.2.2.*c*.ζ) *satkāyadṛṣṭi* in the form of the notion of 'I' (*ahaṃkāra*) and the notion of 'mine' (*mamakāra*) (*ṅar 'dzin pa daṅ ṅa yir 'dzin pa'i rnam par 'jig tshogs la lta ba*).

947. At least according to what is expressly stated at Y_t 'i 210a6-8 (Y_c 797c20ff.):
"As for the Ārya, even when he contemplates (*manasi-kṛ-*) conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) under the aspect of their specific character (*svalakṣaṇataḥ*), the feeling of identity (*asmimāna*) does not arise (*samudācarati*), let alone [when he contemplates them] under the aspect of their common character (*sāmānyalakṣaṇataḥ*, viz. impermanence, etc.). Even when he contemplates (or: views) them in their conventional form (*prajñaptitaḥ*), the feeling of identity does not arise as long as Mindfulness (*smṛti*) is present (*upa-sthā-*). [But] when he just views [them in] their conventional form, without Mindfulness being present, the feeling of identity may (or: will) arise."
(*de la 'phags pa ni raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi sgo nas 'du byed rnams yid la byed pa na yaṅ ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal kun tu spyod par mi 'gyur na spyi'i mtshan ñid kyi sgo nas lta ci smos / gdags pa'i sgo nas yid la byed pa na yaṅ dran pa ñe bar gnas na ni ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal kun tu mi spyod do // gdags pa ñid yid la byed pa na dran pa ñe bar gnas pa med na ni ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal kun tu spyod par 'gyur ro //*).

948. I.e. provided that the definition/explanation of the new *manas* in the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (see § 7.1A.2.2.*c*.α + n. 945) is not by a later hand. However, note that this definition/explanation too uses the notion of Ego and the feeling of identity for characterizing the nature of *manas*

i t s e l f (i.e. does not, explicitly or implicitly, establish them as *caittas*), and hence looks as archaic as the "statement of identity" (n. 944).
To be sure, the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya does n o t contain any reference to ālayavijñāna as the object of *manas*, but this too need not be of evidential value; for, the general problem of the precise textual relation between the *Pravṛtti/Nivṛtti Portion* and the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (see add. ad p. 82) apart, it would be difficult even in the specific case of the characterization of *manas* to derive that found in the *Pravṛtti Portion* (n. 944) from that in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (n. 946), or vice versa (for I for one cannot imagine a convincing reason why the *Pravṛtti Portion* should have added *asmimāna*, or the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya *mameti*). It would seem to be more probable that both characterizations, as also the explanation/definition of the *Pravṛtti Portion* (n. 945), are different "redactions" of a common (possibly oral) source the formulation of which may have been close to that of Y 25,15f. (see n. 368).

949. Such a thing one would n o t necessarily expect when starting from the *asmimāna* and innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi* of Śaikṣas: cp. ASBh 62,1of. (see n. 932) where the object of the innate notion of Self in Śaikṣas is not identified as ālayavijñāna but merely specified as something "not clearly ascertained, or definable" (*aparicchinna*). Of course, one would have to consider the possibility that, b e f o r e the question of the a s s o c i a t i o n of this *satkāyadṛṣṭi* with a suitable *citta* arose, a need for concretizing its o b j e c t may have been felt. This, however, would mean that the problem of the *asmimāna* of Śaikṣas and of the innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi* it was (at least according to ASBh 62,3ff.) considered to presuppose would, b e f o r e giving rise to the idea of the new *manas*, have come to involve, or to merge with, the problem of the o b j e c t of (the innate) *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and *asmimāna* i n g e n e r a l .

950. Y 25,15f. (see n. 368); PG 30 + 34 (see App. II).

951. Y 25,15 and 212,18 (see n. 368); 26,18f. (see n. 391 and § 3.11.4.2); PG 29 (see App. II).

952. We are, of course, in this context not concerned with a purely s p e c u l a t i v e view of Self which may arise through (a misunderstanding of) the t h e o r y of ālaya-vijñāna (in the sense of Saṃdh V.7: see § 3.11.6).

953. Already in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, etc., associated with *manas* are qualified as "innate" (**sahaja*: Y_t zi 7b8 = Y_c 581a18f. = H 1979, 36f. [§ 4]) or "spontaneous" (Y_c 651c15ff.; Y_t zi 190a7ff.: *ye yod pa*). At Si 2a12ff., the continuous, subliminal *sahaja ātmagrāhaḥ* of *manas* (which has ālayavijñāna as its object) is distinguished from a sporadic *sahaja ātmagrāhaḥ* on the supraliminal level of *manovijñāna*, which has the five skandhas as its object.

954. Y_t zi 190b3 (Y_c 651c25f.): *de dag* (viz. the Defilements associated with *manas*) *ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i sa bon las byuṅ ba kho na yin pas dus rtag tu yod pa* ...

955. Cp. Y_t 'i 210b1f. (Y_c 797c24f.):
"As for ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*), even when they contemplate conditioned factors (*saṃskāra*) under the aspect of their common character (*sāmānyalakṣaṇataḥ*, i.e. as impermanent, etc.), their mental series (**citta-santati*) is mixed up with the feeling of identity (*asmimāna*), let alone in other states."
(*so so'i skye bo'i* (P; D: *bo*) *ni spyi'i mtshan ñid kyi sgo nas 'du byed rnams yid la byed pa na yaṅ sems kyi rgyud ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal gyis rnam par 'dres na* (D; P: *nas*) *gnas skabs gźan dag la lta ci smos /*)

956. Y_t zi 190b4 (Y_c 651c28ff.):
"In a Śaikṣa who has seen [all the four Noble] Truths (**dṛṣṭapada*),[1] [the four Defilements of *manas*, and therefore *manas* itself, too,] do not arise as long as the Supramundane

Path is present (**saṃmukhī-bhūta*). As soon as [the Śaikṣa] has re-emerged from the [Supramundane Path] (**tato vyutthitasya*), they arise [again]. For, [on the one hand, in Supramundane Insight the unreality of their content, viz. Self,] is clearly realized (**supratividdha*), and [on the other hand] they are not yet eradicated (*aprahīṇa*) [and thus re-arise as soon as their *pratipakṣa*, viz. Supramundane Insight, ceases to be present]."

(*slob pa* (D; P: *ma*) *gźi* (D and P: *bźi*) *mthoṅ ba la ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam mṅon du gyur na ni mi 'byuṅ ṅo // de las laṅs pa la ni kun tu 'byuṅ ste / śin tu rtogs pa'i phyir daṅ ma spaṅs pa'i phyir ro //*)

Cp. TrBh 24,19ff. (at 24,21f., read *yaugapadyābhāvāl* [with TrṬ_J 476,35]).

1. Cp. Dhp 273b, etc.; the expression is variously interpreted by the commentaries. According to Vi 5o4 a28f., it means one who has perceived *mārga(satya)*, and thus completed the *darśanamārga*.

957. See n. 947.

958. Y_t zi 19oa7f. (= Y_c 651c15ff.):
yid ni dus rtag tu ye yod pa'i ñon moṅs pa rnam pa bźi po 'di lta ste / ṅar 'dzin pa daṅ ṅa yir 'dzin pa'i rnam par 'jig tshogs la lta ba (cp. n. 946) *daṅ / ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal daṅ / bdag la chags pa daṅ / ma 'dres pa'i ma rig pa daṅ ... mtshuṅs par ldan te /.*

959. Y_t zi 7b8f. (Y_c 581a18ff.; H 1979, 36f. [§ 4.b.B.4]):
(*yid ... ni ...*) *dus rtag pa kho nar lhan cig skyes pa'i* (= *sahaja*) ... *kun nas ñon moṅs pa rnam pa bźi po 'jig tshogs la lta ba'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa daṅ / ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal gyi kun nas ñon moṅs pa daṅ / bdag la chags pa'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa daṅ / ma rig pa'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa yin par blta bar bya'o //.*

96o. See n. 1351.

961. See n. 918.

962. Cp. PG 32 (see App. II), but also Y 18,2 belonging, like the passage Y 25,15 referred to above (§ 7.1A.2.2.*c*.γ + n. 951), to the context of death and rebirth; cp. also the expressions *'ālaya'* and *'upādāna'*, in the sense of "what is c l u n g to" (see § 7.1B.2.1.3), in the list of terms, pointing to the objective basis of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and *asmimāna*, at Y 26,18f. (see n. 391). In a sense, *ātmasneha* may even be regarded as a kind of inevitable consequence of the view of Self; cp. AKBh 287,4f.: *yatrâtmadṛṣṭis tatrâtmatṛṣṇā*.

963. Cp., e.g., Y 166,16f.: *tatra viparyāsamūlam avidyā / viparyāsaḥ* (Tib., Ch.; Y_m, ed.: *°saniṣyandaḥ*) *satkāyadṛṣṭir* ... *rāgaś ca* ; cp. also AKBh 3o4,11ff.; with reference to the Defilements associated with *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*: $MSgBh_t$ 15ob4: *gsum po de dag* (i.e. *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, *asmimāna* and *ātmasneha*) *gi rgyu ma rig pa ste*; $MSgU_t$ 24ob4; VGPVy 379a4; TrBh 23,14ff.; PSkBh 2o2b8ff.; YVy 1o1b3f.: *rmoṅs pa med na* (= *asati mohe*) *gźan dag 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur ba'i phyir* ...

964. Cp. PG 3o (*ajānakāḥ*), 33 (*mohāt*) and, especially, 36cd.

965. Suguro 1977, 133.

966. See App. II. As for Suguro's suggestion (1977, 133 (below, 17ff.)) - provided that I have grasped his intention correctly - that *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* at PG 39 is substantially identical with ālayavijñāna (having the function of Clinging to Self), it appears to me entirely unacceptable, even in its modified form to be discussed in § 7.1B.2.1.4.

967. See § 7.1B.2.1.4 and 7.1B.2.2.1.

968. Suguro 1982a, 1o5f.

969. Ibid.

97o. Y 4,7, etc.: see §§ 6.1-3 and 6.5. Cp. Saṃdh V.2 (55,11f.): *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems r n a m p a r s m i n c i ṅ* (= **vipacyate*). As for Suguro's (1982a, 1o5,15ff.) remark

that the expression '*vipāka- saṃgṛhīta*' suggests that the concept of ālayavijñāna was (at that stage regarded to be) subsumed under the concept of *vipāka*, i.e. that different concepts had come to be combined with each other, I agree with him, but I find that the only thing one can deduce from this observation is that ālayavijñāna was, at that stage, probably not yet considered to be the sole entity to be classified as *vipāka* proper (the rest being *vipākaja* only) but was only one among several others (especially those included in the *ātmabhāva* or *ṣaḍāyatana*) (see § 3.12.1).

971. Y 109,13-15 (see § 6.4).

972. Y_t zi 224b6 (Y_c 664c24f.; cp. Suguro 1982a, 106,6f.); cp. Y 222,12; Y_t zi 47a3f. (Y_c 595c19); AKBh 95,9f.

973. E.g. MSg I.21; 34ff.; 62.

974. Viz. at MSg I.62 which gives the impression of being a kind of supplement (cp. also n. 975) but, being confirmed by all versions, may nevertheless stem from the author himself; see also Hsien-yang 480c8, but cp. the remark on this text in n. 943.

From the argument of MSg I.62 that the *vipāka(vijñāna)* is *anivṛtāvyākṛta* because otherwise, i.e. if it were good or bad, the cessation of Pollution would not be possible, Suguro (1982a, 107,10ff.) tries to deduce a distinction between *vipākāvyākṛta* and *anivṛtāvyākṛta*. I.e. in his opinion the former only qualifies ālayavijñāna as the result of previous karman and only fits its function of being the basis of Pollution, whereas the latter characterizes ālayavijñāna as forming - in the sense of what Suguro regards as the view of MSg - the basis, and being susceptible of the Impressions, of both polluted and pure dharmas (cp. Suguro 1982a, 106,8ff.). Apart from the fact that I have considerable reserves against this interpretation of the character of ālayavijñāna in MSg (for which see § 4.8.5), I

do not find any such distinction involved in the wording of MSg I.62. To me, it merely yields the information that the result of Maturation of good and bad dharmas (thus particularly ālayavijñāna as the primary result of Maturation) must, in its turn, be morally neutral because otherwise [intramundane] good and bad actions, once performed, would automatically reproduce themselves ad infinitum, not allowing of an interruption of this mechanism for the sake of salvation.

975. MSg I.7C (later addition, cp. H 1978a, 23o); cp. Y_t zi 19oa8 and 8a2f. (= H 1979, 37 [§ 4.b.B.4]).

976. SacAcBh § 5 [see App. I]; cp. also S 1969a, 46f. (see § 4.1o.2).

977. Suguro 1982.

978. Ibid., 54,1ff; cp. Suguro 1963, 566,1o.

979. Cp, Suguro 1963, 566,11.

98o. Suguro 1982, 6o; 63.

981. Ibid., 61,1f.; 63,6f. (肉体・個人存在に ...); cp. 66,5 (身体に ...).

982. Ibid., 65f.

983. Ibid., 66,5ff; cp. § 3.9.2.5.

984. Especially Y 18,1-26,19, epitomized in Suguro 1982, 54f.; cp. also Shimizu 1985, 18ff.

985. Suguro (1982, 54f.), expressly pointing out the ambiguity of this concept (cp. n. 1477(*E*)), makes use of various renderings: 自己存在 ("individual existence"), 肉体 ("body"), 生命体 ("basis of life or existence").

986. Suguro 1982, 55,15ff.

987. Ibid., 55,17f. (... 因果の両方にわたると見るのが妥当なところであろう).

988. Ibid., 55,20f. (アーラヤ識は我を執着する識（因）であるとともに我として執着される識（果）である...).

989. Cp. Suguro 1963, 566,10ff.

990. See § 6.3.1.

991. See § 6.1.1.

992. Suguro 1977, 129 (below, especially 10-12); 1976, 38f. (especially 39,1f.); cp. also § 6.3.2.

993. See n. 374.

994. See § 6.3.3.

995. See § 6.8.

996. As for the fact that these materials, too, have, in view of abrupt transitions and significant diversity of terminology, obviously been compiled from different sources, see n. 869.

997. Cp. Mikogami 1965, 120, and, in a different context, Odani 1976 (see ns. 1103 and 442).

998. See n. 391.

999. Suguro 1982, 55,18-20.

1000. Cp. also Suguro 1963, 566,5ff., especially 8f. and 10f.

1001. Cp., e.g., MN I 299; SN IV 259f.; AKBh 281,20.

1002. Cp. MN I 191 (*yo imesu pañcasu u p ā d ā n a k k h a n- d h e s u chando ā l a y o* ...). As for *'ālaya'* in the sense of "what is clung to", see § 2.10 + ns. 202-204. As for the present passage (Y 26,18), the meaning "what is clung to" is, by the way, confirmed by the commentaries of Kuei-chi (T 1829, 13a17) and Tun-lun (T 1828, 324c7f.): 阿頼耶者、所愛著義.

1003. See n. 513; cp. also Kuei-chi (T 1829, 13a17) and Tun-lun (T 1828, 324c7f.): 取者、所取義.

1004. *sakkāyābhirata*: Th 765; AN III 293f.; III 435; *papañcābhirata*: Th 989; AN III 294f.;

papañcārāmo papañca-rato/-rati: MN I 65; AN III 293f.;
ālayārāma, etc.: see § 1.3.4.2 + n. 71;
upādānārāma: SN IV 39o.

1oo5. SN IV 389.

1oo6. Significantly enough, other complements of these expressions, not admitting of being interpreted in the sense of the five skandhas (as the totality of the constituents of one's personality), as e.g. *kāma* or *taṇhā* (see n. 1o62), are n o t included in the list of Y 26,18f.

1oo7. Y 26,16f. (see n. 469).

1oo8. This expression is used here with reference to the ālaya-vijñāna passage (Y 24,4f.) as a later element (see § 6.3.3) but not with the intention of excluding internal heterogeneity of materials (see n. 996). Considering this heterogeneity, my interpretation of Y 26,18f. in the light of the preceding sentence may not be entirely unobjectionable. Indeed, I should prefer to understand *satkāya*, etc., at Y 26,18f. not so much in the (canonical) sense of the five *upādānaskandhas* in their entirety as rather in the sense of the *sarvabījaka ātmabhāvaḥ* consisting of the *vipāka* (or even primary *vipāka*) elements only (cp. § 3.11.2). One may argue - though I for one do not find it probable - that the notions of *satkāya*, etc., should, in view of their equation with the *bījas*, be interpreted as denoting, at Y 26,18f., the *b ī j a s a n t ā n a* of Y 25,2off. (cp. § 3.4.3). But it would be rather arbitrary to take them to have, from the outset, denoted ālayavijñāna.

1oo9. Cp., e.g., TrBh 19,16f. (see n. 372); MSABh 186,1; ASBh 45,23; AKBh 278,21 and 279,12 + AKVy 444,9 and 445,2f.

1o1o. Y 26,11ff; 25,3; 25,12; 26,1o.

1o11. See § 3.11.2.

1o12. See n. 1oo7.

1013. Y 26,11ff. (see n. 481).

1014. Cp., e.g., AKBh 92,25: *santatau bījabhāvaḥ*; 64,1; 97,6f.; 278,20f.: *ko 'yaṃ bījabhāvo nāma / ātmabhāvasya ... kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ*; probably also 63,20: *agnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūte āśraye kleśānām ..., upahatabījabhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa*, i.e. "when the basis[-of-personal-existence] has become a non-Seed for Defilements ... like a rice-grain burnt by fire ..., or when its being a Seed [for Defilements] has been [temporarily] suppressed by the Mundane Path" (the illustration does, to my mind, not favour an interpretation of *abīja-* as a Bahuvrīhi), and 63,23f.: *āśrayasya tadbījabhāva-* (cp. AKVy 147,18f.); MSg III.1 (**āśrayaḥ ... bījabhūto ...*: see n. 582); I.45 (see n. 574); Y 206,15 *-bījabhūtaṃ vijñānam*, and 207,9, etc. (same expression with reference to *nāmarūpa*, etc.); 219,13: *vijñānādīni vedanāvasānāni bījabhūtāni*.

1015. Cp., e.g., Y 61,3: *bījānāṃ ... dharmāvyatirekatvāt*; Y_t 'i 2b6f.

1016. Cp. Y_t zi 30a6f.; Y_t zi 208a4 (*'dus byas kyi miṅ can gyi dṅos po la* (= **saṃskṛtasaṃjñake vastuni*) ... *sa bon ... ñe bar 'dogs pa*); cp. AKBh 64,4; with reference to ālaya-vijñāna (instead of *ātmabhāva*, etc.): MSg I.16; with reference to *citta*: AKVy 149,3ff.

1017. It appears that Suguro himself does not exclude such an interpretation but seems to take it as one aspect only, to be supplemented, even in the concept of ālayavijñāna, by the aspect of *ālaya* as the subjective act of conceiving Self (Suguro 1963, 566,10-12).

1018. YVy 115b7f.: *'jig tshogs la lta ba daṅ ṅa'o sñam pa'i ṅa rgyal gyi dmigs pa* (= *ālambana*!) *yin pa'i phyir de dag gi gnas* (= *adhiṣṭhāna*) *yin no //*.

1019. Cp., e.g., BoBh$_D$ 35,2ff. (BoBh$_W$ 51,3ff.): *vikalpaprapañcādhiṣṭhānaṃ vikalpaprapañcālambanaṃ*

v a s t u ... rūpādisaṃjñakam, yad vastv adhiṣṭhāya ... vikalpaḥ ... tasminn eva vastuni vicarati ...; Sāgaramegha is quite explicit in equating *adhiṣṭhāna* with *ālambana* (BoBhVy 86b1: *de'i gnas ni dmigs pa'o*); cp. also ASBh 45,2f.: *iṣṭaviṣayādhiṣṭhānena sparśena* ("[objective] basis"); slightly different ASBh 4o,12f.: the object of false views (*dṛṣṭi*) and *asmimāna* is the object (*ālambana*) of [mental factors] referring to what has no reality (*avastukaviṣaya*), because [false views, etc.] have [non-existing] Self as their object (i.e. content!) (*ātm a d h i ṣ ṭ h ā n a tvāt*). Cp. also Y 191,18 (*adhiṣṭhāna* of the act of giving is the t h i n g g i v e n (*deyaṃ vastu*) and the receiver (*pratigrāhaka*).
Of course, *'adhiṣṭhāna'* is also used in other meanings, e.g. in the sense of the support or gross material substratum of the subtle sense-faculties.

1o2o. Y 25,15f. (see n. 368).

1o21. See ns. 377-379.

1o22. Suguro 1982, 6o,13f.

1o23. PG 37ff. (see App. II).

1o24. Suguro 1982, 61,15f. and 2of.

1o25. Ibid., 61,5ff. (... 因も果もともに中心主体としての一つの識のはたらきに属するとみなされている。 ...).

1o26. Ibid., 61,14f. (... アーラヤ識と染汚意は、対治によって解脱に達する実[illegible]主体…である ...).

1o27. Ibid., 62,1ff. (... この染汚意は、自性清浄心と異ならないものとされている。 ...).

1o28. See PG 44 (*na ceha* (W.: *veha*) *kaścit saṃsartā, nirvāty api na kaścana*); cp. 41cd (see App. II).

1o29. See § 7.1B.2.1.4.*2.d*.

1o3o. For this verse and the following ones see the corresponding passages in App. II.

1031. It is thus at least as much concerned with s a m u d a - y a s a t y a as with *duḥkhasatya*: see n. 1444(*C*).

1032. ŚrBh$_W$ 174: *pudgalanairātmyaṃ paramārthaḥ* / (= Y$_m$; ŚrBh$_m$, W.: *-rthatas*) *tad-adhikārāt paramārthagāthāḥ* (= Y$_m$; ŚrBh$_m$, W.: *-rthaṃ gāthā*) /.

1033. Liberation as a s t a t e resulting from this "process" is treated in PG 42-44 (not included in App. II).

1034. PG 40ab.

1035. PG 5ab: *kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, asthirāṇāṃ* (see 1394) *kutaḥ kriyā* /.

1036. PG 39ab.

1037. PG 39cd.

1038. PG 41a.

1039. PG 40c.

1040. PG 41b.

1041. See n. 1447.

1042. See ib.

1043. See App. II and § 6.7.

1044. Suguro 1982, 60,4ff.

1045. In the latter case Suguro (1982, 60,11-13 and 18) would consider, for '*ātmabhāva-parigraha*', the meaning "C l i n g - i n g to the body" (肉体に執着すること). I have, however, not so far noted any passage where '*ātmabhāva-parigraha*' is unambiguously used in this sense. A passage in AKBh (333,19: see n. 1477(*A* (17))) which appears to express the idea of Clinging to the basis-of-personal-existence rather uses '*ā-grah-*'.

1046. Suguro 1982, 60,10ff.

1047. Ibid., 61,1.

1048. Ibid., 61,1f.

1o49. Exceptions are AS 1,24 + 2,2f. and 54,5 and 8 (see n. 1477 (*A* (15) and *B*)).

1o5o. See n. 1477.

1o51. Cp. especially $MSgU_t$ 24oa7f. (H 1975, (18),7) expressly referring, in this context, to the arising of a basis-of-personal-existence in the *ārūpya(dhātu)*.

1o52. See § 6.2.2.*d*.

1o53. Cp. Suguro 1982, 59,2f. (それが ... ニヴェーシャナをなして ...); cp. also $ŚrBh_W$ 184,7.

1o54. Madhyamakakārikā XXVI.2:

vijñānaṃ saṃniviśate saṃskārapratyayaṃ gatau /
saṃniviṣṭe 'tha vijñāne nāmarūpaṃ niṣicyate //

1o55. Pr 552,4f., paraphrasing the second half of the verse: ... *vijñāne s a ṃ m ū r c h i t e ... nāmarūpaṃ niṣicyate ... prādurbhavatīty arthaḥ /*.

1o56. The same semantic affinity would also be implied if *'(vi)-niveśana'* is interpreted as a non-causative action noun (cp. n. 1474(*C.b*)), because in this case, too, ālayavijñāna would be what is stuck to.

1o57. ŚrBh 16,15-18 (Katsube et al. 1981, (28)f.); Suguro 1982, 62.

1o58. Which is, however, essentially confirmed by Y_c (398a2f.), whereas Y_t (wi 8a7) takes it, as I do, with *ādita eva*.

1o59. Cp. DBhS 74,9 where *'dūrānugata'*, said of *kleśas*, is rendered by one Chin. translation (T 1522, 187a25) as 深入 ("what has deeply entered"); cp. also the expression *'dūrānupraviṣṭa'* (Y_c 487b18: 深入) at $BoBh_D$ 28,1o ($BoBh_W$ 41,15).

Yet, *'dūrānugata'* may, of course, also mean "permeating [it] (or: continuing) for a long period" (cp. SHT I, p. 279 [No. 623, fol. 27 V 3f.]: *trī(!)kalpāsaṃkhyeyānugatatvād dūrānugataḥ*). If this meaning is applied to the ŚrBh passage under discussion, it would not essentially change the import of the sentence as long as it is primarily referred to the

past (cp. Y_m 135b1 [Y_t dzi 299a2; Y_c 386a23-25]: *tad* (= *cittaṃ*) *atītam adhvānam upādāya vicitrātmabhāvapāramparyeṇa* ... *dūrānugatam*). But if it is primarily referred to the future, one would perhaps have to translate as follows: "... *ālayatṛṣṇā*, [because] deeply (*saṃ-?*) sticking in his basis[-of-personal-existence] from the very beginning (i.e. from time immemorial), ... cannot be eradicated ... [and is hence] everlasting, sticking [in it] most firmly".

At T 1522, 187b1-3, *'dūrānugata'* is taken to indicate that the *kleśas* continue up to the highest level of mundane existence.

1060. Suguro 1982, 62,15. Cp. the equation of *ālaya* with *tṛṣṇā* at Vi 746c11ff. (see n. 193).

1061. Cp. n. 71.

1062. See ns. 202-204. - In other canonical texts, we find, as the first member of compounds in *-ārāma*, *-(abhi)rata*, etc., apart from *ālaya* both concepts like *sakkāya* equivalent to the five skandhas or to (the basis of) personal existence (*ātmabhāva*) (see n. 1004) as also the sense-objects or sensual pleasures (*kāma*: Ja V 254; AN IV 438; *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc.: MN I 503). To be sure, occasionally even *taṇhā* occurs in such a position (SN IV 390), but even such a combination (which may be due to a mechanical variation of the subjective meaning of *ālaya*) does not support the assumption of a synonym compound but will rather convey the - admittedly somewhat odd (cp. n. 202) - idea of delighting in desire or attachment.

1063. Y_t zi 127a2 (*rtag tu 'brel* (D) *ba'i lus kun gźi la chags pas so //*) ≡ Y_c 626a19 (常隨自身而藏愛故).

1064. According to Y 99,5ff. (cp. Y_t zi 221a2ff. ≡ Y_c 663b18ff.; cp. n. 624), the occurrence of pleasant and painful sensation in the basis-of-personal-existence (*āśraya*, ≈ *ātmabhāva* [see n. 1009]) which on account of being permeated by

Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) is like a burning ulcer (see n. 469), may be compared to the supervention (*upanipāta*) of contact with a cool object or of a caustic thing, respectively, whereas the occurrence of neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation - unsatisfactory on account of *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* (cp. § 4.1.4 + n. 490) - is like the natural burning of the ulcer itself when it is not touched by anything cool or caustic. Later on, when the basis-of-personal-existence in the older sense (see § 3.11.2-3) had, as the fundamental constituent of a living being and ultimate object of the notion of Ego, come to be replaced by ālayavijñāna, Thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) for (or attachment to?) conditioned entities in the state of *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* is stated to be, in particular, Thirst for (or attachment to?) ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a (cp. also n. 1421[end]), since the latter is characterized by neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation (ASBh 55,13ff.; cp. § 4.1.4 + n. 489 and § 5.9).

1065. Y_t zi 127a1: *phrad par mṅon par dga' ba daṅ / mi 'bral bar mṅon par dga' ba*, clearly referring to *sukhā vedanā* and its objects, etc. (cp. ASBh 55,12f.).

1065a. In the sense of the d i s p o s i t i o n to desire: cp. ŚrBh 493,16 *āśrayasanniviṣṭas* (ms.) *tṛṣ ṇ ā n u ś a y ā dikaḥ*.

1066. Cp. the examples collected in Suguro 1982, 63f., and Yokoyama 1979a, 13f.

1067. Y Sasaki 1982 and 1982a.

1068. AS 27,9.

1069. Y. Sasaki 1982, 190; 1982a, 133.

1070. Y. Sasaki 1982, 190.

1071. Ibid., 190f.; 192; Y. Sasaki 1982a, 133.

1072. Y_t 'i 311a5ff. (see § 4.3.2 + ns. 500, 502 and 504).

1073. Y. Sasaki 1982, 183 and 185f.; 1982a, 133.

1074. See n. 196; cp. also ns. 587 and 555 (for the a b s e n c e, in Arhats, of *s o p ā d ā n a -vijñāna* and of ālayavijñāna as its successor) and Y 202,15ff. and SacAcBh § 5 (see App. I) (for the p r e s e n c e , in *sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* [i.e. in Arhats], of *vijñāna* in its b i o l o g i c a l function and of ālayavijñāna as its successor).

1075. MSg. I.36: *rnam par śes pa daṅ / miṅ daṅ gzugs mduṅ khyim ltar gcig la gcig brten pa'i tshul gyis 'dug pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ rnam par smin pa'i rnam par śes pa med na mi ruṅ ṅo //.*

1076. $SĀ_c$ No. 288 (81a9ff., especially b5ff.); AKṬU thu 112b1ff., especially 114b2-4 (cp. Honjō 1982, especially (82) § 13); cp. NidSa No. 6, especially 6.13; YVy 100a2ff.; AKVy 668, 2ff.; SN No. 12.67 (II 112ff.).
The title of the Sūtra ought perhaps to be read as 'Naḍakalāpikā̱-sūtra': cp. n. 1086 and Honjō 1982, (85), pointing out that at NidSa § 6.13, too, feminine forms should be read in accordance with AKVy and Tripāṭhī's own ms. (NidSa p. 29); the uddāna at NidSa p. 10 (*Nagara-Naḍakalāpike*) is ambiguous.

1077. $MSgU_t$ 259b6f. = $MSgU_c$ 393b6ff. (cp. MSg_L II,59 and 14*f.); see also T 1833, p. 886a4ff.

1078. $MSgU_t$ 259b5 (see § 12.2.2).
That this quotation is, as Enomoto (1982, 46) and Kajiyama (1985, 339 and 353) suggest, taken from the Nagarasūtra (see ns. 1139 and 1140) and not from the Mahāvadānasūtra, follows from the fact that it uses the first person singular which is n o t used in the Mahāvadānasūtra (MAvSū p. 137, Vorgang 9b.13; Fukita 1982, p. 35 § 13). This fact was kindly pointed out to me by Fumio Enomoto.

1079. Enomoto 1982, especially pp. 49ff.

1080. Y_t 'i 289a5ff. (Y_c 829b7ff.), especially 289b1f.; quoted and discussed in Enomoto 1982, 50ff.

1081. Y_t 'i 290a3ff. (Y_c 829c7ff.), especially 290a5f., cp. Enomoto 1982, 53,5-8.

1082. Y_t 'i 294a4ff. (Y_c 831b2ff.).

1083. Y_t 'i 285a3ff. (Y_c 827c3ff.); cp. Enomoto 1982, 53,8ff.

1084. Y 198,17ff. (Y_t dzi 115b3ff.; Y_c 321a17ff.); Kajiyama 1985, 337f.; cp. also Aramaki 1963, 211f.; Odani 1976.

1085. Y 199,4-15 (though 199,10-13 appears to be a fragment from an explanation of the dependence of the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*) on *nāmarūpa*!); cp. 202,16.

1086. Y 199,14 (where Y_m reads: ... *varttamāne* <'>*dhvani naḍakālāpikā-yogena varttate* (read *naḍakă-*?) ...).

1087. Y 230,4-9; this passage may refer to the Naḍakalāpik(ā)sūtra (cp. also Y 230,16-18), but more probably does so to the M a h ā n i d ā n a s ū t r a since a part of it (viz. Y 230,7-9) is almost a paraphrase of a passage of the latter (see § 7.3.4.1.*3*.*b* + ns. 1120 and 1121).

1088. Y 230,10-15.

1089. Enomoto 1982, 54,15ff.

1090. Ibid., 54,19f.

1091. Ibid., 54,20f.

1092. Y 199,8-10; cp. 14f.

1093. Enomoto 1982, 53,10-12.

1094. Ibid., 53,27ff.

1095. Kajiyama 1985, 353.

1096. $S\bar{A}_c$ 85a28f.; NidSa 16.7: *vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam (iti) nāma* (text: *nāmarūpaṃ*) *katarat / catvāro 'rūpiṇaḥ skandhāḥ / vedanāskandhaḥ saṃjñāskandhaḥ saṃskāraskandho vijñānaskandhaḥ /* (cp. MSūSg 117,24f.).

1097. Kajiyama 1985, 354,11f.

1098. Ibid., 345,13f.; 353,13-15.

1099. See n. 1078.

1100. Kajiyama (1985, 353) places him ca. 450-530, as does Nakamura 1980, 276. Katano (1975, 38-40), though very cautious, seems to favour a still later date. However this may be, in view of the fact that Hsüan-tsang quotes *Asvabhāva's MSgU as an a u t h o r i t y (which he never does with Dharmapāla [ca. 530-561], let alone Sthiramati [ca. 510-570]), it does seem that *Asvabhāva belongs to a generation earlier than the latter masters (cp. also Lindtner 1985, 115). Therefore, it is highly probable that, as Katano (1975, 39) himself suggests, chronological precedence is the import also of the fact that in the Tanjur *Asvabhāva's commentary on MSA is placed before Sthiramati's.

1101. Kajiyama 1985, 353,15ff.

1102. Ibid., 338,8ff.

I do not find that there is any possibility of understanding, as Kajiyama (1985, 338,10-13) suggests, the six *āśrayas* of *vijñāna* at Y 199,7f. as the six (ordinary) *v i j ñ ā - n a s* , and the *vijñāna* based upon them as ālayavijñāna, for the normal thing would be to call ālayavijñāna the basis (*āśraya*) of the six *vijñānas* (cp. Y 4,4ff., etc.), not the other way round. Actually the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī version of the passage e x p r e s s l y specifies the six *āśrayas* as the s e n s e - f a c u l t i e s (*cakṣurādi*) (Y_t 'i 285b1f.: *de yaṅ m i g l a s o g s p a rten drug po rnams la gnas śiṅ 'dug ste*; similarly Y_c 827c16).

I equally fail to see why one should, in a "pre-ālayavijñānic" text, find it odd (Kajiyama, op. cit., 338,13-15) that the *vijñāna* arising at the moment of conception as the result of the Maturation (*vipāka*) of previous karman, as well as the subsequent *vijñānas* which are still *vipāka* (for there is no reason why the *vipākavijñāna* of Y 199,7 should be limited to the moment of conception, *'... pratiṣṭhāya v a r t a t e '* clearly suggesting duration), are identi-

fied with the six ordinary kinds of *vijñāna* (*yathāyogam*, of course). Even at the moment of conception, the assumption of a (dim form of) *manovijñāna* - as in Vaibhāṣika dogmatics: see § 3.3.o + n. 232 -, though denied by later Yogācāra authors (cp. ib. + n. 237), does not seem to be impossible in an early text, at any rate not for lack of its *indriya* (viz. *manas*, i.e. any immediately preceding *vijñāna*, in this case the last *citta* of the preceding existence).

11o3. Kajiyama 1985, 338,18ff.
However, Odani (1976) thinks that what is m e a n t here by the terms '*vipākavijñāna*', etc., i s ālayavijñāna. But in my opinion Kajiyama, Enomoto and Aramaki (see n. 1o84) are right in refraining from such an identification which would only be justified from the point of view of l a t e r systematization. In view of the heterogeneity of the materials assembled in Y it is, however, - at least as long as we are concerned with the original meaning of a given passage - advisable to abstain from such harmonizations and to take the text at its word (cp. § 7.1B.2.1.2).

11o4. Kajiyama 1985, 352,15ff.

11o5. Ibid., 352,18ff.

11o6. See § 2.3 + ns. 155 and 156.

11o7. The versions used by the Sarvāstivādins and Yogācāras contain 12 members in the case of *nivṛtti* but only 1o in the case of *pravṛtti* (Murakami 1973, 29ff.; Fukita 1982, 32ff.; Enomoto 1982, 47; Kajiyama 1985, 327ff.).

11o8. Vi 124a26ff. (Vi_2 97b13ff.); NA 5o4c15ff. (cp. Enomoto 1982, 48f.; Kajiyama 1985, 334f.). The problem is also discussed in the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī (Y_t 'i 289b1f.; cp. Enomoto 1982, 5off.) and the Savitarkādibhūmi of the *Basic Section* (Y 23o,1off.; see § 12.1).

11o9. This problem is expressly posed by the Sthavira (Śrīlāta) at NA 5o3b11f.

1110. I.e. in the context of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, which is taken as a causal relation between simultaneous factors (cp. NA 503b23ff.; 504a7ff.; c21f.), i.e. as concerning "origination-in-dependence [explained as] referring to one single instant" (*kṣaṇikaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*: NA 504a10; cp. AKBh 133,1ff.). It is, of course, only in this context that the difficulty of a "doubling" of *vijñāna* might be felt. It does not arise in the framework of "origination-in-dependence [explained as] referring to [successive] states" (*āvasthikaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*: AKBh 133, 8f.) to which the unilateral dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *vijñāna* is usually related by the Vaibhāṣikas (NA 504a9f.). In this case, both *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* are taken to comprise all the five skandhas, but at different moments (AKBh 131,24ff.).

1111. Vi 124c6ff. (Vi$_2$ 97c26ff.); cp. NA 504c25ff.

1112. Cp. AKBh 117,18ff.; NA 504c26; DN III 228; SN III 53f.; cp. Collins 1982, 216.

1113. I fail to understand why Kajiyama (1985, 351,10f.) thinks that even in this theory there is still "doubling" of *vijñāna*.

1114. NA 503b13f. (Śrīlāta's view, but in this respect not refuted by Saṅghabhadra; cp. NA 504c26); AKBh 133,3f. (context: *kṣaṇikaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ* [see n. 1110]): *vijñāna-sahabhuvaś* *c a t v ā r a ḥ* *skandhā nāmarūpam* (cp. AKVy 286,6: *saṃjñādi-skandha-* *t r a y a ṃ* *nāma*); Shu-chi 366a16-19 (cp. also T 1832, p. 736b6f.). - Cp. also the Theravāda interpretation of *nāman* in the context of *pratītyasamutpāda*, e.g. Vibh 162 (*nāmaṃ = vedanākkhandho, saññākhandho, saṅkhārakkhandho*); VisM XVII.187; Nyanatiloka, Buddhistisches Wörterbuch, 131. - On the other hand, in the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins the situation appears to be different: cp. DhSk$_D$ 35f. (DhSk$_C$ 507c25ff.), where in the explanation even of *'nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānam'* *nāman* is

consistently interpreted as i n c l u d i n g *vijñāna* too. But for deciding whether this implies a "doubling" of *vijñāna* (cp. $DhSk_c$ 5o8a6 and 1o: 俱生識 ; not confirmed, however, by Skt.), more careful investigation is required. Anyhow, $DhSk_c$ 5o8a11ff. adds an explanation with a different interpretation of *nāmarūpa*, which clearly does n o t imply a "doubling" of *vijñāna*.

1115. Cp. Y_t 'i 295a3f. (Y_c 831c5ff.): *miṅ daṅ gzugs de'aṅ skye mched drug po ñid de / ... y i d k y i s k y e m c h e d ... de las gźan pa'i gzugs med pa'i chos rnams daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa ... ni miṅ yin no //.*

1116. Cp. Vi 124b25 (Vi_2 97c11); NA 5o3b29ff. Cp. also n. 111o. But (at least some of) the explanations proposed in DhSk may not presuppose simultaneity (see n. 1114).

1117. Cp., e.g., the theory of Bhadanta Rāma (a pupil of the Sthavira (i.e. Śrīlāta) acc. to Ak_P III, p. 81 note 2) at NA 5o4a1off.: *nāmarūpa* of *antarābhava* ⟶ *pratisandhivijñāna* ⟶ *nāmarūpa* of *upapattibhava*.

1118. Cp. NA 5o3b17.

1119. Y 23o,5f.: *vijñānasya dṛṣṭe dharme nāmarūpapratyayatvāt, nāmarūpasya punaḥ samparāye vijñānapratyayatvāt.* - Cp. also Vasubandhu's Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā (PSVy 18b1f.) where the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is, in a similar way, relaxed by referring the dependence of *vijñāna* on *nāmarūpa* to a context different from rebirth, viz. to the context of perception of objects on the basis of sense-faculty, object, and attention (*manaskāra*). Cp. also MK XXVI.2+4 and (though somewhat obscure in detail) $DhSk_D$ 35, 16ff. ($DhSk_c$ 5o7c25ff.).

112o. DN II 63: *nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ ti ... / viññāṇaṃ ca hi ... nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṃ na labhissatha, ...*; $DhSk_D$ 36,2of.

1121. Y 23o,8f.: *tan-nāmarūpa-pratyayaṅ* (Y_m) *ca punas tad vijñānam tatra pratiṣṭhāṃ labhate.*

1122. It is, however, more probable that in this statement, as also in the preceding sentence (see n. 1130), *nāmarūpa* originally means m a t t e r as far as it is biologically a p p r o p r i a t e d by mind, i.e. l i v i n g c o r - p o r e a l matter (see § 7.3.4.1.*3.c*).

1123. Cp. MAVṬ 37,18. Y_c interprets *'pratisandhim upādāya'* as "after [the act of] Linking up [a new] life has been achieved" (續生已後).

1124. *Manovijñāna* is, of course, based on *nāman* only.

1125. Y 199,7ff. (≈ Y_t 'i 285b1-3): *tac ca* (Y_m) *vipāka-vijñānaṃ*[1] *tad eva nāmarūpaṃ pratiṣṭhāya vartate - ... -, yenôcyate "nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānam" iti / sahabhūtaṃ cêndriya-rūpaṃ samanantara-niruddhaṃ* (Y_m) *ca nāma ṣaṇṇāṃ vijñānānāṃ yathāyogam āśrayo, yad āśritya yāvajjīvaṃ vijñānasya pravṛttir bhavati /*

1. VaSg: **vipākajaṃ vijñānam* (see n. 255).

Y_t 'i 295a5f. (Y_c 831c10ff.): "The *vijñāna*, in its turn, continues, from Linking up onward (see n. 1123), to arise on the basis of (**pratiṣṭhāya vartate*) just [that] *nāmarūpa*, by way of being simultaneous [with the corresponding material sense-faculty (= *rūpa*)] and arising immediately after [the preceding moment of mind which functions as *mana-indriya* (= *nāman*)] (**sahabhāva-samanantarotpatti-yogena* (?)). Therefore, it (sc. *vijñāna*) is, in its turn, in the present life conditioned by *nāmarūpa*" (*rnam par śes pa de yaṅ ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba blaṅs nas miṅ daṅ gzugs kho na la gnas te lhan cig 'byuṅ ba daṅ de ma thag tu skye ba'i tshul gyis 'jug go / de bas na de yaṅ tshe 'di la miṅ daṅ gzugs kyi rkyen las byuṅ ba yin te /*).

1126. The term *'pratisandhi-vijñāna'* may also designate the *vijñāna* immediately p r e c e d i n g the moment of conception or Linking up (see n. 259(*c*)). Cp. also the use of the term at Y_t 'i 295a4f. (see n. 1127).

1127. Cp. Y 198,22ff.; Y_t 'i 295a4f. (Y_c 831c8-1o):
"This *nāmarūpa*, in its turn, is, in the present life, conditioned by being "pre-disposed" (**ākṣepa*) and taken possession of (**parigraha*) by the *pratisandhi-vijñāna*, ... (to be continued in n. 1131)."
(*miṅ daṅ gzugs de'aṅ tshe 'di la ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par śes pas 'phaṅs pa daṅ zin pa'i* (Y_c: 執持) *rkyen las byuṅ ba ste / ...*).
It appears that in this passage the term *'pratisandhi-vijñāna'* denotes *vijñāna* not only in so far as it performs Linking up but also in so far as it has prepared it during the prior existence.

1128. This is the position advocated in Vasubandhu's PSVy, where the *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam*, which, in its turn, becomes the condition (*pratyaya*) of *nāmarūpa* (PSVy 23a3f.; 29b7), is the (prior) *vijñāna* infested with karmic Impressions (18b5; 23a1f.), and not the *pratisandhi(phala)vijñāna* (detailed refutation: 2ob4ff.), which is rather taken to be simultaneous with (and comprised in) the first moment of *nāmarūpa* (21b4; cp. also n. 1129).

1129. Cp. MAV(Bh) I.1ob (see n. 1477(A7)); AS 26,21f. + ASBh 31,12ff.; PSVy 21b4 (see n. 1128); TrBh 37,22.

1130. Cp. Y_t 'i 313a6f. (see n. 24o).
Cp. also Y 199,3ff. (≈ Y_t 'i 285a7f.) [difficult passage, translation tentative]:
"After dying in the past (i.e. in the prior existence), one produces a new (basis of) personal existence in the present, in due order, [viz. producing at first,] in the mother's womb, the *vijñāna* at the moment of Linking up, which is Result[-of-Maturation since it is] conditioned by the [*karmopagaṃ*] *vijñānam* [of the prior existence] as its cause, and which entails (? *yāvad eva* ... °*āya*) the [formation and growth] of *nāmarūpa* (i.e. living, animated corporeal matter) in the womb through the successive stages of *kalala*, etc.,

[its birth, etc., and] finally (*yāvad*) its decay."
(*sa kālaṃ kṛtvā pūrvāntād vartamāne 'dhvany ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayaty anupūrveṇa mātuḥ kukṣau hetuvijñāna-pratyayaṃ* (Y_m) *pratisandhi-phala-vijñānaṃ yāvad eva kalalatvādibhir avasthāviśeṣair uttarottarais tasya garbhagatasya nāmarūpasya yāvaj jīrṇatvāya* /).
Yet, the use of the anaphoric pronoun *'tasya'* may be taken to signalize that already the *pratisandhiphalavijñāna* stands for a (viz. the initial) phase of *nāmarūpa*.
Still less clearly Y 23o,7f.:
"Due to *vijñāna*, matter [consisting of] semen-cum-blood in the mother's womb, being taken possession of by *nāman* (i.e. by mind and the mental factors), coalesces [with them] so as to become the *kalala* (= *nāmarūpa*)."
(*vijñāna-pratyayaṃ* (Y_m) *mātuḥ kukṣau śukraśoṇitarūpaṃ nāmaparigṛhītaṃ kalalatvāya saṃmūrcchate*).

1131. Y_t 'i 295a5 (continued from n. 1127): "... and it (sc. *nāmarūpa*) does not perish so long as it is not separated from this [*vijñāna*]" (*de daṅ ma bral na med par mi 'gyur ba'o* //).

1132. VGPVy 421b6-8; Shu-chi 366b1f. cp. also NA 5o3c1ff. Saṅghabhadra (NA 5o3c6ff.; 5o4c2ff.) points out that the lack of agreement, of n o n -simultaneous *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, with two reed bunches mutually supporting each other becomes altogether inevitable when the existence of past and future entities (which may be considered to imply a kind of coexistence even of non-simultaneous factors) is rejected.

1133. It could just as well have been interpreted in the sense of being only the n o r m a l condition but admitting of exceptions, as was done by (certain?) Mahāsāṅghikas according to Shu-chi 366b2off.

1134. See n. 154.

1135. Y 2oo,1f. (= Y_t 'i 285b7f.):
"In the case of [living beings in] the immaterial [world-

spheres], however, *vijñāna* [subsists] on the basis of *nāman* and of the S e e d of corporeal matter, [and] *nāman* and the S e e d of corporeal matter [in their turn] subsist on the basis of *vijñāna*."
(*ārūpyeṣu* (Y_m *-peṣu*) *punar nāmāśritaṃ rūpabījāśritaṃ* (Y_m) *ca vijñānaṃ, vijñānāśritaṃ nāma rūpabījaṃ ca pravartate* /).

1136. One might argue that the Yogācāras may have been forced to assume, as the basis of *rūpa* in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti*, a new kind of *v i j ñ ā n a* , and not just S e e d s of *vijñāna*, precisely on account of the passage of the Dharmadinnāsūtra (etc.) which states, in their version, that in *nirodhasamāpatti vijñāna* has not withdrawn from the body (§ 2.4). But of course it would be much more probable that this Sūtra passage took effect d i r e c t l y on the theory of *nirodhasamāpatti* (as is actually documented in Y: see § 2.1), and not merely by m e d i a t i o n of the interpretation of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, *kalpanāgauravāt*, and because there is no pertinent textual evidence in Y.

1137. The explanation of the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *vijñāna* in the Mahānidānasūtra, viz. that, if *vijñāna* does not enter the womb or if it happens to leave it again or happens to be interrupted while the child is still young, *nāmarūpa* will not concretize or thrive,[1] might be taken to imply the idea that *vijñāna* must not quit the body during one's lifetime, not even in *nirodhasamāpatti*, and thus to call for the assumption of some kind of *vijñāna* even in this state. But apart from the fact that it is more probable that it was the e x p l i c i t reference to the existence of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* in the Dharmadinnāsūtra, etc., that led to this assumption (see n. 1136), other schools like the Sarvāstivādins, though acknowledging similar versions of the Mahānidāna passage (the $M\ddot{A}_c$ version, at least, is a Sarvāstivāda version), do not seem to have felt any need for drawing

such a conclusion. Actually, the wording of the Sūtra could even be taken to imply that it is o n l y during the embryonic state and early childhood, but n o t later, that an interruption of *vijñāna* is fatal.

1. AKVy 669,1ff.; AKṬU tu 157a1ff.; DhSk$_D$ 34f.; NA 485 b27ff.; MĀ$_c$ 579c17ff.; T 14, 243b18ff.; DN II 63; DĀ$_c$ 61b9ff.

1138. A Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the Mahāvadānasūtra is not known to me.

1139. Murakami 1973, 31ff. and Fukita 1982, 35 (revising NidSa No. 5.11-15; cp. also Vi 124a18ff.):

... vijñānapratyayaṃ ... nāmarūpam / tasya mamaîtad abhavat: kasmin nu sati vijñānaṃ bhavati, kiṃpratyayaṃ ca punar vijñānam / tasya mama yoniśo manasikurvata evaṃ yathābhūtasyâbhisamaya udapādi / nāmarūpe sati vijñānaṃ bhavati / nāmarūpapratyayañ ca punar vijñānam / tasya mama vijñānāt pratyudāvartate mānasaṃ nâtaḥ parato[1] *vyativartate / yaduta nāmarūpapratyayaṃ*[2] *vijñānam*[2] */ vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam / ...*

1. Thus with MAvSū p. 137 (9b.13) and Fukita 1982, 41 note 13; Murakami 1973, 36: *pareṇa*.
2. Thus with MAvSū p.137 (9b.14), T 714 and 715, Vi 124a 21f., and Fukita 1982, 41 note 17; omitted by Murakami.

1140. Murakami 1973, 31ff., especially 36 (SĀ$_c$ No. 287, especially 80c2ff.; T 714 = vol. 16, p. 828a4f.; Gopālpur Brick II [see Murakami 1973, 24; cp. also de Jong 1974, 140 = 1979, 240]); Näther 1975, 29 (kindly brought to my notice by Fumio Enomoto):

... vijñānapratyayaṃ ... nāmarūpam iti / ([1]*tasya mamaitad abhavat: kasmin sati vijñānaṃ bhavati, kiṃpratyayaṃ ca punar vijñānam iti /*[1]) *tasya mama vijñānāt pratyudāvartate mānasaṃ, nātaḥ pareṇa vyativartate / yaduta vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam / ...*

(1 ... 1) Lacking in SĀ$_c$ and T 714.

1141. As for Enomoto's and Kajiyama's thesis that some Yogācāra sources presuppose not the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the

Nagarasūtra but rather one that contained, like that of the Sarvāstivādins, an express statement of the m u t u a l dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, I refer to § 12. The matter is, however, not decisive for my argument since even in case Enomoto and Kajiyama were right the version used by these Yogācāras would be just the same as that of the Sarvāstivādins, and n o t a m o r e s p e c i f i c one.

1142. a) *Nāman* i n v a r i a b l y includes *vijñāna*;
b) *nāman*, *rūpa* and *vijñāna* are strictly s i m u l t a - n e o u s ;
c) *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* are i n v a r i a b l y concomitant, i.e. both *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* are a l w a y s present throughout saṃsāra, though it seems that lack of e i t h e r *nāman* o r *rūpa* must be admitted in certain situations (no *nāman*: *nirodhasamāpatti* etc., provided that the *caittas* of ālayavijñāna and, in the case of the other unconscious states, *kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ* are disregarded in this context; no *rūpa*: *ārūpyadhātu*).

1143. This development seems to have a forerunner in the *Pravṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (Y_t zi 5b3ff.; H 1979, 30f. [§ 3]), where the mutual dependence (**itaretara-* or *anyonya-pratyayatva*) of ālaya v i j ñ ā n a and pravṛttivijñāna (which may be taken to represent *n ā m a n*) is treated; and this passage may be regarded as a forerunner all the more since it also alludes, in passing, to the m a t e r i a l sense-faculties being appropriated by ālaya- v i j ñ ā n a (see n. 358). Cp. also Saṃdh V.2 which may be understood as explaining - though not professedly - the dependence of *vijñāna* on *nāman* and *rūpa* (cp. Takasaki 1982, 28), whereas V.4f. may be taken as an explanation of the dependence of at least *nāman* on *vijñāna*.

1144. Cp., e.g., NA 484b19ff.

1145. According to Kuei-chi (Shu-chi 366b23-25), precisely with regard to the moment of conception the introduction of

ālayavijñāna is n o t sufficient to settle the problems involved in the mutual dependence of *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* (interpreted in the strict sense). Since in Kuei-chi's opinion in the first moment of a new existence n o n e of the ordinary six kinds of *vijñāna* arises, he has to recur to *kliṣṭaṃ manas* (366b27f.) in order to supply (ālaya)vijñāna, in that moment, with a simultaneous *n ā m a n* .

1146. See § 7.3.2 + n. 11o4.

1147. See § 7.3.2 + n. 11o5.

1148. See also ŚrBh 384,11ff.

1149. See § 3.8.1 + n. 3o3.

115o. Y 2oo,15f.

1151. See n. 789.

1152. Y 2oo,13; 198,22 (see n. 1153).

1153. Y 198,22f.: *tatkarmopagaṃ* (Y_m) *cāsya vijñānam ā maraṇasamayād anuvṛttaṃ bhavati pratisandhivijñānahetubhūtam*; 199,4: *hetuvijñānapratyayaṃ* (Y_m) *pratisandhiphalavijñānam*; 2oo,14f.

1154. Cp. Y 2o6,14ff.: *āyatyāṃ cakṣurindriyāśrayāyā* (etc.) *rūpaprativijñāpter* (Y_m) (etc.) *yat puṇyāpuṇyāneñjya*(Y_m)*-paribhāvita-b ī j a b h ū t a ṃ v i j ñ ā n a m , yac ca tadbījasamudbhavaṃ phalabhūtaṃ* (Y_m); ŚrBh 384,12f.: *saṃskāra-parigṛhītaṃ ca punarbhava-vijñānāṅkura-prādurbhāvāya tad-bījaṃ* (see n. 147(*c*)).

1155. Y 2o7,9: *v i j ñ ā n a - b ī j a - p a r i g ṛ h ī t a - b ī j a -b h ū t a ṃ* (sc. *nāmarūpam*).

1156. Y 2oo,16ff.; 2o7,13 (read, with Y_m, *nāmarūpa- b ī j a -parigṛhīta-bīja-bhūtaṃ*), etc.; cp. ŚrBh 384,14f. where, however, the *bījas* of *nāmarūpa*, etc., are simply stated to be possessed by or contained in (*-parigṛhīta*: see n. 147(*b*)) *v i j ñ ā n a* .

1157. Y 198,22f. (see n. 1153).

1158. *antarābhava* is not mentioned in this passage, i.e. is either disregarded or had not (yet?) been accepted at the time of composition (to be distinguished, of course, from the time of incorporation into the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī or the Savitarkādibhūmi). Cp. also n. 259(*a*).

1159. Y 199,4f. (see n. 113o).

116o. Cp. Y 199,9.

1161. Y 2oo,2 (see n. 1135); 2o1,11.

1162. Y_t 'i 288a8f. (see n. 788).

1163. Y 24,7f. (see § 6.3.1).

1164. Y 4,11f. (see § 6.1.1(d)γ).

1165. Cp., e.g., Y 52,16 (*citta-santatau bījāni sanniviṣṭāṇi*) or 61,8 (*vijñāna-santāne ... bīja-santānaḥ*).

1166. See n. 1o.

1167. Y_t zi 9a4ff.: see § 1o, especially 1o.1 ((2a) and (3a) - (3d)) and 1o.3.3.
Cp. also MSA XIX.51:
"Insight which, being devoid of Clinging to both (sc. *grāhya* and *grāhaka*), has True Reality for its object and immediately perceives the mass of Badness (MSABh: = ālayavijñāna), is considered to entail, for the Wise (= Bodhisattvas), the extinction of the latter."
(*tathatālambanaṃ jñānaṃ dvaya-grāha-vivarjitaṃ /*
dauṣṭhulya-kāya-pratyakṣaṃ tat-kṣaye dhīmatāṃ matam //)

1168. See §§ 1.3.1(*1o*), 3.7.1 and 5.4.2.

1169. See §§ 1.3.1(*11*) and 5.7.

117o. See § 9.

1171. This would even fit Y_t 4b5f. (Y_c 58oa13f.; Chüeh-ting 1o19b7 f.; H 1979, 27 [§ B.1]): "As this object [of ālayavijñāna] is not easily discerned (*duṣpariccheda*) even by the learned among [ordinary?] people, it is subtle (*sūkṣma*)" (*dmigs pa*

de ni 'jig rten gyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyaṅ yoṅs su gcad par dka' ba'i phyir phra ba yin no //). Yet, it cannot be taken for granted that the different parts of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* have to harmonize in every respect (cp. §§ 9 and 11).

1171a H 1978, 21,9; cp. 21,23f.; 22,15f.; 23,6.

1171b Ib. 22,1; cp. 22,7f.

1171c Ib. 21,8f.

1171d Ib. 21,19f.

1171e MSg I.2o.

1171f See n. 321 and § 3.11.6.

1172. Cp. also Ui 1958, 17o; Griffiths 1986, 94 ("... constructed as an *ad hoc* explanatory category ...") and 96 ("... as an *ad hoc* intellectual construct ...").

1173. Such a decision does not mean that one has to forget the e x i s t e n c e of "tradition" altogether and f o r e v e r , as one of Hakamaya's arguments (H 1977, 223 [above, 1o-12] + 227 note 23) seems to suggest. Of course it is necessary to raise, a f t e r an unbiased investigation of the text itself, the question whether and, if yes, how tradition can be reconciled with its results, even if one feels unable to offer a definitive solution (cp. S 1969, 819). It i s , no doubt, good method to approach a problem i n d e p e n d e n t l y from as many different starting points as possible and a f t e r w a r d s compare and evaluate the results (for an instructive example see Oetke 1977).

1174. Cp., e.g., Demiéville 1954, 38off.; Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 5off.; Mukai 1976, 23ff. and 33ff.

1175. H 1977, 22o (below, 14ff.); 221 (below, 14ff., especially 24ff.); 225 (above, 6ff.).

1176. Mukai 1976, 24f.

1177. Cp. Mukai 1978, 272; 1981, 681.

1178. H 1977, 223 (above, 3ff.); cp. 221 (below, 4f.).

1179. H 1977, 223 (above, 4ff.); 224 (above, 3-5).

1180. Other cases admit of being explained by the fact that later masters sometimes adopted the names of famous predecessors (as e.g. the Tantric masters called Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, etc.: Seyfort Ruegg 1981, 104ff.), or that the name of the founder of an institution was used as a t i t l e by his successors (as in the case of Śaṅkara: P. Hacker, Śaṅkarācārya and Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda, in: Hacker 1978, 42f.).

1181. Cp. n. 451.

1182. H 1978, 2,22f.

1183. To be sceptical with regard to the historicity of "traditions" does not imply (as H 1977, 221 [below, 14ff.] seems to suggest) that one does not acknowledge that different cultures have different patterns of thought or evaluation (I should even maintain that such a difference is, on the contrary, rather ignored by those who take legends for historical documents in o u r sense). On the other hand, to acknowledge such a difference does n o t mean that one has to presuppose, at least in what we call philosophical texts, substantially different standards of l o g i c a l o r s t r u c t u r a l c o n s i s t e n c y , as is easily observed by looking into other Yogācāra texts like, e.g., Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā, or Hsüan-tsang's Siddhi (成唯識論).

1184. H 1977, 221 (below, 23f.).

1185. Cp., e.g., Karl H. Schlesier, Zum Weltbild einer neuen Kulturanthropologie, in: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 105/1980, 32 (This most impressive article was kindly brought to my notice by Mr. Volker Dumann).

1186. Schlesier, op. cit., 33; L. Klages in: H. Gruhl, Glücklich werden die sein ... - Zeugnisse ökologischer Weltsicht aus vier Jahrtausenden, Düsseldorf 1984, 197f.

1187. S 1985a, 115ff.

1188. S 1985a, 1o2f.; 1o7f.; 112.

1189. Schlesier, op. cit., 33; Werner Müller, Indianische Welterfahrung (Ullstein-Taschenbuch, 1981), 4off.

119o. S 1969, 82of.; cp. also Yokoyama 1971.

1191. H 1977, 222 (above, 3ff.).

1192. Cp., e.g., § 5.11.

1193. I.e. except, perhaps, the absence of *vijñaptimātratā* in some parts of VinSg which presuppose Saṃdh (see § 1o.3.1).

1194. S 1969, 819ff. notes 45 and 48.

1195. The same is, of course, also true of whole text passages (cp. H 1977, 226 note 22), which may freely be taken over from (the author's own o r o t h e r authors') earlier works as also from Sūtras, either by way of explicit quotation o r by way of simply being i n c o r p o r a t e d , with or w i t h o u t change in wording, with or without "cryptomnesia" (H 1977, 224 and 227 note 3o). To expect a classical Indian author to distinguish expressly between what he has conceived or at least formulated himself and what he has taken over from earlier works of his line of tradition is to attribute to him a modern historical sense and to assume that he set great store by originality. For a traditionalist author, "originality" would have been a serious charge (even the Buddha is related to have stressed that he merely rediscovered the Ancient Path), but "plagiarism" a nonsensical one. Of course, an author will be inclined to expressly q u o t e from a highly authoritive or canonical source in order to give additional support to his own view, but in the case of a work which has not (yet) reached such a status he will more probably simply make use of it.

1196. Deliberate avoidance appears to be the reason for, e.g., the non-occurrence of ālayavijñāna in the "Maitreya texts" (see § 5.11).

1197. Cp., as an example, the material discussed in § 6.5.3, where the explanation in AS is more archaic than that given in Y.

1198. One has to stress that the notions "compiler" and "author" in the strictest sense are only the (hardly ever actualized) extreme points along a whole scale of intermediate stages.[1] Even a compiler usually contributes or selects at least some order or framework of arrangement, and most authors will, more or less, and consciously or not, draw on what other people have already said. One may speak of "compilatory elements" if such elements are not fully integrated from the point of view of either form or contents. An author may even "compile" from his own works or rework them at different periods of his life, and if the development of his thought covers a variety of standpoints and/or if he is not a very systematic thinker, it may be quite difficult (and perhaps not even of primary importance) to distinguish such "pseudo-compilations" from compilations proper.

1. I owe this idea to S. A. Srinivasan who expressed it in an unpublished lecture on the composition of the Nāṭya-śāstra, delivered in 1975 on the occasion of the XIXth German Congress of Orientalists at Freiburg.

1199. P. Hacker, Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Īśvara, in: ZDMG 1oo/195o, 246ff. (= Hacker 1978, 69ff.).

12oo. I.e. Yogācāra literature before (or anyway under exclusion of) the works of Vasubandhu (or of both Vasubandhus, if Frauwallner's theory is adopted).

12o1. S 1969, 82o; Yokoyama 1971, 3off.

12o2. S 1969, 821 note 47.

12o3. Cp., e.g., MSg II.2, etc.

1204. H 1977, 226 note 13.

1205. Yokoyama 1971, 31.

1206. H 1977, 222.

1207. S 1972, 155f.

1208. H 1984a, 57f.

1209. BoBh$_D$ 32,11ff. = BoBh$_W$ 47,16ff.

1210. Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 319ff.; Nagao 1978, 542ff.; 1978a; Mukai 1974; 1983; Mizuo 1983; Hotori 1984, 55f.; 74f. note 1 (with further references); H 1984a, 55f.

1211. MN No. 121; MĀ$_c$ No. 190; Kj No. 956.

1212. *Nitya*, etc., are taken as attributes of *ātman* in accordance with the final sentence of the quotation (*ātmano 'bhāvaḥ*, showing that *ātman* is the dominant word) and ASBh 51,20 (*nityādilakṣaṇasyâtmanaḥ*); cp. also the parallel from AD in n. 1214, etc. On the other hand, AS$_t$ (90b3f.) juxtaposes *nitya*, etc., and *ātman*; cp. also SĀ$_c$ 56b24f. (see n. 1215); Y$_t$ 'i 246a7 = Y$_c$ 812a10; Y$_t$ 'i 360a6 = Y$_c$ 859a8f.; SĀ$_c$ 72c14f.; MĀ$_c$ 542c18f. In this case, the skandhas, etc., would be devoid of Self and Mine and of the qualities of permanence and unchangeability (in contrast to *asaṃskṛta* which is devoid of Self and Mine but not of permanence, etc.: Y$_t$ 'i 246a7f.). But this too is absolutely traditional (Śrāvakayāna) ontology.

1213. The original wording of the passage is lost (Pradhan's retranslation is unacceptable), but it can be restored to approximately the following text (for details see S 1972, 155f.): **śūnyalakṣaṇaṃ katamat? yad yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati, yat punar atrâvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihâstîti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti; iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir yathābhūtâviparītā. kutra kiṃ nāsti? skandhadhātvāyataneṣu nityo dhruvaḥ śāśvato*[1] *'vipariṇāmadharm(ā) ātmā ātmīyaṃ ca*[2] *nāsti; evaṃ tāni tena śūnyāni. kiṃ punas tatrâvaśiṣṭaṃ*

bhavati? tad eva nairātmyam. evam ātmano 'bhāvo nairātmyasya ca bhāvaḥ śūnyatâvagantavyā.

1. Or: *nitya-dhruva--śāśvata-*.

2. For the sake of convenience I have disregarded the Sandhi rules in the preceding words. It is not clear whether one has to presuppose *avipariṇāmadharman* or °*dharma* or even °*dharmaka*.

1214. Cp., e.g., AD 254,3f.: *śūnyāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ nityena dhruveṇa śāśvatenâvipariṇāmadharmaṇā* (Jaini changes into *-dharmeṇa*) *ātmanā (ā)tmīyena vā* (cp. $SĀ_c$ 72c14f.).

1215. C.p., e.g., MN I 297 and II 263 (*suññaṃ idaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā*) or SN IV 54 (*cakkhu ... suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā*, etc.) besides MN I 8 (*attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo*). Both elements are combined at $MĀ_c$ 542c18f. (corresponding to MN II 263) and at $SĀ_c$ 56b24f. The latter passage (眼空常恒不變易法空我所空) corresponds to SN IV 54 and has been tentatively retranslated into Sanskrit in Lamotte 1973, 321, as **cakṣuḥ śūnyam / śāśvatenāvipariṇāmadharmeṇa śūnyam / ātmīyena śūnyam /*. The passage is, however, corrupt, lacking an equivalent of *ātman* as is confirmed by the corresponding passage in the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī (Y_t 'i 246a7 = Y_c 812a1o).

1216. H 1984a, 58 (above); cp. also Nagao 1978, 548f.

1217. AS 4o,14 (corrected in n. 1213).

1218. H 1984a, 58 (above).

1219. AS 4o,15 (see n. 1213).

122o. S 1972, 154ff.

1221. SN No. 22.95; $SĀ_c$ No. 265.

1222. AS 15,14-17 (original lost; on the basis of AS_t 65a2-4 and ASBh 19,25ff., I should retranslate into Skt. as follows): **yad uktaṃ - (*[1]*rūpaṃ phenapiṇḍopamaṃ, vedanā budbudopamā, saṃjñā marīcikopamā, saṃskārāḥ kadalīskandhopamāḥ, vijñānaṃ māyopamam*[1]*) iti, tatra kim upādāya rūpaṃ phenapiṇḍopamaṃ yā-*

vad vijñānaṃ māyopamam? ātmāsattāṃ[2] *śucyasattām alpāsvādatām*[3] *adṛḍhāsāratāṃ*[4] *copādāya*[5] /

(1 ... 1) Or - perhaps better - with anteposition of the predicates. Cp. SN III 142 (verse); a Sanskrit verse version is available in PG 17-18 (ŚrBh$_W$ 17o,1-3; cp. also Pr 41,9ff. and 549,2ff.) and should perhaps be inserted here, too, but AS$_t$ is in prose.

2. ASBh 2o,2 + note 1. Tatia reads *ātmasattām* which he changes into *anātmatām*.

3. *ro bro ba chuṅ ba ñid*; cp. MVy 6894.

4. *mi brtan źiṅ sñiṅ po med pa ñid.*

5. ASBh 2o,2.

1223. AS 4o,16-18 (retranslation, corrected by myself on the basis of AS$_t$ 9ob6f. and ASBh 52,1ff.):
**api khalu trividhā śūnyatā* - (1*svabhāvaśūnyatā tathābhāvaśūnyatā prakṛtiśūnyatā*1) *ca / ādyā* (1*parikalpitaṃ svabhāvam upādāya*1) *draṣṭavyā, dvitīyā* (1*paratantraṃ svabhāvam upādāya*1) *draṣṭavyā*[2], *tṛtīyā* (1*pariniṣpannaṃ svabhāvam upādāya*1 *draṣṭavyā*[2] /

(1 ... 1) ASBh 52,1-4.

2. Thus AS$_t$ and AS$_c$, but perhaps superfluous in Skt.

1224. H 1984a, 58 (below).

1225. Cp., e.g., AS 31,6 = AS$_t$ 81b3;
31,12 = 81b8; 31,22 = 82a7.

1226. The terms themselves *could*, of course, easily be interpreted in the sense of *pudgala-nairātmya*, too: the imagined *ātman* and *ātmīya* is empty of essence; skandhas, etc., originating in dependence, are empty of being such [as they are imagined, viz. as *ātman* or *ātmīya*]; *(pudgala)-nairātmya* is emptiness by nature. I do not suggest that the author *intends* them to be interpreted thus, but at any rate he does not *explicitly exclude* such an interpretation.

1227. AS 31,6ff. (AS_G 29,1ff.): ... *tatra parikalpitalakṣaṇaprabhedaḥ katamaḥ / skandhadhātvāyataneṣv ā t m e t i vā sattvo jīvo jantuḥ poṣaḥ p u d g a l o manujo mānava iti vā yat parikalpyate / vikalpitalakṣaṇaprabhedaḥ katamaḥ / tāny eva skandhadhātvāyatanāni / dharmatālakṣaṇaprabhedaḥ katamaḥ / teṣv eva skandhadhātvāyataneṣu ātmābhāvaḥ ... nairātmyāstitā /*

In contrast to *parikalpita*, *vikalpita* would seem, in this interpretation, to designate not the effected but the affected object.

1228. S 1972, 156.

1229. Conze/Iida 1968, 238,2ff.; cp. also H 1975b, (2o)ff., especially (24)f.; 1975c, (13)ff.

123o. AS 84,11ff.

1231. Cp. Hotori 1982, 44 note 1o; 48 note 35; 52 note 95; cp. also Hotori 1984, 61.

1232. = H 1979, 43f. (§ II, especially 2.a). This passage states that not only in *nirodhasamāpatti* but a l s o in *a - s a ṃ j ñ i s a m ā p a t t i* , *āsaṃjñika*, deep sleep and deep swoon [a non-Arhat] is possessed of ālayavijñāna but l a c k s p r a v ṛ t t i v i j ñ ā n a . In this statement, the new *manas* (which should be missing in *nirodhasamāpatti* but not in *asaṃjñisamāpatti*, etc.[1]) is e i t h e r not taken into account because it was not considered to be included in pravṛttivijñāna - which would, however, run counter to Y_t zi 6a5f. (H 1979, 32 [§ 4.b.A.1]) and 189b2 (see n. 357) -; o r - and this is more probable - the new *manas* is not taken into account because it had not yet been introduced when the above statement was formulated (or had at any rate not been accepted by its author).

1. Cp. - apart from slightly later sources like MSg I.7A.4-5 - Y_t zi 6a6f. which states (without a n y restriction: see n. 657) that *manas* accompanies ālayavijñāna in both conscious a n d u n c o n s c i o u s states.

1233. Cp. ns. 1351 and 357; Suguro 1977, 138 (above, 5ff.).

1234. Y_t zi 9a3-b3 ≡ Y_c 581b22-c8 ≡ Hsien-yang 567b13-28 ≡ Chüeh-ting 1020a28-b11; H 1979, 39-41; cp. SaṃdhVy co 104b5-105b1 (omitting (2b): see n. 1240) and 78a2-5 (abbreviated). - As for the compositional structure of the passage, see § 11.1.

1235. (o) = H 1979, 39 (§ B.1, last sentence);
(1a), (1b), (2a), (2b) = H 1979, 40 (§ B.2);
(3a) - (3d) = H 1979, 40f. (§ B.3).

1236. According to N. Hakamaya (1979, 50 note 103; cp. also Ui 1965, 746; but otherwise Ui 1958, 188), this sentence has to be taken, against Y_c (復次 ...) but with Hsien-yang (是故 ..., and 又 in the beginning of the next sentence), with the p r e c e d i n g paragraph of the text (viz. 5.b.B.1). But see § 11.2.4.3.

1237. See § 11.2.2.

1238. Or: **tasyaîvaṃ saṃkleśamūlasyâlayavijñānasya*; cp. passages like ŚrBh 506,6 (*tasyaîvaṃ bhāvanā-prayuktasya* ...) or $BoBh_D$ 38,8 (*sa evaṃ vaśitāprāptaḥ* ...); 33,18; 225,11.

1239. Thus acc. to Hts. (達 ... 已); Tib. *rtogs par byed pa na* would seem to be based on **pratividhyan*. Cp. § 10.3.3.3.a + n. 1322.

1240. According to Pa.'s rendering, one should refer **tatra* to ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a : "He then perceives all [constituents of] Pollution to be altogether assembled there (= in ālayavijñāna)." Yet, in my opinion this would unduly anticipate the sentence next but one ((3a)). Of course, there may be incoherence due to heterogeneity of materials; in other words: due to (2b) being, p e r h a p s intrusive to the main material of the *Nivṛtti Portion*. In this connection, it is worth noting that (2b) is missing in the (quasi-)quotation of the passage at SaṃdhVy co 105a3 (cp. § 11.2.4.5 + n. 1355). On the other hand, (2b) appears to be reminiscent of

Saṃdh VIII.37.3 (see n. 627), though this need not, perhaps, contradict its being intrusive to the "main material".

1241. Or: "should view", if Tib. *blta* is correct; but this is hardly in agreement with Hts. (能 ... 觀察) and Pa. (即見 ...).

1242. **prapañca* appears, in this passage, to be practically equivalent to *s a ṃ k l e ś a* (cp. Pa.'s rendering of **prapañca-saṃgṛhīta* by 煩惱攝 !), i.e. to be understood as undue (i.e. p o l l u t i v e or unwholesome) intellectual and emotional psychic activities and the entities which these activities produce or refer to or characterize; cp. the definition of *prapañca* as *kleśāḥ sakleśāś ca skandhāḥ* at Y_m 84b2 (see n. 532(b)).

1243. I have preferred the reading of SaṃdhVy (*'du byed kyi rnam pa spros pas bsdus pa*) because it is more easily reconciled with Hts.'s rendering (一切戲論所攝諸行, i.e. "... of all *saṃskāras* comprised in *prapañca*"). In contrast to this, the reading of Y_t (*'du byed kyi rnam par spros pas bsdus pa*) would have to be taken to mean "(all those [constituents, or fetters]) belonging to the [pollutive] proliferation/diversity (*viprapañca*: cp. MVy 2926, but so far not noted by me in Y) of conditioned factors".

1244. I.e.: "these factors" (Hts.) or "all *prapañca*" (*spros pa thams cad*: SaṃdhVy).

1245. Cp. ASBh 121,29f.; see H 1979, 65 + 78 note 71.

1246. Tib. (*pas*): "by", which is not confirmed by Pa. (Hts. is ambiguous) nor by the parallel passages (see n. 1247), where *'āsevanānvayāt ...'* is never found to occur with an instrumental but only with a genitivus objectivus.

1247. Cp., e.g., ŚrBh 2oo,7 (Y_t wi 94b3; Y_c 428b19f.); 4o3,1f. (Y_t wi 178b1; Y_c 458a14f.); 499,6f. (Y_t wi 229b5f.; Y_c 475c3f.); 5o6,1o-12 (Y_t wi 233b6; Y_c 476c28f.).

1248. Cp. ŚrBh 506,1 *samanantaraprahīṇe kleś<e>* = Y_t wi 233b2 *ñon moṅs pa spaṅs ma thag tu* = Y_c 476c21 惑 (text: 或) 斷無間 ; cp. DBhS 82,26 or 83,14 (read *samanantara-samāpanne ... tasmin* with $DBhS_K$ 180,3 + note 9). Another possibility is **sahâśrayaparivṛtteḥ*: cp. $BoBh_D$ 13,7 *saha-cittotpādāt* (see BHSD s.v. *saha-*) = Y_t źi 13b2 *sems bskyed ma thag gis*; cp. DBhS 64,9 and 16, or 83,6 (Tib.: ... *ma thag tu*).

1249. Omitted in SaṃdhVy co 104b5f. and 78a2.

1250. Thus Y_t and SaṃdhVy co 78a2; ib. 104b5: *bsgom*; cp. 104b3: *sgom*.

1250a SaṃdhVy co 104b6: *bya ste /*.

1251. SaṃdhVy co 104b6 and 78a3: *sgom*.

1252. SaṃdhVy co 104b8: *na*.

1253. D: *bsgom*; no equivalent in Hts.

1253a Missing at SaṃdhVy co 104b7.

1254. D: *pa yaṅ*; SaṃdhVy co 104b8: *pas*.

1255. SaṃdhVy co 105a3: *so //*.

1256. Thus D and SaṃdhVy co 105a3; P lacks *chos thams cad kyi*.

1257. P: *ñes par rtog*; D: *bciṅs pa rtogs*.

1258. SaṃdhVy co 105a5: *śes pa de ni*.

1258a Thus SaṃdhVy (ib.); Y_t: *par*.

1259. SaṃdhVy (ib.) om. *de dag*.

1260. SaṃdhVy (ib.): *khams d a ṅ l d a n pa*.

1261. SaṃdhVy (ib.): *de la spros pa thams cad* instead of *kun gźi rnam par śes pa la*.

1262. SaṃdhVy (ib.): *gcig bsdus*.

1263. Thus D; P: *spuṅ pa*; SaṃdhVy (ib.): *spaṅ ba/pa*.

1263a SaṃdhVy co 105a7 wrongly *bsogs*.

1264. Thus P, D and SaṃdhVy co 105a8; read *pa*??

1265. P, D and SaṃdhVy (ib.): *brten*; but cp. Hts. and Pa. 修習 and the passages referred to in n. 1247.

1265a SaṃdhVy (ib.) falsely *gnas par*.

1266. Thus SaṃdhVy co 1o5a8; 78a4: *su gyur*; Y_t: *'gyur*.

1267. SaṃdhVy co 78a4: *spaṅ bar* (but 1o5b1 *spaṅs par*).

1268. SaṃdhVy co 78a4 and 1o5b1: *spaṅ bar*.

1269. Ōsaki 1978.

127o. Ib., 1o69. Spacing mine.

1271. Ib., 1o68. Spacing mine.

1272. Ib., 1o67.

1273. Ib., 1o68. Cp. also Ui 1965, 752f.

1274. See n. 1167.

1275. See also § 2.13.7 + n. 221.

1276. Saṃdh VIII.3 (p. 89,14-16). "... he inwardly contemplates that *citta* by means of which he is contemplating [those doctrinal texts]" (*sems gaṅ gis yid la byed pa'i sems de n a ṅ d u ... yid la byed do //*, corresponding to something like **yena cittena manasikaroti, tac cittam adhyātmam ... manasikaroti*). Cp. also VIII.5 (p. 9o,8-9); VIII.6 (p. 9o,27); VIII.9 (p. 92,1f.).

1277. Cp. the context of the passages indicated in n. 1276.

1278. E.g. ŚrBh 363,14f.; AS 75,15f.; $BoBh_D$ 77,5ff.; also MSA XVIII.66.

1279. Saṃdh VIII.9 (p. 92,11-13); cp. VIII.2o.2.3.

128o. Saṃdh VIII.37.2: *ji ltar na gnas pa la mkhas pa yin źe na / gal te rnam par rig pa'i de bźin ñid yaṅ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du* (Y_t 'i 86b8) *rab tu śes pa'o //*.

1281. See n. 627.

1282. ŚrBh 497,2off., especially 498,2ff. (cp. S 1982, 79): *sa utpannotpannaṃ* c i t t a ṃ *nirudhyamānaṃ ... paśyati .../ sa ... cittena* c i t t a m ā l a m b a n ī k a r o t y *.../*

1283. ŚrBh 498,2f. (see n. 1282) and 8ff.

1284. ŚrBh 498,5-7 and 499,6ff.; S 1982, 78f.

1285. S 1982, 8o-82.

1286. See n. 1275.

1287. Yokoyama 198o, 2o1,18.

1288. See n. 627.

1289. Cp. Saṃdh VIII.7-8; S 1984.

129o. See n. 128o.

1291. Cp. S 1976, 239 and 243.

1292. Cp., e.g., MN I 355; ŚrBh 9,16ff. (Katsube et al. 1981, (22)f.) and 68,1ff. (Mano et al. 1985, 56f.).

1293. MN III 18 (... *imasmiṃ ca saviññāṇake kāye* b a h i d d h ā *ca sabba* n i m i t t e s u *ahaṃkāra* m a m a ṃ k ā r a *mānānusayā* ...).

1294. Y_m 89a7 (Y_t dzi 197b4-6; Y_c 35oa24-27): *(tatra cittaṃ kāye upādānabandhena baddham / ...) rūpādiṣu viṣayanimitteṣu vijñaptibandh<e>na[ḥ] / rāgādibhiḥ kleśopakleśair eṣv eva yathānirdiṣṭeṣu kāyādiṣv abhiniveśabandhena baddham /*

1295. Cp., e.g., Saṃdh VIII.34.2 (≡ Hsien-yang 568b6f.; cp. AS 9,21f.):
"When one lets one's mind stray to the five external objects of desire (*kāmaguṇa*) or ... to [appealing] characteristics (*nimitta*; SaṃdhVy co 238b6f. explains: the characteristics of the figure of a man or woman, etc.) ... or [other?] external objects, then this is 'outward distraction of mind'."
(gal te phyi rol gyi 'dod pa'i yon tan lṅa po dag daṅ / ... mtshan ma daṅ / ... phyi rol gyi dmigs pa rnams la sems rnam

par 'phro bar gtoṅ na de ni phyi rol tu sems rnam par g-yeṅ ba yin no //).

Cp. also the characterization of the five kinds of sense-perception as "distraction by nature" (*svabhāvavikṣepa*) at AS 9,2of. (≡ Hsien-yang 568b12f.).

1296. See n. 1294.

1297. I admit that my interpretation of the passage (text: see n. 1298) is only a preliminary attempt and that a thorough treatment will have to take into account - with due caution - additional materials like the close parallel in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t zi 19oa2 = Y_c 651c3f.):

"This *manas* is called the support (*āśraya*) of *manovijñāna*, since [it is] on the basis of the [former that in the latter] conceptual activity (*vikalpa*) arises in such a way."

(*gźi des de ltar rnam par rtog pa 'jug pa ñid kyi phyir yid de ni yid kyi rnam par śes pa'i gnas źes* (P: *śes*) *bya'o //*),

or MSA IX 42 (*manaso 'pi parāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate param ... jñāne nirvikalpe ...*; cp. XI.45).

As far as I can see, the passage from the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya admits of a similar interpretation as the one under discussion, or may even be taken to mean that under the influence of the conception of 'I' and 'mine' in which *manas* consists (cp. Y_t zi 189b5: see n. 946), in *manovijñāna*, too, s u c h concepts, viz. the concepts of 'I' and 'mine', arise. And even in the MSA passage the opposition between *manas* and *nirvikalpa-jñāna* is not inexplicable if we start from *manas* as a continuous notion of Ego (cp. MSA XIX.76a?), since *nirvikalpa-jñāna* is taught to penetrate, in the first *bhūmi* of a Bodhisattva, into the True Essence of dharmas (*dharmadhātu*) under the aspect of sameness (*samatā*: MSA XIV.29-3o) or omnipresence (*sarvatragârtha*: MAV II.14a) so that one realizes the s a m e n e s s o f o n e s e l f a n d o t h e r s (MSA XIV.3o; cp. MAVBh

35,1of. (ad II.14)) which is just the opposite of the conception of Ego (as d i s t i n c t from others) typical of *(kliṣṭaṃ) manas*.

At any rate, unlike Kelsang/Odani (1986, 141f.) I hesitate to deduce, from cryptic passages like the one under discussion, the idea that *manas* was, already in this early period, conceived of not only as a subtle notion of Ego but also as associated with a subtle notion of d h a r m a s [as real entities] (*dharmagrāha*); for such an idea appears to be (unambiguously) documented only in fairly late texts like Si 6c29ff. (or 24a28ff.), VGPVy 385a2ff., or Tsoṅ-khapa's YidKun 6o,8ff. (Kelsang/Odani 1986, 84) where, by the way, the faculty that gives rise to *dharmagrāha* = *jñeyāvaraṇa* is unmistakably attributed to *manas* as the seventh *vijñāna* (*bdun yid*) and not, as Kelsang/Odani 1986, 14of., seem to suggest, to the *samanantara-manas*. (The old dichotomy of *kliṣṭa-* and *samanantara-manas* has nothing to do with the - presumably fairly late - dichotomy of *ātmagrāha* and *dharmagrāha* as two functions of *manas*, i.e. of the "seventh *vijñāna*".)

That it is problematic to interpret early sources in the light of this later theory of *manas* comprising *dharmagrāha* seems to be confirmed by the fact that even a comparatively late author like Sthiramati (SAVBh mi 142a5ff. [= BShK 2, 83,2ff.]; cp. SAṬ 79b5ff.) does not seem to be familiar with it but rather takes the above-mentioned verse MSA IX.42 to presuppose that as long as *kliṣṭaṃ* *m a n a ḥ* functions in the wrong way of conceiving ālayavijñāna a s ' I ' o r ' m i n e ', *m a n o v i j ñ ā n a*, too, arises, on its basis, in the wrong way of clinging to non-existent d h a r m a s as if they existed.

1298. Y_t zi 6b2 (≡ Y_c 58oc9-11 ≡ Hsien-yang 566c6f. ≡ Chüeh-ting 1o19c13f.); H 1979, 32f. (§ 4.b.A.2); cp. also the quotations at Si 25c13f. and YVy 97b7f., and the verse version quoted at $MSgU_c$ 384c29f. (≈ Si 25c18f.; cp. H

1978a, 305); as for the "intrusive" character of this paragraph see n. 1351.

The first part of the passage does not pose serious problems;

In Y_t, it runs as follows:

yid kyi rnam par śes pa de ni yid la brten pa źes bya ste /

This would correspond to something like

**tan manovijñānaṃ mana-āśritam ucyate*,

which is essentially confirmed by all the versions (provided that we ignore that Si omits *mano-* before *vijñānam*).

In the second part of the passage, however, the various versions diverge considerably:

Y_t:	*rgyu mtshan gyi*	*yid*	*ma*	*'gags*	*na*
YVy:		*yid*	*ma*	*'gags*	*na*
Hts. Y_c:		彼	未	滅	時
Hts. Hsien-yang:		意	未	滅	時
Pa. (Chüeh-ting):		心	未	滅之	時

Y_t:		*rnam par rig pa'i*
YVy:		*rnam par rig pa rnams kyaṅ*
Y_c:	相	了別
Hsien:	於相	了別
Pa:		意識

Y_t:		*'chiṅ ba*	*mi 'grol*	*la /*
YVy:	*mtshan ma la*	*bciṅs pa las*	*mi 'grol*	*la /*
Y_c:		縛	不得解脱	。
Hsien:		縛	不得解脱	。
Pa.:			不 解 縛 故	。

Y_t:				*'gags*	*na*	*ni*
YVy:				*'gags*	*na*	
Y_c:		末那		滅已		
Hsien:	若	意		滅已		
Pa.:	因	心	若	滅		

Y_t:	*de*			*'grol*	*ba'i*		*phyir*	*ro*	*//*
YVy:	*de*	*las*		*grôl*	*bar*	*'gyur*		*ro*	*//*
Y_c:	相縛			解脫					。
Hsien:	相縛			解脫					。
Pa.:	意識		則	解					。

As a presumable original on the basis of which all these versions can be explained I should like to propose something like

**aniruddhe hi manasi nimitte vijñaptibandh(an)āmuktiḥ, niruddhe ca*(?) *tanmuktiḥ* /.

There can be no doubt that the passage has to be understood along the lines of Y_m 89a7 (see n. 1294). This means that **vijñapti* is not, as in YVy and Chüeh-ting(?)[1], the subject of **amukti* but has to be construed with **bandha(na)* and to be taken as the first member of a rūpaka compound designating the "fetter consisting in cognition", by which mind, in the present context *manovijñāna* (to be supplied from the first part of the passage), is tied to its object (**nimitte*, mis understood as an apposition to **manasi* by Y_t and Chüeh-ting), and from which (YVy) it is not freed as long as *manas* has not ceased. Accordingly, in the last part of the passage, **tad-* (in **tan-muktiḥ*) will refer not to *manovijñāna* (as in Chüeh-ting) but to the fetter, to the "[*vijñapti*]*bandhana* [by which *manovijñāna* is tied] to its object" (Hts.) and from which (YVy) it is freed as soon as *manas* has ceased.

1. Starting from my reconstructed text, it would seem that Pa. has misconstrued **vijñapti* as the subject of **amuktiḥ* and has, as is reasonable on this presupposition, at the same time i n t e r p r e t e d it as *manovijñāna*.

1299. It should be interesting - but is of course beyond the limits of the present essay - to analyze the complicated discussion devoted to this passage (and to the reference to it at Si 25c11ff.) in the commentaries of the masters of the Chinese and Japanese Fa-hsiang (Hossō) school (e.g. T 1828, 600b5ff.; T 1829, 175c24ff.; T 1830, 414a5ff.; T 1831, 640b9ff.; T 1832, 747c3ff.; T 2266, 492a21ff.).

1300. Y_t zi 8a5f. (see n. 444).

1301. See, e.g., AKBh 94,21f.; 95,15; 158,1f.; 192,3ff.; cp. Sh. Kumoi and H. Sakurabe in: Kumoi 1979, 57ff. and 298.

1302. AS_t 102b6-8 (AS 55,10ff. [largely unreliable reconstruction]; AS_c 679b24-27; cp. $ASVy_t$ 244a2f.): *las thun moṅ ba źes kyaṅ 'byuṅ / las thun moṅ ma yin pa źes kyaṅ 'byuṅ / ... thun moṅ ba gaṅ źe na / gaṅ snod kyi 'jig rten rnam par 'byed pa'o // thun moṅ ma yin pa gaṅ źe na / gaṅ sems can gyi 'jig rten rnam par 'byed pa'o //*, corresponding to something like **sādhāraṇaṃ karmety apy ucyate / asādhāraṇaṃ karmety apy ucyate / ... sādhāraṇaṃ katamat / yad bhājanalokavibhājakam*(?) / *asādhāraṇaṃ katamat / yat sattvalokavibhājakam*(?) /

1303. The same holds good for ālayavijñāna as the "root" or cause of the mutual influence of living beings (Y_t zi 8a6-b1 = H 1979, 37f. [§ 5.b.A.3]; not referred to in the concluding summary [Y_t 8b2-4 = § 5.b.A.5]!):
"Besides, it (viz. ālayavijñāna) is also the root of living beings acting upon one another (**anyonya-(pra)vṛtti-mūla*), [such acting upon one another having to be accepted] because all living beings influence one another (**itaretarādhipatyāt*). For there is no living being which would not experience pleasure or pain, etc., by perceiving, etc., other

living beings (**tathāhi na so 'sti kaścit sattvo yas tadanyasattvadarśanādinā sukhaduḥkhādi nānubhavet*, or the like)."

(*gźan yaṅ sems can thams cad ni gcig gi dbaṅ gcig yin pa'i phyir sems can phan tshun 'jug pa'i rtsa ba yaṅ yin te / 'di ltar de las gźan pa'i sems can gyi mthoṅ ba la sogs pas bde ba daṅ / sdug bsṅal la sogs pa ñams su myoṅ bar mi 'gyur ba gaṅ yin pa'i sems can de* (D: *de dag*) *ni 'ga' yaṅ med pa'i phyir ro //*)

In the Abhidharmasamuccaya parallel (see n. 1302), this effect, too, is ascribed to a special kind of k a r m a n (AS_t 102b8f.; AS 55,13ff. [entirely unreliable reconstruction]; AS_c 679b27ff.; $ASVy_t$ 244a3f. + 4f.):

yaṅ gaṅ gis sems can rnams[1] *phan tshun gyi dbaṅ gis byuṅ ba źes brjod pa*[2] *sems can rnams kyi phan tshun gyi*[3] *dbaṅ gis 'byuṅ ba'i las kyaṅ yod de / 'di ltar gaṅ*[4] *sems can* (5 *gźan rnams daṅ*5) *phan tshun du lta*[6] *ba la sogs pas*[7] (8 *ñe bar*8) *spyod par mi 'gyur* (9 *ba'i sems can*9) *de ni* (10 *thun moṅ ba*10) *ma yin no //*

This would be based on something like

**api khalv*[11] *asti sattvānām* (12 *anyonyādhipateyaṃ karma*12), *yenânyonyādhipateyāḥ sattvā ucyante*(?) / *tathāhi na sulabhaḥ sa sattvo yasya tadanyasattvānyonyadarśanādyupabhogo na syāt*(??) /

1. D add *kyi*.
2. P *pa'i*; ASVy *pa* /
3. P *gyis*.
4. P om.

(5 ... 5) **ASVy:** *d e l a s gźan pa'i sems can rnams k y i g z u g s la*, but there is no equivalent for *gzugs* in AS_c.

6. ASVy (P): *blta*.
7. ASVy: *pa'i*.

(8 ...8) P: *ñes par*; ASVy: *loṅs*.

(9 ... 9) ASVy: *ba*.

(10 ... 10) D: *moṅ pa*; ASVy: *rñed pa sla ba*; cp. AS_c （不）易可得！

11. Cp. AS 30,25, etc.
(12 ... 12) Cp. ASBh 67,6.

1304. Y_t zi 4b1f. (see § 5.6.3 + n. 633).

1305. TrṬ 17b4 and 18a2f.; cp. H 1979, 71 note 6. Cp. also $MSgU_t$ 271b1-3 (S 1984, 448f.): **ālambana-vijñapti-* (at Saṃdh VIII.7) glossed by **ālambana-pratibhāsa* or the like. See also n. 628a.

1306. Cp. also Takasaki 1985, 36,13ff.

1307. I.e. if the reading suggested by TrBh 19,5, viz. **dvi-dhâ lambanataḥ pravartate*, which in fact appears better, could be preferred to **dvi v i d h ā lambanataḥ pravartate*, though the latter is, to be sure, supported by all the three versions of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* (cp. H 1979, 7f.).

1308. Similarly, at Y_t zi 4b6f. (H 1979, 27 [§ B.2]: *dmigs pa de ni rtag tu yod pa yin te ...// ... ji srid 'tsho'i* (D) *bar du* (**yāvajjīvam*) *rnam par rig pa ro gcig pas* (**ekarasa-vijñaptitaḥ*) *'jug par 'gyur ro //*) I should prefer to understand *vijñapti* n o t as " i m a g e " but as "[act of] making known", or "perception/cognition". To be sure, the syntactical situation suggests to understand the passage to mean that t h e o b j e c t [of ālayavijñāna], being always present, continues as a uniform i m a g e as long as life lasts. But since there is, in texts like the Yogācārabhūmi, no shortage of loose modes of expression, it would not be impossible to understand the passage to mean that the object [of ālayavijñāna] is always present (i.e. retained throughout life) and that [hence ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a] continues to operate as a uniform p e r c e p t i o n as long as life lasts.

1309. Y_t zi 5a2-5 (Y_c 580a23ff.; Chüeh-ting 1019b13ff.; H 1979, 28 [§ c]):
de ltar na dmigs pa rnam pa gñis rnam par rig pa daṅ ... rgyu (see n. 647) *chuṅ ṅu'i dmigs pa rnam par rig pa...s*

kyaṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa dmigs pas 'jug pa rnam par gźag (P: *bźag*) *par rig par bya'o //* ≈ **iti dvividhālambanavijñaptito 'pi ... parīttopādānālambanavijñaptito 'pi ... ālayavijñānasyâlambanataḥ pravṛttivyavasthānaṃ veditavyam.*[1]

This will naturally be taken to mean:

"Thus - so one should know - the operating of ālayavijñāna under the aspect of object is established [by characterizing ālayavijñāna] as perception of a twofold object", etc.;

cp. even Hts., whose rendering 了別二種所緣故 , etc., clearly takes *vijñapti* as an action noun and **dvividhālambana* as its object.

1. For phraseology cp. Y 73,7-1o (Y_t dzi 42b4-6; D: tshi 37b1f.).

131o. Y_t zi 4b2 (see § 4.5.1 + n. 531).

1311. Cp. n. 532 and Pa.s rendering of *parikalpita-svabhāvâbhiniveśa-* as 執著邪我見 , and AS 31,7-9 (see § 8.4 + n. 1227). Cp. also Y_t 'i 26a7f. and TrBh 19,11f., referring *parikalpita-svabhāva* to both *dharmas* and *pudgala/ātman*.

1312. Y_t zi 9b2 (see above: (3b)) and 9b4f. (= H 1979, 41 [§ C.2, line 4])!

1313. Y_t zi 9a7 (see above: (2a)).

1314. Y_t zi 9a5 (see above: (1b)): *bden pa rnams la ...*

1315. But cp. n. 1323 (end).

1316. Y_t zi 9a6f. (see above: (2a)).

1317. Y_t zi 1ob3ff. (H 1979, 44 [§§ II.2.b and d]).

1318. This is, of course, a relative concept admitting of degrees, and in a full treatment of methodology one would have to define it and to point out criteria.

1319. Cp. § 4.7.2 and n. 1337.

132o. Y_t zi 8b1 (see n. 548).

1321. See § 4.1.2-4.

1322. Though this would seem to be implied by the reading presupposed, in (2a), by Y_t, viz. **pratividhyan* (see n. 1239), which would hence appear less acceptable than the reading **pratividhya* presupposed by Y_c; for the latter would seem to suggest that ālayavijñāna is perceived only a f t e r the Full Comprehension of (non-analyzed) Truth, and this may mean: in the subsequent "analytical" Comprehension of the four Noble Truths.

1323. Cp. Y_t zi 302b7f. (Y_c 696a12-14):

"Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, after having penetrated (*pratividhya*) into True Reality (*tathatā*) by means of the first Correct Insight (*samyagjñāna*), then, by means of the [insight which is] attained subsequent (*pṛṣṭhalabdha*) to [this] first, [purely] supramundane (*lokottara*) insight and which [itself] is both mundane and supramundane (*laukika-lokottara*), cause their mind, on the basis of Truth analyzed [into four] (**vyavasth(āp)iteṣu satyeṣu*), to shrink back from the world with its three spheres (*traidhātuka*), relish the taste of its extinction (*praśama*), ... and fully attain purification from the obstacle consisting in Defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa-viśuddhi*)."

(... *ñan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas rnams kyis yaṅ dag pa'i śes pa daṅ pos de bźin ñid rab tu rtogs nas / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i śes pa daṅ po'i r j e s l a s ' t h o b p a 'jig rten pa daṅ 'jig rten las 'das pas r n a m p a r b ź a g* (P, D: *gźag*) *p a ' i b d e n p a d a g l a khams gsum pa las yid skrag par byed pa daṅ / khams gsum pa rab tu źi ba'i ro myoṅ* (P: *myaṅ*) *bar byed ciṅ ... ñon moṅs pa'i sgrib pa rnam par dag pa yaṅ dag* (D om. *pa yaṅ dag*) *par 'thob par byed pa'o //*)

Y_t 'i 14a6f. (Y_c 701a6-8); cp. Y_t 'i 5b4 (Y_c 697c16f.): *de la 'phags pa'i bden pa bźi ni rnam par bźag pa'i bden pa yin no // de bźin ñid ni rnam par ma bźag pa'i bden pa yin no //*; Y_t zi 194b5-7 + 195a3 (Y_c 653c23-26 + 654a5f.).

Cp. also Y_t zi 73a1-3 (Y_c 605c27ff.) where insight into non-analyzed Truth (*rnam par ma* (D [źi 69b2]) *bźag pa'i bdeṅ pa*, 非安立諦) is said to comprise three steps (see Y_t zi 72b3ff.; cp. S 1983, 262f.), the first of which realizes *pudgalanairātmya* only and would thus fit Śrāvakas too, whereas the second, realizing *dharmanairātmya*, would, in Yogācāra dogmatics, probably be reserved for Bodhisattvas, although in the Yogācārabhūmi there seem to be exceptions to this rule: cp. especially Y_t zi 302b5f. (Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya), ascribing supramundane penetration into *tathatā*, which had expressly been defined as ** d h a r m a nairātmya-prabhāvita* in the preceding line, to both Bodhisattvas a n d Ś r ā v a k a s /Pratyekabuddhas.

1324. Y_t zi 8b2 (see n. 548).

1325. Cp. MAVṬ 161,9-11.

1326. Y_t 'i 15a8 (Y_c 701b14f.): *mtshan ma med pa'i śes pa sdug bsṅal la sogs pa'i śes pa'i rgyur gyur pa ñon moṅs pa spoṅ bar byed pa gaṅ yin pa* ..., corresponding to something like **yad animittajñānaṃ duḥkhādijñānahetubhūtaṃ kleśān prajahāti* ...; Y_t zi 202b5ff. (Y_c 657a3f.): "Without [insight into] non-analyzed Truth the twofold liberation (**vimukti*) - viz. liberation from the fetter of phenomena (*nimitta-bandhana*) and liberation from the fetter of Badness (*dauṣṭhulya-bandhana*) - would not be possible" (*rnam par ma bźag pa'i bden pa med na rnam par grol ba gñis po mtshan ma'i 'chiṅ ba las rnam par grol ba daṅ / gnas ṅan len gyi 'chiṅ ba las rnam par grol ba mi ruṅ ste / ...*).

Yet, in other passages it is, on the contrary, Insight into Truth analyzed [into four] that is taught to eradicate Defilements (*kleśa*), transconceptual, supramundane insight into True Reality (*tathatā*) serving to eliminate *jñeyāvaraṇa* ($BoBh_D$ 25,22ff.; Y_t zi 302b5ff. [see n. 1323]).

According to Y_t zi 73b2f. (Y_c 606a15-17), transconceptual insight [into non-analyzed Truth] expunges Defilements,

whereas the subsequent insight [into Truth analyzed into four] prevents them from arising again (令彼所斷更不復起).

1327. Cp. the idea of the gradual disappearance or melting away of the "mass of Badness" (*dauṣṭhulyakāyaḥ ... dravate* § MSA XIV.2o) or removal/dissolution/washing-out (cp. SAṬ bi 127b6) of the "basis [characterized by] Badness" (*dauṣṭhulyā-śrayaṃ drāvayati*: Saṃdh VIII.15.1; MSABh ad XX.31; MSg V.4; AS 85,4; cp. H 1972, 5, etc.; 1972a, (42)f. and (46)). As for the meaning of *'dauṣṭhulyakāya'* and *'dauṣṭhulyāśraya'*, see n. 133o.

1328. Cp. n. 1337.

1329. See § 7.4 + n. 1167.

133o. *'d a u ṣ ṭ h u l y a k ā y a'* probably means "mass of Badness": cp. the occasional translation of the term by *gnas ṅan len (gyi) t s h o g s* (instead of the more frequent *gnas ṅan len gyi lus*), e.g. at Y_t zi 236b3 (Y_c 669a11: 麁重身) or SAVBh tsi 244b5 (= rendering of the present passage MSA XIX.51!), and its interpretation as *kāya-* and *cittâkarmaṇyatā* at SAVBh mi 3oob1 (ad MSA XIV.2o); cp. also MSA VI.9 *doṣa s a ṃ c a y a s y a*, commented upon by *dauṣṭhulyalakṣaṇasya* ("consisting of Badness") in the Bhāṣya. On the other hand, the term *'d a u ṣ ṭ h u l y ā - ś r a y a'* is perhaps, originally, an abbreviation of *'dauṣṭhulya s a h a g a t a āśrayaḥ'* (ŚrBh 283,7), i.e. the basis-of-existence (body and mind, or even the [animated, sensitive] body alone) in so far as it is bound up with Badness and has to be freed from Badness and filled with Ease (*praśrabdhi*) (ŚrBh 432,2off.; cp. ASBh 115,28f.) or may (probably against the background of the doctrine of momentariness) even be taught to require being s u p - p l a n t e d by a [new] basis-of-existence which is *praśrabdhi-sahagata* (ŚrBh 283,6ff.: see n. 3oo; cp. also n. 475). Perhaps the term *'dauṣṭhulya- k ā y a'*, too, admitted of being interpreted in a similar sense (cp., per-

haps, SaṃdhVy co 239a7f. [ad Saṃdh VIII.34.5], where it is explained as *ñon moṅs pa daṅ bcas pa'i lus* which, if correct, would correspond to **sakleśaḥ kāyaḥ*).

When Badness (*dauṣṭhulya*) had come to be associated with ālayavijñāna and ālayavijñāna was considered to be the fundamental constituent of personal existence (cp. § 3.1o.3), *dauṣṭhulyāśraya* could come to be interpreted as ālayavijñāna (cp., e.g., MSgU$_t$ 314b8; ASBh 93,2of.; SAVBh mi 15oa8f. [BShK 2, 111,11f.]; BBhVy 12o,18f.; cp. H 1976, 61, etc.), in the sense of the "basis which consists of, or is stricken with, Badness", or, later on at least (e.g. SaṃdhVy co 2o5a4f. (ad Saṃdh VIII.15.1)), in the sense of the "basis of Badness". *Dauṣṭhulya-kāya*, too, could come to be understood as ālayavijñāna – especially if the latter was regarded as essentially consisting of the mass of Badness –, as is the case, e.g., at MSABh 169,23 (ad XIX.51) or SaṃdhVy cho 2o7b7 and 2o8a3 (ad Saṃdh X.8).

1331. Y$_t$ zi 1oa4-6 (Y$_c$ 581c24-26; Chüeh-ting 1o2ob26-28 (see n. 1339); H 1979, 42f. [§ 5.c]); cp. SaṃdhVy co 1o5b8ff. and 78b3-5.

1332. Y$_t$ zi 8a4-b4 (H 1979, 37f. [§ 5.b.A]).

1333. SaṃdhVy: *goms pa*.

1334. Cp. SaṃdhVy co 78a3 and 1o4b6ff.

1335. SaṃdhVy co 1o5a6-8: *yid la byed pa źes bya ba ni khyad par gyi lam ma thob pa mthar thug par bya ba'i phyir de bźin ñid yid la byed pa ste / ... sgom pa'i lam gyi mthar thug pas bsdus pa'i dge ba'i chos sgom pa ni yid la byed pa sgom pa yin te /*; cp. 78a3.

1336. **praveśa*: Y$_t$ zi 9a5 (*bden pa mṅon par rtogs pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir*); **prativedha*: 9a7 (*chos kyi dbyiṅs rtogs par byed pa na kun gźi rnam par śes pa yaṅ rtogs par byed de*); **bhāvanā*:

9b2 (*de bźin ñid la dmigs pa'i śes pas kun tu bsten ciṅ g o m s p a r b y a s p a ' i rgyus* (*... *āsevanā-b h ā v a n ânvayāt*: see n. 1247)).

1337. To be precise, in the paragraph concerned (viz. (5.b.)C.1 in H 1979; (3b) - (3d) in § 1o.1) the Transmutation (i.e. purification or substitution: cp. S 1969a, 92ff., especially 95f.) of Basis seems to be a p r o c e s s , after the completion of which ālayavijñāna can be said to be [definitively] eliminated (*prahīṇa*). This state in which the elimination of ālayavijñāna is accomplished, i.e. the state of an Arhat (as long as he is still alive), is characterized in the paragraph next but one (C.3 = Y_t zi 9b8-1oa4) which connects fairly well with C.1, whereas the paragraph in between (viz. C.2 = Y_t zi 9b3-8), contrasting ālayavijñāna and *āśrayaparivṛtti*, appears somewhat heterogeneous; the more so since the latter paragraph (C.2) seems to understand the term '*āśrayaparivṛtti*' not in the sense of a process or its completion but in the sense of an e n t i t y or reality - viz., in view of its being qualified as permanent (*nitya*: Y_t zi 9b4), the *t a t h a t ā* - which is the cause which supports (*pratiṣṭhā-hetu*) the continuance (*pravṛtti*) of the [Supramundane] Path (Y_t zi 9b6f.: see n. 57o) and is thus the opponent or enemy of ālayavijñāna (Y_t zi 9b3f.[1]). On the other hand, if C.2 is left out of account, it would be natural to understand, in C.1, the Basis (*āśraya*) which is Transmuted to be the (animated, living) b o d y , i.e. the body furnished with or consisting of *ṣaḍāyatana*, which according to C.3 (see n. 555!) continues to subsist, after Transmutation, as a mere condition of physical life but f r e e f r o m a l l B a d n e s s (*dauṣṭhulya*, in the sense of latent wickedness). Thus, in C.1/C.3 Transmutation of Basis would seem to consist in the Transmutation of the b o d y or *ṣaḍāyatana* by gradually removing all Badness (latent wickedness) that sticks in it. And since ālayavijñāna is, at least in that part of the *Nivṛtti Portion* which

treats the cessation of ālayavijñāna, hardly anything but a hypostasis of this Badness (in the sense of latent wickedness), it is automatically eliminated (*prahīṇa*) as soon as the Basis is entirely Transmuted, i.e. as soon as all Badness is removed from the body or *ṣaḍāyatana*.

1. *kun gźi rnam par śes pa de'i gnas ni gñen po daṅ / dgra bos bsgyur bar rig par bya'o*, which – in view of the Chinese versions which separate **āśraya* from ālayavijñāna and take it with **parivṛtti/parivarta* – corresponds, to my mind, to something like **tasyâlayavijñānasyâśraya-parivṛttiḥ* (or *-parivartaḥ*; Tib. wrongly **āśrayaḥ parivartyaḥ*??) *pratipakṣataḥ śatrutaḥ* (predicative ablatives!) *veditavyā* (/*-vyaḥ*); cp. Y_t zi 30b7: *de* (sc. *gnas gyur pa*) *yaṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i gñen por gyur pa* ...

1338. Y_t zi 9a4f. (for text and transl. see § 10.1 (1a)).

1339. Chüeh-ting 1020b26f.: 入通達分故、修善思惟故 .

1340. E.g. ŚrBh 439,5ff. or 278,1ff.

1341. The inclusion of (2b) in the treatment of **prativedha-manaskāra* is, to be sure, somewhat questionable. Cp. also n. 1240.

1342. Y_t zi 9a4ff. (H 1979, 40); see (1a)(ff.) in § 10.1.

1343. Y_t zi 8b4ff. (H 1979, 39).

1344. My interpretation of statement (b), which takes the "other mundane *kuśalamūlas*" of the text (Y_t zi 8b6) to be the *p u ṇ y a bhāgīya-kuśalamūlas* (cp. n. 563), is substantially confirmed by the Chinese commentaries of Kuei-chi (T 1829, 178a2ff.) and Tun-lun (T 1828, 603a29ff.), especially by the interpretation ascribed, by the latter, to the Master Ching (景 , cp. Yūki 1962, 256f.).

1345. Cp. Y_t 'i 330a4 (Y_c 846c16f.).

1346. Cp. Y_t 'i 330a6ff. (Y_c 846c21ff.); H 1981.

1347. Y_t zi 9a4 (see § 10.1 (1a)).

1348. Cp. also Yūki 1935, 473.

1349. Cp. also Yūki 1935, 471.

1350. Y_t zi 8b2-4 (H 1979, 38).

1351. This does not, of course, necessarily mean: after the compilation of VinSg; cp. the similar situation in the Nirvāṇa chapter of VinSg (S 1969a, 32ff., especially 35). There are, by the way, further paragraphs in the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* which are not supported by the corresponding final résumé: § 5.b.A.3 (H 1979, 37f.; Y_t zi 8a6-b1; see n. 1303!), and much of § 4.b (H 1979, 32ff.; Y_t zi 6a5-8a3), viz. §§ A.2 and B.1-4. § A.2 (H 1979, 32 f.; Y_t zi 6b2-4) hardly fits the heading *'sahabhāvataḥ pravṛttiḥ'* (cp. also Ui 1958, 185, where the first part of A.2 [for which see also § 10.3.1.*2.b*] is considered to have intruded by mistake), but it still seems to be a fairly old addition because it has a parallel, in essentially the same position (i.e. between a treatment of simultaneity of *vijñānas* and a treatment of simultaneous occurrence of *vijñānas* with *vedanās*) in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t zi 190a2; see n. 1297). § B.1 (H 1979, 34f.; Y_t zi 7a4-7) looks like a more developed doublet of the concluding résumé (§ 4.c: H 1979, 37; Y_t zi 8a3f.), whereas §§ B.2-4 (H 1979, 35-37; Y_t zi 7a7-8a3) are clearly supplements to §§ A.1, A.2(!) and, once again, A.1, respectively. - The fact that one of the "intrusive" elements of § 4.b (viz. A.2) is also found, in substantially the same position, in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya may be taken, if one-sided dependence of one text on the other proves improbable (cp. add. ad p. 82), to suggest that in t h i s case the "intrusive" element already formed part of some earlier material which was only later subsumed under the heading *'sahabhāva'*, although the material included more than a discussion of simultaneity.

1352. Cp. Hsien-yang 567b13: 是故 ... (see n. 1236).

1353. Y_t zi 8b4 (H 1979, 38).

1354. SaṃdhVy co 104b2ff.; cp. 77b8ff.

1355. Especially in view of the fact that this commentary seems to be the work of a Tibetan author (see Steinkellner, I.4). It is very interesting to see that SaṃdhVy almost invariably omits paragraphs or even sentences or parts of sentences which appear "intrusive" from the point of view of compositional structure, e.g. (SaṃdhVy co 77a2ff.) §§ 4.b.A.2 and B.2-4 (but, curiously enough, n o t B.1!), for which see n. 1351. On the other hand, SaṃdhVy occasionally also omits passages which appear to belong to the "main material", as e.g. § 5.b.A.1-2 and 4 (H 1979, 37f.; Y_t zi 8a5f. and b1f.), SaṃdhVy giving only the concluding résumé (§ A.5 = Y_t zi 8b2-4).

1356. Enomoto 1982, 53f., especially 54,11ff.

1357. Kajiyama 1985, 336,16ff.; 339,11; 342,18f.

1358. Enomoto 1982, 50-52.

1359. Y 230,11-13: *tasya yathā vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ tathaiva* (Y_m) *nāmarūpapratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ vyavalokayato vijñānāt pratyudāvṛttaṃ* (sc. *mānasaṃ*: 230,11); *tadanyeṣu tv aṅgeṣu na tathā pratyudāvṛttaṃ* /

1360. Vi 124c9-11 (Vi_2 98a1f.); cp. Vi 124c14-17 (Vi_2 97c28f.).

1361. Or: "... [to *nāmarūpa*] as (*-tayā*) a means-for-showing that ..."?

1362. Y 230,13f.: *tatraikatrânyonyapratyayatvasaṃdarśanatayā tatpratyudāvṛttam ity ucyate* /

1362a Cp. the use of *'saṃdarśana'* in this sense (in exegetical contexts!) at AKBh 15,16, 86,9 and 139,14, and the Chin. rendering 顯示 (Y_c 328a15). But *'saṃdarśana'* may, of course, also mean "watching, perceiving" (cp. the Tib. rendering *mthoṅ bas na* [Y_t dzi 136a2] and passages like $BoBh_D$ 3,21 or 11,19), or even "becoming manifest" (cp. MSA IX.17 [Tib. *snaṅ*]; PW s.v. *saṃdarśana (4)*). If these latter meanings are preferred, one would have to take the present

passage to mean that "the Sūtra states that the Bodhisattva's mind turned back from the [member *vijñāna*] because (or: in the sense that?) he perceived mutual dependence (or: because mutual dependence became manifest to him) in this one case [only]". But even so the passage would *not* presuppose an *express* statement of mutual dependence in the wording of the Sūtra.

1363. Y 230,14f.: *nivṛtti-pakṣe tu nāmarūpaṃ* (Y_m) *na paunarbhavikasya vijñānasya nivṛtti-hetur, yena pareṇa* (Y_m) *pratyavekṣitavān //*

1364. See n. 1140.

1365. See n. 1139.

1366. $MSgU_t$ 259b2-7 ($MSgU_c$ 393a29ff.); Enomoto 1982, 45.

1367. See n. 1075.

1368. In view of the reference to "operating by way of a continuous sequence", one would expect "*kalala, etc.*". But cp. n. 1369.

1369. $MSgU_t$ 259b3f. (Enomoto 1982, 45,9-11): *'di gñis kyi rkyen rnam par śes pa gaṅ yin pa skad cig gcig nas gcig tu brgyud de gnas ñid du gyur pa, de yaṅ kun gźi rnam par śes pa las gźan ma yin no //*. However, the Chinese version ($MSgU_c$ 393b2f. [cp. Enomoto 1982, 45,19f.]: 此二皆用識為因緣。識復依此刹那傳傳(v.l.)相續而轉。識者不離阿賴耶識。) takes the *vijñāna* that cannot be anything but ālayavijñāna to be the condition (*pratyaya*) of *nāmarūpa* *and* to arise, in its turn, as a continuous flow of instants, *on the basis of* it (sc. *nāmarūpa*). Perhaps the original contained, as presumably in the next paragraph also (see § 12.2.2: (b) and (c)) an ambiguous compound (**tad-āśraya-?*) which was interpreted as a tatp. by Tib. but as a bahuv. by Chinese. Taken in the sense of the Chin. version, it looks like a *de facto* reference to, or even explanation of, the complementary Sūtra phrase *'nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānam'*. In

fact, this is precisely how it figures in MSgBh; for all versions of this text not only declare the *vijñāna* that arises, without interruption, as a continuous flow of instants and cannot by anything else but ālayavijñāna, to be based on *nāmarūpa*,[1] but also explicitly introduce it as the explanation of the *nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānam*. In its structure (the fact apart, of course, that *vijñāna* has come to be replaced by ālayavijñāna), the interpretation of MSgBh is, by the way, still reminiscent of the older tendency (see § 7.3.4.1.3) to refer *'vijñāna-pratyayaṃ nāmarūpam'* to the situation of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) - which would account for *rūpa* being, in this case, equated with *kalala* only - and *'nāmarūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānam'* to the situation from *pratisandhi* onward.

1. $MSgBh_t$ 160a6f.: *miṅ daṅ gzugs la brten nas ... 'jug go*; $MSgBh_c$ [Hts.] 332b3f.: 依名色 ... 流轉; cp. also $MSgBh_c$ [Dharmagupta] 280a4f.; $MSgBh_c$ [Pa.] 170c4f.

1370. $MSgU_t$ 259b6f. ($MSgU_c$ 393b6ff.).

1371. $MSgU_t$ 259b5f.

1372. $MSgU_c$ 393b5f.

1373. Cp. PSVy 25a6 (Muroji p. 42,3f.) where the absence of pervading the whole *lus* appears to be adduced as a reason excluding biological appropriation of the body; cp. also KSi § 34a (Muroji p. 41,2-5); Si 20b26ff.; PSkVai 53b7: *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni khog pa* (**kāya, *kalevara*: LC) *thams cad la khyab pa'o*; PSkBh 199b7f., expressly stating that what is meant by *'lus'* - which is subsequently taught to be pervaded by ālayavijñāna - is "[corporeal] matter furnished with the sense-faculties of vision, etc." (*lus kyi<s?> mig la sogs pa'i dbaṅ po daṅ bcas pa'i gzugs la bya'o //*).

1374. Less probable, but cp. MSg I.21 *des* (i.e. *ālayavijñānena*) *khams gsum pa'i lus* (*ātmabhāva:* cp. Hts. 自體) *thams cad* ... *bsdus so* + $MSgU_t$ 251a6 *khyab pa'i phyir thams cad 'dzin par byed pa'o* ("[ālayavijñāna, in contrast to pravṛttivijñānas, is not absent in any kind of existence nor interrupted at any time as long as its *pratipakṣa* has not arisen;] due to [this] omnipresence (**vyāpanāt*, or the like), it comprises (or assumes?) all [existences]").

1375. Or: **tena kāyasya* (/*ātmabhāvasya*) *vyāptatvāt*.

1376. See n. 1078.

1377. See n. 372.

1378. Enomoto 1982, 53,23ff.

1379. Ibid., 53,15ff.

1380. See n. 1139.

1381. See n. 1140.

1382. Cp. MSg_L vol. II, p. 59; Enomoto 1982, 56 notes 4 and 5. To be sure, the wording of Tib. does not altogether exclude a bahuvrīhi interpretation, but at least in an ambiguous situation as the present one it is certainly more likely to be understood as a tatpuruṣa.

1383. Cp. PSkBh 199b4f.:
"What is called *'ātmabhāva'* is the five skandhas, consisting of the four [immaterial] skandhas = *nāman* and the skandha 'corporeal matter' (*rūpa*). Now, it is on ālaya[vijñāna] that this *ātmabhāva* is based, it is on ālaya[vijñāna] that it rests, it is due to ālaya[vijñāna] that it arises without interruption."
(*de la ... miṅ gi phuṅ po bźi daṅ / gzugs kyi phuṅ po ste phuṅ po lṅa la lus źes bya'o // lus de yaṅ kun gźi la gnas śiṅ kun gźi la brten la kun gźi'i mthus rgyun ma chad par 'byuṅ ste /*)
VGPVy 421b2: ... *kun gźi'i rnam par śes pa ni chos thams*

cad kyi rten yin pa'i phyir dbaṅ po gzugs can gyi rten yaṅ yin no //.
Cp. also n. 1390.

1384. If (c) is taken as a parenthesis, (d) may be taken as a further substantiation of (b).

1385. See n. 1383.

1386. See n. 1374.

1387. See n. 1384.

1388. See n. 1373.

1389. Cp. YVy 98a3-5 (see n. 811).

1390. Cp. Y_t zi 5b5f. (H 1979, 30 [§ 3.b.A.2]); see n. 358.

1391. See § 7.3.4.1.*3.c*.

1392. Cp. Si 20b25 and 27f.: ālayavijñāna b a s i n g i t - s e l f o n the material sense-faculties so as to p e r - v a d e them (遍依止有色諸根); PSVyṬ 155a2, declaring that *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., do not p e r v a d e the whole body because they a r e b a s e d o n their respective sense-faculty only; KSiṬ 103b1f. (same idea).

1393. See n. 1369.

1394. As far as the t e x t of the g ā t h ā s is concerned, the part not re-edited by me is (in contrast to the text of the corresponding part of the commentary) largely correct. Yet, a few passages would seem to need revision:
PG 1c *niṣveṣṭā(ḥ)*: read, here as well as in the comm., *niśceṣṭā(ḥ)*, with both mss.
PG 5b *asthitānāṃ*: Y_m reads *asthirānāṃ* (for *asthirānāṃ*); cp. Y_t *mi brtan* and the quotation in BCAP IX.6.
PG 5c *bhūtir yeṣāṃ kriyāsau ca*: Both mss., here as well as in the commentary, read *kriyā s a i v a* (cp. Y_t *de ñid*), as do the quotations in BCAP IX.6, Bhāmatī ad Brahmasūtra 2,2,20, Nyāyamakaranda (Benares 1907)

35,5, and Hetubinduṭīkāloka (Baroda 1949) 375,1. Instead of *yeṣāṃ*, Y_m has *yaiṣā* (for *yaiṣāṃ*, as in the commentary and in BCAP), but the *yeṣāṃ* of ŚrBh$_m$ is confirmed by Tib. (*gaṅ dag skye ba*, no demonstrative!) and by the Bhāmatī and the Nyāyamakaranda. Since the verse is expressly reported to stem from a Sūtra (see n. 1401), we should perhaps start from a MI **y' esaṃ* which was mechanically sanskritized to *yeṣāṃ*, in its turn changed, later on, for reasons of meaning and syntax, into *yaiṣāṃ*, which luckily coincides with what was meant in the original.

PG 6b *naḥ* (ŚrBh$_m$): read *na* (Y_m).

PG 7a *no sparśā*: read *na sparśān* (both mss.).

PG 16 *kalpyate 'nubhūtaṃ <na> ca*: the restoration is unmetrical; read, with Y_m: *kalpyate anubhūtaṃ ca* (with hiatus), which is in accordance with Y_c and, from the point of view of meaning, also with the commentary (W. 176,1f.): "Not only what has been experienced is represented by imagination, but also what has not been experienced, [i.e.] the future, is imagined" (*na ca*[1] *kevalam anubhūtam eva kalpyate; ananubhūtaṃ*[2] *cānāgatam*[3] *api*[4] *kalpyate*). This is essentially the same as what the verse says, viz.: "Both what has been experienced is imagined, and what has not been experienced is imagined."

1. Thus Y_m (106b4); ŚrBh$_m$ om. *ca*.
2. Y_m *anubhūtaṃ*.
3. Thus ŚrBh$_m$ and Y_t *ma 'oṅs pa*; Y_m *anăgataṃ* (i.e. *an⟨-⟩āgataṃ*, or *ana<va>gataṃ*?); Y_c^m: 隨種類 ("by analogy")!
4. Thus Y_m; ŚrBh$_m$: *avi-*.

PG 25c. *svayaṃkṛto 'pabhogaś*: read, of course, *svayaṃkṛtopabhogaś*, as in the comm. (W. 176,27).

PG 42a *sarvabījasamutsādāt*: read *sarvabījasamudghātāt* (and *-samudghātena* in the comm. [W. 177,37]) with both mss.

1395. Suguro 1982, 56ff.

1396. ŚrBh$_m$ 3A5,2ff. and 15A5,4ff.

1397. Y$_t$ dzi 237a3ff. and 241a1ff.

1398. Y$_c$ 363c13ff. and 365a19ff.

1399. Y$_m$ 105b2ff. and 107a3ff.

1400. Cp. PG 30a *-yaty*: read *-yanty*; 35c *cittaṃ*: read *-citaṃ*; W 175,13 *ṣaḍ* (Tib. *drug*): one expects *sapta* (thus Ch.); 175, 38 *ava-*: read *anava-* (Tib., Ch.); 176,7 *parīkṣya-*: read *parīkṣa-*; 177,5 [in my ed.: 236,1f.] *-dṛṣṭi-*: read *-dṛṣṭiḥ*; *-grāha-*: read *-grāhāt*; 177,10 [in my ed.: 236,8] *nivarta-*: read *nirvarta-*; 177,14 [in my ed.: 236,13]: see n. 1472; 177,29 [in my ed.: 240,5] *sapta-*: one expects *ṣaḍ-* (Tib., Ch.). At W. 176,27, the scribe of ŚrBh$_m$ first wrote (copied?) *paridīpayati* but appears to have realized his mistake since the wrong *-dīpayati* is cancelled and followed by the correct *-harati*; Y$_m$ has only the wrong reading *-dīpayati*.

1401. PG 2-4 are quoted (in different order) at AKBh 466,8ff. as stemming from the Kṣudraka-āgama (cp. also AKṬU thu 128b4ff., showing that the verses are from the Pārāyaṇa; see Honjō 1984, 119). PG 17a-18b is probably taken from the Saṃyuktāgama (SĀ$_c$ 69a18-20; SN III 142; cp. Ui 1958, 316). PG 34b seems to be identical with SĀ$_c$ 88c10 (see n. 1428). PG 39 is reported, by later Yogācāra sources (Si 24c 19ff.; VGPVy 381b2), to stem from a *muktakasūtra*, i.e. a Sūtra which had dropped out of, or not been included in, the literary Āgama/Nikāya collections (cp. H 1978a, 306 and 309). PG 5 is quoted at BCAP IX.6 as an utterance of the Buddha and appears to preserve traces of a MI version (see n. 1394).

1402. Cp. especially PG 31b (see below n. 1415); cp. also PG 33cd (see n. 1426) and 38 (see n. 1446).

1403. This question requires further investigation.

1404. If the commentator was n o t the compiler, even three layers of interpretation would have to be distinguished:

a) the original meaning of the single verses,

b) what they were considered to mean by the compiler,

c) how they were understood by the commentator.

Of course, in many if not most cases the understanding of the compiler and/or commentator will coincide with the original meaning of a verse.

1405. *A.* Though the present verse, in view of the term *sarvabījo vipākaḥ*, does not appear to be of early origin, the expression *prapañca-(abhi)rati* itself is almost canonical (cp. the Pāli adjectives *papañca-(abhi)rata*, *°-rati*, *°-ārāma*).[1] I do not venture to be definite about the original meaning of *prapañca* in the Buddhist canon or even in these expressions, but Ñāṇananda (1971, passim, especially 21f.) may be right in understanding it, mainly, in the sense of "conceptual proliferation" or "prolific conceptualization", implying the nuances of i n a d e q u a t e n e s s and o b s t i n a t e c l i n g i n g (cp. the association of the nomen actionis [see n. 1425(*B,D*)] *papañcita* with *diṭṭhi* and *upādāna*: e.g. AN IV 68f.; cp. Johansson 1979, 191; see also n. 532(b)), r e s t l e s s n e s s (association with *iñjita*, *phandita*: e.g. SN IV 202f.; ŚrBh 233,16f.) and w i s h f u l n e s s (*taṇhā*: see ns. 532(b) and 1425(*B,D*); cp. Johansson 1979, 191f.). Yet, at least in some cases it may be used in a vaguer sense including all restless worldly activity and existence.

1. Cp. also UV XXIX.38c; ŚrBh 146,15f.

B. Anyway, in later sources (cp. also S 1969a, 137ff.) including Yogācāra texts and, last but not least, the Yogācārabhūmi, *prapañca* is not only *de facto* employed in, but even expressly stated to have, both a subjective and an objective meaning (see n. 510); cp., e.g., Y_m 84b2 (see ns.

532(b) and 1242), or YVy 115b4f.: "'*prapañca*' is used in the sense both of what is or may be the object of prolific conceptualization (etc.) (**prapañcya*) and of what is the subject (or, more probably: the subjective act) of prolific conceptualization (etc.) (**prapañcaka* or **prapañcana*(?))" (*spro bar bya ba daṅ spro bar byed pas na spros pa ste*).

C. Since in the present passage and its parallels (see n. 1408) *prapañcābhirati* functions - in the light of Y 25,12-14 (see ib.) - as the main cause of the origination of a new basis-of-personal-existence, it obviously holds the position of Thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) leading to rebirth. It may not thus be far-fetched to argue that at least one motive for the choice of this rather elastic term was the wish to combine, into one single concept, at any rate the most important aspects of Thirst or Desire, which would have to include, besides Clinging to conceptual proliferation and the concepts created by it, Thirst for sensual pleasures (*kāma-tṛṣṇā*) and, above all, Thirst for existence (*bhava-tṛṣṇā*).

D. Actually, *prapañca* is, in Buddhist texts, occasionally explained precisely in such a way:

a) As the five "qualities which are the o b j e c t s - o f - d e s i r e" (*kāma-guṇa*), i.e. the five sense-objects. Cp., e.g., UVViv p. 847 (ad UV XXIX.51): *spros pa ni ... 'dod pa'i yon tan lṅa źes bya ste*.

b) As t r a n s m i g r a t i o n (*saṃsāra*) or w o r d l y e x i s t e n c e (*bhava*). Cp., e.g., UVViv p. 836 (ad XXIX.38): *spros pa'i gźi'i dṅos po ni spros pa ste / 'khor ba źes bya ba'i don to* (≈ **prapañcādhiṣṭhānaṃ vastu* [cp. $BoBh_D$ 35,2] *prapañcaḥ; saṃsāra ity arthaḥ*); ŚrBh 17,1: *pra-pañce saṃsār<e>*; cp. also n. 1425(*A*); Y_t 'i 4b8 (**prapañca* as a synonym of **bhava*, etc.).

c) Viewed in a c o n c r e t e way, worldly existence (*bhava*) is the personality (*satkāya*) or its constituents (*skandha*), or the "basis-of-personal-existence" (*ā t m a - b h ā v a* : AKBh 279,11f.), which is likewise equated with *prapañca*. Cp., e.g., Y 26,18: *prapañca* besides *satkāya* (cp. also Y_t 'i 4b8) in a list of synonyms of [the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva, āśraya*) in so far as it is] the Seed [of what emerges during a given existence as well as of future existences] (cp. §§ 3.11.4.2 and 7.1B.2.1.3.*b*); cp. also n. 532(b): *prapañca* denoting (also) the defiled s k a n d h a s .

In the sense of "basis-of-personal-existence" (as that which one's wishful conceptual proliferations are particularly concerned with?), *prapañca* would seem to come quite close to the notion of *sarvabījo vipākaḥ*, which may be taken to mean the basis-of-personal-existence in the sense of the Six Senses (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*) which are the result-of-Maturation (*vipāka*) and contain all Seeds (see § 3.11.3).

E. In the first parts of the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi, where *prapañca-(abhi)rati* is several times said or indicated to be responsible for the origination of a new basis-of-personal-existence or *vipāka* containing all Seeds (see n. 1408), rebirth is, in fact, taught to be preceded by the occurrence of several forms of desire, viz.

α) as occurring before death: attachment to oneself (or to what one considers to be one's Self, i.e. to one's basis-of-personal-existence) (*ātmasneha*, Y 18,1f.), which in view of imminent death entails welcoming or attachment to or desiring [a n e w basis of] personal existence (*ātmabhāvâbhinandanā, ātmabhāva-sneha, ātmabhāvâbhilāṣa*: see § 3.3.2.1 + n. 264);

β) as occurring in the intermediate state: desire for the diversity of [sense-]objects (or: for [sense-]objects as [part of] what one's thoughts and wishes are about [cp. ASBh

39,7f.: *smaraṇasaṃkalpair atītān viṣayān prapañcayati*]?) (*viṣaya-prapañcâbhilāṣa*: Y 19,7f.).

In view of the connotations of *prapañca* noted above, it would therefore appear reasonable to understand *prapañca-(abhi)rati* as the g e n e r a l term covering b o t h forms of desire or attachment (including their former habitual occurrences: Y 18,1; 18,21), viz. delight in, or desire for a new, basis-of-personal-existence, and delight in or desire for sense-objects.

F. This would also seem to be supported by Y 199,1-3 where we read that Thirst with regard to o n e s e l f and to [what is] o u t s i d e (*adhyātma-bahirdhā-tṛṣṇā*) is present as an assisting factor when the *vijñāna* [of the previous existence] engenders its effect, viz. a new (basis of) personal existence (*ātmabhāva*). This twofold attachment (*sneha*) to oneself and to external [objects] is, in the context of describing the causes of rebirth, also mentioned in PG 32.

G. Fortunately, the interpretation proposed for *prapañcābhirati* receives additional support from the explanation of a canonical verse which is quoted in another part of the Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ of the *Basic Section* and in which the expression *prapañcābhirata* occurs (viz. UV XXIX.38, quoted at Y_m 131b1f. = Y_t dzi 293b1f.). In commenting upon this verse the Yogācārabhūmi (Y_m 131b2ff.) says that there are living beings which, desiring excellence for [their] objects-of-desire (*k ā m a vaiśeṣikatāṃ prārthayamānāḥ*), resort to striving for objects-of-desire (*kāmaparyeṣaṇām āpadyante*), that there are, furthermore, beings which, desiring excellence for [their] (basis-of-)personal-existence (*ā t m a - b h ā v a*), strive for [better] existence (*bhava*), and that there are, finally, beings which, desirous of release (*mokṣa*), resort to religious practice (*brahmacarya*), some of them, however, to a wrong one. It is these kinds of beings (the first two of which do not, by the way, seem to be

regarded as different groups in the following part of the text) which are taught to be *prapañcâbhirata* by way of searching for objects-of-desire (*kāma*), [better] existence (*bhava*), and wrong religious practices. Thus, *prapañca* in the expression *prapañcâbhirata* is, in this explanation, understood to include, apart from wrong religious practices (or the concepts they are based on?), the objects-of-desire (*kāma*, i.e. *kāmaguṇa*) and the (basic constituents of) personal existence (*bhava*, i.e. *ātmabhāva*).

H. Several explanations of *prapañca-rati* are offered by YVy 88b7ff. (ad Y 4,12, for which see n. 1408). Among these explanations, too, there is one which, expressly referring to the quasi-synonymity of *prapañca* and *satkāya* at Y 26,18, takes *prapañca* to mean the [five] skandhas belonging to a person (*ādhyātmika*) (YVy 89a1f.: *spros pa źes bya ba naṅ gi phuṅ po rnams la bya ste*), and explains *prapañcarati* as "affection for oneself" (*ātmasneha*, i.e. affection for these five skandhas which one regards as one's Self). This attachment to oneself is regarded as the cause of the [Result-of-]Maturation [containing all Seeds] (*(sarvabījo) vipākaḥ*), either indirectly by way of stimulating karman, or directly (*mṅon sum*, **sākṣāt*) on account of its actual occurrence when one is [about to be] reborn (*skye ba'i tshe*), i.e. - in the sense of Y 18,1f. (see *E*) expressly quoted by the text - immediately before death. This interpretation of *prapañca-rati*, though not confirming the aspect of "delight in sense-objects", at least corroborates, in substance, the aspect of "delight in (the basis of) personal existence", which is anyway the primary one.

I. In another explanation YVy (89a8ff.) tries to trace back the origination of the [Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds to the fundamental wrong attitude by interpreting *prapañca* as the notion of Ego (*ṅar 'dzin pa*,

ahaṃkāra), quoting, in evidence of such a use of *prapañca*, the commentary on PG 33: *tenopaiti prapañcitam - bhaviṣyāmi na bhaviṣyāmīti*. But as far as I can see, such an interpretation is not corroborated by the pertinent parts of the Yogācārabhūmi. This would seem to hold good also for the remaining explanations which need not hence be sketched here.

1406. In the sense of the entity resulting from the process of Maturation.

1407. See § 3.11.3.

1408. Cp. Y 25,12ff.: *tasyāṃ punaḥ sarvabījakāyām ātmabhāvābhinirvṛttau śubhāśubhakarmahetutve 'pi sati prādhānyena* (Y_m) *prapañcābhiratir eva kāraṇaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ / kula-bala-rūpâyur-bhogâdikasya tu phalasya prādhānyena śubhāśubhaṃ karma kāraṇaṃ*, suggesting that in our verse the causes *prapañcābhirati* and *śubhāśubhaṃ karma* should be connected, at least primarily, with *sarvabījako vipākaḥ* and *iṣṭāniṣṭam*, respectively. Cp. also Y 4,11f.: *pūrvakaṃ prapañcaratihetum upādāya yaḥ sarvabījako vipāko nirvṛttaḥ*; 17,2f.; 18,21f.; Hsien-yang 580a19-21: "For three reasons, all diversificatory modes [of cognition?] (**praprañcākāra*) make mind (*citta*) proceed [in saṃsāra] (**pravṛtti*): 1. On account of their being indulged in (**āsevanataḥ*?); ... i.e.: because [diversificatory modes] have [previously] been indulged in, [afterwards, viz.] at the time of receiving [the Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*), [one, or: mind?] takes possession (**pari-grah-*?) of a [new] basis[-of-personal-existence] (**āśraya*)" (... **一切戲論行相、三因緣故、令心流轉。一、由親近故。…謂、得報時、 執持所依。**).

1409. The particle *hi* may not have any other but a metrical function here. Or it may stress the (self-)evidence of the matter: "It is, of course, the [Result-of-]Maturation ... that comes to be looked upon as Self."

1410. Cp. § 3.11.3. - The comm. (q.v.) gives a more artificial explanation (cp. also n. 1459). For a possible variety of meanings of *rūpin* see AS 17,8ff. (ASBh 22,4ff.).

1411. The usual Abhidharma explanation is "invisible" (cp., e.g., AS 17,16ff.), which in the present passage may mean: not accessible to sense-perception (see § 3.11.3). But the comm. (q.v.) prefers "incommunicable"; cp. CPD s.v. *anidassana*.

1412. "... *ca* ..., ... *tathā* ... *ca* ...". Following the comm., one may, however, assume, in the first line, emphasis on *bālā ajānakāḥ*, which would make this line convey information going beyond 29ab and thus impart, to the *ca* of the first line, an independent meaning: "And [it is only(?)] the ignorant f o o l s [who] imagine ...; and on the basis ...". Yet, occasional repetitiveness may also be due to the fact that the verses are obviously compiled from different sources (see p. 223f.); cp. also n. 1426(*C.d*).

1413. Cp., e.g., $BoBh_W$ 51,9f. ($BoBh_D$ 35,6: text unsatisfactory): *satkāyadṛṣṭiṃ* ... *tadanya-sarva-dṛṣṭi-mūlaṃ* ...; Si 31c13f.

1414. I.e. taking an aggregate of many factors, e.g. the body (cp. AKVy 47,25f.) or the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*, cp. AKVy 47,22f.), as a solid unit. Cp. also BoBhVy 87a7): "*piṇḍagrāhavikalpa* is the *vikalpa* which apprehends as a [homogeneous] unit what is [in reality] many" (*maṅ po gcig ñid du 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa ni ril por 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa'o //*). For *piṇḍagrāha* as a basis of the view of Self see AKVy 47,19f.: ... *piṇḍato gṛhītvā tān evātmato gṛhṇanti, piṇḍagrāhe saty ātmagrāhapravṛtteḥ*. AKBh 281,2o (AKVy 45o,1o), when indicating the presuppositions of *ātmagrāha*, supplements the "notion of 'a unit'" (*piṇḍasaṃjñā*) by the "notion of 'permanent'" (*nitya-saṃjñā*) - a notion which may perhaps be regarded as i m p l i e d by *piṇḍagrāha* in the present passage. Cp. also Śālistambasūtra 1o3,17 (*piṇḍasaṃjñā* between *ekasaṃjñā* and *nityasaṃjñā*!).

1415. The comm. has "incorrect reflection" instead, but in view of the parallels (see n. 1416) pointing to "associating with bad people" as one of the causes of the false view of Self, this is definitely n o t what the v e r s e means; the

comm. rather s u b s t i t u t e s , for "bad companions", a n o t h e r cause which is, it too, corroborated by the parallels but n o t mentioned by our verse.

1416. Cp. Y 162,11f.: *tatra satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ katamā? asatpuruṣasaṃsevām* (Y_m) *āgamyâsaddharmaśravaṇam ayoniśomanaskāraṃ* ...; 164,3ff.: *āśrayato 'pi kleśa utpadyate, ālambanato 'pi, saṃsargato 'pi, deśanato 'pi, abhyāsato 'pi, manasikārato 'pi / tatrâśraya<ta>ḥ katamaḥ* (Y_m; sc. *utpadyate*)? *yo 'nuśayād* (≈ *svabījāt!*) *utpadyate / tatrâlambanato: yaḥ kleśasthānīye* (cp. n. 540) *viṣaye ābhāsagate* (Y_m; *utpadyate* has, of course, to be supplied in all the sentences) / *tatra saṃsargato: yo 'satpuruṣāṇām anuśikṣamāṇasya / tatra deśanato: yo 'saddharmaśravaṇataḥ / tatrābhyāsato: yaḥ pūrvasaṃstavabal<ādhā>nataḥ* (supported by Tib. *stobs bskyed pa*) / *tatra manasikārato: yo 'yoniśo manasikurvata utpadyate* /.

1417. Cp. AKBh 287,4f. (see n. 962).

1418. Cp. Y 199,1: *adhyātma-bahirdhā-tṛṣṇā* (see n. 1405(*F*)); cp. also BoBh$_D$ 224,9f., implying that the idea of Self (*ātmasaṃjñā*) is the presupposition of attachment to oneself (*ātmasneha*) and to means of subsistence (*upakaraṇa-sneha*). Cp. also Vetter 1984, 42f. and 113.

1419. In case the reading *-lāṣaś ca* is preferred: "and eagerness to benefit [oneself involving] ...".

1420. *Saṃharati* ("to collect; to lay hold of, attract, appropriate"; cp. Ch. 攝受 , also used for *parigraha* and *samādāna* [MAV-I p. 204]) is, as far as I can judge, not a very precise term. Primarily, it would seem to mean, in the present passage, that people, due to delusion and against their intention, a t t r a c t precisely that which they are afraid of, viz. Suffering (cp. Ud III.10 [see n. 1428]); cp. the expression *duḥkhopasaṃhāra* ("inflicting pain") at BoBh$_D$ 132,4f. This may refer to this life as well as to the next one, and to acute pain or grief as well as to

Suffering in the ultimate, ontological sense (§4.1.1). Yet, if the latter is, as the following lines suggest, understood concretely, especially as the basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*, cp. § 4.1.2) - the comm. even takes it as ālayavijñāna (cp. § 4.1.4) -, then "laying hold" (*saṃharati*), out of delusion, of what one is afraid of because it is in reality Suffering may be taken to include the nuance of spiritually evil Clinging to the *ātmabhāva* as to one's Self (and perhaps also to objects of sensuality as to one's possessions); and additionally, or alternatively, *saṃharati* may intend the nuance of accumulating (cp. *ācinoti* in PG 35) or producing (cp. Tib. *sgrub par byed pa*) a new basis-of-personal-existence in the next life. It is in the latter sense that the line is probably understood by the comm. where it is comprised in the verses elucidating Suffering [as the r e s u l t of the causes of rebirth (*samudaya*)]. From the point of view of the original purport of the verses, however, the former nuance (viz. Clinging) may have been central (see n. 1426(*C.c*)).

1421. *Mohāt* may be used here in a fairly vague sense: "on account of their wrong orientation, their wrong attitudes". If, however, "what people are afraid of", viz. Suffering, is taken to mean, concretely, (the basis of) personal existence (and perhaps also objects of sensuality), *moha* will more specifically mean delusion or ignorance with regard to the true nature of the latter, i.e. to its (or their) being Suffering or unsatisfactory (*duḥkha*; cp. n. 1438). It may even be supposed to include the aspect of wrong notions (*viparyāsa*) like taking as pleasant what is unsatisfactory or taking as Self what is not Self, thus coming close to, or even including, the false view of Self (*satkāya-* or *ātma-dṛṣṭi*).

To be sure, the Yogācāras, like the Sarvāstivādins (cp. Vetter 1984, 25 and 113), usually distinguish clearly between *avidyā /moha/ajñāna* and *satkāyadṛṣṭi/ātmadṛṣṭi* (cp.,

e.g., Y 162,11ff.[1] + 163,19f.[2]; Y_t zi 112b6ff. + 114b5ff. (≡ Y_c 621b6ff. + 622a4ff.); Y 166,16ff.[3]; AS 7,5f.+8f.; PSk_D § 19.4 + § 19.5(1°a)). But the Paramārthagāthās do not seem to be much concerned with such Abhidharmic distinctions. At the same time, they lay considerable stress on the false view of Self (PG 29-31; cp. 24) or the notion of Ego (PG 35; cp. 38) and would thus seem to have, to a certain extent, affinities to a tradition like that of the Śālistambasūtra (represented, later on, by Dharmakīrti) to which the (innate) false view of Self is the fundamental Defilement and not distinct from *avidyā* (Vetter 1984, 22ff.; 42f.; 112f.). Cp. also $BoBh_D$ 167,5f. ($BoBh_W$ 243,10f.): ... *ātmabhāve aham iti vā mameti vā saṃmūḍhaḥ* ...; Y 212,18f.: *purvam ātmabhāve ātmagrāhādibhiḥ saṃmūḍhaḥ*.

Besides, even in Yogācāra materials particularly concerned with the analysis of the concepts of *avidyā*, etc., one can find forms of ignorance or delusion which include or are at least connected with (and are so to speak the formally negative aspect of) the notions of Self (*ātman*) and of one's own (*ātmīya*): Cp., e.g., Y 204,10-13 (*adhyātmam ajñānaṃ katamat / pratyātmikān saṃskārān ayoniśa* *ā t m a t o* (Y_m) *manasikurvato yad ajñānam / bahirdhâjñānaṃ katamat / bāhyān asattvasaṃkhyātān* (Ch., Tib., and prob. Y_m) *saṃskārān ātmīyato 'yoniśo manasikurvato yad ajñānaṃ /*), or Y_t zi 156b2-4 ≡ Y_c 637b21ff. (**pratyakṣa-saṃmoha* comprising the notions of 'permanent', 'pleasant' and 'Self' (*ātmasaṃjñā*) with regard to what is manifestly impermanent, unsatisfactory and not Self). Cp. also YVy 89a8f. (*naṅ gi rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu rmoṅs pa'i tha sñad kyi gźi ste ṅar 'dzin pa'o* ≈ **"adhyātmam vipākaphalasaṃmoha"*[4]*-vyavahārāspadam ahaṃkāraḥ*, i.e. "the notion of Ego which is what is designated as ...") and 89b4 (... *ṅar 'dzin pa... des ni ma rig pa bstan to*).

In the present context, it is particularly interesting that in the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (55,14f.; cp. also n.

1o64) Thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) for (or attachment to?) ā l a y a - v i j ñ ā n a as the representative of *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* (with which what is "taken hold of" according to the present verse, viz. Suffering, is expressly identified in the comm. [on PG 33-34]) is taught to arise through delusion with reference to (the true nature of what one regards as) Self[5] (or even: delusion [mistaking for] Self [what is not Self]) (*ātma-saṃmoha-mukhena*).

1. Cp. n. 93o.
2. *avidyā katamā / asatpuruṣasaṃsevām āgamya asaddharmaśravaṇam ayoniśomanaskāraṃ naisargikaṃ vā* (Y_m) *smṛtisaṃpramoṣaṃ yaj jñeye vastuni ... kliṣṭam ajñānaṃ* /
3. See n. 963.
4. Cp. Y 2oo,1of.; cp. also 2o4,1of.; ŚrBh 384,11 (*dvividhe phale sammoha<ḥ>*, one of the two *phalas* being *ātmabhāvaphala*).
5. Cp. PSkBh 2o2b8: "Not to comprehend ālaya[vijñāna] as not being Self (Tib.: as being without Self) [although in fact it is] not Self, is called *'ātmamoha'*" (*kun gźi bdag med pa la bdag med par khoṅ du ma chud pa ni bdag tu gti mug pa źes bya'o //*).

1422. *A*. In classical Skt., *niveśana* (on which cp. also Suguro 1982, 6of.) is used both as an action noun - in the sense of "entering" or "settling" and also of "causing to enter, or settle" - and as a locus noun (designating the "place where one enters or settles", "hiding or dwelling-place"). On the other hand, in Buddhist canonical verse texts (especially in the Suttanipāta), *niveśa(nā)*, like the verb *ni-viś-* and its participle *niviṭṭha*, is also used in the sense of *abhiniveśa*, i.e. both intellectual and emotional attachment (e.g. Sn 1o55 and, perhaps, 47o[1]). Occasionally (especially when used in the pl.?) it seems to denote the objects of such attachment, especially wrong views (e.g. Sn 785) and objects of desire or attachment (Sn 21o), thus showing the same ambivalence of "subjective" and "objective" use as many other semantically related words (see n. 2o1).

1. It may, however, be difficult to exclude, for this passage, an interpretation of *nivesana* in the "objective" sense, i.e. as "the [main] object of Clinging", viz. Self, or the skandhas in so far as they are taken to be Self.

B. *a*) The expression *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* is, besides *niveśaṃ kṛ-*, documented in epic Skt. in the sense of "sich niederlassen, ein Lager beziehen" (PW), i.e. "to settle, encamp" (MW), especially in a military context. PW, tentatively aligning *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* with *niveśana* as an action noun, seems to take it as a periphrastic verb, but adds that *niveśana* may just as well be understood to designate the camp itself, which would mean that the expression is an ordinary combination of object (= effect) + verb. If *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* is understood as a periphrastic verb, one should, in view of the ambiguity of the action noun *niveśana*, also consider as possible that the periphrastic verb, too, is ambiguous and may be used not only in the sense of "taking up one's residence", "settling down (somewhere)", but also in the sense of "causing to settle" "settling (someone or something)".

b) In the case of the semantically related expressions *upadhiṃ karoti* (Sn 1051: see n. 1426(*C.b*)) and *(ātmabhāva-)parigrahaṃ kṛ-* (see n. 1477(*D.b*)), the action noun alternative would usually seem preferable if not imperative. But I have not so far come across a sentence where any of these expressions is unequivocally used as a unified transitive verb by being construed with an additional accusative of the object (cp. v. Hinüber 1968, 71ff.; Renou 1975, 495), or, in a passive construction, with a subject in the nominative while preserving the action noun in the accusative. The latter construction would, however, have to be presupposed in PG 34a if *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* were, in the present text, consistently regarded as a unified verbal expression. Yet, actually PG 34a is syntactically ambiguous since *niveśanam* may just as well be taken as a part of the subject or, more

probably, as a predicative complement of *kṛtam*. The question is, however, not essential to my argument as long as *niveśana* is understood in an intransitive or transitive meaning, because it does not make much difference whether one settles somewhere or enters something or sticks to it, or makes something one's abode or object-of-sticking-to. In this connection, the afore-mentioned syntactical alternative may therefore be disregarded. But it would seem to become crucial if we were to take *niveśana* in a causative sense; for in that case there would be, in PG 34a, hardly any reasonable alternative to taking *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* as a unified verbal expression. However, at least as far as the original purport of the verses is concerned, an interpretation of *niveśana* in a causative sense is, in view of the parallel materials (see ns. 1426(*B-C*) and 1428), highly improbable.

C. As far as the meaning of the expression *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* in the present text is concerned, we are thus left with two main alternatives:

[1] to make an abode, or to make something one's abode, settle (down) in it, stick to it in an "existential" sense;

[2] to adhere or be attached or cling to something, i.e. to stick to it in a spiritually evil sense.

D. In the comm., *niveśana* is said to mean *ātma-bhāva-parigraha*, i.e. taking possession of a new (basis of) personal existence (cp. n. 1477). This interpretation is in accordance with the pertinent introductory remark of the comm., viz. *yathā samudayānupūrvyā duḥkhaṃ nirvartayati*, which can only refer to rebirth. Thus, the comm. unambiguously supports alternative [1].

E. Similarly, Tib. (Y_t dzi 237a6f.) renders *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* in PG 33c by *gnas byas nas*, and *yat tan niveśanaṃ kṛtam*

in 34a by *gnas byas gaṅ yin*. Besides, the metrical *gnas byas nas* appears, in the translation of the corresponding passages of the comm. (Y_t dzi 241b5), as *gnas p a r byas (nas)*, which, from the grammatical point of view, supports a univerbal interpretation of *niveśanaṃ kṛ-*; for *gnas par byas nas* should hardly mean "having made [it] one's abode" (which would be *gnas s u byas nas*) but "having (actively) settled (down)", or even "having c a u s e d [it] to settle (down)", for the pronoun *tad* in the sentence *tad dhi*(?) *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* is rendered by *d e* , a fact which, as far as I can judge, would normally mean that it is the o b - j e c t of *gnas par byas*, and not its subject, which in the case of an active verb should be in the ergative (*des*).

F. The Chin. version, on the other hand, appears to favour alternative [2], i.e. spiritually evil sticking, since it translates *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* in 33c by 起愛藏已 (Y_c 363c24; cp. 365b11f.), viz. "after having produced affection-and-storing/hiding (i.e. emotional appropriation?)". From the grammatical point of view, this rendering, too, would seem to support the interpretation of *niveśana* as an action noun. The more so since *tad dhi*(?) *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* in the comm. is rendered by an active verbal expression with the demonstrative pronoun as its object (Y_c 365b11: 愛藏此已 "having affectionately appropriated it"), and *yat tan niveśanaṃ kṛtam* in PG 34a by a passive verbal expression (Y_c 363c25: 彼所愛藏者 "that which[1] is affectionately appropriated") - renderings which even suggest a univerbal conception.

1. Or: "what is ... appropriated by those [fools]".

1423. I.e. either "at first" or "previously, formerly".

1424. Viz. foolish people (*lokaḥ*).

1425. *A.* I have not noted any occurrence of *prapañc(it)a* with *upaiti* in Buddhist texts (no item in PTC, nor in CPD s.v. *upeti*), but K. R. Norman (1969, p. 2o4) quotes an

instance from canonical Jaina literature, viz. Sūyagaḍaṃga I.7.30 *ṇidhūya kammaṃ ṇa pavaṃc' uvei*, where *prapañca* is explained by Śīlāṅka to mean *saṃsāra*. Provided that *prapañcita* is, in the present passage, simply a metrically suitable equivalent of *prapañca*, Śīlāṅka's explanation would suggest interpreting *upaiti prapañcitam* as "they (sc. *lokaḥ*) [again] fall into wordly existence" (cp. the expression *gabbhaseyyaṃ upeti*), which of course involves Suffering.

B. Even if this solution is accepted, *prapañcita* in the present passage, as well as *pavaṃca* in the Sūyagaḍa parallel, need not necessarily mean "diversified world". To be sure, *prapañca* does occur in this sense (cp., e.g., S 1969a, 141; Pr 538,5 (*prapañcānām* ≡ *nimittānām*); cp. also *viṣaya-prapañca* in n. 1405(*E*)). But I doubt that Norman (loc. cit.) is right in deriving, from Śīlāṅka's explanation,[1] the view that *p(r)apañca* has a l w a y s to be understood in the "objective" sense of the "diversified world" o n l y , and that the Pāli commentaries, which usually take the word to mean the proliferation of desires (*taṇhā*), conceits (*māna*), and [false] views (*diṭṭhi*), "are confusing what causes *papañca* with *papañca* itself". In my opinion - as I have already stated in n. 1405(*B*) - *p(r)apañca* is, in Buddhist texts at least, rather another instance of the group of words admitting of being used both in an objective and a subjective sense. As for Śīlāṅka's explanation of *prapañca* as *saṃsāra* (which is, occasionally, found in Buddhist sources, too: see n. 1405(*D.b*)), I for one should, even if the borderline may not always be quite clear, prefer to d i s t i n g u i s h the notions of *saṃsāra* and *bhava* from that of the "diversified world".

The notion of "diversified world" does to be sure involve an "objective" interpretation of *prapañca*. It would seem that *saṃsāra*, too, may, occasionally, be understood in a concrete sense as the world where "transmigration" takes place, or even as the constituents of this world, and that

in this case *prapañca*, denoting *saṃsāra*, would also have to be understood in the sense of "diversified world" (cp. the explanation of UVViv quoted in n. 1405(*D.b*)). But usually *saṃsāra* ("wandering around", "incurring one rebirth after another") is rather a state in which l i v i n g b e i n g s are and (usually) w a n t t o r e m a i n . From this point of view, *saṃsāra* will be called *'prapañca'* rather in the sense of what is the o b j e c t o f w i s h f u l c o n c e p t u a l a c t i v i t y . This will also hold good for *bhava* ("existence, rebirth"), even if it is understood in the concrete sense of the (or: a new) basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*: cp. n. 1405(*D.c*)).

On the other hand, at least *saṃsāra* may equally well be called *'prapañca'* in a "subjective" sense in so far as it is a kind of "existential" m o v e m e n t or state of t u r b u l e n c e of l i v i n g b e i n g s . This would be relevant to the present passage since it uses not *prapañca* but *prapañc*<u>*ita*</u> (neutr.). For although it would, from the point of view of grammatical form, be unobjectionable to take *prapañcita* in an "objective" sense, i.e. as the result or object of diversificatory or wishful conceptual activity, the word is, at least as far as I can see, generally used as an a c t i o n n o u n (cp. Pāṇ. 3,3,114 and Wackernagel II,2, § 436c), as is indicated by its frequent association with words like *iñjita* (see CPD s.v.!), *phandita/spandita* and *tṛṣṇāgata* or *tṛṣṇāvicarita*[2], which hardly admit of a different explanation.

1. And from Sn 874 and AN II 161f., which, however, would seem to admit of a different interpretation (cp.Ñāṇānanda 1971, 1ff.; but for *saṃjñā* see S 1981, 214f. note 51).
2. Cp., e.g., AN IV 68f.; SN IV 202f.; ŚrBh 233,17; Y_m 128b2 (see n. 532(b)); Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā, ed. Hikata, p. 81.

C. In view of this "subjective" meaning of *prapañcita* (and the predominance of this aspect in the early Buddhist use of *prapañca*, too), one may even go one step further.

Even if Śīlāṅka's understanding of the purport of the above-quoted Sūyagaḍa line as a whole is correct, still he need not have been aware of the original literal meaning of the expression *ṇa pavaṃc' uvei*. From the Buddhist perspective, at least, one might, in view of the close relation between *p(r)apañca* and *saṅkh(y)ā* (Ñāṇananda 1971, 1ff.), consider the possibility that *ṇa pavaṃc' uvei* might be a quasi-synonym of the well-documented Buddhist expression *saṅkhaṃ nôpeti* or *na upeti saṅkhaṃ*, which means "cannot be defined", with the implication "is not reborn" (CPD s.v. *upeti*, 2.c.λ.β). If this is correct, Śīlāṅka would indeed have correctly interpreted the purport of the line as a whole but not the literal meaning of *pavaṃca/prapañca*, which would, in this context, have to be taken as the (subjective) act of conceptual or even verbal differentiation and determination (or, at the utmost, the concept(s) or denomination(s) resulting from that act). If this is correct, in PG 33cd, too, *upaiti prapañcitam* would mean: "They (i.e. [foolish] people, *lokaḥ*) come to be (conceptually or verbally) defined (as belonging to such and such a class of beings)", practically implying, or perhaps even meaning, not much more than: "they are reborn".

D. The "subjective" meaning of *prapañcita* is also supported by the comm., but since the commentator had already referred Pāda 33c to taking possession of a new existence, he had to concretize the diversificatory conceptual activity expressed by *prapañcita* in a quite different way: In contrast to what was proposed in *C*, viz. to understand *prapañcita* as the conceptual activity of somebody who is not identical with the grammatical subject of *upaiti*, the comm., explaining it as ideas like "I shall be", "I shall not be" (*bhaviṣyāmi na bhaviṣyāmîty evam-ādi*), takes it as the conceptual activity of this very subject. According to this interpretation, *upaiti* is, as is confirmed by the Tib. ren-

dering *khas len to*, used in the sense of accepting (an opinion) (cp. CPD s.v. *upeti* 2; Sn 897 ≡ BoBh$_D$ 33,1of.), of resorting to or indulging in idle conceptual proliferations and wishful thinking. Such indulging in conceptual proliferation (*papañcita*) including the ideas "I shall be" and "I shall not be" is described in SN 35.2o7 (IV 2o3; SĀ$_c$ No. 1168 [312a8ff.+16]). In this Sūtra, these ideas appear to be idle speculative activities, which also include an aspect of (unsatisfied, disquieting[1]) d e s i r e (cp. the designation of a similar set of concepts as *tṛṣṇā-vicaritāni*[2]). As such, they are conducive to rebirth.[3] For this reason, as also on account of their turbulent, disquieting nature, they involve Suffering[4] and are, accordingly, expressly taught to be "a disease (*roga*[5], not *rāga* as in PTS ed.), an ulcer, a dart".

1. For the aspect of a n x i e t y cp. also Sn 774 (see n. 1426(*B*)).
2. AN II 212 ≈ SĀ$_c$ No. 984, quoted at AKBh 4o1,1ff. (AKVy 628,13ff.; 22o,14ff.; AKṬU tu 1o9b3ff.); SHT V, Kat.-Nr. 1o31 (see Enomoto in: BK 15/1985, 81f.); Y$_t$ 'i 32ob1ff. ≡ Y$_c$ 842b27ff.; ŚA 656a29ff.); Vibh 392ff.
3. Cp. SN IV 2o1 (*sace so ... āyati-punabbhavāya ceteti*); AKBh 4oo,23f.+17ff.; AKṬU tu 1o9b5f.: ... *'gro ba daṅ 'oṅ bar gyur ciṅ 'jig rten 'di nas 'jig rten pha rol tu ñiṅ mtshams sbyor bar byed la* (text: *pa*; but cp. end of line 6) *'khor bar 'khor źiṅ 'jug par byed pa* ... (cp. SĀ$_c$ 256a21f.; AN II 212: *apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ saṃsāraṃ nâtivattati*).
4. Cp. SĀ$_c$ 312a14: 正觀察動搖故苦者 (but 動搖故著 in the preceding phrase; although the argument would seem to imply that both phrases should be congruent, the discrepancy is also found in the Korean ed., the Chung-hua ta-tsang-ching and the Dainihon kōtei daizōkyō, which were kindly collated for me by Mr. Y. Sueki).
5. Cp. SĀ$_c$ 312a13.

E. To sum up: If we concentrate on the p u r p o r t of the expression and disregard the problems concerning its literal meaning discussed in *A*-*C*, there would seem to be two possibilities of interpreting *upaiti prapañcitam*:

[a] to incur rebirth (involving Suffering);

[b] to indulge in [idle and at the same time wishful and/or disquieting] conceptual proliferation.

1426. On the basis of the preceding investigation of the semantic possibilities of *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* and *upaiti prapañcitam*, it would seem that the line PG 33cd admits of three essentially different (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) interpretations:

[I] "After having first made an abode or settled down [in a new (basis of) personal existence], they [then] come, due to this, to indulge in conceptual prolifertation." (= [1] + [b])

[II] "Having first become attached, they thereby come to indulge in conceptual proliferation." (= [2] + [b])

[III] "Having formerly practised Clinging (or: been attached), they, due to this [very fact],[1] [then] incur rebirth." (= [2] + [a])

1. But cp. below (*C.a*)!

A. Out of these three alternatives, [I] corresponds to the explanation of the comm. (see ns. 1422(*D*) and 1425(*D*)). It is, however, not probable that this was the original purport of the verses. In view of the parallels to PG 34ab adduced in n. 1428 it would rather seem more likely that the *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* performed by ordinary people is not the "existential" act of taking possession of a new personal existence but rather the spiritually evil m i s c o n c e p t i o n of its nature or, at best, the wrong emotional attitude this misconception involves, as will also be corroborated by the materials presented below (*B* and *C*).

B. Alternative [II] (viz. spiritually evil Clinging entails conceptual proliferation involving Suffering i n t h i s life, without any reference to rebirth) may be taken to receive support from the Saṃyuttanikāya/Saṃyuktāgama passage referred to in n. 1425(*D*) (viz. SN No. 35.207 [IV 203] ≈

$S\bar{A}_c$ No. 1168), where the notions "I shall be" and "I shall not be" are p r e c e d e d by the notion "t h i s I am" (*ayam aham asmī ti*), which is, in its turn, preceded by the notion "I am [...]" (*asmī ti*).[1] These two notions may be understood, in view of the Kṣemakasūtra (see § 7.1A.2.2(b.α) + ns. 916, 918 and 920), as the definite idea that one is identical with [one or the other of] one's present skandhas or with one's *ātmabhāva* (i.e. as *satkāyadṛṣṭi*), and as a vague feeling of identity (i.e. as *asmimāna*), respectively (cp. T 1610, 803b25ff.). Since the latter notion (viz. *asmī ti*) is, at AN II 212 (see n. 1425(*D* + subn. 2)), expressly stated to be the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of the more explicit wishful conceptual proliferations (*papañcita*: Vibh 393) including the ideas of "I shall be" and "I shall not be"[2], it would not seem unreasonable to understand *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* in PG 33cd as referring to the notions of " t h i s I am" and "I am [...]" (or at least to the former if one prefers rather to let the latter be anticipated by *moha* in PG 33b [see n. 1421]). The more so since such an interpretation of *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* would accord perfectly with what would result from interpreting PG 34ab in terms of the parallel passage Y 25,15f. (see n. 1428) where "what is stuck to" (*niveśanaṃ kṛtam*) of PG 34a is represented by the *ātmabhāva* with regard to which immature people form the ideas of 'I' (*aham iti*) or 'mine' or 'I am [this]' (*asmîti*). Cp. also Sn 774: *kāmesu giddhā ... visame n i v i ṭ ṭ h ā / dukkhūpanītā paridevayanti "kiṃsu bhavissāma ito cutāse" //*. This verse may be taken to express the idea that those who have entered upon the wrong [road][3], i.e. cling to objects of desire (*kāmaguṇa*)[4] or, in the present context, to the *ātmabhāva* as their Self, will thereby be led into distress (especially when death is imminent)[5] and come to lament: "What shall we become after having passed away from here"[3], i.e. fall a prey to anxious reflections (≈ *prapañcita*!) with regard to their future destiny.

1. Cp. also SN No. 22.47 (III 46): *"asmī" ti pi 'ssa hoti, "ayam aham asmī" ti ..., "bhavissaṃ" ti ..., "na bhavissaṃ" ti pi 'ssa hoti.*
2. Cp. also DhSk$_D$ 55,17-19, implying that the notions *asmīti* (cp. ns. 918 and 92o) and *ayam aham asmīti* are more fundamental than *bhavadṛṣṭi* (i.e. *bhaviṣyāmīti*) and *vibhavadṛṣṭi* (i.e. *na bhaviṣyāmīti*).
3. Norman 1984, 13o.
4. Nidd I, 37f., adding wrong behaviour, wrong views, etc.
5. Nidd I, 38; Pj II, 516.

C. a) Alternative [III] (viz. spiritually evil Clinging entailing rebirth [involving Suffering]) would seem to be corroborated by SN No. 22.35 (III 35): "To what one inclines, by (or: as) that (viz. the five skandhas) does one come to be defined" (*yaṃ kho ... anuseti, tena saṅkhaṃ gacchati*). The parallelism of *anuseti* + *saṅkhaṃ gacchati* and *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* + *prapañcitam upaiti* can hardly be denied. Besides, the expression *tena saṅkhaṃ gacchati* may also account for the affirmative use of *upaiti prapañcitam* in PG 33d (whereas *saṅkhaṃ upeti* seems to be used in negative formulas only: see CPD s.v. *upeti*) as well as for *tena* which, from this point of view, will have to be taken to mean not "therefore" but "(defined/definable) by (means of) that", or even "as that".

To be sure, the purport of SN 22.35 may not be unambiguous either. But at any rate the parallel Sūtra SN No. 22.36 (III 36f.) intercalates *anumīyati*, which is represented by 隨...死 (**anu-mriyate*) at SĀ$_C$ 3b16 and a18f. and explained as *anu-marati* even at Spk II 266, and was thus perhaps understood, by some exegetes at least, as "dying accordingly", i.e. having, in the hour of death,[1] aspirations corresponding to one's inclinations during life. In fact, in Y$_t$ 'i 154a1ff. (Y$_C$ 776c14ff.) the Sūtra is expressly interpreted as referring to death and rebirth. Besides, even in another set of Sūtras (SN Nos. 12.38-4o [II 65ff.]; SĀ$_C$ Nos. 359-361) *anuseti* is explicitly stated to be the condition of rebirth. Thus, there

are good reasons for taking (or at any rate there was an old exegetical tradition which in fact took) the above-quoted passage (SN No. 22-35) to mean that Clinging leads to a corresponding rebirth.

1. Cp. S 1986, 206; F. Edgerton, The Hour of Death, in: Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute (Poona) 8/1927, 219ff.

b) The line PG 33cd is moreover, strongly reminiscent of Sn 1051ab[2]: *yo ve avidvā upadhiṃ karoti punappunaṃ dukkham upeti mando*, i.e.: "The fool who being ignorant 'makes acquisition'[3] (i.e. takes, regards or claims anything as his possession), incurs Suffering again and again".

The affinity of this line with PG 33cd is palpable not only in view of the formal parallelism of *upadhiṃ karoti* + *dukkham upeti* and *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* + *prapañcitam upaiti*[4], but also because of the semantical closeness of both sets of terms. As for *prapañc(it)am upaiti*, it has already been shown (n. 1425) that it may be practically equivalent to "being reborn", which means incurring Suffering (cp. also the quasi-synonymity of *prapañca* and *duḥkha* at Y 26,18 [see n. 391]). *Upadhi*, on the other hand, is, in Pāli, almost synonymous with *pariggaha* (cp. CPD s.v. *upadhi*), and *parigraha* is, in its turn, used by the comm. on PG 33c in explaining *niveśana*. Cp. also Sn 470 (*niveśana* side by side with *pariggaha*). Moreover, in the Mettagūmāṇava-pucchā itself, to which Sn 1051 (*yo ve avidvā* ...) belongs, a few verses later the fundamental evil attitude of possessiveness or attachment is called *mamāyita* (Sn 1056b: cp. PG 32d!) and even *nivesana* (Sn 1055c).

It would thus seem justified to regard Sn 1051ab as a fairly close parallel to PG 33cd. To be sure, the first half of the Mettagūmāṇava-pucchā is not expressly concerned with the origin of Suffering in the sense of rebirth but may equally well be understood as also implying that even in one's actual exist-

ence itself possessiveness or possessions will lead to Suffering, especially grief (cp. Sn 34: *upadhī hi narassa socanā*, certainly expressing, primarily at least, the idea that possessions cause grief in this very life[5]). But the exegetical tradition of Sn 1o51 and of its parallels expressly refers Suffering to rebirth (Nidd II: *jāti-dukkha*, etc.; cp. Pj II, 59o; Ud-a 213; Pj II, 5o5: *vaṭṭa-dukkha*).[6] Similarly, SN No. 12.66 (II 1o7f.) glosses *dukkha* by *jarāmaraṇa*.[7] What is more, the second half of the Mettagūmāṇavapucchā (and it is in this part that *n i v e s a n a* is used!), dealing with the question of how to overcome Suffering, clearly focusses on the Suffering entailed by rebirth (Sn 1o52cd: *kathaṃ nu dhīrā vitaranti oghaṃ, j ā t i ṃ j a r a ṃ sokapariddavaṃ ca*). Thus, as a parallel to PG 33cd, Sn 1o51, though not excluding interpretation [II] as a nuance, will yet primarily support alternative [III].

2. = SN 728cd = Thg 152ab; cp. also Ud III.1o; UV XXXII. 37; UV_t XXXII.42; MVu II,418,1o; SN No. 12.66 (II 1o7ff.); $SĀ^c$ No. 291 (82b11f.; cp. No. 292, 82c21f.); NidSa §§ 9 and 1o (especially 9.W-Y and 1o.3b); MN III 7o,1o.

3. Cp. Norman 1984, 167.

4. Cp. also *avidvā* and *mando* at Sn 1o51ab with *mohāt* at PG 33b.

5. Cp. also $BoBh_D$ 167,5f. expressing the idea that taking the *ātmabhāva* as 'I' or 'mine' entails excessive grief (... *ātmabhāve aham iti vā mameti vā saṃmūḍho 'tyarthaṃ śocati*).

6. Cp. also the similar Pāda *c y u t ā c y u t ā duḥkham upaiti mūḍhāḥ* in KP § 1o7.

7. This appears to imply that *upadhi* has been equated, in this text, with *jāti* (cp. Spk II 119,25f.: *khandhapañcaka*). This, however, is clearly a secondary, later interpretation, as is confirmed by the fact that the gloss *jarāmaraṇa* is missing in $SĀ_c$ 82b1of. and c 2off. as well as in NidSa § 1o.3. On the other hand, this reinterpretation of *upadhi* in the sense of (re)birth, i.e. of (taking possession of) new skandhas or a new *ātmabhāva*, is a systematical parallel to the interpretation of PG 33a proposed in the comm., i.e. alternative [I].

c) If I am right in parallelizing PG 33ab with Sn 1o51ab (and 1o55c), *niveśana* would not so much be the wrong view or feeling of Self[8] as a t t a c h m e n t (cp. the canonical parallels to PG 34ab, suggesting an interpretation of *niveśana* as "taking as pleasant [what is in reality Suffering]" or "delighting in" (see n. 1428)). To be more precise, *niveśana* would come close to the notion of *u p ā - d ā n a* , which, in PG 33, may also be expressed or at least alluded to by *saṃharati* in Pāda b, and would carry onward the twofold *sneha* (≈ *tṛṣṇā*) of PG 32. Taken in this way, *niveśana* would also be more or less equivalent to the *p r a p a ñ c ā b h i r a t i* of PG 28, the more so since this notion is, at Y_m 131b2ff. (see n. 14o5(*G*)), connected with *paryeṣaṇā*, which in its turn is close to *upādāna* (e.g. Y 2o1,3f.; 212,3ff.).

From this point of view, *pūrvam* in PG 33c would, in view of the expression *p ū r v a -prapañcābhirati* (Y 18,21; cp. 4,11f.; cp. also Y 212,18f.), admit of being taken not as a more or less superfluous element - which it would be in the case of the alternatives [I] and [II] (cp. its omission in the pratīka of PG 33cd in the comm.) - but rather as a s i g n i f i c a n t element of the sentence, characterizing *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* as belonging to the p r i o r e x i s t e n c e and thereby signalizing that *upaiti prapañcitam* is to be referred to r e b i r t h , i.e. to be taken as standing parallel to the arising of the *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* in PG 28c.

One may, in this way, interpret *niveśana* in PG 33c as being parallel to " d e l i g h t i n (and desire for) w o r d l y e x i s t e n c e " (*prapañcâbhirati*) in PG 28a, and " f a l l i n g a p r e y t o c o n - c e p t u a l proliferation/wordly existence" (*upaiti prapañcitam*) in 33d as corresponding to the result of the latter. Since what is obtained is obviously precisely that which had been enjoyed and desired previously, it is tempt-

ing to equate the literal meaning of both also, viz. of *prapañca* in 28a and *prapañcita* in 33d, and to take *upaiti prapañcitam* to mean "they (sc. *lokaḥ*) incur what they had in various ways wishfully and restlessly thought about", i.e. a new *ātmabhāva* (and sense-objects). Yet, there is no guarantee that such a conclusion is justified, and in view of the presumable heterogeneity of the verses it may well be that, in spite of the systematic correlation of the object of *abhirati* and its result (viz. rebirth), the l i t e r a l meaning of *prapañca* (in *prapañcâbhirati*) and *prapañcita* (in *upaiti prapañcitam*) is, or at least originally was, n o t identical.

8. But cp. SN No. 22.47 (III 46; cp. $SĀ_c$ 16b2o): *asmī ti ... avigate pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ avakkanti* (Spk: *nibbatti*; Y_t 'i 183b8: *p h y i m a l a ... mṅon par 'grub pa* = **āyatyām ... abhinirvṛttiḥ*) *hoti*. The (somewhat complicated) exegesis of this passage at Y_t 'i 183b4ff. (Y_c 788a11ff.), however, integrates *ā t m a b h ā v a - t ṛ ṣ ṇ ā* (*lus sred pa*; Ch. 我愛 = **ātma-tṛṣṇā*) into the causal complex.

d) Even though it would seem that interpretation [III] has to be regarded as the primary meaning of PG 33cd, what appears to be focussed upon by the verse is not so much the result but rather the a c t o f C l i n g i n g t o or grasping at (i.e. *upādāna*) and its ultimate a b s u r d i t y in view of the unsatisfactoriness of what is clung to (cp. PG 34ab, where what is stated to be in reality unsatisfactory is - if interpretation [III] is followed - not what is obtained at rebirth but what had [previously] been stuck (= clung) to (*niveśanaṃ kṛtam*)). The r e s u l t and its true value and consequences would seem to be the central topic only in verses (34cd and (?)) 35-36. But since, in the case of interpretation [III], PG 33d, too, would refer to the result, and since on the other hand 35a refers to the cause, and 35c (*ahaṃkāra*) as well as 36 to the cause of the *next* result, there is no clear-cut delimitation but rather a certain repetitiveness. This is not at all astonishing in

view of the fact that the verses ought to stem from different sources (and most probably the change of metre - which seems to switch over to vaitālīya at PG 34d at the latest: see p. 224ff. - coincides with one of the seams). But it was not acceptable to the commentator who had to explain the text as a coherent whole and, ignoring the affinity of *saṃharati* and *niveśana* to *upādāna* in the sense of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula, tried to fulfil his task by taking *niveśana* in the sense of taking possession of a new existence and by accordingly referring verses 33 and 34 to rebirth (i.e. to *duḥkha(satya)* in the sense of the primary result of the cause(s)-of-Suffering), and PG 35 to the secondary outcome.

1427. In view of the correlative *tad* in PG 34b, I prefer to take *yad tad* not as an indefinite pronoun (= *sarva*), as W. puts it, but rather as demonstrative + relative: "that [already mentioned or well-known thing] which ..." (Speyer 1886, p. 355 note 1). - *Tad* in PG 34a can hardly be construed as the prior member of a compound. For as a bahuvr. this compound would not tally with PG 33c. As a tatp., on the other hand, it would either imply that what is known to the Āryas to be Suffering is the a c t of settling or Clinging - which is odd and at variance with the parallel passages quoted in n. 1428 -; or, if *niveśana* is taken as a locus noun, there would hardly be anything which *tad-* might refer to except *loka*, but this too appears odd since *loka* is implied as the agent of the *yat* clause and would therefore be expected to be referred to not by *tad-* but by *sva-*.

1428. Cp. AKBh 328,19: *yat pare sukhataḥ prāhus, tad āryā duḥkhato viduḥ //* (quoted from $SĀ_c$ 88c1o; cp. SN IV 127; Sn 762ab); UV_t XXXII.39a: *dga' ba gaṅ yin de sdug bsṅal* ("What [they, i.e. *pṛthagjanas*: UVViv] delight in, that is [in reality] Suffering"); cp. Ud III.1o: *y a d a b h i n a n d a t i , taṃ bhayaṃ; yassa bhāyati, t a ṃ d u k k h a ṃ* ; MVu II,418,6f.: *bhave ayaṃ loko sakto bhave*

rakto bhavābhinandito / bhavo yatra bhavati, duḥkhaṃ bhavati; cp. also SN No. 22.29 (see n. 1444(*A*)); Y 25,15f.: *tatra câtmabhāve bālānām "aham" iti vā "mama" iti vā "asmi" iti vā bhavati / āryāṇāṃ punar "duḥkham" ity eva bhavati*. The latter parallel shows that Suffering (*duḥkha*) tends to have, in this context, the c o n c r e t e sense of w h a t i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y (in the ultimate, ontological sense), i.e., primarily, the b a s i s - o f -p e r s o n - a l - e x i s t e n c e (*ātmabhāva*: see n. 1477(*E*) and § 4.1.2) or the *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* (PG 28c). In the comm., this Suffering is equated with *ālayavijñāna* (see § 4.1.4).

1429. This may mean: in a state of constant uneasiness (in the sense of *dauṣṭhulya*: see § 4.1.2).

1430. From the point of view of the original meaning of the verses, PG 34cd is, also in view of the change of metre (see p. 224ff.), perhaps better connected with 35 (and 36ab) (cp. n. 1426(*C.d*)): "Such Suffering by which the fools are always miserable since it does not cease even for a single moment, is accumulated by mind [as long as the latter] is befallen with Unevenness - [Suffering which,] having been accumulated, becomes the cause of ... pain, [and] to which all fools stick ...".

1431. Tib. (*yoṅs dkris pa*) and Ch. (纏) seem to take *parigata* as a synonym of *paryavasthita*.

1432. I.e. unwholesome attitudes or actions. Cp. Sn 774b and 57b: *visame niviṭṭhaṃ* (Nidd I and II: *visame kāyakamme* ..., etc.; *visame pāṇātipāte* ..., etc.; *visamesu saṅkhāresu* ..., *visamesu pañcasu kāmaguṇesu* ..., *visamesu pañcasu nīvaraṇesu* ...); Vibh 368: *tattha katamāni tīṇi visamāni? rāgo visamaṃ, doso visamaṃ, moho visamaṃ* ... / *tattha katamāni aparāni pi tīṇi visamāni? kāyavisamaṃ, vacīvisamaṃ, manovisamaṃ* (Vibh-a 498: *kāya-duccaritâdi*).

1433. The line seems to allude to a frequent "etymology" of *citta*; cp., e.g., AKBh 61,21 (= VGPVy 377a7): *cinotîti cittam*; AKVy 141,15f.: *kuśalam akuśalaṃ vā cinotîty arthaḥ*. At LAS II.106a, etc., too, what *citta* accumulates is *karman*, not *duḥkha*: *cittena cīyate karma*. When the term *citta* is specifically referred to ālayavijñāna, it is usually etymologized in an intrinsically passive sense, ālayavijñāna being called *citta* on account of its being an accumulation of, or filled, covered, "set" with, Impressions or Seeds; e.g. TSN 7: *°vāsanā-bījaiś citatvāc "cittam" ucyate cittam ādyaṃ* (i.e. *ālayavijñānam*); Y_t zi 189b4 (see n. 824); MSg I.9 (cp. Lamotte 1934-35, 202); AS 12,1f.: ... *vāsanācitatām upādāya*; ASBh 11,13f.; Si 13c8f.; 15b19ff. (Si_P 182f.); cp. also AKBh 61,21f.: *citaṃ śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittam*[1] (AKVy 141,19: view of the Sautrāntikas or Yogācāras!). This should also be the purport of passages like KSi § 31 (Muroji p. 37,14f.) and PSk_t 17a1 (PSk_D § 26; Muroji p. 44,5-7), though commentatorial exegesis suggests alternative explanations (PSkVai 45b3f.; PSkBh 179b4ff.; cp. also the active interpretation at PSkViv 94a8f. or at Y_c 651b20f. and $ASBh_c$ 701a25f. and b2f.).

1. The reading *citaṃ* is confirmed by Tib. (*bsags pa*) and Pa. (所增長), but AKVy (mss.) and Hts. (種種差別) have *citraṃ*; cp. AKVy 141 note 6 and AK_P II 177.

1433a Cp. Thg 795c = SN IV 73 (see also SWTF p. 233 [s.v. *ā-ci-*]): *evam ācinato dukkhaṃ*. Cp. also Thg 456d: *ācinanti punabbhavaṃ*.

1434. Tib. (Y_t dzi 237a8) seems to take *bālānām* as the agent of *ācita* (cp. v. Hinüber 1968, § 234).

1435. Cp. the comm. A bahuvrīhi does not make sense, whether we keep to the reading of the mss. or not. Suffering is the new *ātmabhāva* or *vipāka* which contains all Seeds and which thus becomes, in the course of this new existence, the cause of actual (physical or mental) pain and pleasure as well as of

new occurrences of the notion of Ego (or view of Self) which had been habitual in the previous life.

1436. Cp. Dhp 327d; UV IV.27d.

1437. It would seem natural to understand *sarvaceṣṭite* as specifying *sarvatragaḥ*. But the comm. (q.v.) refers the two expressions to sensations and morally qualified factors, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

1438. Cp. the *tattvārtha-saṃmoha* of AS 55,2 (ASBh 66,18ff.) which is presupposed even by meritorious (*puṇya*) and "immovable" (*āniñjya*) actions and is said to consist in delusion with regard to the four Noble Truths, and particularly in the absence of a correct understanding of the whole world as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y (ASBh: ... *yad-vaśena te duḥkhatas traidhātukasya yathābhūtam aparijñānāt punarbhavahetubhūtān puṇyāniñjya- (°ñjyān?) saṃskārān utthāpayanti*).

1439. Or: hard to traverse?

1440. The "lake" (*saras*) is of course the *ātmabhāva* or *vipāka* containing all Seeds (comm.: ālayavijñāna) from which, like rivers springing from a lake[1] as their common source, the different sense-faculties and - in the course of *saṃsāra* - (existences in) different Destinies and world-spheres (thus according to the comm.) branch off or emerge.
For the streams ramifying into various directions, cp. Sn 1034f., a Sanskrit version of which is quoted at Y_m 136a2 (Y_t dzi 299b6f.):

sravanti sarvataḥ srotāḥ,
srotasāṃ kiṃ nivāraṇam / ...
y ā n i s r o t ā ṃ s i l o k a s y a,
smṛtis teṣāṃ nivāraṇam / ...

Y_m 136b3 (Y_t dzi 300b4f.) explains: *ṣ a ḍ ā y a t a n a srota* (cp. also comm. ad PG 37!) *duḥkhāyânusravati*; but Nidd II: *sotā ti t a ṇ h ā soto diṭṭhisoto*, etc. / *sabbadhī ti sabbesu āyatanesu*; Pj II: *sabbesu rūpādisu āyatanesu taṇhādi-*

kā sotā sandanti.

1. Probably an allusion to the lake Anavatapta from which four rivers are said to flow forth towards the four quartes (Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names, vol. I [London 1960], 97).

1441. Ordinary rivers and lakes may, of course, be dried up by wind (cp., e.g., Sn 433ab) or by fire or by the sun, especially by the seven suns at cosmic conflagration (AN IV 101; Y 35,13ff.); see also Sn 3ab (cp. Brough, The Gāndhārī Dharmapada [London 1962], p. 200). – In its commentary on the verses *kutaḥ sarā nivartante* ($S\bar{A}_c$ No. 601 or 1329; cp. SN No. 1.27), Y_m 119b5f. (Y_t dzi 269b5ff.) states that, as long as Thirst has not completely ceased, fools enjoy the six bases of contact (*ṣaṭ sparśāyatanāni*, i.e. the six senses) by way of contact with sense-objects, just as people and even animals enjoy a l a k e (*saras*) as long as its water is not e x h a u s t e d (cp. S 1987, § 3.1.1 + note 29).

1442. For *anyatra* c. i n s t r . (of the logical subject) in the sense of "with the exception of", "but only" cp. AN V 82 (*na kho idha añño koci pavisati aññatra pabbajitena*).

1443. For *vy-ava-so-* in the sense of m i s conception cp. AKBh 329,21f.: *ko hi vidvān ... gaṇḍa<ṃ> "sukham" iti vyavasyet*.

1444. *A*. I.e. one misconceives the impermanent, unsatisfactory basis-of-personal-existence as Ego taken to be the s u b j e c t of feeling (*vedaka*); cp. Y 25,15f. quoted in n. 1428, and, for the aspect of misconceiving what is in reality unsatisfactory, also Sūtras like SN No. 22.29 (III 31): "He who is pleased with corporeal matter, (etc.,) is pleased with [what is in reality nothing but] Suffering" (*yo ... rūpaṃ abhinandati, dukkhaṃ so abhinandati*); MN I 233: *yo nu kho d u k k h a ṃ a l l ī n o ... dukkhaṃ "etaṃ mama, e s o 'h a m a s m i , eso me attā" ti samanupassati, api nu kho so ... d u k k h a ṃ p a r i j ā n e y y a*

...?; Pischel 1904, f. 160b, 161a: *ayam āyuṣmān d u ḥ - k h a m e v ā l ī (n a ḥ)*.

B. My translation of this difficult line presupposes that *aham asmi*, because of its unstressed position (cp. SWTF s.v. *aham* 2 a ε [p. 213]), is not e s p e c i a l l y emphasized (i.e. that it does not mean "it is I who am ...": cp. also the fact that the paraphrase given in the comm. omits *aham*), but that it is nevertheless not altogether incidental, and that *ātmānam* is not merely an unstressed reflexive pronoun. Otherwise, i.e. if *aham asmi* and *ātmānam* are not stressed at all, the (main) purpose of the line would not be to contrast the wrong conception of S e l f as the subject of pleasure and pain with the (impermanent and thus ontologically) unsatisfactory *ātmabhāva* or aggregate of skandhas as the real fact, but to contrast the idea of a d i s t i n c t i o n o f p a i n a n d p l e a s u r e with the real fact that a l l s e n s a - t i o n s a r e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y (cp., e.g., SN Nos. 36.2 and 36.11). In this case it would appear that one would - as the comm. actually does - have to construe *vyavasyati* twice:

> "[When, being] pained, one conceives oneself [to be pained, thinking:] 'I am pained', or, being pleased, [conceives oneself to be pleased], [what] one conceives [as pain o r p l e a s u r e is in reality nothing but] Suffering."

Yet, if this were in fact the purport of the verse, it is strange that of the wrong conceptions the one to be stated i n f u l l is the idea of being p a i n e d and not instead the idea of being pleased, which has to be gained rather by s u p p l e m e n t s (i.e. the words "[by thinking] ... ['I am pleased']" in the translation of the verse). Besides, in the context of what is responsible for Bondage, the False View (*dṛṣṭi*) which according to the subsequent pāda (38c) arises from the wrong idea charac-

terized in the present line (38ab) is almost certainly the False View of S e l f , and this means that the wrong idea by which it is called forth is most likely the wrong idea of "I ..." (cp. also n. 1445). I therefore prefer to take the cumulative weight of the expressions referring to the 1st person (*aham, asmi, ātmānam*) seriously and to interpret the verse accordingly.

C. In the light of his rendering of the corresponding passage of the comm. (see n. 1486(*b*)), Hts.'s translation of the line (Y_c 364a4: 於苦計我受 苦樂了知苦) appears to imply the following interpretation: "[To understand that it is] with reference to [what is in reality nothing but (?)] Suffering that one conceives 'I feel pain or pleasure': [this is] 'understanding Suffering'" - a rendering which probably presupposes *duḥkhe* (instead of *duḥkhī*) and ignores *ātmānam*. But this apart, it also seems to presuppose not only that *vyavasyati* has to be construed twice (virtually even thrice), but also that it has, each time, a different meaning: *duḥkhe duḥkhito/sukhito 'ham asmīti vyavasyati* (計 !) <*iti vyavasyan*> *duḥkhaṃ vyavasyati* (了別 !). This interpretation may be motivated by a certain reluctance to take *vyavasyati* in a purely negative sense (for which see n. 1443), and this is understandable enough in view of passages like the verse quoted at AKBh 329,24 (... *duḥkham sukham iti vyavasyanti*: "they understand that pleasure is Suffering") where *vyavasyanti* is more or less equivalent to *parijānanti*. But apart from the syntactical *kalpanāgaurava* involved, such an interpretation appears less recommendable also from the point of view of content. For like the subsequent verses on "understanding Liberation" (*mokṣaparijñā*), the present verse, which according to the comm. deals with "understanding Bondage" (*bandhaparijñā*), does not - as the comm. rightly puts it and as is beyond doubt in the case of the second line - describe this understanding i t - s e l f but only its c o n t e n t . Hts.'s rendering,

however, takes *duḥkhaṃ vyavasyati* to designate this understanding (*parijñā*) itself and in so far makes it diverge from its context. Besides, *bandha-parijñā* can hardly be reduced to *duḥkha-parijñā* but should include, or rather be focussed on, understanding the causes of Suffering.

D. Tib., both here and in the comm. (see n. 1486), offers still another interpretation of the passage : "When one is pained, one knows oneself [to be pained, thinking:] 'I am pained', or when one is pleased one knows '[I am] pleased'" (Y_t dzi 237b2f.: *sdug bsṅal bdag ñid bdag ni sdug bsṅal sñam // yaṅ na bde na bde sñam ṅes par byed //*). This rendering obviously presupposes a reading *sukhito vā sukham* instead of *duḥkham*. From the point of view of content, it gives the impression of understanding the line in terms of the *smṛtyupasthāna* practice, but in this case once again, the present line would express the *parijñā* itself and not its content; moreover, the *parikalpa* in pāda c would not be concretized - as one may duly expect - in the preceding (i.e. the present) line. The only possibility of evading this difficulty would be to regard the words "oneself" and "I" to be stressed in this version, too. In this case, the verse would make good sense, but it would hardly fit the comm., where the reading and interpretation of Tib. is rather improbable (see n. 1486(*c*)).

E. Still another interpretation of the line is proposed by Wayman (W. 173; similarly Suguro 1982, 57)): "When suffering, one thinks, 'I am suffering', or when happy, takes it to be suffering." Wayman thus takes the verse to describe correct understanding as consisting in realizing pain as pain (and hence as suffering) and in knowing pleasure to be, in reality, equally Suffering. For the latter aspect Wayman (184 note 42) refers to SN IV 127 (see n. 1428). This

interpretation, unobjectionable, at any rate in substance, though it is from the grammatical point of view and, taken by itself, quite reasonable from the point of view of content, would nevertheless seem to involve, in the context of the passage as a whole, similar difficulties as the Tibetan version. It would, at any rate, be incompatible with the wording of the corresponding passage of the comm., Wayman's translation of which is untenable (see n. 1486(*d*)).

1445. I.e., if my interpretation of the preceding line is correct: the more or less spontaneous, incidental idea "I feel pain or pleasure" (whereas in reality, there is no Ego but only Suffering, i.e. a cluster of impermanent, unsatisfactory factors) tends to solidify into a tenaciously embraced false view or theory, viz. the View of Self. Cp. the distinction between wrong ideas and false views at Y 166,9ff.: *saṃjñāviparyāsaḥ katamaḥ / yo 'nitye nityam iti duḥkhe sukham iti aśucau śucīti anātmany ātmeti saṃjñā parikalpaḥ / dṛṣṭiviparyāsaḥ katamaḥ / yat* (Y_m; ed.: *yas*) *tatraiva tathā saṃjñāparikalpite kṣāntī rucir vyavasthāpanâbhiniveśaḥ* ("[the fact] that [there arises] ...")/. Cp. also the distinction between the *dṛṣṭiviparyāsas* as false views proper, infallibly eradicated by the *darśanamārga*, and the *saṃjñā-* and *citta-viparyāsas* as more spontaneous, incidental wrong ideas (some of) which may, according to certain schools (cp. VisM XXII.68) or masters (see § 7.1A.2.2(*b*.γ)), occur even in Śaikṣas. As for the manifestation of a spontaneous idea of 'I', not yet solidified into a speculative theory, in connection with pleasure and pain, cp. PV II.2oo (Vetter 1984, 1o1):

"The idea of 'I' [occurring in a person] who desires 'may I be happy' or 'may I not be unhappy': precisely this is the innate view of a Living Being (= Self)."
(*sukhī bhaveyaṃ duḥkhī vā mā bhūvam iti tṛṣyataḥ / yaivāham iti dhīḥ saiva sahajaṃ sattvadarśanam //*)

1446. According to the comm., *sa* resumes *parikalpaḥ*, whereas *tasmāt* and *tad* refer to *dṛṣṭi* (!). The sentence would then mean:

"Having [itself] arisen from this [False View], it (viz. the wrong idea) [thus] also engenders it (viz. the False View)."

It would not appear improbable that the (more or less spontaneous) wrong idea "I̲ am pained", etc., which according to the preceding pāda (38c) calls forth or produces the False View of Self, is itself conditioned by (the Impression of a previous occurrence of?) this False View. But the comm. renders *taj janayaty api* merely repetitive of what had already been stated in the preceding pāda, and apart from this, oddly enough it refers *tasmāt* (n e u t e r or masculine but definitely not feminine) and the unambiguously neuter *tad* to the f e m i n i n e *dṛṣṭi*. I do not contend that the comm. is necessarily wrong, but I should nevertheless like to suggest, as an alternative, to refer *tasmāt* and *tad* to *d u ḥ k h a* :

"[Thus - i.e. because it calls forth the False View of Self and because the latter, by mediation of Desire, entails rebirth and thus new Suffering (see verses 31-35) -] this wrong idea ['I̲ am pained', etc.,] which has arisen from it (i.e. from Suffering) [by way of misconception], also (i.e. in its turn) engenders it (i.e. [new] Suffering)."

1447. I.e. any defiled mental event or state of mind, especially of *manovijñāna* (but on occasion even sense-perception may be *kliṣṭa*: cp. Y 59,1ff.). There is, as has already been observed by Ui (1958, 317), not the slightest reason to interpret the "defiled mind" of the present verse, as later Yogācāra authors (e.g. VGPVy 381b2; Si 24c19ff.; T 1828, p. 417c18ff.; cp. also Ōsaki 1976, 259) quite understandably do, in the sense of the *kliṣṭaṃ manas* of the full-fledged Yogācāra doctrine, i.e. as a specific kind of *vijñāna* (characterized by a subtle notion of Ego, etc.); for in this case

one would expect at least the commentator to make this point clear, e.g. by concretizing the Defilements or at least specifying their number, none of which, however, he does. Nor do I find that such a specific form of mind is, from the point of view of content, in any way anticipated in the present passage, as Hakamaya (1978a, 306) suggests (cp. also Yūki 1935, 389); for *sadā* does not necessarily imply that one and the same mental series is c o n t i n u o u s l y associated with Defilements, but may just as well be understood to mean that e v e r y t i m e (cp. PW s.v. *sadā*: "... jedesmal") when a defiled *citta* arises, it does so and it ceases together with its Defilements (cp. also passages like ASBh 40,1f. stating that the *antarābhava-cyuti-citta* is *nityaṃ kliṣṭam*, i.e. defiled i n e v e r y c a s e).

1448. *Sadā* excludes a preterite function of the suffix *-ta*, signalizing an atemporal use instead; cp. Wackernagel II,2, 578 (especially the example *nitya-jāta-* + *nityaṃ* ... *mṛta-* "immer wieder geboren werdend und sterbend"); cp. Tib. (Y_t dzi 237b3) *rtag tu* ... *skye źiṅ 'gag* ("present"!).

1449. The background against which this statement has to be understood is the doctrine of m o m e n t a r i n e s s (see § 7.1B.2.1.4.*2.d*). This means that the expression "(defiled) mind" in 39b is intended to mean "(any defiled) m o m e n t of mind (*citta-kṣaṇa*)".

1450. I.e. because of its momentariness.

1451. I have taken *śuddham* with the preceding sentence, but one could also take it, with the comm., ἀπὸ κοινοῦ.

1452. Comm.: because. But I think that a concessive interpretation makes better sense because *mukta* u s u a l l y presumes that there was, previously, bondage and, then, a process of liberation of which it is the result.

1453. Because, on account of its momentariness, it did not yet exist when the Defilements were still there. It is thus

called liberated in the sense of "free", not in the (usual) sense of "freed", namely, from non-freedom.

1454. Viz. of momentariness.

1455. I.e. defiled for the whole duration of its existence (which, however, does not exceed one moment).

1456. Because it too is pure from the very beginning of its existence (which, however, is - at least as far as conditioned entities like mind are concerned - confined to one single moment). - Ch. (Y_c 364a1o) appears to have misunderstood the line: "That which is defiled is absolutely pure by nature"; similarly W. and Suguro (1982, 57). But Tib. (Y_t dzi 237b4f.) correctly *ñon moṅs can gaṅ, de 'dir gtan* (P, D: *gźan*)*; // dag pa* (sc. *gaṅ yin pa*)*, de ni raṅ bźin gsal //.*

1457. Ch. (Y_c 364a11): "Since there is nothing that is purified, how can there be anything that purifies?". But Tib. (Y_t dzi 237b5) *gaṅ las kyaṅ* confirms abl. separ. As an example for the latter in connection with *(vi)śudh-*, see $BoBh_D$ 25,24f. (... *kleśāvaraṇāj jñānaṃ viśudhyate*).

1458. I.e. in what they consist.

1459. In *arūpin*, the comm. obviously takes *rūpa* not as "shape" but as being derived from the verb *rūpayati* "to investigate speculatively", obviously in a passive sense (*rūpyata iti rūpam*). This may correspond to *rūpin* under the aspect of "investigation" (*prarūpaṇataḥ*) in AS 17,8+11, but ASBh 22, 15f. interprets this concept in an a c t i v e sense, referring it to *vitarka* and *vicāra* which may be said to be *rūpin* in the sense of "investigating their object" (*ālambana-prarūpaṇāt*). On the other hand, AS 2,1off. (AS_t 52a1ff.; cp. ASBh 2,1o-12) would seem to support a passive interpretation when it defines matter (*rūpa*) as being characterized by *rūpaṇā* in the sense of *a) sparśarūpaṇā* (MVy 7546), i.e. being subject to alteration (*anyathībhāva*: ASBh 2,1o) or affliction (*bādhana*: ASBh 22,16f.) by physical contact (cp.

SN III 86), a n d *b) deśa-nirūpaṇā* (MVy 7547), i.e. being susceptible of conceptual determination in space by means of a mental act associated with discursive thought (* *v i - t a r k a*) (**deśe "idaṃ cêdaṃ ca rūpam" ... iti ... vitarkasaṃprayuktena manasā citrīkāratā* [restored with the help of ASBh, AS_t and AS_c]).

1460. Cp. SN III 86 (*ruppatī ti ... rūpaṃ ...*; cp. $S\bar{A}_c$ 11b26ff.; H. Lüders, Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons, Berlin 1954, § 29), on which the etymologizing definition of AS 2,10ff. (see n. 1459) is based.

1461. I.e. the p e r s o n s in whom the view of Self occurs.

1462. For the distinction of *sahajā* and *pari-(/vi-)kalpitā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ* see § 7.1A.2.2.*b*.ε and S 1979, 9ff.; cp. also PV II.199f. and Vetter 1984, 23; 42; 100f.

1463. As the following explanation shows, *āśraya* refers, in this passage, n o t , as before, to the p e r s o n in whom the view of Self occurs (see n. 1461), but to former habit. For yet another use of *āśraya* see next note.

1464. For these categories used in a similar context (viz. the context of the arising of Defilements in general), see Y 164,3ff. quoted in n. 1416. Yet, in that passage, *āśrayataḥ* and *ālambanataḥ* refer to o t h e r causes than in the present passage, viz. to latent propensity (*anuśaya*) and to a suitable object (*viṣaya*), respectively, whereas former habit and listening to wrong doctrines are indicated by the items *abhyāsataḥ* and *deśanataḥ*.

1465. This is clearly a misunderstanding or (deliberate or inadvertent) replacement of *sahāyataḥ* in the verse (see n. 1415).

1466. Triple *ca* confirmed by Y_t (dzi 241b1: ... *yaṅ ... la / 'dir yaṅ ... ciṅ / ...yaṅ ...*) and Y_c (365b4f.: ..., ..., 又 ...); but $ŚrBh_m$ unambiguously *vā* (°*m vā!*) for the last *ca*. Yet, in W. 176,18, where *ca* is certain, we have the same situation (Y_m: °*ṃ ca*, $ŚrBh_m$ °*m vā!*). In case the reading

of ŚrBh$_m$ (... *ca* ... *ca* ... *vā*) is, in the present passage, to be preferred, one would have to translate: "... in the sense that, on the one hand (*ca*), this [false] view ... had ... been habitually followed (= α) and, on the other (*ca*), in this [existence] one either reflects incorrectly (= β), or (*vā*) hears, from others, ... (= γ)."

1467. Cp. the parallels in n. 1416.

1468. Viz. *tṛṣṇā*, as the direct and main cause of Suffering (i.e. of the new *ātmabhāva* or *sarvabījo vipākaḥ*: cp. verse 28 + n. 1405, and AKBh 333,8f. and 15f.; cp. also Y 108,8-10.

1469. In the sense of *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* concretized in ālayavijñāna (see comm. ad v. 33-34).

1470. See comm. ad v. 35.

1471. Since the Suffering which is taught to be the cause of these two further kinds of Suffering or unsatisfactoriness is identified with *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* (see n. 1469), the two other kinds of Suffering can only be *vipariṇāma-* and *duḥkha-duḥkhatā* (on which see S 1977, 919ff.). This is confirmed beyond doubt by the fact that they refer to "pleasure" (*sukha*) and "pain" (*duḥkha*) in v. 35, respectively (see n. 1480).

1472. To be sure, both Y$_m$ and ŚrBh$_m$ read *duḥkha-saṃskāra-duḥkhatā-saṃgṛhītam ālayavijñāna-mayam*, thus suggesting that ālayavijñāna corresponds to both *saṃskāra-* and *duḥkha duḥkhatā*, and this is what Wayman (W. 184 + note 37; likewise Suguro 1982, 59) expressly takes the passage to mean. Tib., too, seems to presuppose such a reading (Y$_t$ dzi 241b4f.: *sdug bsṅal daṅ / 'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal du bsdus pa'i kun gźi rnam par śes pa (de gnas par byas nas ...)*). It is, however, highly improbable that the subliminal ālayavijñāna, which demonstrably and understandably came to be regarded as the hypostasis or (foremost) representative of *saṃskāra duḥkhatā* (see § 4.1.4), was ever

thought to include the unsatisfactoriness of (gross) p a i n (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*), too. In fact, the comm. itself unequivocally states that the t w o o t h e r kinds of Suffering or unsatisfactoriness, which in view of the verse to which they refer cannot but mean *vipariṇāma-* a n d *d u ḥ k h a -duḥkhatā* (see n. 1480), are c a u s e d by the basic kind of Suffering or unsatisfactoriness consisting in ālayavijñāna. *Duḥkha-duḥkhatā*, or acute pain, is thus an e f f e c t of ālayavijñāna and not its nature, which therefore will consist in *s a ṃ s k ā r a d u ḥ k h a t ā* o n l y . This is in fact what the Chinese version (Y_C 365b10f.: ... 顯示行苦所攝阿賴耶識) says. But since it has no equivalent at all for the initial *duḥkha-*, it offers no help in solving the problem of how this word can be interpreted in a reasonable way. To be sure, Tib. too would admit of a less offensive interpretation, viz. "comprised in Suffering [in the ultimate sense] and in *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*". But since *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* will, in this case, have to be understood not as something different from Suffering but as its explanation or concretization ("Suffering, i.e. *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*"), one would rather expect *'duḥkha-'* to f o l - l o w *'saṃskāra-duḥkhatā-'*.

Moreover, from a syntactical point of view, the sentence under discussion is, as it stands, also as a whole altogether unsatisfactory. For what ought to follow upon the initial *dvitīyatṛtīyābhyām* is an o b j e c t for the verb *darśayati* (to be supplied from the preceding sentence). Now, in view of the verse and because *kṛtvā* would otherwise be without any complement, *niveśanaṃ* has to be construed with the following sentence (viz. ... *kṛtvā* ... *upaiti* ...). Likewise, the preceding *tad* has, even if we read *tad vi-* instead of *tad dhi*, to be taken with what follows, because it would otherwise not be referable to anything. Thus, what remains as the required object of *darśayati* is two a d j e c - t i v e s , viz. the problematic *duḥkha-saṃskāra-duḥkhatā-*

saṃgṛhītam and *ālayavijñānamayaṃ*; for there is no possibility to read, with W. 177,15, *ālayavijñānam ayaṃ* , because *ayam* - apart from not being represented in Ch. nor in Tib. - would not admit of being construed with what precedes (the use of an unstressed demonstrative as the subject of a verb which has to be supplied seems altogether impossible) nor with what follows (because in this case *ayam*, being in an initial position, would be stressed, which, however, does not make sense). Thus, as regards the object of *darśayati*, we are left with two adjectives, without a noun to support them, which is definitely odd. Searching for the noun that one expects, one is referred to the word *duḥkham* both by the initial résumé of content (236,7f.: *yathā tad ātmadarśanam samudayānupūrvyā* (→ v. 32) *duḥkhaṃ nirvartayati* ...) and by the closely related sentence on p. 238,7 (*tasyedānīm ālayavijñānasaṃgṛhītasya duḥkhasya* ...). Therefore it seems imperative to sever the word *duḥkha*- from the alleged compound *duḥkha-saṃskāra-duḥkhatā-saṃgṛhītaṃ* (where, as was shown above, it does not belong for reasons of content and style) and convert it, by adding an anusvāra, into the urgently required noun, the result of this minute emendation being a text which is entirely satisfactory from the point of view of both syntax and sense. Since there are other instances in our text where both manuscripts are clearly faulty (see n. 1400), such an emendation can hardly be denounced to be illegitimate. - For the word sequence as well as the expression *duḥkhaṃ saṃskāraduḥkhatāsaṃgṛhītam* cp. also BoBh$_D$ 169,11 (beginning of a list): *saṃmohavipākaṃ duḥkhaṃ saṃskāraduḥkhatā-saṃgṛhītaṃ duḥkham* ...

1473. I for one do not see any reason why the commentator should have replaced, in this sentence, *niveśana* by *viniveśana*. The possibility that he thus read the verse text is excluded for metrical reasons (⏓ ⏑ ⏑ ⏓ is not allowed, and does not

occur in any of the PG ślokas, as an opening of an uneven pāda) and by the next sentence confirming precisely *niveśanaṃ* for the verse text. Thus, it appears preferable to read not *tad(-) vi°* but *tad dhi*. The replacement of *pūrvam* in the verse text (superfluous if not disturbing in the context of the commentator's explanation: see n. 1426(*C.c*)) by *tad dhi* in the comm. may, perhaps, signalize that the commentator takes the fact that people s t i c k to it (*niveśanaṃ kṛ-*) as a justification for his equating *duḥkha* with ā l a y a vijñāna (which may be interpreted as "*vijñāna* that is stuck to": cp. §§ 6.7.2.*2.b* and 7.1B.2.2.1.*3*).

1474. *A.* Chin. (**愛蔵此** : see n. 1422(*F*)) and probably also Tib. (*de*, not *des*: see n. 1422(*E*)) take *tad* not as the subject but as the o b j e c t of *kṛtvā*. This is in accordance with the verse text where the subject is "people" (PG 33a), and where what is known by the Āryas to be Suffering - i.e., according to the comm.: ālayavijñāna - is clearly the o b j e c t of *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* (PG 34ab). Besides, if *tad = ālayavijñānam* were the grammatical subject of *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā*, it would also have to be the subject of the main verb, viz. *upaiti prapañcitam*. This, however, appears difficult because the comm. itself explains *prapañcita* as the s u b j e c t i v e act of t h i n k i n g "I shall be", etc. - a function which of course, fits only *manovijñāna* and not at all the subliminal ālayavijñāna which is, after all, nowhere in the *Basic Section* of the Yogācārabhūmi documented to have been conceived of as an a c t u a l c o g n i t i o n already at that stage of development. And even if *prapañcitam upaiti* could be understood not as i n d u l g i n g i n such conceptual proliferation but rather as b e c o m i n g i t s o b j e c t , one would have to prove that ālayavijñāna is, in common people, the object of such d i s c u r s i v e notions - quite apart from the fact that ālayavijñāna is nowhere in the *Basic Section* expressly stated to be the object of the notion of 'I'.

B. As far as the comm. is concerned, the meaning of *niveśana* is, by its explicit equation with *ātmabhāva-parigraha*, restricted to the "existential" context of entering, or coming to stick to, a new (basis of) personal existence (see n. 1477(*D*)).

C. In these circumstances, I discern, theoretically speaking, three possibilities of understanding *tad ... niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* in the present passage:

a) *niveśana* as a predicative locus noun:
"having made it (= ālayavijñāna) one's abode, or that to which one sticks".

b) *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* as a unified verbal expression with a transitive meaning:
"having stuck to it (sc. ālayavijñāna)".

c) *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* as a unified verbal expression with a causative meaning:
"having made it (= ālayavijñāna) enter [a new existence], or stick to or hide in [a new body]".

The alternatives *b* and *c*, although supported by Chin. and Tib., respectively (see n. 1422(*E-F*)), presuppose the possibility of taking *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* as a unified verbal expression governing an accusative, which would seem to require additional evidence not available to me (see n. 1422(*B.b*)).

D. In case that, in spite of n. 1473, the reading *°d vi°* (instead of *°d dhi*) is preferred, a grammatically unproblematical semantical equivalent of the alternatives *b* and *c* would be obtained if the text is read as *tad-viniveśanaṃ kṛtvā* (*b*: "having performed [the action of] settling in, or sticking to, it"; *c*: "having performed [the action of] settling it").

1475. I.e. [foolish or immature] people (*lokaḥ*): see n. 1474(*A*).

1476. See n. 1425(D). According to Tib. (Y_t dzi 241b5: *'gyur ram mi 'gyur ba źig gu sñam pa*), the conceptual proliferations *'bhaviṣyāmi'*, etc., have to be understood as questions (perhaps: "I wonder whether I shall be?", etc.); cp. also YVy 89b1 where the passage is quoted as *'byuṅ bar 'gyur ram mi 'gyur źes / de'i phyir spros pa khas len to //*.

1477. The following attempt to clarify the concept of *ātmabhāvaparigraha* and its systematical context is only preliminary, but I hope that even in this form it may help to illuminate the possibilities of interpreting the present passage, and that it will at any rate facilitate a fuller investigation.

A. Materials

(1) Pañcav 76,1f.: *nâpi (bodhisattvās) tādṛśam ātmabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇanti yena nindanīyā bhavanti* ...

(2) Pañcav 185,7f.: *so* (sc. *bodhisattvaḥ*) ... *yādṛśenâtmabhāvena sattvānāṃ śaknoty arthakaraṇāya tādṛśam ātmabhāvaṃ saṃcintya parigṛhṇāti* /; cp. 80,7.

(3) Śat 1470,13ff.: *iha bodhisattvo ... sañcintyâtmabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇāti / ... kathaṃ bodhisattvo ... sañcintyâtmabhāvam upādatte?* ...

(4) As 24,11ff. (AS_G 24,23f.):
parigrahato 'vyākṛtaṃ katamat / yathāpi tac chilpasthānasyâbhyastatvād āyatyāṃ tadrūpam ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ karoti yena laghu laghv eva teṣu śilpasthāneṣu śikṣāniṣṭhāṃ gacchati /
"What is [morally] neutral in the sense that it is taken possession of [due to something neutral]? E.g. when [a person], because he has habitually practised a [certain] craft, in future (i.e. at the time of Linking up) takes possession of such a basis-of-per-

sonal-existence (or body) that he becomes quite easily extremely skilful in these (= such?) crafts."
Cp. the parallel passage AS 22,15f.: *parigrahataḥ kuśalaṃ katamat / yad ... puṇyakriyāvastunā ... svargopapattiparigraho ... /*

(5) AS 29,8f. (AS_G 27,22f.):
kathaṃ parigrahataḥ (sc. *hetupratyayo draṣṭavyaḥ*: 28, 11f.) / *akuśalāḥ kuśalasāsravāś ca dharmāḥ, ātmabhāvaparigrahāya /*
(I.e.: Bad and impure good factors are *(vipāka)hetu* [in so far as they are conducive] to taking possession of a [new] basis-of-personal-existence; cp. ASBh 37,20f.: ... *āyatyām* ... *ātmabhāvasaṃgṛhītasya* (ms. and ed.: *-vya-*) *vipākasyâkṣepakatvāt*.)

(6) AS 27,3f. (AS_G 26,14; Matsuda 1983, 41): *nāmarūpaṃ kiṃkarmakam / ātmabhāvaṃ ... sattvān grāhayati .../*
(ASBh 32,19f.: *tan-nirvṛttyā sattvānāṃ nikāyasabhāgântara-bhajanāt*.)

(7) MAVBh 21,14f.: *saṃparigrahān nāmarūpeṇâtmabhāvasya* (sc. *parikliśyate jagat*) /
[underlined parts: pratīka of MAV I.10b+11b]

(8) MAVṬ 37,17ff. ($MAVṬ_t$ 41a8ff.):
(a) *nāmarūpaṃ hi pañca skandhāḥ ... pratisandhim upādāya ... anutpannaṣaḍāyatanā(ḥ) ... / tasmiṃś côtpanne manuṣya-tiryag-ādi-nikāyasabhāga-bhedād ātmabhāvo bhidyata iti "nāmarūpeṇâtmabhāvaḥ parigṛhīta" ity ucyate /*
(b) *athavâmaraṇāt* (i.e. °*vā ā-maraṇāt*) *sarvam evâtmabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇāti, tatprathamataḥ sarvasya hetubhāvena vyavasthānād iti /*
(c) *yaṅ na dbyer med kyaṅ miṅ daṅ gzugs kyis lus yoṅs su 'dzin to źes 'di tha dad par ston to // dper na 'dus byas thams cad phuṅ po lṅa rnams kyis kun bsdus so źes bya ba lta bu'o //*

<*athavā 'bhede 'pi nāmarūpeṇâtmabhāvaḥ parigṛhyata iti ... bhedena nirdiśyate (?) / yathā "sarvaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ pañcabhi>ḥ skandhaiḥ saṃgṛhītam" iti /

(9) MAVṬ 42,4-6: *parigrahahetur nāmarūpa-ṣaḍāyatane* (= MAVBh 22,6) *iti, upanītasya nāmarūpa-ṣaḍāyatanābhyāṃ nikāyasabhāga-parigrahāt /*

(10) MSg I.34: *mñam par ma bźag pa'i sa nas śi 'phos pa'i yid bar ma do'i srid pa na gnas pa'i tshe yid kyi rnam par śes pa ñon moṅs pa can gyis ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba sbrel te* (MSgU_t 257b5f.: *lus yoṅs su 'dzin ces bya ba'i tha tshig go*) /
(**asamāhitāyā bhūmeś* (MSgU: = *kāmadhātoś*) *cyutasya antarābhavastham manaḥ* (MSgU: = *cittam*) *kliṣṭena manovijñānena pratisandhim badhnāti* (MSgU: *ātmabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇātîty arthaḥ*) /)

(11) ASBh 47,7f.: *upādāna-saṃgraho yathā svāminā ātmīyataḥ parigṛhītānāṃ* (ms. *-tādīnāṃ*) *dāsādīnāṃ tathâlayavijñānenâtmabhāvasya /*
"'Gathering' in the sense of 'taking hold of' [obtains in the case] of the basis-of-personal-existence, [in so far as it has been taken possession of] by ālayavijñāna, in the same way as slaves, etc., have been taken possession of by the owner as his own."

(12) ASBh 11,12f.: *punaḥ punaḥ pratisandhibandhe ātmabhāvôpādānād ādānavijñānam /*

(13) MSg I.5 (≡ PSkViv 95b3-5; cp. MSg_N *11f.* and H 1978a, 216f. and 226):

(a) *lus* (Hts.: 自體) *thams cad ñe bar len pa'i gnas su gyur pa'i phyir te* (**sarvâtmabhāvôpādānâśrayabhūtatām upādāya*(?)) /

(b) *'di ltar ... ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba sbrel ba na yaṅ de mṅon par 'grub pa ñe bar 'dzin pa'i phyir* (PSkViv: ... *'grub pa daṅ len pas*) *lus bzuṅ ba*

(D; cp. PSkViv *zin pa*) *yin te* (**pratisandhibandhe ca tad-abhinirvṛtty-upagrahaṇena*[1] *ātmabhāvo gṛhīto bhavati*) /

MSgBh$_t$ 150a6f. (cp. Y. Sasaki 1982, 191): ... *lus thams cad*[2] *yoṅs su gzuṅ* (D) *ba byas par* (D *pas*) *'gyur te / kun gźi rnam par śes pa la lus thams cad*[2] *kyi bag chags kun tu gnas*[3] *pa'i phyir ro* (**... sakal(asy)âtmabhāva(sya)parigrahaḥ kṛto bhavati, ālayavijñāne sakalâtmabhāvavāsanā-sanniveśāt*(?)) //

1. H 1978a, 226: *-upagrahaṇārtham*, but contradicted by PSkViv *len pas*, MSgBh$_t$ *'dzin par byed pas*, and Pa. 由 ... 故. - PSkViv appears to have misunderstood *-abhinirvṛtty-upagrahaṇa-* as a dvandva.

2. Hts., Pa.: 一期 ; Dharmagupta: 具足 ; cp. MSgU$_t$ 240b1 *mtha' dag*.

3. Hts., Dharmagupta: 住.

(14) Śat 110,3f.: *mamânubhāvāt tataś cyutvā mānuṣyam ātmabhāvaṃ pratilapsyante* /

(15) AS 54,5 (ASBh 65,3f.): *ātmabhāvaparigrahayor vipattiḥ* (AS 54,8: *saṃpattiḥ*);

cp. AS 1,14f. (ASBh 1,16) *saparigraha-deha-* and AS 2,2 (ASBh 1,20) *deha-parigrahābhyām* ("body and possessions").

(16) ASBh 45,5f.: ... *ālayavijñānôpādāna-vaśenâtmabhāvôpasthāpanāt / tathāhi tad-viyukta āśrayaḥ pūtībhavati* /

(17) AKBh 333,19: *na câtmabhāva evaṃ kenacid āgṛhīto yathā tṛṣṇayā* /

B. Analysis of the compound

As is evident from the frequent verbal phrase *ātmabhāvaṃ parigrah-* ((1)-(3); (8b); cp. (6)), *ātmabhāvaparigraha* will usually have to be interpreted as a tatp. with an action

noun as its second and a genitivus objectivus as its prior member (cp. (7)). In the Abhidharmasamuccaya ((15)), however, we meet with an entirely different use, viz. as a dvandva in the sense of "basis-of-personal-existence (or: body) a n d possessions". This would seem to mean that the compound was semantically not petrified, as it were, and was open to more than one use. Thus, its occasional use in the sense of "taking possession of [something] a s one's basis-of-personal-existence" or "possession c o n s i s t - i n g i n the basis-of-personal-existence" can hardly be ruled out *a priori*. In fact, the first of these possibilities is chosen by the Chin. translation of the present passage (攝爲自體). For the second possibility, cp. the interpretation of the compound *ātmabhāva-...-pratilambha* (see below: *D.b*) at AĀ 362,17f. (*tad eva pratilabhyate iti pratilambhaḥ*).

C. Syntax

In "ordinary" phraseology, the grammatical or at least logical subject of the verbal phrase *ātmabhāvaṃ (pari)grah-* (or *ā.-parigrahaṃ kṛ-*) is, explicitly or implicitly, a person ((1)-(4); (9)[1]), or living beings (cp. (6)). Occasionally, however, a "de-personalized" phraseology is preferred. In that case, the subject or agent is naturally supplied by "person-substitutes" like mind ((10): *manas* in the sense of the mind series; cp. Hsien-yang 580a19-21 quoted in n. 1408) or ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a ((11); cp. (12)); but even the i n i t i a l f a c t o r of the new existence may figure in this function ((8b), probably also (7)[2], (8a) and (8c)). In "ordinary" phraseology, the initial factor, appearing in the instrumental ((9)) or as the grammatical subject of a causative verb ((6)), will have to be taken as the means or starting-point of *ātmabhāva-parigraha*, as holds good also for the *manovijñāna* immediately preceding the beginning of the new existence and functioning as the

i n i t i a t i n g factor ((10)). The i n i t i a l factor, on the other hand, is *nāmarūpa* ((6)-(8)), but in (13) it seems to be ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a (see below: *G*).

1. Provided that I am right in taking *upanītasya* as a genitivus subjectivus.

2. The agentive function of the instrumental is probable in view of some of the parallel sentences, which contain causative action nouns, as e.g. MAVBh 21,13f.: nayanād (= MAV I.10b) *vijñānenôpapattisthāna- s a ṃ p r ā p a ṇ ā t* .

D. Purport of *ātmabhāva-parigraha* and related notions

a) The expressions *ātmabhāvaṃ parigrah-* and *ātmabhāva-parigraha* denote taking hold or possession of (a new basis of) personal existence, especially in explicit or implicit connection with the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*). Instead of or side by side with *pari-grah-/parigraha* ((1)-(5), (8)-(11); cp. also MSgBh ad (13b)), not only simple *grah-* ((6)) and metrical *saṃparigraha* ((7)) but also *upâ-dā-/upādāna* ((3); (11)-(12)) or *ādāna* (see § 3.9.2.5 + ns. 339 and 340) may be used.

b) *Ātmabhāvaparigraha* is thus closely related to the notions, already met with in the canonical texts, of *ātmabhāva-pratilambha* and *ātmabhāvâbhinirvṛtti*. In these latter notions, however, the beginning of a new existence is viewed as a h e t e r o n o m o u s event (cp. *mam â n u b h ā v ā t* in (14)!), whereas *ātmabhāva-parigraha* would seem to point to something one takes up v o l u n t a r i l y , as is confirmed by *s a ṃ c i n t y a* in (2) and (3) referring to the a u t o n o m o u s rebirth of a Bodhisattva. In the case of the Yogācāra sources, the expression is, to be sure, used with regard to ordinary rebirth determined by karman. But nevertheless it would seem to have preserved, in some instances at least, an aspect of voluntariness, assent, or at any rate involuntary but active participation (rendered explicit in the expression *ā.-parigrahaṃ k a r o t i* :

(4)), perhaps on account of rebirth being viewed in this case from the angle not so much of karmic determination as of the d e s i r e to be reborn (*tṛṣṇā*, *prapañcābhirati*; cp. also the description of rebirth in n. 844). This is particularly the case in the present passage (viz. comm. ad PG 33-34) where *ātmabhāva-parigraha(ṃ kṛ-)* serves to explain *niveśana(ṃ kṛ-)*. It is, occasionally, palpable even in occurrences of related expressions like *vipāka-*, *phala-* or *vipāka-phala-parigraha* (cp. Y 25,21f.; 62,4; 200,15; Y_t zi 6a3; (°-)*parigrahaṃ kṛ-*: PG 27d; $BoBh_D$ 91,9f.; AKBh 122,15f.), e.g. at Y 6,2 and 12,3f. where *iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaparigraha* is enumerated among the f u n c t i o n s or activities (*karman*) of sense perceptions and *manas* (i.e. *manovijñāna*: see § 6.2.4).

c) *Ātmabhāva-parigraha* is thus used in what one may call - in a literal sense - the "existential" context, or - in a lax sense not intended to exclude rebirth in the *ārūpyadhātu* - the "reincarnational" context. It is, as far as I can see, n o t used in the sense of b i o l o g i c a l appropriation of corporeal matter; in this sense, *ātmabhāva* will have to be combined with *u p ā d ā n a* ((16)), not *parigraha*. Nor does *ātmabhāva-parigraha* seem to be used in the sense of s p i r i t u a l l y e v i l C l i n g - i n g to (the basis of) personal existence - an idea which may, however, be expressed (apart from other phrases like **ātmabhāv â l a y a* [PSk_t 17a4: see n. 140] and *ātmabhāvam u p â - d ā -* [ASBh 2,6f.]) by *ātmabhāvam ā - g r a h -* ((17)).

E. Meaning of *ātmabhāva*

The concept of *ātmabhāva* involves several aspects which are not mutually exclusive but may be variously stressed or ignored according to the context (cp. Collins 1982, 156ff.):

a) "Qualitative" aspect: a particular existence or life in so far as one belongs to a specific class of living beings. Under this aspect, *ātmabhāva* comes close to the concept of *nikāyasabhāga* (cp. (9); ASBh ad (6); AKBh 122,15f.).

b) "Temporal" aspect: a particular existence or life covering a certain span of time.

c) "Concrete" aspect: the "basis-of-personal-existence" (more or less equivalent to *āśraya*: see § 7.1B.2.1.3.*a* + n. 1009 and n. 372), i.e. the constituents on which a certain personal existence is based, or which forms its nucleus resulting from karmic Maturation, especially the *vipākajaṃ ṣaḍ-āyatanam* (see § 3.11.2).

d) The "concrete" aspect is (as also in the case of *āśraya*: see ns. 187 and 796) sometimes narrowed down to the most palpable and solid part of the basis-of-personal-existence, i.e. corporeal matter or even the body (thus unambiguously in (16)).

F. Problems

a) If *ātmabhāva* is, in the sense of *E.b* and *c*, understood as the whole (basis) of a certain personal existence, i.e. as the sixfold Basis (*ṣaḍāyatana*), and/or as covering the entire span of life until death, the question arises how this *ātmabhāva* can nevertheless be stated to be taken possession of by the initial factor or phase, e.g. *nāmarūpa* which denotes the state preceding that of *ṣaḍāyatana* ((8a)), i.e. does not yet consist of all the six Bases and covers only the very first part of a life-span.

Sthiramati offers two solutions: According to (8a), a given (basis of) personal existence is said to be taken possession of already by *nāmarūpa* because [in spite of the absence of the complete *ṣaḍāyatana*] it is already with the origination of *nāmarūpa* that a given existence is specified

in the sense of belonging to a particular class of living beings. According to (8b), on the other hand, *nāmarūpa* can be stated to take possession of the whole [period of a given] personal existence u n t i l d e a t h because *nāmarūpa* is the first[1] factor to be definitively established as the c a u s e of the w h o l e [existence].

1. Cp. MAVṬ 42,8f. pointing out that by *nāmarūpa* the [new] basis-of-existence as such (*ātmabhāvamātra*) - be it complete or incomplete - is taken hold of (*saṃgraha*: cp. ASBh 47,7) for the first time.

b) If, in contrast to what was presupposed in *F.a*, the notion of *ātmabhāva* is used in such a way that the aspect of c o m p l e t e n e s s is d i s r e g a r d - e d , viz. in the sense of the basic constituent(s) of personal existence at a n y time, be they complete or only rudimentary, it can, it is true, be used also for the initial element of a new existence even if the latter does not yet include all the six sense-faculties, i.e. also for the phase of *nāmarūpa*. But since in this case *nāmarūpa* and *ātmabhāva* would be non-different, it would, strictly speaking, become impossible to say that the *ātmabhāva* is taken possession of b y *nāmarūpa* ((7)). Thus, such a statement is, from this point of view, a mere mode of expression not to be taken literally (cp. (8c)).

G. Mahāyānasaṃgraha I.5

The problem described in *F.a* and, in substance, also the solution offered in (8b) can probably be traced back to the difficult passage MSg I.5. In this text, the initial factor is, however, ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a .

a) MSg I.5 states that ālayavijñāna may, for two reasons, also be called *'ādānavijñāna'*. The second reason is that it is the b a s i s (**āśraya*) for taking possession of the whole[1] (basis of) personal existence ((13a)); for by taking hold of its coming forth (i.e. of the new ālayavijñā-

na coming forth[2]) at the moment of Linking up (*pratisandhi*), one [automatically] takes possession of the new existence and its constituents [as a whole] ((13b)), because - according to the commentaries[3] - ālayavijñāna contains, or is permeated with, Impressions (*vāsanā*) [functioning as Seeds for] that existence (and its constituents) as a whole.

1. According to Y. Sasaki (1982, 191f.), **sarvātmabhāva* has to be understood as a l l k i n d s o f personal existence. This may not be impossible if taken in the sense of (8a) , but the fact that instead of **sarva-* the commentaries use **sakala* ("complete") favours an interpretation in the sense of (8b) . Quite explicitly so VGPVy 376a4f. *lus skye ba ril daṅ 'brel pa* and b2 *skye ba ril daṅ 'brel pa'i lus* ("the *ātmabhāva* belonging to a whole life (**sakala-janman-*?)").

2. Formations in *-ti* may designate the c o n c r e t e result (cp. S 1969a, 1o4 and 112; Ratnākaraśānti, Sāratamā [ed. Jaini, Patna 1979], 173,1f.: *"dharmadhātuviśud-dhiḥ" "suviśuddho dharmadhātuḥ" ... iti nārthabhedaḥ kaścit*; cp. Wackernagel II,2, p. 635ff.).

3. See MSgBh ad (13b) ; cp. also $MSgU_t$ 24oa8f.: *kun gźi rnam par śes pas lus mtha' dag ... lus mtha' dag gi bag chags bsgos pa'i phyir yoṅs su bzuṅ ba yin no //*

b) If this interpretation is correct, ālayavijñāna is, in this passage (viz. (13b)), the o b j e c t of the act of "taking hold" (**upagrahaṇa*). The subject is not expressed and I have supplemented the "person" who would seem to be intended as such. But an interpretation in the sense that it is, ultimately, ālayavijñāna itself that takes hold of its "rebirth" does not appear impossible either.[4]

4. The same result would be obtained if *tad-* were taken as the logical subject not of **abhinirvṛtti-* but of **upagrahaṇa-*, but to my mind such an analysis (which runs counter to at least Tib. and Hts.) is less probable. There is an analysis of the compound in MSgBh, but Tib. appears to be corrupt. Considering the evidence of all versions ($MSgBh_t$ 15oa7f.; $MSgBh_c$ [Hts.] 325b1-3 and [Dharmagupta] 274a25f.), I should expect the original to have been something like **tasyâbhinirvṛttis tad-abhinirvṛttiḥ / tad-abhinirvṛtter upagrahaṇaṃ tad-abhinirvṛtty-upagrahaṇam / tad-upagrahaṇāc* (?; Tib. *°ṇaṅ*?) *câtmabhāvo-pādānam* (?; Tib. *°votpādanam*?) /. But this is anything but certain.

c) On the other hand, most scholars[5] have interpreted **tad-* in (13b) as referring to *ātmabhāva-* or *sarvātmabhāva-*, supplying ālayavijñāna as the logical subject of the "taking hold" (**upagrahaṇa*) of the arising of a new *ātmabhāva* (or of the newly arisen *ātmabhāva*[6]) which may, in this case, be taken more or less in the traditional sense of *ṣaḍāyatana* or its rudimentary prefiguration. This interpretation would seem to be supported by *Asvabhāva's commentary[7]. To be sure, the compound *ātmabhāvâbhinirvṛtti* (See *D.b*) is fairly common (cp., e.g., CPD s.v.; Y 25,12). But **tad-* = *ālayavijñāna-* is not impossible either, for in Y_t zi 5b8 (see n. 418) **tad-abhinirvṛtti-* clearly stands for *ālayavijñānâbhinirvṛtti-*. Besides, (13b) stands, as the explanation of the second reason for ālayavijñāna being also called *'ādānavijñāna'*, parallel to the preceding sentence which explains the first reason (viz. biological appropriation). Now, in this explanation of the first reason[8] the demonstrative pronoun (*des*) unambiguously refers to ālayavijñāna. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the same for the demonstrative pronoun in the explanation of the second reason also, i.e. for the **tad-* in **tad-abhinirvṛtty-upagrahaṇena*, because otherwise there would not be, in this second explanation, any explicit reference to ālayavijñāna at all. I therefore prefer to understand the passage to mean that by taking hold of the new ālayavijñāna at the moment of Linking up, the new existence as a w h o l e , and its basis in its e n t i r e t y , is v i r t u a l l y taken possession of.

5. Cp. MSg_L vol. II, p. 15; MSg_N, 86; Y. Sasaki 1982, 179f.; Takeuchi 1985, 268,4.

6. See *G.a*, footn. 2.

7. $MSgU_t$ 240a7-b1 (H 1975, (18)), which seems to explain *pratisandhi-* as ** ā t m a b h ā v â bhinirvṛtti-*, *-bandha* as **-parigraha*, and to make ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a the subject or agent of taking possession of the whole *ātmabhāva* (though this last is not confirmed by $MSgU_c$ (383c7)).

8. MSg I.5: *'di ltar tshe ji srid par rjes su 'jug gi bar du* d e s *dbaṅ po gzugs can lṅa po* (om. in Ch.) *dag ma źig par ñe bar bzuṅ* (D) *ba ...*; PSkViv 95b4: *'di ltar des dbaṅ po gzugs can dag zin na ji srid 'tsho'i bar du mi 'chi bar gnas so //*; Buddhaśānta (T 1592, 97c7f.): 如是彼依諸色等根不壞者、 乃至命不盡隨順故 ; presumable original (cp. H 1978a, 226; Aramaki in MSg_N, *11*): **tathāhi tena* (or *tad-*) *upagṛhītāni rūpîṇîndriyāṇy avinaṣṭāni yāvadāyur* (or *yāvajjīvam*) *anuvartante* (thus PSkViv and probably also Hts.; MSg_t, Aramaki, Hakamaya: **yāvad āyur anuvartate*; Buddhaśānta may have read *-*śṛtāni* instead of *-*gṛhītāni*).

H. *Ātmabhāvaparigraha* and *ālayavijñāna*

From the preceding exposition, the following consequences would seem to be derivable with regard to possible relations of *ātmabhāvaparigraha* and ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a :

a) In (11), and perhaps also in MSgU ad (13b) (see *G.c*, footn. 7), ālayavijñāna is expressly stated to be the s u b j e c t or agent of the act of taking possession (*pari-grah-*) of a new *ātmabhāva* (cp. also (12) and § 3.9.2.5).

b) In (13b), ālayavijñāna is stated to be the b a s i s of taking possession of the new *ātmabhāva* a s a w h o l e , because in the beginning of a new existence ālayavijñāna is the o b j e c t of a s i m i l a r act of taking hold (**upagrahaṇa*) in which taking possession of the developing *ātmabhāva* as a whole is involved and anticipated.

c) If, in the sense of *F.b* (→ (8c)), the term *ātmabhāva* is not restricted to the complete basis-of-personal--existence but applied to any stage of its development, ālayavijñāna, as the initial element of the new existence and as that from which the entire development of the latter derives, may also be called *ātmabhāva*. In this case, ālayavijñāna would be the logical o b j e c t of the *(ātmabhāva-)-parigraha* proper. Unfortunately, I cannot substantiate this

by an explicit text passage but only by a kind of cumulative evidence: On the one hand, the *Pravṛtti Portion* (Y_t zi 6a3) mentions the "taking possession of [the Result-of-]Maturation of ālayavijñāna" (**ālayavijñānasya vipākasya* (or *vipāka-*?) *parigraha-*: see n. 417), and however the passage may have to be understood grammatically, it is clear from the corresponding passage Y_t zi 5b8 (**tad-* (= *ālayavijñāna-*) *-abhinirvṛtti-*: see n. 418) that the [Result-of-]Maturation (*vipāka*) to be taken possession of is the new ālaya-vijñāna (see § 3.12.5). On the other hand, ālayavijñāna has, in Y 192,8 (see § 6.5.1), come to take the position of the traditional *ātmabhāva* as the main or primary result of karmic Maturation (see § 6.5.4). Cp. also MSg I.21, declaring ālayavijñāna to comprise all *ātmabhāvas*, and PSk_t 17a4 (see n. 14o) according to which ālayavijñāna is the object of Clinging to the *ātmabhāva*.

I. *Ātmabhāvaparigraha* as an explanation of *niveśana*

a) In the present passage (comm. ad PG 33-34), *ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ (kṛtvā)* is presented as an explanation of *niveśanaṃ (kṛtvā)* in PG 33c. In fact, the latter can, in this pāda, be replaced by the former in its usual meaning (action noun with its logical object as prior member [see *B*]; subject: *lokaḥ* [see *C*]), without the slightest syntactical difficulty. It will not be felt to be disquieting that in PG 34a such a replacement appears to be possible only *ad sensum* (e.g. by taking *yat tan niveśanaṃ kṛtam* to mean "that which has been taken possession of as the basis-of-personal-existence"). It may, however, be found somewhat unsatisfactory that the same is also true of the slightly modified repetition of PG 33cd in the comm. (*tad dhi niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* ...).

To be sure, if *tad* could be taken as the subject, there would be no difficulty in replacing *niveśanam* by *ātmabhāvaparigraham* in its usual meaning (action noun

cum object). But as was shown in n. 1474(*A*), such an interpretation of the sentence is highly improbable, and *tad* will have rather to be considered as the o b j e c t of *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā*. In that case, however, a replacement of *niveśana* by *ātmabhāvaparigraha* in its u s u a l meaning (action noun cum object) would seem to be impossible. For if *niveśana* is taken as a predicative l o c u s n o u n (n. 1474(*C.a*)), it could be replaced by *ātmabhāvaparigraha* only if the latter is, by way of exception, understood as a karmadhāraya ("having made it one's p o s s e s s i o n c o n s i s t i n g i n the [new] basis-of-personal-existence"). If, on the other hand, and provided this is possible, *niveśanaṃ kṛ-* is understood as a u n i f i e d v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n (n. 1474(*C.b*)), an interpretation of the sentence in terms of *ātmabhāvaparigraha* will be possible only ad sensum ("having taken possession of it a s one's basis-of-personal-existence"). In case of a c a u s a t i v e interpretation of *niveśana* (n. 1474(*C.c*)), a mechanical substitution of *ātmabhāvaparigraha* for *niveśana* does not work, but the w h o l e expression '*tad* ... *niveśanaṃ kṛtvā*' ("having (re)settled it (sc. ālayavijñāna)") may be taken to be equivalent to "having taken possession of a [new] personal existence" (*ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ kṛtvā*).

Thus, in the case of the comm. sentence '*tad dhi niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* ...', an application of the present explanation of *niveśanaṃ (kṛtvā)* by *ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ (kṛtvā)* would seem not to contradict nor to favour any of the interpretations considered in n. 1474(*C*). It would support rather the interpretation of *tad* as the s u b j e c t of the sentence, which, however, has to be discarded for other reasons (see n. 1474(*A*)).

b) Likewise, the different interpretations of the comm. sentence '*tad dhi niveśanaṃ kṛtvā* ...' involve different views on the relation of ā l a y a v i j ñ ā n a to *ātmabhāvaparigraha*, but there seems to be no clue as to

which of these views deserves preference. For

α) according to *H.c*, the view – implied if *niveśana* is taken as a predicative locus noun or as a transitive action noun – that ālayavijñāna is what is, at the moment of Linking up, taken possession of *as* the new *ātmabhāva*, will hardly be objectionable.

β) If, on the other hand, *niveśana* is interpreted in a causative sense, ālayavijñāna would have to be regarded *either* as the *logical subject* of taking possession of a new basis-of-personal-existence (in the traditional sense: see *E.c*), *or* as the *initial factor* by means of which a new existence is taken possession of; and these two alternatives would not involve serious problems either (cp. *H.a* and *H.b*).

γ) Nor would it be possible, from this point of view only, to rule out even the alternative, discarded for other reasons (see n. 1474(*A*)), of taking *tad* = *ālayavijñānam* as the *grammatical subject* of the sentence and thus of *ātmabhāvaparigrahaṃ kṛ-*; for this would materially coincide with the first alternative of β and thus likewise keep within the range of the syntactical possibilities of *ātmabhāvaṃ pari-grah-*, etc. (see *H.a*).

1478. Cp. ŚrBh 272,4f.: ... *aprahīṇakleśasya* ... *-dauṣṭhulyam avigataṃ bhavati sadânuṣaktam*. Somewhat differently: BoBh$_D$ 131,27f.: *tān* (sc. *sattvān*) ... *tisṛbhir duḥkhatābhir anuṣaktān paśyati*, ŚrBh 257,13f.: *trivedanābhir*[1] *anuṣaktāḥ*, and ŚrBh 385,6f.: *trividha-duḥkhatânuṣaktasya*[2] ... *duḥkha-skandhasya*.

1. Thus ms.; cp. Wackernagel II,1, 307.

2. Ed. *-pakṣasya*, but ms. (indistinct) admits of being read as *-ṣaktasya*, as is unambiguously supported by Tib. (Y$_t$ wi 170a1) and Ch. (Y$_c$ 454c1f.) using the same equivalents as in the case of BoBh$_D$ 131,27f. (Y$_t$ źi 114a8; Y$_c$ 523c14), viz. *daṅ 'brel pa* and 之所隨逐.

1479. Viz. the fundamental Suffering representing *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*, which, in the comm., is equated with ā l a y a v i j ñ ā - n a (see p. 236,13f. + n. 1472 and p. 238,7).

1480. Viz. - in view of "pleasure" (*sukha*) and "pain" (*duḥkha*) in the verse to be explained - *vipariṇāma-* and *duḥkha-duḥkhatā*. Cp. also n. 1471.

1481. See n. 1435.

1482. *dharmacaryaiva*, confirmed by both manuscripts, is, in view of *dharmacaryayā* in the verse, probably a mistake for *dharma-caryayaîva*. Theoretically one could take it as an instrumental of *dharmacarī* (for *carī* instead of *caryā*, see BHSD s.v.), but I am by no means sure that this form of the word does occur in Y. At any rate, the syntactical situation requires an instrumental.

1483. If this explanation is not merely traditional (see the explanation of the Pārāyaṇa parallel (≈ Sn 1o34f.) quoted in n. 144o), it would seem to imply that ālayavijñāna is, in this passage, regarded as the source of the sense-faculties. Such a view would, especially if one considers the paucity of similar statements in the earliest Yogācāra sources (see § 3.13), be quite remarkable, even if the present passage does not expressly state that the sense-faculties proceed from S e e d s in ālayavijñāna.

1484. Probably to be understood not in a cosmological but in an "existential" sense (cp. MSg I.21), perhaps in the sense that ālayavijñāna has already taken over the rôle of the *ātmabhāva* containing the Seeds of all kinds of personal existences (Y 25,3ff.).

1485. I take the instrumental in the sense of Pāṇ 2,3,21 (*itthaṃ-bhūtalakṣaṇe* [sc. *tṛtīyā*]; cp. Tib. (Y_t dzi 242a3) ... *yoṅs su śes paṟ bstan to*), i.e. in the sense of the more usual instr. of the abstract. If one insists on a truly instrumental function, one would have to translate: "... [to be performed] by means of ...".

1486. *a*) As for the interpretation of this passage, cp. n. 1444, though it has to be admitted that the emphasis on the 1st person is, in the comm., less conspicuous than in the verse, and that, in contrast to the verse, there is, in the comm., no disequilibrium between pain and pleasure.

b) Ch.: "(Understanding bondage means) precisely [the same thing as] understanding Suffering, i.e. understanding that [conceptions like] 'I feel pain, [I] feel pleasure', all refer to [what is in reality nothing but] Suffering" (Y_c 365b22f.: ... 即了知苦。謂了知我受苦受樂皆依於苦。). This rendering - in substance it would seem to correspond to Hts.'s interpretation of the verse (see n. 1444(*C*)) - is however not easily reconciled with the Skt. text (unless, perhaps, one presupposes a dittography of *duḥkham (eva)*).

c) Tib.: "(Understanding bondage means) to understand like this: one apprehends pain [by thinking] '[I am?] pained', and when one is pleased, one apprehends oneself (or: one's Self ?) to be pleased" (Y_t dzi 242a3f.: ... *'di ltar yoṅs su śes pa ste / sdug bsṅal la yaṅ sdug bsṅal lo sñam du 'dzin pa daṅ / bde na yaṅ bdag ñid bde'o sñam du 'dzin pa'o //*). This rendering - substantially agreeing with the Tib. rendering of the verse (see n. 1444(*D*)) - would seem to presuppose a different punctuation and a dittography of *sukhita* (*duḥkham ... vyavasyati duḥkhitaḥ / s u k h i t a ḥ sukhito 'smīti* ...(?)). Such a construction of *asmi* and *ātmānam* with *sukhitaḥ* only is however (especially in view of the wording of the verse) highly improbable, quite apart from the problems of content involved (for which see n. 1444(*D*)).

d) Wayman's translation (W. 184) is as follows:

"(... there is complete knowledge of bondage ... when one so recognizes: he takes it as just suffering. But ... he who when suffering takes himself as happy has an imagination that is ...".

This rendering (which is of course based on the reading of $\acute{S}rBh_m$) may have been motivated by the plausible wish to have the content of *parikalpa* concretized in the text; but for grammatical reasons it cannot but be rejected. For to take *sa ca parikalpaḥ* as the apodosis to "*yo ... vyavasyati*" is not only excluded by *ca* but still more by the fact that the p e r s o n who takes himself as happy cannot, of course, b e the *parikalpa*. He can, as Wayman actually puts it, only h a v e the *parikalpa*. But such a rendering would require a different text (viz. *t a s y a parikalpaḥ*) and hence is incompatible with the text as it stands. Thus, there is no alternative to taking the relative clause with the p r e c e d i n g *duḥkham eva vyavasyati*. Starting from the text of $\acute{S}rBh_m$, it would in fact be natural to translate as follows:

"When one, [though in reality] suffering, conceives oneself to be happy, one conceives [as pleasure what in reality is] nothing but Suffering",

but the oddness of this rendering is obvious as it would involve redundance of the main clause, the information of which would already be contained in the expression *duḥkhitaḥ* of the relative clause. Besides, such an interpretation of this comm. passage would be altogether i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e w o r d i n g o f t h e v e r s e .

1487. Cp. n. 1445.

1488. Cp. n. 1446.

1489. Acc. to Tib., Ch. and W. Both $\acute{S}rBh_m$ and Y_m have *saptabhir*, but they, too, contain only six more verses.

1490. I.e. Because, when a defiled state of mind has arisen, it has by necessity arisen together with the Defilements that make it a d e f i l e d state of mind, and because on account of its m o m e n t a r i n e s s it does n o t p r e - e x i s t these Defilements.

1491. Because, on account of their momentariness, both the Defilements and the defiled state of mind have ceased to exist already in the very next moment after their simultaneous existence. Thus, being no longer in existence, the defiled state of mind has no future chance to be freed from the Defilements.

1492. For this elliptical use of *yadā tarhi* cp. AKBh 77,21: *yadā tarhi sadṛśā utpadyante / na te nirviśeṣā bhavanti /*, which one would have to translate as follows: "[Objection (cp. Tib. *'o na gaṅ gi tshe 'dra bar yaṅ skye'o źe na*):] Then [how is there change of the series] when a succession of similar [moments] arise[s]? [Answer:] These moments are not completely alike." That the sentence beginning with *yadā tarhi* is best understood as an elliptical question (to be supplied by *tadā katham* or the like) - especially a rhetorical question pointing out a difficulty which the interrogator may regard to be fatal to the position of the defensor - is corroborated by the more frequent analogous elliptical construction with *yat tarhi* (e.g. AKBh 76,23; 215,5; 258,14; 283,2o; 284,14; 285,4; 361,11; 388,1o; 396,1o; similarly *yas tarhi* at 282,17), which is, occasionally, expressly supplied by *tat katham* in Yaśomitra's Vyākhyā (e.g. AKVy 376,12 [ad 215,5]; 454,25 [ad 283,21], or, still more explicitly, 424,27f. [ad AKBh 258,14: *yat tarhi ... uktam '...' iti /*]: ... *yat* ... *uktam '...' iti, tat kathaṃ na virudhyata iti vākyārthaḥ*). The Tibetan translation of AKBh, too, frequently supplies *(de) ji lta bu (yin*, or: *źe na)*.

1493. Viz. in the sense of "free (by nature)", not of "freed" (viz. from non-freedom) (see n. 1453).

1494. See n. 1452.

1495. See n. 1453.

Select Bibliography

I. Abbreviations

1. Original works

Remark: In the case of Pāli texts (except VisM), references are always to the PTS-ed., even when I have taken the text from the Nāl.-ed.

AAĀ — Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā (Haribhadra), ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960. (BST no. 4: Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā, with Haribhadra's commentary called Āloka).

AD — Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna 1959 (TSWS vol. IV).

AK — Abhidharmakośa: s. AKBh

AK_p — Louis de la Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté, Paris-Louvain 1923-1931.

AKBh — Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Vasubandhu), ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967 (TSWS vol. VIII).

AKṬU — Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā Upāyikā (Abhidharmakośopāyikā) (Śamathadeva): Tj 5595 (mDo-'grel, vol. tu and thu).

AKVy — Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā (Yaśomitra), ed. U. Wogihara, repr. Tokyo 1971.

AN — Aṅguttaranikāya

AS — Abhidharma-samuccaya (Asaṅga), ed. P. Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950.

AS_G — V. V. Gokhale, Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga. In: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Bombay), N.S. vol. 23/1947,13ff.

AS_c — Chinese translation of AS: T 1605.

AS_t — Tibetan translation of AS: Tj 5550 (mDo-'grel vol. li).

ASBh — Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (Buddhasiṃha or Jinaputra; cp. n. 755), ed. N. Tatia, Patna 1976 (TSWS vol. 17).

$ASBh_t$ — Tibetan translation of ASBh: Tj 5554 (mDo-'grel vol. śi).

ASVy	Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā (Tj title of the "mixed" text containing AS and [a slightly enlarged version of] ASBh, ascribed to Jinaputra in Tj but compiled by Sthiramati according to T 1606).
$ASVy_c$	Chinese translation of ASVy: T 1606.
$ASVy_t$	Tibetan translation of ASVy: Tj 5555 (mDo-'grel vol. śi).
BBhVy	Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna (Śīlabhadra), ed. K. Nishio, repr. Tokyo 1982.
BCAP	Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā (Prajñākaramati), ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960 (BST No. 12: Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati).
$BoBh_D$	Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. N. Dutt, Patna 1966 (TSWS vol. VII).
$BoBh_W$	Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo 1930-1936.
BoBhVy	Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhyā (Sāgaramegha): Tj 5548 (mDo-'grel vol. ri).
Chüeh-ting	決定蔵論 (Paramārtha's incomplete translation of VinSg): T 1584.
$D\bar{A}_c$	Chinese translation of the Dīrghāgama: T 1.
DBhS	Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed. J. Rahder, Paris/Louvain 1926.
$DBhS_K$	-, ed. R. Kondō, Tokyo 1936.
DhDhV	Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga ("Maitreya"), Tibetan transl., ed. J. Nozawa in: StIB, 11-18.
DhDhVV	Dharmadharmatāvibhāga-vṛtti (Vasubandhu), Tibetan transl. and Skt. fragment, ed. J. Nozawa in: StIB, 19-49.
Dhp	Dhammapada
Dhs	Dhammasaṅgaṇi
$DhSk_c$	Chinese translation of the Dharmaskandha: T 1537.
$DhSk_D$	Fragmente des Dharmaskandha, herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Sieglinde Dietz, Göttingen 1984 (AAWG Nr.142).

DN Dīghanikāya

Hsien-yang 顯揚聖教論 (ascribed to Asaṅga; see n. 99): T 1602.

Ja Jātaka

Jñānagarbha 'Phags pa dGoṅs pa ṅes par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'Phags pa Byams pa'i le'u ñi tshe'i bśad pa (comm. on Saṃdh VIII), ed. in: Nozawa 1957.
On Jñānagarbha see Steinkellner, II.2.

JP_H Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of the Jñānaprasthāna: T 1544.

KP Kāśyapa-parivarta, ed. Staël-Holstein, Shanghai 1926.

Kv Kathāvatthu

Kv-a Kathāvatthu(ppakaraṇa)-aṭṭhakathā

KSi Karmasiddhi (Vasubandhu), ed. É. Lamotte in: MCB 4/1935-36, 151ff.
Cp. also Muroji 1985.

KSiṬ Karmasiddhi-ṭīkā (Sumatiśīla): Tj 5572 (mDo-'grel vol. ku).

LAS Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, repr. Kyoto 1956.

$MĀ_c$ Chinese translation of the Madhyamāgama: T 26.

MAV Madhyāntavibhāga ("Maitreya"): see MAVBh.

MAVBh Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Vasubandhu), ed. G. M. Nagao, Tokyo 1964.

MAV-I Index to MAV(Bh): see MAVBh.

MAVṬ Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā (Sthiramati), ed. S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1934 (repr. Tokyo 1966).

$MAVṬ_t$ Tibetan translation of MAVṬ: Tj 5534 (mDo-'grel vol. tshi).

MAvSū Mahāvadānasūtra, ed. E. Waldschmidt, Teil II: Die Textbearbeitung, Berlin 1956 (Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, Jg. 1954, Nr. 3).

MK (Mūla-)Madhyamaka-kārikāḥ (Nāgārjuna), ed. J. W. de Jong, Adyar (Madras) 1977.

MN Majjhimanikāya

Mp Manorathapūraṇī AN-aṭṭhakathā (Buddhaghosa)

MPPU Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa[1] (大智度論 : T 1509).

1. Cp. Kudara 1980, 55 and 59.

$MPPU_L$ É. Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Louvain 1944sq.

MSA Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra ("Maitreya"), ed. S. Lévi (Asaṅga: Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra), Paris 1907.

MSABh Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra-bhāṣya (Vasubandhu, but cp. n. 101): see MSA.
Cp. also SAṬ and SAVBh.

MSg Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Asaṅga), quoted according to MSg_L but making use of the textual emendations and additional subdivisions found in MSg_N.

MSg_L É. Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga, Louvain 1938.

MSg_N G. Nagao, 摂大乗論，和訳と注解，上 (Mahāyānasaṃgraha Japanese translation and annotation, 1st part; including a critical ed. of the Tibetan text of the Prastāvanā and chs. I and II, as well as a retranslation into Skt. by N. Aramaki), Tokyo 1982. (2nd vol. = ch. III-X: Tokyo 1987).

MSgBh Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya (Vasubandhu).

$MSgBh_c$ Chinese translation(s) of MSgBh:

[Dharmagupta] : T 1596;
[Hts.] = Hsüan-tsang: T 1597;
[Pa.] = Paramārtha: T 1595.

$MSgBh_t$ Tibetan translation of MSgBh: Tj 5551 (mDo-'grel vol. li).

MSgU Mahāyānasaṃgraha-upanibandhana (*Asvabhāva).

$MSgU_c$ Chinese translation of MSgU: T 1598.

$MSgU_t$ Tibetan translation of MSgU: Tj 5552 (mDo-'grel vol. li).

MSūSg	Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṃgraha, part I, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1961 (BST No. 17).
MVu	Mahāvastu(-Avadāna), ed. E. Senart, Paris 1882-1897.
MVy	Mahāvyutpatti, ed. R. Sakaki, repr. 1962.
NA	*Nyāyanusāra (or °riṇī?) (Saṅghabhadra): T 1562.
Nidd II	Culla-niddesa
NidSa	Chandrabhāl Tripāṭhī, Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasaṃyukta, Berlin 1962 (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, VIII).
Pāṇ	Pāṇini
Pañcav	Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. N. Dutt, Calcutta 1934.
PG	Paramārthagāthāḥ (of the Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi), ed. in ŚrBh$_W$ 167ff.; PG 26-41 re-edited in App. II of the present study.
Pj II	Paramatthajotikā on Sn
Pr	Prasannapadā (Candrakīrti), ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin (Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā ..., repr. Osnabrück 1970 (1st ed.: 1903-13) (Bibliotheca Buddhica, IV).
Prak	Prakaraṇa(-pāda): T 1542.
Ps	Papañcasūdanī MN-aṭṭhakathā (Buddhaghosa)
PSk	Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa or Pañcaskandhaka (Vasubandhu).
PSk$_c$	Chinese translation of PSk: T 1612.
PSk$_D$	J. Dantinne, Le Traité des Cinq Agregats, Bruxelles 1980.
PSk$_t$	Tibetan translation of PSk: Tj 5560 (mDo-'grel vol. si).
PSkBh	Pañcaskandha-bhāṣya (*Pṛthivībandhu or, perhaps, Vasubandhu, but perhaps not the real name of the author of the commentary,[1] who is in any case different from the author of PSk[2]): Tj 5569 (mDo-'grel vol. hi).

1. Cp. Matsuda 1984, (12)=85 note 5.
2. Cp. the presumable misinterpretation, also in PSkBh, of the second explanation of the term 'ālayavijñāna' in PSk (see n. 14o + footnote 1).

PSkVai — Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa-vaibhāṣya[1] (Sthiramati): Tj 5567 (mDo-'grel vol. hi).

1. This title may not be authentic since Sthiramati himself refers to the work as Pañcaskandhakopanibandha (TrBh 39,4).

PSkViv — Pañcaskandha-vivaraṇa (Guṇaprabha): Tj 5568 (mDo-'grel vol. hi).

PSVy — Pratītyasamutpāda-(ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-)vyākhyā[1] (Vasubandhu): Tj 5496 (mDo-'grel vol. chi).

1. On the problem of the title of the text see de Jong 1974, 145 = 1979, 245.

PSVyṬ — Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā-ṭīkā or Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa-ṭīkā (Guṇamati): Tj 5497 (mDo-'grel vol. chi).

PV — Pramāṇavārtika (Dharmakīrti); ch. II (Pramāṇasiddhi): see Vetter 1984; ch. III (Pratyakṣa): = ch. II in Y. Miyasaka's edition of PV in AI 2/1971-72.

RGVV — Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti (Sāramati?), ed. E. H. Johnston (The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra), Patna 195o.

ŚA — Śāriputrābhidharma: T 1548.

$S\bar{A}_c$ — Chinese translation of the Saṃyuktāgama: T 99.

SacAcBh — Sacittikā-and-Acittikā Bhūmiḥ of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi: see App. I of the present study.

Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya = Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ of VinSg (Y_t zi 189a7ff. = Y_c 651b5ff.

Śālistambasūtra: see MSūS p. 1ooff.

Saṃdh — Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, ed. E. Lamotte, Louvain-Paris 1935.

SaṃdhṬ — Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra-ṭīkā (Ven-tshig/Yüan-ts'ê/Uŏn-č'øk): Tj 5517 (mDo-'grel vol. ti).

SaṃdhVy Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra-vyākhyāna (attributed to Byaṅ-chub rdzu-'phrul, i.e. the king Khri-sroṅ lde-btsan, or, more plausibly, to Klu'i rgyal-mtshan: see Steinkellner, II.4): Tj 5845 (mDo-'grel vols. co and cho).

Saṅghabh R. Gnoli, The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu, part I, Rome 1977 (SOR XLIX,1); part II, Rome 1978 (SOR XLIX,2).

Śat Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. P. C. Ghoṣa, Calcutta 1902-1913.

SAṬ (Mahāyāna-)Sūtrālaṅkāra-ṭīkā (*Asvabhāva): Tj 5530 (mDo-'grel vol. bi).

SAVBh (Mahāyāna-)Sūtrālaṅkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya[1] (Sthiramati): Tj 5531 (mDo-'grel vols. mi and tsi).

1. Skt. title dubious; Tib. 'grel bśad may correspond to Ṭīkā (cp. lHan-dkar-ma catalogue No. 631: de'i 'grel bśad = MAVṬ) or Vyākhyā (ib. No. 682: de'i 'grel bśad = AKVy).

Shu-chi 成唯識論述記 (Kuei-chi's larger comm. on Si): T 1830.

Si 成唯識論 (commentary on Tr compiled by Hsüan-tsang): T 1585.

Si$_P$ L. de La Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, traduite et annotée), Paris 1928-29.

Sn Suttanipāta

SN Saṃyuttanikāya

Spk Sāratthappakāsinī SN-aṭṭhakathā (Buddhaghosa)

Śr = ŚrBh$_m$ (in the critical apparatus of App. I and App. II).

ŚrBh Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. K. Shukla, Patna 1973 (TSWS vol. XIV).
(Cp. also Katsube et al. 1981, etc.)

ŚrBh$_m$ Skt. manuscript of the Śrāvakabhūmi, photos of which are kept in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna; the ms. contains also some other portions of Y (cp. ŚrBh$_W$, 2f.).

ŚrBh$_W$ A. Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961.

Sv Sumaṅgalavilāsinī DN-aṭṭhakathā (Buddhaghosa)

Thg Theragāthā, 2nd ed. with appendices by K. R. Norman and L. Alsdorf, PTS 1966.

Tr Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Vasubandhu), ed. S. Lévi, Paris 1925.

TrBh Triṃśikā-bhāṣya (Sthiramati); ed. see Tr.

TrṬ Triṃśikā-ṭīkā (Vinītadeva): Tj 5571 (mDo-'grel vol. ku).

$TrṬ_J$ P. S. Jaini, The Sanskrit Fragments of Vinītadeva's Triṃśikā-ṭīkā, in: BSOAS XLVIII.2/1985, 470ff.

TSi *Tattvasiddhi (Harivarman): T 1646.

TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (Vasubandhu(?)), ed. S. Yamaguchi in: Yamaguchi 1972, 119ff.
Cp. also F. Tola and C. Dragonetti in: JIPh 11/1983, 225ff.

Ud Udāna

Ud-a Paramatthadīpanī Ud-aṭṭhakathā (Dhammapāla)

UV Udānavarga, ed. F. Bernhard, Göttingen 1965, (AAWG Nr. 54).

UV_t (Tibetan translation of the) Udānavarga, nach dem Kanjur und Tanjur mit Anmerkungen hrsg. von H. Beckh, Berlin 1911.

UVViv Udānavarga-vivaraṇa (Prajñāvarman), ed. M. Balk, 2 vols., Bonn 1984 (Indica et Tibetica, Arbeitsmaterialien A).

VaSg Vastusaṃgrahaṇī Section of the Yogācārabhūmi.

VGPVy Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā (incomplete comm. on MSg): Tj 5553 (mDo-'grel vol. li).

Vi (Abhidharma-Mahā-)Vibhāṣā(-Śāstra): T 1545.

Vi_2 Vibhāṣā des Buddhavarman: T 1546.

Vibh Vibhaṅga

Vibh-a Sammohavinodanī Vibh-aṭṭhakathā (Buddhaghosa)

VinSg — Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī Section of the Yogācārabhūmi

VisM — Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa), ed. H. C. Warren and Dh. Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass. 1950 (Harvard Oriental Series 1950).

Vś — Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Vasubandhu), ed. S. Lēvi, Paris 1925.

Y — Yogācārabhūmi, especially
1. The Yogācārabhūmi of Acārya Asaṅga, ed. V. Bhattacharya, Univ. of Calcutta 1957
2. [only in the critical apparatus of the text editions in App. I and II:] = Y_m

Y_c — Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of the Yogācārabhūmi: T 1579.

Y_m — Skt. manuscript of the Yogācārabhūmi, photos of which are kept in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.

Y_t — Tibetan translation of the Yogācārabhūmi: Tj 5536-5543 (mDo-'grel vols. dzi, wi ($ŚrBh_t$), źi ($BoBh_t$), zi, 'i and yi).

YVy — *Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā: Tj 5544 (mDo-'grel vol. yi).

YidKun — Tsoṅ kha pa, Yid daṅ kun gźi'i dka' 'grel, New Delhi 1961.
Cp. Kelsang/Odani 1986.

2. Periodicals, Serial Works, Felicitation and Commemoration Volumes

AAWG	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse
AI	Acta Indologica (Naritasan)
ANISt	Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien (Hamburg)
BEFEO	Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient
BG	Bukkyō-gaku (Journal of Buddhist Studies: Tokyo)
BGK	Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū (The Studies in Buddhism: Kyoto, Ryūkoku University)
BGR	Bukkyō-gaku Ronshū (Tokyo: Risshō University)
BGShM	Bukkyō-gaku no Sho-Mondai, ed. by the Association of Scholars for the Commemoration of the 2500th Anniversary of the Birth of Buddha (Buttan Nisen-gohyaku-nen Kinen Gakkai), Tokyo 1935.
BK	Bukkyō Kenkyū (Kamoe, Hamamatsu)
BSem	Bukkyō-gaku Seminā (Buddhist Seminar: Kyoto, Ōtani University)
BShGK	Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū (The Journal of the History of Buddhism)
BShK	(Chibetto Bunken ni yoru) Bukkyō Shisō Kenkyū, ed. Chibetto Bunten Kenkyū-kai, Tokyo. Vol. 1: 1979; vol. 2: 1981. Contains an edition and a Japanese translation of SAVBh.
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
BST	Buddhist Sanskrit Texts (Mithila Institute, Darbhanga)
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies: Univ. of Tokyo)
IIJ	Indo-Iranian Journal
JIABSt	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

JIPh	Journal of Indian Philosophy
JPTS	Journal of the Pāli Text Society
KDB	Kōza Daijō Bukkyō, ed. A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama and J. Takasaki (vol. 8: Yuishiki Shisō, Tokyo 1979).
Kj	Peking-Kanjur, ed. D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo and Kyoto 1955 sq.
KomK	Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgaku-bu Kenkyū Kiyō
KomR	Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgaku-bu Ronshū
Kumoi Fel. Vol.	Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions (Bukkyō to Ishūkyō). Essays in Honour of Dr. Shōzen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday. Kyoto 1985.
MCB	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
Nāl.-ed.	Nālandā Devanāgarî Pāli Series (General Editor: Bhikkhu J. Kashyap)
NBG(K)N	Nihon Bukkyō Gak(ku Kyō)kai Nempō
ŌsG	Ōsaki Gakuhō (Tokyo: Risshō University)
ŌtG	Ōtani Gakuhō
PhEW	Philosophy East and West
Publ. EFEO	Publications de l'Ècole Française d'Extrème-Orient)
RDR	Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronshū
ShK	Shūkyō Kenkyū (Journal of Religious Studies)
SHT	Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfan-Funden, ed. E. Waldschmidt et al., Wiesbaden 1965ff. (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, 1o,1ff.).
SOR	Serie Orientale Roma
StIB	Studies in Indology and Buddhology, Presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Birthday. Ed. G. M. Nagao and J. Nozawa. Kyoto 1955.

SuzKN	Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan Kenkyū Nempō
T	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese, Taishō-ed.)
Tamura Fel. Vol.	Bukkyō Kyōri no Kenkyū: Tamura Hakushi Kanreki Kinen Ronshū. Ed. K. Tanaka. Tokyo 1982
TBKK	Tōyō Bunka Kenkyū-jo Kiyō
TGK	Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū (The Journal of Oriental Studies: Tokyo)
TGN	Tetsugaku Nempō (Annual of Philosophy, Published by the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu University)
Tj	Peking-Tanjur, ed. D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo and Kyoto 1955 sq.
TP	T'oung Pao (Leiden)
TSWS	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series (Patna)
WZKS(O)	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)asiens
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

3. Other Abbreviations

AKBh-I	Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (P. Pradhan Edition), by A. Hirakawa et al., Tokyo (pt.1: 1973; pt. 2: 1977; pt. 3: 1978).
App.	Appendix (I and II of the present work)
Basic Section	of the Yogācārabhūmi (see § 1.6.3)
BHSD	Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven 1953.
BHSG	- -, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, New Haven 1953.
BDJT	Shinkō Mochizuki, Bukkyō daijiten, 1o vols., Tokyo 1931-63.
Ch(in).	Chinese
CPD	A Critical Pāli Dictionary, begun by V. Trenckner, ed. D. Andersen et al., Copenhagen 1924 sq.
D	Derge
EDS	An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles, ed. A. M. Ghatage, Poona 1976 sq.
Initial Passage	see § 2.1
H	Hakamaya (see list of modern works cited)
Hôb	Hôbôgirin. Dictionnaire encyclopédique du bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et japonaises, ed. S. Lévi et al., Tokyo 1929 sq.
Hts.	Hsüan-tsang
MAV-I	Index to the MAV(Bh): see MAVBh

MW	M. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 1899 (repr. 1951).
n., ns.	note, notes (referring to notes of the present work)
Nivṛtti Portion	see n. 226
P	Peking
Pa.	Paramārtha
Pratīty. Analysis	see § 7.3.1
Pravṛtti Portion	see n. 226
Proof Portion	see n. 226
PTSD	The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, repr. London 1966.
S	Schmithausen (see list of modern works cited)
SWTF	Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, begonnen v. E. Waldschmidt, hrsg. H. Bechert. Göttingen 1973 sq.
T(ib).	Tibetan
VinSg ālay. Treatise	see § 1.5
W.	Wayman (more precisely: ŚrBh$_W$) [in App. II]
Wackernagel	J. Wackernagel, A. Debrunner, Altindische Grammatik, 3 vols., Göttingen 1896-1930, repr. 1954-1975.

II. Modern Works Cited

Remark: Where available, English titles of Japanese articles have been taken over from the publications themselves. Occasionally, I have made supplements (in square brackets). Where the translation of the title is mine, I have asterisked it.

Anacker, Stefan

1970 Vasubandhu: Three Aspects. A Study of a Buddhist Philosopher. PhD Dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin.

1984 Seven Works of Vasubandhu. Delhi.

Aramaki, Noritoshi 荒牧典俊

1963 唯識思想に於ける十二支縁起の解釋 (The Vijñānavāda's Understanding of dvādaśāṅgapratītyasamutpāda). In: IBK XI.1[21], 211-214.

1963a 摂大乗論の依他起性 (Relative Reality as Expounded in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). In: Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia 4-5, 26-67.

1967 Paratantrasvabhāva (I): A Diagrammatic Account. In: IBK XV.2 [30], (40)-(54) [= 955-941].

Bareau, André

1955 Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule. Saïgon (Publ. EFEO, 38).

Bronkhorst, Johannes

1986 The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India. Stuttgart (ANISt vol. 28).

Brown, Brian Edward

1981 The Buddha Nature: A Study of the tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna. PhD Dissertation, Fordham Univ.

Collins, Steven

1982 Selfless persons: Imagery and thought in Theravāda Buddhism. Cambridge.

Conze, Edward

1953 Der Buddhismus. Stuttgart (Urban-Bücher, vol. 5).

- , - and Iida, Shotaro

1968 "Maitreya's Questions" in the Prajñāpāramitā. In: Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou, Paris, 229-242.

Cousins, Lance S.

1981 The Paṭṭhāna and the Development of the Theravāda Abhidhamma. In: JPTS 9, 22-46.

Dantinne, Jean see PSK_D

Demiéville, Paul

1952 Le concile de Lhasa. Paris.

1954 La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa. In: BEFEO XLIV.2, 339-436.

Enomoto, Fumio 榎本文雄

1982 『摂大乗論』無性釈に引用される若干の経文をめぐって ―「城邑経」の展開を中心に― (On some Sūtras quoted in the Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana - mainly, the evolution of the ideas on the Nagarasūtra --). In: BShGK 24.2, 44-57.

Frauwallner, Erich

1951 Amalavijñānam und Ālayavijñānam. In: Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, Walther Schubring

zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht, Hamburg (ANISt vol. 7), 148-159.

1953 Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. I. Band. Salzburg.

1969 Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, 3rd rev. ed. Berlin (1st ed.: 1958).

1982 Kleine Schriften, ed. G. Oberhammer and E. Steinkellner. Wiesbaden (Glasenapp-Stiftung vol. 22).

Fukihara, Shōshin 富貴原章信

1953 阿頼耶識の異名に就て (On the Different Names of ālayavijñāna). In: IBK I.2, 378f.

Fukita, Takamichi 吹田隆道

1982 梵文「大本経」縁起説の復元について (A Restoration of the Pratītyasamutpāda in the Mahāvadānasūtra). In: BShGK 24.2, 26-43.

Funahashi, Naoya 舟橋尚哉

1967 末那識の源流 ―サンスクリット原典及びチベット譯佛典による考察― (On [the Origin of] the mano nāma vijñānam. [An Investigation Based on the Original Sanskrit Texts and Tibetan Translations]). In: IBK XVI.1 [31], 184-187.

1969 阿頼耶識思想の成立とその展開 ―末那識の成立をめぐって― (The Origin of the Idea of ālayavijñāna and its Development. In Conjunction with the Origin of mano nāma vijñānam). In: ŌtG 49.2, 31-48.

1976 初期唯識思想の研究 (*A Study of Early Vijñaptimātra Thought). Tokyo.

1977 阿頼耶識思想の形成について (*On the Formation of the Idea of ālayavijñāna). In: ŌtG 56.4, 73-76.

Griffiths, Paul J.

1983 Indian Buddhist Meditation-Theory: History, Development and Systematization. PhD Dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin.

1986 On Being Mindless. Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem. La Salle, Illinois.

Hacker, Paul

1978 Kleine Schriften, ed. L. Schmithausen. Wiesbaden (Glasenapp Stiftung vol. 15).

H(akamaya), Noriaki 袴谷憲昭

1972 五種の修習に関する諸文献 －和訳および註記－ (Japanese Translation and Notes of the Literatures Concerning the Five Kinds of 'bhāvanās'). In: KomR 3, 1-19.

1972a On a Paragraph in the Dharmaviniścaya Chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. In: IBK XXI.1 [41], (40)-(51) = 468-457.

1975 Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana (III). Its Tibetan and Chinese Texts. In: KomK 33, (14)-(33).

1975a Nirodhasamāpatti. Its Historical Meaning in the Vijñaptimātratā System. In: IBK XXIII.2 [46], (33)-(43) = 1084-1074.

1975b A Consideration on the Byams ṣus kyi leḥu from the historical point of view. In: IBK XXIV.1 [47], (20)-(30) = 499-489.

1975c 弥勒請問章和訳 (A Japanese Translation and Notes on the Maitreya Chapter in the Prajñāpāramitā). In: KomR 6, (1)-(21) = 210-190.

1976 〈三種転依〉考 (On the Triple āśraya-parivṛtti (°parāvṛtti)). In: BG 2, 46-76.

1977 初期唯識文献研究に関する方法論的覚え書 (*A Methodological Note on the Study of Early Vijñaptimātra Literature). Sanzō No. 147 (1977) = Sanzōshū 4/1978, 219-227.

1977a Tatia 校訂本 Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (review of ASBh). In: KomR 8, 255-262.

1978 アーラヤ識存在の八論証に関する諸文献 (Materials on the Eight Proofs of the Existence of ālayavijñāna). In: KomK 36, 1-26.

1978a *Mahāyānasaṃgraha における心意識説 (*The Theory of citta, manas and vijñāna in MSg). In: TBKK 76, 197-309.

1979 Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī におけるアーラヤ識の規定 (*The Definition of ālayavijñāna in VinSg). In: TBKK 79, 1-79.

1979a bhoga-nimitta 考 (A Note on bhoga-nimitta). In: IBK XXVIII.1 [55], (71)-(76) = 438-433.

1981 三乗説の一典拠 - Akṣarāśi-sūtra と Bahudhātuka-sūtra - (*A Scriptural Basis for the triyāna Theory: Akṣarāśi- and Bahudhātuka-sūtra). In: Bukkyō no Rekishiteki Tenkai ni miru Sho-Keitai (Furuta Shōkin Hakushi Koki-kinen Ronshū), Tokyo, 127-142.

1982 瑜伽行派の文献 (*The Literature of the Yogācāra School). In: KDB 8, 44-76.

1984 The Old and New Tibetan Translations of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra: Some Notes on the History of Early Tibetan Translation. In: KomK 42, (1)-(17) = 192-176.

1984a 空性理解の問題点 (*Problematic Points in Understanding śūnyatā). In: Risō, March 1984, 50-64.

1985 唯識文献における無分別智 (Nirvikalpajñāna in the Yogācāra Literature). In: KomK 43, (41)-(78) = 252-215.

1986 Pūrvācārya 考 (pūrvācāryāḥ in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya). In: IBK XXXIV.2 [68], (93)-(100) = 866-859.

1986a A Comparative Edition of the Old and New Tibetan Translations of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, (I). In: KomR 17, (1)-(17) = 616-6oo.

1987 Id., (II). In: KomK 45, (1)-(35) = 354-32o.

Hattori, Masaaki 服部正明

1985 The Transformation of the Basis (āśraya-parāvṛtti) in the Yogācāra System of Philosophy. In: All-Einheit - Wege eines Gedankens in Ost und West, ed. D. Henrich, Stuttgart, 1oo-1o8.

1986 唯識思想体系における自我意識について (Ego Consciousness in the Yogācāra System). In: BGSem 43, 79-91.

Hayashima, Osamu 早島理

1978 Chos yoṅs su tshol baḥi skabs or Dharmaparyeṣṭy Adhikāra, The XIth Chapter of the Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya, Subcommentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Part II. In: Bulletin of the Faculty of Education, Nagasaki University, Humanistic Science, no. 27, 73-119 (pt. I: ib. 26/1977, 19-61; pt. III: ib. 28/1979, 37-7o; pt. IV: ib. 31/1982, 55-98; pt. V: ib. 32/1983, 11-23).

1982 唯識の実践 (*The Practice of Vijñaptimātra). In: KDB 8, 145-176.

von Hinüber, Oskar

1968 Studien zur Kasussyntax des Pāli, besonders des Vinaya-piṭaka. München.

Hirakawa, Akira 平川彰

1974 インド仏教史，上 (*History of Indian Buddhism, part I). Tokyo.

1981 インド仏教史，下 (*History of Indian Buddhism, part II) Tokyo, 2nd ed. (1st ed.: 1979).

Hirosawa, Takayuki 広沢隆之

1983 『瑜伽師地論』にみられる真如観 (On the Concept of tathatā in the Yogācārabhūmi). In: IBK XXXI.2 [62], (82)-(85) = 902-899.

1984 真如と分別 －『瑜伽論菩薩地』に見る宗教性－ (tathatā and vikalpa: A Religious and Philosophical Feature in the Bodhisattvabhūmi). In: BG 18, 45-67.

Honjō, Yoshifumi 本庄良文

1982 倶舎論註ウパーイカーの伝える『因縁相応』〔1〕 －蘆束経－ (On the Nidānasaṃyukta Cited in the Abhidharmakośopāyikā [I]: Naḍakalāpika). In: IBK XXXI.1 [61], (79)-(86) = 407-400.

1984 A Table of Āgama-Citations on the Abhidharmakośa and the Abhidharmakośopāyikā. Part I. Kyoto 1984.

Hotori, Rishō 阿理生

1980 瑜伽行と唯識説 (*Yogācāra and Vijñaptimātravāda). In: NBGN 45, 73-85.

1982 瑜伽行派 (Yogācārāḥ) の問題点 －唯識思想成立以前の思想的立場をめぐって－ (*A Problem [in the Philosophical History] of the Yogācāras: On their Philosophical Standpoint before the Arising of Vijñaptimātra Thought). In: TGN 41, 25-53.

1983 解深密経第一章と菩薩地 (Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra ch. I and Bodhisattvabhūmi). In: ShK 56.4 (= 225), 229 (= 633)f.

1984 瑜伽行派の空性と実践 (*Śūnyatā and Practice in the Yogācāra School). In: TGN 43, 55-82.

Hyōdō, Kazuo 兵藤一夫

1982 『成業論』における異熟識説 (The Theory of vipākavijñāna in the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa). In: IBK XXX.2 [= 60], (44)-(47) = 998-995.

Imanishi, J.

1969 Das Pañcavastukam und die Pañcavastukavibhāṣā. Göttingen (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philolog.-hist. Klasse, Jg. 1969, Nr. 1).

Iwata, Ryōzō (Taijō) 岩田良三（諦靜）

1971 真諦の阿摩羅識説について (On Paramārtha's Theory of Amalavijñāna). In: SuzKN 8, 46-56.

1981 初期唯識思想研究 －世親造『摂大乗論釋』所知相章の漢蔵對照－ (A Study of the Early Yogācāra Philosophy: Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya. A Comparison of the Chinese and Tibetan Translations: The Jñeyalakṣaṇa Chapter). Tokyo.

Jaini, Padmanabh S. see TrṬ$_J$

Johansson, Rune E. A.

1979 The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism. London/ Malmö (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, no. 37).

de Jong, J. W.

1973 Review of Walpola Rahula (tr.), Le compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga, Paris 1971. In: TP LIX, 339-346 (repr. in: de Jong 1979, 601-608).

1974 A propos du Nidānasaṃyukta. In: Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à Monsieur Paul Demiéville, II, Paris, 137-149 (repr. in de Jong 1979, 237-249).

1979 Buddhist Studies by J. W. de Jong, ed. G. Schopen. Berkeley.

Kajiyama, Yūichi 梶山雄一

1985 輪廻と超越 －『城邑経』の縁起説とその解釈－ (Transmigration and its Transcendence: On the Theory of Dependent Origination as Represented in the So-called "Sūtra of the Old Town"). In: Tetsugaku Kenkyū 550, 324-359 (= 1324-1359).

Kanakura, Yensho

1980 Hindu-Buddhist Thought in India, transl. by Sh. Iida and N. Donner, ed. by T. Maruyama and Th. Quinn. Yokohama 1980.

Katano, Michio 片野道雄

1968 摂大乗論における声聞乗のアーラヤの異門 (The Śrāvakayāna's [synonyms of] ālaya in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). In: BSem 8, 46-61.

1975 唯識思想の研究 －無性造『摂大乗論註』所知相章の解読－ (*A Study of Vijñaptimātra Thought: An Annotated Translation of the jñeyalakṣaṇa Chapter of *Asvabhāva's Commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). Kyoto.

Katō, Junshō 加藤純章

1973 有漏・無漏の規定 (Definition of sāsrava and anāsrava). In: IBK XXI.2 [= 42], 635-639.

1976 経部師シュリーラータ（一） (*The Sautrāntika Master Śrīlāta, I). In: BG 1, 45-64.

1977 経部師シュリーラータ（二） －『倶舎論』根品第二十二頌下の問題－ (*The Sautrāntika Master Śrīlāta, II: The Problem of AK(Bh) II.22ff.). In: Buzan Gakuhō 22, 99-123.

1978 経部師シュリーラータ（三） －心の構造－ (*The Sautrāntika Master Śrīlāta, III: The Structure of Mind). In: Buzan Kyōgaku Taikai Kiyō 6, 109-135.

Katō, Seishin 加藤精神

1933 唯識學に於ける種子説の發達に就いて (*On the Development of the bīja Theory in the Vijñaptimātra Doctrine). In: NBGKN 4, 208-218.

1935 第七識を論ず (*On the "Seventh vijñāna"). In: BGShM, 668-679.

Katsube, Takatoshi 勝部隆敏, Takahashi, Hisao 高橋尚夫 and Matsunami, Yasuo 松濤泰雄

1981, etc. 梵文声聞地 (The Śrāvakabhūmi. Sanskrit Text, Analysis, and Japanese Translation. Part I.). In: Taishō Daigaku Sōgō-Bukkyō-Kenkyū-jo Nempō, 3, (1)-(44) (= 228-185). (Continued, by a partly different team and, from pt. III onward, under the direction of Mano Ryūkai, in vols. 4/1982 (pt. II), 6/1984 (pt. III), 7/1985 (pt. IV), 8/1986 (pt. V) and 9/1987 (pt. VI) of the same journal.)

Katsumata, Shunkyō 勝又俊教

1974 仏教における心識説の研究 (A Study of the citta-vijñāna Thought in Buddhism). 5th ed., Tokyo (1st ed.: 1961).

Kawasaki, Shinjo

1976 Analysis of Yoga in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. In: Buzan Gakuhō 21, 170-156.

Keenan, John P.

1982 Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra. In: JIABSt 5.1, 7-18.

Kelsang, Tshultrim, and Odani, Nobuchiyo

1986 ツォンカパ著アーラヤ識とマナ識の研究 —クンシ・カンテル— (*A Study of Tsoṅ-kha-pa's [Treatise on] ālayavijñāna and manas, the Kun-gźi-dka'-'grel). Kyoto.

Kim, Seong-Gwan 金聖觀

1985 阿賴耶識의相續性 (The Nature of Succession in ālaya-vijñāna). In: 韓國宗教 (Korea Religion) 1o, 181-235.

[I have to thank Mr. Hung-guk Cho for a synopsis of the relevant parts of this article.]

Kudara, Kōgi 百濟康義

198o ウィグル訳『妙法蓮華経玄賛』 (1) (Uigur Translation of the Miao-fa-lian-hua-jing Xuan-zan (1)). In: BGK 36, 49-65.

Kudō, Jōshō 工藤成性

1975 『瑜伽師地論』の成立に関する私見 (A Critical Study [Jap.: My view!] on the Formation of the "Yogācāra-bhūmi"). In: BGK 31, 1-2o.

Kumoi, Shōzen 雲井昭善

1979 業思想研究 (Studies on the Karma Theory), ed. Sh. Kumoi, Kyoto.

198o 原始仏教における citta 構造 (On the [Structure of] "citta" in Early Buddhism). In: BG 9/1o, 25-51.

Lamotte, Étienne

1934-35 L' Ālayavijñāna (Le Réceptacle) dans le Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Chapitre II). In: MCB 3, 169-255.

1973 Trois Sūtra du Saṃyukta sur la vacuité. In: BSOAS XXXVI.2, 313-323.
Cp. also KSi, $MPPU_L$, MSg_L and Saṃdh.

de La Vallée Poussin, Louis

1932 Documents d'Abhidharma. 2. La doctrine des refuges; 3. Le corps de l'Arhat est-il pur? In: MCB 1, 65-125.

1934-35 Note sur l' Ālayavijñāna. In: MCB 3, 145-168.

1937 Musīla et Nārada: le chemin du Nirvāṇa. In: MCB 5, 189-222.
Cp. also Si_P.

Lindtner, Christian

1985 A Treatise on Buddhist Idealism: Kambala's Ālokamālā. In: Miscellanea Buddhica (Indiske Studier 5), ed. Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen, 1o9-221.

Mano, Ryūkai 真野龍海

1985, etc. see Katsube et al.

Matsuda, Kazunobu 松田和信

1982 世親『縁起経釈 (PSVy)』におけるアーラヤ識の定義 (The Definition of ālayavijñāna in the PSVy of Vasubandhu). In: IBK XXXI.1 [61], (63)-(66) (= 423-42o).

1982a *Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā におけるアーラヤ識とマナスの教証について (Scriptual Evidence of ālayavijñāna and kliṣṭamanas in the Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā). In: IBK XXX.2 [6o], 667f.

1982b 『分別縁起初勝法門経 (ĀVVS)』 ―経量部世親の縁起説― (*Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhāga-sūtra: Theory of pratītya-samutpāda as Presented by Vasubandhu from the Sautrāntika Position). In: BSem 36, 4o-7o.

1983 Abhidharmasamuccaya における十二支縁起の解釈 (Interpretation of the Twelvefold Chain of Dependent Origination in the Abhidharmasamuccaya). In: Ōtani Daigaku Shinshū-Sōgō-Kenkyū-jo Kenkyū-jo-Kiyō 1, 29-5o.

1984 Vasubandhu における三帰依の規定とその応用 (Prescription for Taking refuge in the triratna and its Application in Vasubandhu). In: BSem 39, (1)-(16) (= 96-81).

1984a Vasubandhu 研究ノート (1) (Notes on Vasubandhu (I)). In: IBK XXXII.2 [64], (82)-(85) = 1o42-1o39.

Mikogami, Eshō 神子上恵生

1965 瑜伽師地論に於ける種子の問題 (On the Problem of bīja in the Yogācārabhūmi). In: (Ryūkoku Daigaku) Bukkyō Bungaku Kenkyū-jo Kiyō 4, 118-121.

Mimaki, Katsumi 御牧克己

1972 初期唯識諸論書に於ける Sautrāntika 説 (Deux thèses philosophiques de l'école Sautrāntika, discutées dans les premiers traités des Vijñaptivādin du Grand Véhicule). In: Tōhō-gaku 43, 92-77.

1979 Le chapitre du Blo gsal grub mtha' sur les Sautrāntika. In: Zinbun 15, 175-21o.

Mizuno Kōgen 水野弘元

1932 阿頼耶識思想の發生 (*The Genesis of the ālayavijñāna Concept). In: ShK (n. s.) 9.6, 127-149 (= 1o67-1o89).

1957 心識論と唯識説の發達 (*The Theory of Mind and the Development of Vijñaptimātravāda). In: Bukkyō no Kompon Shinri, ed. Sh. Miyamoto, 3rd ed., Tokyo (1st ed.: 1956), 415-454.

1978 (パーリ佛教を中心とした)佛教の心識論 (*The Theory of Mind in Buddhism, with special reference to Pāli Buddhism). Tokyo, 3rd ed. (1st ed.: 1964).

Mizuo, Jakuhō 水尾寂芳

1983 瑜伽行学派における「余れるもの」の展開 ([The Development of] avaśiṣṭa in the Early Yogācāra School). In: IBK XXXIII.1 [63], 182f.

Mōri, Toshihide 毛利俊英

1983 唯識学の哲学的構造 —初期唯識論書を中心として— (*The Philosophical Structure of Vijñaptimātravāda: with special reference to Early Vijñaptimātra Texts). In: Ryūkoku Daigaku Daigakuin Kiyō 5, 115-117.

1984 瑜伽行派に於ける四念住 (catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni in the Yogācāra School). In: IBK XXXIII.1 [65], 134f.

1986 瑜伽行派に於ける四念住の展開 (Development of catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni in Yogācāra School). In: BGK 42, 27-48.

Mukai, Akira 向井亮

1974 『瑜伽論』の空性説 －『小空経』との関連において－ ('Śūnyatā' in the Yogācārabhūmi[: In Connection with the Cūḷasuññata-sutta]). In: IBK XXII.2 [44], 900-907.

1976 アサンガにおける大乗思想の形成と空観 －ヨーガーチャーラ派の始祖の問題として－ (The Formation of the Mahāyāna Thought [and the View of śūnyatā] in Asaṅga, with Reference to the Founder of the Yogācāra School). In: ShK 227, 23-44 (= 511-532).

1978 ヨーガーチャーラ（瑜伽行）派の学派名の由来 (*On 'Yogācāra-' as the Name of a Buddhist School). Sanzō No. 153 = Sanzōshū 4, 267-273.

1979 『顕揚聖教論』と『瑜伽師地論』 (On the *Śāsanodbhāvana and the Yogācārabhūmi). In: BG 8, 39-68.

1981 『瑜伽論』の成立とアサンガの年代 (On the Compilation of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Dates of Asaṅga). In: IBK XXIX.2 [58], 680-686.

1983 阿含の〈空〉に対する大乗の解釈とその展開 (śūnyatā in the Āgama and its Exegesis in the Mahāyāna). In: IBK XXXI.2 [62], 785-788.

1985 『瑜伽師地論』摂事分と『雑阿含経』 (The Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃyuktāgama). In: Hokkaidō Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 32.2 (No. 56), 1-41.

Murakami, Shinkan 村上真完

1973 サンスクリット本城邑経 (nagara) - 十支縁起と十二縁起 (*The Sanskrit Nagarasūtra: the ten-membered and the

twelve-membered pratītyasamutpāda). In: BK 3, 2o-47.

1978 サーンクヤ哲学研究 ―インド哲学における自我観― (A Study of the Sāṃkhya-Philosophy: Concepts of the Self and Liberation in Indian Philosophy). Tokyo.

Muroji, Gijin 室寺義仁

1985 成業論 チベット訳校訂本 (The Tibetan Text of the Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa of Vasubandhu, with Reference to the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya and the Pratītya-samutpāda-vyākhyā. Critically edited). Kyoto.

Nagao, Gadjin 長尾雅人

1935 所縁行相門の一問題 (*On a problem concerning ālambana and ākāra). In: ShK (n. s.) 12.2. Repr. in: Nagao 1978, 373-388.

1978 中観と唯識 (*Madhyamaka and Vijñaptimātra). Tokyo.

1978a "What Remains" in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness. In: Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. M. Kiyota, Honululu, 66-82.

1982 see MSg_N

Nagazawa, Jitsudō 長沢実導

1978 瑜伽行思想と密教の研究 (*Studies in Yogācāra Thought and Esoteric Buddhism). Tokyo.

Nakamura, Hajime

198o Indian Buddhism, A Survey with Bibliographical Notes. Tokyo (Intercultural research Institute Monograph, 9).

Ñāṇananda (Bhikkhu)

1971 Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought. Kandy.

Nārada (Mahā Thera)

1975 A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Bhadanta Anuruddhācariya, ed. with English Transl. and Explanatory Notes). Kandy.

Näther, Volkbert

1975 Das Gilgit-Fragment Or. 11878A im Britischen Museum zu London. Herausgegeben, mit dem Tibetischen verglichen und übersetzt. Inaugural-Diss. Marburg 1975.

Nishi, Giyū 西義雄

1937 唯識學上の種子説と其の淵源に就て (*On the bīja Theory in the Vijñaptimātra School and its Origin). In: Bukkyō Kenkyū I.2, 66-81.

1938 阿毘達磨論に於ける種子 (bīja) 説に就いて (*On the bīja Theory in Abhidharma Śāstras). In: Shūkyōgaku Kiyō 4, 270-277; repr. in: Nishi 1975, 483ff.

1975 阿毘達磨仏教の研究 －その真相と使命－ (*A Study of Abhidharma Buddhism: Facts and Message). Tokyo.

Norman, K. R.

1969 The Elders' Verses, I, Theragāthā, transl. with an introduction and notes. London (PTS Translation Series No. 38).

1984 The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipāta), transl. by K. R. Norman, vol. I. London/Boston (PTS Translation Series No. 44).

Nozawa, Jōshō 野澤靜證

1957 大乘佛教瑜伽行の研究 －解深密經聖者慈氏章及び疏の譯註－ (*A Study of the Yogācāra [School] of Mahāyāna Buddhism: Translation and Annotation of the Ārya-Maitreya-parivarta [i.e. ch. VIII] of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra). Kyoto.

Obermiller, E.

1933 The Doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā. In: Acta Orientalia (Uppsala) 11, 1-133.

Odani, Nobuchiyo 小谷信千代

1976 瑜伽師地論本地分に見られるアーラヤ識縁起説の萌芽 (The Beginnings of the ālayavijñāna-pratītyasamutpāda Theory in the Yogācārabhūmi). In: IBK XXV.1 [49], 168f.

1977 Sāsravadharma について (A Consideration on sāsrava-dharma). In: IBK XXVI.1 [51], (55)-(58) (= 457-454).

1984 大乗荘厳経論の研究 (*Studies in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra). Kyoto.

Oetke, Claus

1977 Die aus dem Chinesischen übersetzten Versionen des Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra. Wiesbaden (ANISt No. 18).

Okada, Yukihiro 岡田行弘

1981 『大乗荘厳経論』 XIX 功徳品について — "urtext" の推定 — (On Chapter XIX, guṇādhikāra, of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra[: Inferring an "Urtext"]). In: IBK XXIX.2 [58], 636f.

Osaki, Akiko 大崎昭子

1975 解深密経における心意識説について (On the [Theory of] Citta, Manas and Vijñāna in the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra). In: IBK XXIV.1 [47], 200-203.

1976 末那識の成立に関する一考察 (*A Consideration Concerning the Formation of manas as a vijñāna [on its own]). In: Hanazono Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō 7, 253-272.

1978 What is meant by destroying the Ālayavijñāna? In: IBK XXVI.2 [52], (15)-(20) (= 1069-1064).

Paul, Diana

1981 The structure of consciousness in Paramārtha's purported trilogy. In: PhEW 31.3, 297-319.

1984 Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China: Paramārtha's 'Evolution of Consciousness'. Standford.

Pischel, Richard

1904 Bruchstücke des Sanskritkanons der Buddhisten aus Idykutšari, Chinesisch-Turkestan. In: Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1904, 807-827.

Renou, Louis

1975 Grammaire Sanscrite (2nd rev. ed.). Paris.

Saigusa, Mitsuyoshi 三枝充悳

1983 ヴァスバンドゥ (Vasubandhu). Tokyo (Jinrui no Chiteki Isan, 14).

Sakurabe, Hajime 櫻部建

1979 『倶舎論』に見える業論 (*The Karman Theory as Found in the Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)). In: Kumoi 1979, 285-304.

Sasaki, Genjun 佐々木現順

1957 我慢の概念分析と思想史的意味 (The Linguistical Analysis of asmimāna and its Philosophical Meaning). In: ŌtG 37.3, 15-29.

1975 煩悩の研究 (A Study of kleśa: A Study of Impurity and its Purification in the Oriental Religions), ed. Genjun H. Sasaki, Tokyo.

1980 Māna, asmimāna, ātmamāna. In: Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture, New Delhi, 185-192.

Sasaki, Yōdō 佐々木容道

1982 アーラヤ識成立の一要因 (A Principal Factor toward the Formation of Ālayavijñāna). In: TGK 21.1, 178-197.

1982a sopādānavijñāna. In: IBK XXXI.1 [61], 132f.

S(chmithausen), Lambert

1967 Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā. In: WZKSO XI, 109-136.
Cp. also the Japanese translation by Y. Kaji in: BSem 37/1983, (1)-(24) = 96-73.

1969 Zur Literaturgeschichte der älteren Yogācāra-Schule. In: ZDMG, Supplementa I.3, 811-823.

1969a Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ. Wien (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 264. Bd., 2. Abh.).

1972 The Definition of pratyakṣam in the Abhidharmasamuccayaḥ. In: WZKS XVI, 153-163.

1973 Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus. In: Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 57, 161-186.

1976 On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism. In: German Scholars on India, ed. by the Cultural Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Vol. II, Bombay, 235-250.

1977 Zur buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leidhaftigkeit. In: ZDMG, Supplement III.2, 918-931.

1979 我見に関する若干の考察 －薩迦耶見，我慢，染汚意－ (Some Aspects of the Conception of Ego in Buddhism: satkāya-dṛṣṭi, asmimāna and kliṣṭa-manas). In: BG 7, 1-18 (transl. into Japanese by K. Yokoyama).

1981 On some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism. In: Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (ANISt No. 23), 199-250.

1982 Versenkungspraxis und erlösende Erfahrung in der Śrāvakabhūmi. In: Epiphanie des Heils, ed. G. Oberhammer, Wien, 59-85.

1983 The darśanamārga Section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its Interpretation by Tibetan commentators (with Special Reference to Bu ston Rin chen grub). In: Contributions on Tibetan Language, History and Culture, ed. by E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, Vol. 1, Wien 259-274.

1984 On the Vijñaptimātra Passage in Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra VIII.7. In: Studies of Mysticism in Honor of the 1150th Anniversary of Kobo-Daishi's Nirvāṇam (= AI VI), 433-455. [Cp. n. 625!]

1985 Once again Mahāyānasaṃgraha I.8. In: Kumoi Fel. Vol., 139-160.

1985a Buddhismus und Natur. In: Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, ed. R. Panikkar und W. Strolz, Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 100-133.

1986 Critical Response: In: Karma and Rebirth, ed. Ronald W. Neufeldt, Albany, 203-230.

1987 Beiträge zur Schulzugehörigkeit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Mate-

rialien. In: Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur, ed. H. Bechert, 2. Teil, Göttingen.

Seyfort Ruegg, David

1969 La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme. Paris (Publ. EFEO, 70).

1981 The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. Wiesbaden (A History of Indian Literature, vol. VII.1).

Shimizu, Kairyū 清水海隆

1985 『瑜伽師地論』の原典研究 (III) - 意地第 2 の和訳 (その 2) - (Textual Notes on the Yogācāra-bhūmi (III): [Japanese transl. of the Manobhūmi, pt. 2]). In: ŌsG 140, 9-28.
(I [in: BGR 16/1983] and II [?] were not accessible to me.)

Shimokawabe, Kiyoshi 下川邊季由, and Takayama, Hiroshi 高山博史

1976 『五蘊論』研究(一) (A Study of the Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa (1). In: BGR 12, 1-29.

Silburn, Lilian

1955 Instant et cause: Le discontinu dans la pensée philosophique de l'Inde. Paris.

Singh, Amar

1984 The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy: Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. Delhi.

Speijer, J.S.

1886 Sanskrit Syntax, Leyden. Repr. Kyoto 1968.

Steinkellner, Ernst

Who is Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul? Tibetan and non-Tibetan Commentaries on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra - A survey of the literature. To be published in the Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium held in Sopron, 29.8 - 4.9.1987.

Sueki, Yasuhiro 末木康弘

1980 Bodhisattvabhūmi の研究 －成立過程の考察－ (*A Study of the Bodhisattvabhūmi: An Inquiry into the Process of its Formation). In: BGR 15, 37-52.

1981 瑜伽論における随煩悩について (Notes on upakleśa in the Yogācārabhūmi). In: IBK XXIX.2 [58], (67)-(69) (= 911-909).

Sugawara, Yasunori 菅原泰典

1984 kalpa と kalpanā - 特に二世親説に関して - (kalpa and kalpanā: [With special reference to the theory of two Vasubandhus]). In: IBK XXXII.2 [64], 716f.

Suguro, Shinjō 勝呂信静

1963 唯識思想よりみたる我論 (*The Theory of Ego from the Point of View of Vijñaptimātra Thought). In: Jiga to Muga, ed. H. Nakamura, Kyoto, 547-581.

1976 瑜伽論の成立に関する私見 (*My View Concerning the Formation of the Yogācārabhūmi). In: ŌsG 129, 1-50.

1977 アーラヤ識説の形成 －マナ識との関係を中心にして－ (*The Formation of the ālayavijñāna theory: Centering on its Relation to manas). Sanzō No.s 136 and 137 (= Sanzōshū 4/1978, 127-142).

1982 アーラヤ識の語義 (*The Literal Meaning of 'ālayavijñāna'). In: Tamura Fel. Vol., 53-66.

1982a 唯識説の体系の成立 ―とくに『摂大乗論』を中心にして― (*The Formation of the Vijñaptimātravāda System: With Special Reference to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). In: KDB 8, 77-112.

1982b 唯識説における縁起の思想 ―『瑜伽論』本地分の所説を中心にして― (The Theory of Causality in Vijñaptimātratā Doctrine: [Centering on Statements of the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi]). In: ŌsG 135, 205-227.

1982c 唯識思想と法華経の交渉 ―こころの概念を中心にして― (*Relations of the Lotus Sūtra to Vijñaptimātra Thought: with Special Reference to the Concept of Mind). In: Hokkekyō no Bunka to Kiban, ed. K. Tsukamoto, 157-192.

1983 アーラヤ識説と唯識無境 (Ālayavijñāna Theory and the Thought of Denial of External Objects in the Vijñaptimātratā System). In: BG 16, 1-27.

1985 大乗荘厳経論と摂大乗論 ―唯識学派の開祖「弥勒」の問題をめぐって― (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and Mahāyānasaṃgraha: On the problem of "Maitreya", the founder of the Vijñaptimātra School). In: Bukkyōgaku Ronshū: Nakamura Zuiryū Hakushi Koki-kinen Ronshū, 337-369.

Takasaki, Jikidō 高崎直道

1976 入楞伽経の唯識説 - "Deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhâbhaṃ Vijñānam" の用例をめぐって - (Vijñaptimātra Doctrine of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra: [On the use of 'deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhâbhaṃ vijñānam']). In: BG 1, 1-26.

1980 楞伽經 (Laṅkāvatārasūtra). Tokyo (Butten Kōza, vol. 17).

1982 瑜伽行派の形成 (*The Formation of the Yogācāra School).
In: KDB 8, 1-42.

1982a Upādāna (取) について —『中論』の用例をめぐって— (*On upādāna: Its Use in the Madhyamakaśāstra). In: Tamura Fel. Vol., 39-51.

1985 アーラヤ識と縁起 —執受 upādāna との関連— (Ālayavijñāna and Dependent Origination: In relation to the concept 'upādāna'). In: Bukkyō Shisō no Sho-mondai: Hirakawa Akira Hakushi Koki-kinen Ronshū, 1985, 33-53.

Takemura, Makio 竹村牧男

1976 Vijñapti について —チベット訳『摂大乗論』の用例を中心に— (On vijñapti: Centering on its Use in the Tibetan Translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). In: ShK 227, 73-94 (= 561-582).

Takemura, Shōhō 武邑尚邦

1940 瑜伽師地論成立問題考 (*On the Problem of the Formation of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra). In: Ryūkoku Gakuhō 328, 51-80 (= 1125-1154).

Takeuchi, Shōkō 武内紹晃

1950-51 『攝大乘論』に於ける聞熏習論 —特に阿頼耶識との関係— (*The Theory of śrutavāsanā in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, with Special Reference to its Relation to ālayavijñāna). In: RDR 339, 76-87.

1985 唯識学論書における執受の二つの用例 (On Two Usages of "Upādāna" in Vijñaptimātratā Treatises). In: Kumoi Fel. Vol., 267-278.

Tsukinowa, Kenryū 月輪賢隆

1971 仏典の批判的研究 (*Critical Studies in Buddhist Literature). Kyoto.

Ueda, Yoshifumi 上田義文

1982 摂大乗論講読 (*Lectures on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha), 2nd ed. Tokyo (1st ed.: 1981).

Ui, Hakuju 宇井伯壽

1958 瑜伽論研究 (*A Study of the Yogācārabhūmi). Tokyo.

1965 印度哲學研究 (*Studies in Indian Philosophy), vol. 6. [Reprint], Tokyo (1st ed.: 1930).

1965a 印度哲學史 (*A History of Indian Philosophy). Reprint, Tokyo.

1966 攝大乘論研究 (*A Study of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). 2nd ed., Tokyo (1st ed.: 1935).

1979 大乗仏典の研究 (*Studies in Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts). 2nd ed., Tokyo (1st ed.: 1963).

1979a (安慧護法) 唯識三十頌釋論 (*Sthiramati's and Dharmapāla's Commentaries on the Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi). 2nd ed., Tokyo (1st ed.: 1952).

Verdu, Alfonso

1974 Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought (Studies in Sino-Japanese Mahāyāna Idealism). The Univ. of Kansas.

Vetter, Tilmann

1984 Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika. Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 12).

1985 Recent Research on the Most Ancient Form of Buddhism. In: Kumoi Fel. Vol., 67-85.

Warder, A. K.

1970 Indian Buddhism. 1st ed., Delhi (2nd ed. 1980: not available).

Wayman, Alex

1960 The Sacittikā and Acittikā Bhūmi and the Pratyekabuddhabhūmi (Sanskrit texts). In: IBK VIII.1 [15], (30)-(34) (= 379-375).

1961 Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript. Berkeley and Los Angeles.

1984 Buddhist Insight. Essays by A. Wayman, ed. G. Elder. Delhi etc.

Weinstein, Stanley

1958 The Ālayavijñāna in Early Yogācāra Buddhism: A Comparison of Its Meaning in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi of Dharmapāla. In: Kokusai Tōhō Gakusha Kaigi Kiyō (Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan), 3, 46-58.

Willis, Janice D.

1979 On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi. New York.

Wogihara, Unrai

1908 Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi: Ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten nach dem Unikum von Cambridge im allgemeinen und lexikalisch untersucht. Inaugural-Dissertation Univ. Straßburg. Leipzig.

Yamaguchi, Susumu **山口益**

1972, 1973 **山口益仏教学文集** (*Collected Buddhological Essays of S. Yamaguchi). Tokyo. 1st part: 1972; 2nd part: 1973.

1975 **世親の成業論** (*Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa). 2nd ed., Kyoto.

Yeh, Ah-yueh 葉阿月

1975 唯識思想の研究 －根本眞實としての三性説を中心にして－ (A Study of the Vijñānamātra theory: from the Standpoint of the Three Natures as the mūlatattva). Tokyo.

Yokoyama, Kōitsu 横山紘一

1971 五思想よりみた弥勒の著作 －特に『瑜伽論』の著者について－ (*Maitreya's Writings, Viewed from Five Concepts: With special reference to the Author of the Yogācārabhūmi). In: ShK 208, 27-52.

1979 唯識の哲学 (*Vijñaptimātra Philosophy). Kyoto.

1979a 阿頼耶識の三機能 (*The Three Functions of ālayavijñāna). In: Rikkyō Daigaku Kenkyū Hōkoku (Jinbun Kagaku) 38, 1-22.

1980 ヨーガの心と真如 －『瑜伽師地論』と『解深密経』を中心に－ (Mind of Yogin [Jap.: Yoga] and tathatā[: With special reference to the Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra]). In: BG 9/10, 191-225.

1982 「無二」の思想的発展について －『瑜伽論』摂決択分から『大乗荘厳経論頌』へ－ (On the Development of the Conception advaya: [from the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī to the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra]. In: ShK 254, 47-77 (= 301-331).

Yoshimoto, Shingyō 吉元信行

1977 [Review of:] Nathmal Tatia (ed.): Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam. In: BSem 26, 87-94.

Yoshimura, Hiromi 芳村博実

1987 Vijñapti についての一考察 (2). In: BGK 43, 255-285. ((1) in: BGK 34/1978, 58-72.)

Yoshimura, Shūki 芳村修基

1974 インド大乗仏教思想研究 (*Studies in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist Thought). Kyoto.

Yūki, Reimon 結城令聞

1935 (心意識論より見たる)唯識思想史 (*A History of Vijñaptimātra Thought, from the Point of View of the theory of citta, manas and vijñāna). Tokyo.

1935a 攝大乘論に於ける正聞熏習論 (*The Theory of śrutavāsanā in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha). In: BGShM, 680-690.

1962 唯識學典籍史 (*A Catalogue of the Literature of the Vijñaptimātra School). Tokyo.

INDICES

Note:

The following indices are mostly selective. I have tried my best to be exhaustive in the case of the key terms of the present study, but beyond this, choice is admittedly discretionary if not arbitrary, even in the index of Sanskrit words, let alone those of Tibetan and English words, which are merely supplementary to the former.

The entries refer first to vol. I by bare page numbers, and then to vol. II by the numbers of the notes (the whole set preceded by "n(s).").

When an entry refers to a significant occurrence or detailed treatment of a word, passage or author, it has been underlined or, in special cases, doubly underlined. In the index locorum, references to vol. I are often immediately followed by references, in square brackets, to the note(s) where the respective passage is identified or quoted. In these cases, underlining indicates that the note contains additional information (e.g. textual emendations).

In the index of Skt. words, references to passages where a word is represented by an English equivalent only have been placed within parentheses. In the case of Tibetan and Chinese equivalents, the entries are not usually bracketed.

I apologize for any errors that might have crept in in spite of my efforts to avoid them.

I. Word Index

I.1 Sanskrit and Pāli words

I

Ch

J

T

D

Dh

N

Ph

B

Bh

Y

R

S

I.2 Tibetan words

I.3 English words

II. Texts (+ Index locorum)

II.1 Indian texts

II.2 Tibetan and Chinese texts/titles

III. Index of persons

III.1 Indian authors, masters and schools

III.2 Tibetan and Chinese authors

III.3 Modern authors

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

p. 21

On the *bīja* theory referred to in § 2.5, cp. now H. Katō in: BGK 43/1987, 295ff.

p. 37, l. 7f.

If *nāmarūpa* is understood as "living, sensitive corporeal matter", *'saṃ-mūrch-'* could be taken as "to coagulate, solidify".

p. 44 (§ 3.7.2)

Ālayavijñāna is also introduced to explain the experience of pleasant (corporeal) sensation without joy (*niṣprītikaṃ sukham*) in the third dhyāna (Hsien-yang 487b3ff).

The problems involved in the experience of *sukha* in the first three dhyānas are extensively discussed at AKBh 438,15ff (and NA 760a6ff). The Vaibhāṣikas stress the non-occurrence of tactile perception in dhyāna and therefore consider *sukha* to be a pleasant mental sensation (viz. in the third dhyāna)[1] or Ease (*praśrabdhi(sukha)*, viz. in the first and second dhyāna)[2]. Thus, they have to interpret *'kāyena'* in the canonical formula of the third dhyāna (viz. *'sukhaṃ ca kāyena pratisaṃvedayati'*) as *'manaskāyena'*.[3] Though they would quite appear to admit Ease in the dhyānas to be both mental and corporeal,[4] the Vaibhāṣikas would hardly be able to concede experiencing the latter in the state of *samādhi*[5] but could, at best, allow it to take place after re-emergence from this state.[6]

On the other hand, "others" (AKVy 673,6f.: *Dārṣṭāntikānāṃ kilaiṣa pakṣaḥ*) took the Sūtra quite literally and explained *sukha*, in the case of all the three dhyānas, as corporeal pleasant sensation[7] caused by the fact that the body is suffused

with a special kind of wind arising from *samādhi* and called 'Ease'.[8] This, however, means that the experience of *sukha* in dhyāna involves either the occurrence of tactile perception in *samādhi*[9] or the interruption of the latter.[10]

The earliest Yogācāras, too, seem to have held the view that there is, in the first three dhyānas, both pleasant sensation (*vedita-sukha*) and Ease (*praśrabdhi(sukha)*),[11] and that at least the latter is both mental and corporeal,[12] to be experienced by the body (*rūpakāya*) also.[13] But they do not seem to have felt, from the outset, the doctrinal difficulties involved. Yet, in the *Proof Portion* (§ 3.7.1) and - explicitly in the context of the first three dhyānas - in the Hsien-yang (§ 3.7.2), corporeal experience or sensation in states where (ordinary) tactile perception was doctrinally excluded, is explained by means of ālayavijñāna, and this fact seems to indicate that the difficultiesdid not remain altogether unnoticed, and that the newly introduced ālayavijñāna was recognized to offer a chance for a new and (at any rate at first glance) more satisfactory solution to the problem. However, the association, in dhyāna, of ālayavijñāna with pleasant sensation, which is, to be sure, not unambiguously expressed but at any rate strongly suggested by the Hsien-yang, does not appear to have been taken up by other sources, and it was indeed likely to appear questionable: not only from the point of view of the *Nivṛtti Portion* where ālayavijñāna had come to be conceived of as essentially bound up with the opposite of Ease, viz. Badness/uneasiness (*dauṣṭhulya*) (see § 4.7), but also because even ālayavijñāna's being, in dhyāna, suffused with or transmuted into Ease should not involve its association with pleasant sensation, no more than its ordinary constitution, viz. Badness/uneasiness, is considered to involve association with painful sensation.

1. DhSk$_c$ 484c18f.; NA 761c6ff.; cp. also Vibh 257-259 (1st-3rd dhyāna); ŚA 621c5, 622c1f. (1st and 2nd dhyāna).
2. AKBh 438,18; Vi 412b5.

3. AKBh 439,5; $DhSk_c$ 484b25f.; ŚA 623a19; cp. Vibh 259 and VisM IV 175.

4. DhSk 483c5f.; cp. NA 761a22ff.; cp. also VisM IV.175.

5. NA 761a25f.

6. Cp. VisM IV.175.

7. AKBh 439,1f.

8. AKBh 439,1of.; cp. also ŚrBh 433,1f.: ... *kāya-praśrabdhy-ut-pādânukūlāni vāyūdr̥iktāni*(?) *mahābhūtāni kāye 'vakrāmanti*.

9. AKBh 439,1o; AKVy 674,13f.

1o. AKBh 439,11; AKVy 673,6 and 674,2of.

11. ŚrBh 453,9f (3rd dhy.); 45o,11ff., 451,17ff. and 453,6(-8) (1st and 2nd dhy.).

12. ŚrBh 45o,13f. and 451,19f.: see n. 3oo.

13. ŚrBh 453,9f.

p. 5o, l. 8f, (+ n. 352)

If, in spite of the fact that none of the renderings preserved has anything but "body", yet Tib. *'lus'* in the definition of *ādānavijñāna* at Saṃdh V.3 should be a rendering of *'ātmabhāva'*,[1] the remarks of § 3.9.2.6 would have to be modified, and we would have to assume that, even though the pronoun *'di* points to the present, i.e. corporeal, (basis of) personal existence, the Sūtra's definition of *ā d ā n a vijñāna* may in principle be applicable to existences in *ārūpyadhātu* as well, in contrast to the definition of ā l a y a vijñāna where *'lus'* cannot but mean the b o d y , as is corroborated by the parallel passage PSk_t 17a4 (*lus la gnas pa ñid*: see n. 14o) where *'lus'* is unambiguously explained as "body" by the commentaries (see n. 1373).

1. Cp. also the fact that SaṃdhVy (co 83a5f.) explains *'lus'* in the present passage not only as "body" but also as the four skandhas (except *vijñāna*) - an interpretation which, though perhaps not impossible for *'kāya'*, appears more natural in the case of *'ātmabhāva'*.

p. 51 (§ 3.1o.1)

Of course, the Pravṛtti Portion (Y_t zi 6a5ff.; H 1979, 32) as well as the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t zi 189b6f.) contain also a detailed treatment of the s i m u l t a n e o u s o c - c u r r e n c e (*sahabhāva*) of several (occasionally even all the eight) *vijñānas*.

p. 53, l. 17f.

"in so far as ...": The sense-faculties may also be *aupacayika* (Y 64,1; AKBh 25,9).

pp. 57 (§ 3.11.8), 61 (§ 3.12.7), 65 (§ 3.13.7)

See add. ad p. 1oof.

p. 82 (§ 4.1o.1)

The textual relation between the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya on the one hand and the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portion* of the *VinSg ālay. Treatise* on the other requires more careful investigation. As far as I can see, it is difficult to take one of these texts simply as a remodelling of the other a s i t s t a n d s . At least some of the agreements may rather be due to a c o m m o n s o u r c e , or common sources - partly oral ones, perhaps , differently preserved and arranged in the two texts (the thematic emphasis in each of which is, after all, somewhat different: lying on ālayavijñāna in the one case, on a general theory of *vijñāna* (in conscious states) in the other). Since at least the *Pravṛtti* and the *Nivṛtti Portion* appear to contain several strata (see § 11 and ns. 1337 and 1351), m u t u a l dependence between the two texts cannot be excluded either. Indeed, Y_t zi 7b7-8a3 (cp. n. 959) may well have been influenced by the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t zi 19oa7f.: cp. n. 958). But since this paragraph of the

Pravṛtti Portion is a kind of supplement – from the point of view of compositional structure (see n. 1351) as well as from that of dogmatic clarification (see p. 152) –, its dependence on the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya has no evidential value for the basic materials of the *Pravṛtti* and the *Nivṛtti Portion*, nay, it may even be taken to indicate that the latter are probably n o t dependent on the former as it now stands. In fact, though conceding that in some cases the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya would seem to have kept closer to the original form of the source material, I cannot, on the other hand, imagine the *Nivṛtti Portion* (see § 4.7-9) to presuppose the soteriological theory of the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (see § 4.1o.1) or even the mere concept of *(kliṣṭaṃ) manas*. – Cp. also n. 948.

p. 1oof. (§ 5.12.2)

It should be noted, however, that in the Abhidharmasamuccaya mind-only statements are largely missing (cp. S 1972, 154f.; for an exception, see n. 1oo), and that ālayavijñāna's containing or being the Seed(s) of all dharmas can also be accounted for in line with traditional (non-idealist) ontology, viz. in terms of karmic Impressions (see §§ 3.13.4 and 1o.3.1.3). Even the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, though elaborating the mind-only position in its 2nd and 3rd chapter, entirely refrains from explicitly "idealist" statements in its 1st chapter, viz. the one on ālayavijñāna (cp. also Suguro 1983, 5), and this means that viewed w i t h i n the context of t h i s o n e c h a p t e r ālayavijñāna's functioning as the principle of biological appropriation does n o t constitute an incoherence.

p. 116, l. 9 from below and l. 5 from below

Read: § 6.1.3[end]

p. 119, l. 18

Read: § 6.1.2.*1*

p. 12o (§ 6.2.2.*d*)

If one regards the "etymological" intention as the only motive for coining the expressions *'āśrayabhāvopagata'* and *'āśraya-bhāvasanniviṣṭa'*, one might even consider the possibility of referring them merely to the *bījāśraya* function of ālayavijñāna (in the sense of ①), as is in fact done by the first explanation of YVy in the case of *'āśrayabhāvopagata'* (but not in the case of *'āśrayabhāvasanniviṣṭa'*: see n. 811). Yet, such a meaning is not probable for *'āśraya'* without specification, as is shown by the fact that the *Pravṛtti Portion* (Y_t zi 5b3ff.: see n. 356) expressly distinguishes the **āśrayadāna* function of ālayavijñāna from its *bījabhāva* function. Cp. also the use of *'āśraya'* (without specification), referring to ālayavijñāna's character of being the fundamental stratum, in the Sacittikabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t zi 189b2f.: see n. 357) – a text which seems to be earlier than the (extant wording of the) present passage (Y 11,3-8) and may even have influenced its introduction or modification (see § 6.2.3[end] and add. ad p. 125ff.).

p. 123f.

One may even consider the possibility of a pre-ālayavijñānic form of Y 11,3-8, viz.:

ⓐ **cittaṃ katamat / yat sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam /*

ⓑ **manaḥ katamat / yat ṣaṇṇām api vijñānakāyānām anantara-niruddham /*

ⓒ *vijñānaṃ katamat / yad ālambanavijñaptau pratyupasthitam /*

Such a (hypothetical) version of the passage would be particularly

homogeneous from the point of view of phraseology, for *'vijñānam'* of (a) ("mind [in so far as it is ..."] is exactly what one would tend to supply in (b) and (c) as well. Moreover, the assumption of such a version would perfectly well explain the fact that Saṃdh V.3 lists, besides *'ādānavijñāna'* and 'ālayavijñāna', *'citta'* too as another name of Mind-containing-all Seeds (*sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam*, the *rnam par śes pa de* of V.3 referring to the *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems* of V.2).

A differentiating interpretation of *manas* in terms of *citta, manas* and *vijñāna* is also indicated at Y 65,3 (*trividhaṃ (manaḥ): cittaṃ mano vijñānam*) – a passage belonging to a definitely pre-ālayavijñānic context where *manas* is also expressly identified with the six (ordinary) kinds of mind (Y 65,6: *ṣaḍvidhaṃ (manaḥ): ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*), without any reference to ālayavijñāna or to the new *manas*, not even in connection with *manas* being classified as eightfold (Y 65,6–8).

p. 125ff (§ 6.2.4.*d*)

The presumption that in its original form the beginning of the Manobhūmi did not contain definitions of ālayavijñāna and *(kliṣṭaṃ) manas* but was understood rather as dealing with *manovijñāna* only (or at best with the six traditional *vijñānas*) is further confirmed by Y_t yi 59b5f. (Y_c 751b12ff.), referring the reader, for the six kinds of mind (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*), i.e. the five sense perceptions and *mano vijñāna*, to the Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā Bhūmiḥ and the Manobhūmi.

I find it difficult to decide what, precisely, is implied by the remark of the Sacittikabhūmiviniścaya (Y_t zi 189a8f. = Y_c 651b11f.) that the analysis of mind by "establishing it in the conventional way" (**saṃvṛti-naya-vyavasthāna*, in contrast to analyzing it from the ultimate point of view (**paramārtha-naya-vyasthāna*)) is to be learnt from the Manobhūmi (with no mention of the Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā Bhūmiḥ!). But at any

rate this remark too appears to presuppose that when the Sacittika-bhūmiviniścaya was compiled the definition of *citta, manas* and *vijñāna* at the beginning of the Manobhūmi (Y 11,3-8) was still missing or had a purely traditional form like the one suggested in the addendum ad p. 123f.

On the other hand, I a now inclined to think that the definition of *manas* as *cittaṃ mano vijñānam* - with or without a pre-ālayavijñānic differentiating interpretation like the one suggested in the add. ad p. 123f. - was most probably introduced already in connection with the compilation of the first two Bhūmis of Y; for it seems to me that some of the material compiled is, in its basic definitions (cp. n. 774), affiliated to a work like the Pañcavastuka of the Prakaraṇa. And it may well be that in this material the treatment of mind had started, as in the Prakaraṇa (692b24f.), with a statement that *citta* means *cittaṃ mano vijñānam*,[1] to be concretized as the six kinds of mind (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*), viz. *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., up to *manovijñāna*. Since in Y sense perception had to be treated in isolation before non-sensory cognition, the compiler(s) could not start with the general definition of *citta*, only that they were unwilling to drop it, and, in view of the ambiguity of the term *manas*, they may well have considered it suitable for the beginning of the Manobhūmi. Cp. also the concretization of *manas* as *cittaṃ mano vijñānam* at Y 65,1+3 (see add. ad p. 123f.) and at $DhSk_c$ 499b3+9 (cp. Vibh 88, ŚA 525c20+22).

1. Cp. also Hsien-yang 480b26, where this definition is, however, followed by a concretization in the sense of the theory of e i g h t *vijñānas*.

p. 190, l. 12

Instead of "this case", read:
the passage under discussion

p. 194, l. 14

Instead of "(cp. n. 22o)", read:
(for *nirodhasamāpatti*, cp. ns. 22o and 657)

p. 198, l. 5

adhyātmaṃ pratyātmam: cp. ŚrBh 236,17; 299,19f.; 494,18; CPD s.v. *ajjhattaṃ*.

p. 2o5, l. 11 from below ff.

Read: ... ālayavijñāna is not perceived but when or after insight into *dharmadhātu*, i.e. *darśanamārga*, is attained ((1b) + (2a)), ...

p. 216, (d)

lus la khyab pa corresponds to *kāyavyāpana* (so to be read instead of °*dhmāpana*) at AKVy 674,13 (Tib.: chu 353a6), but to *kāyaspharaṇa* at AKBh 439,11 (though this expression is rendered by *lus la rgyas pa* in the pratīka at $AKVy_t$ chu 353a5), and to *āśrayaspharaṇa* at ASBh 115,28. In all these passages, the expression refers to the b o d y being pervaded by, or suffused with, Ease (*praśrabdhi*).

n. 21

Cp. also MAVṬ 40,9-11: *kliśyata iti ... pīḍyate .../ kliśyata iti* n **a** *v y a v a d ā y a t* **a** *ity apare /*

n. 30

On the *bīja* theories ascribed to the Sautrāntikas, see now H. Katō in: BGK 43/1987, 286ff.

n. 51

In the *Proof Portion* (Y_t zi 2b4ff.: see p. 130 + ns. 859 and 860) the *saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam* (= ālayavijñāna) seems to be understood as the *vijñāna* which arises, at conception, as the *v i p ā k a* (of previous karman) and appropriates the (corporeal) basis-of-personal-existence.

n. 99

Hôb (fasc. annexe, 136) reconstructs the Skt. title of the Hsien-yang as Āryaśāsanaprakaraṇa(?).

n. 130 (end)

Add: But cp. § 10.3.1.*1* and n. 627.

n. 132 (end)

Add: Since, however, the detailed treatment of the fivefold *mahābodhi* in the Bodhisattvabhūmi-viniścaya (Y_t 'i 30a5ff. = Y_c 707a1ff.) is introduced by an explicit reference to the occurrence of this term in the "summary of Mahāyāna" in the Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ (of the *Basic Section*), the key words of the Mahāyāna must have

already been there when VinSg was compiled. But this does n o t mean that they must, already at that time, have also included the three *svabhāvas*, etc., the treatment of which in the Bodhisattva-bhūmiviniścaya does n o t contain any reference to the Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ.

n. 137, l. 6f.

Read: ... stick (i.e. cling) to it as to [their] Self ...

n. 171

M u t u a l i t y of being or containing Seeds is explicitly stated only in the AKBh passage (especially 78,2o), whereas KSi and PSVy are explicit only with regard to the Seeds of mind (and mentals).

n. 172a

Cp. also the passages quoted in n. 171.

n. 2o2

The expression *'taṇhālaya'* would seem to derive from the explanation of *nirodhasacca* in the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta (SN V 421) as "... *t a ṇ h ā y a* ... *cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti a n ā - l a y o* ", where *'ālaya'* means "clinging to" in the sense of "not desisting from [a wrong attitude like *taṇhā*]". Such a reasonable interpretation is, however, hardly possible for *'ālayārāma'* (with *'ālaya'* taken in a subjective sense).

n. 222

In at least most of the Yogācāra texts "idealism" (in the sense of n. 222) is, of course, a p r e l i m i n a r y posi-

tion, to be surmounted in *nirvikalpa-jñāna* experiencing ultimate reality = *tathatā*, but re-emerging in *pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*.

n. 232

Instead of *pañcahi pi ñānehi* read: *pañcahi viññānehi*; cp. Vibh 308.

n. 233

Add: Vibh 307f.

n. 327

The non-occurrence of ālayavijñāna in Saṃdh V.2 can hardly be taken as an indication of an earlier version of Y 24,4f. I should rather think that at V.2 the Sūtra deliberately avoided the specific term because it wanted to introduce, in the next paragraph, its own term *'ādānavijñāna'* (mentioning 'ālayavijñāna' only as an alternative). The less specific term *'sarvabījakaṃ cittam'* at Saṃdh V.2 (resumed by *'rnam par śes pa de'* = *'tad vijñānam'* in the beginning of Saṃdh V.3) would seem to have been stimulated by the *'sarvabījakaṃ vijñānam'* of Y 24,7f. (see § 6.3.1) and, in view of *'cittam'* instead of *'vijñānam'*, perhaps also by an older version of Y 11,4f. (see add. ad p. 123f.!).

n. 374 (p. 330,6)

Delete *dharmāḥ*!

n. 555 (p. 365)

[A.] For sentence 1.b, the following rendering is perhaps preferable:

"Because [ālayavijñāna as] the cause of all Pollution (Hts.: Defilements) (*sarva(saṃ)kleśahetu) in this life (*dṛṣṭe dharme) is abandoned, [spiritually negative] Clinging which is the basis of all Pollution (*sarva-saṃkleśâśrayôpādāna) (i.e. of all Defilements (and of karman governed by Defilements)) is abandoned."

[B] If the preceding interpretation of sentence 1.b is accepted, the suggestion of fn. 5 (p. 366) that in sentence 2 'āśraya' should be supplied from sentence 1.b is misleading. Grammatically, such a supplement is anyway superfluous because *jīvita-pratyaya-mātra may act as a substantive. Yet, from the point of view of meaning there is little doubt that the latter expression has a predicative value and that what has to be supplied as the logical subject is the [animated] body (*kāya*) or basis-of-personal-existence (*ātmabhāva*) [furnished with or consisting of the Six Senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*)], which had, in the introductory phrase, been stated to continue [a while], similar to a *nirmāṇa*, i.e. to a supranormally created apparition free from all inclinations and anxieties as well as from latent wickedness and uneasiness (*dauṣṭhulya*).

[C.] The three features indicating, according to the present passage (viz. § 5.b.C.3 in H 1979), the elimination of ālayavijñāna clearly correspond to the three aspects of ālayavijñāna as the root of Pollution distinguished at Y_t 8b1f. (H 1979, 38 [§ 5.b.A.4]; see n. 548): The abandonment of taking possession of a new existence = Suffering in future is due to the elimination of ālayavijñāna as the cause of future *duḥkhasatya*; the abandonment of spiritually negative Clinging as the basis of all the other *kleśas* and of pollutive karman in this life is due to the elimination of ālayavijñāna as the cause of *samudayasatya* in this life; the continuance of the body or basis-of-personal-existence as a mere condition of physical life but free from *dauṣṭhulya* is due to the elimination of ālayavijñāna as consisting in [*dauṣṭhulya* constituting] *duḥkhasatya* in this life. The present passage (§ C.3) thus concretizes - in line with the concretization

of ālayavijñāna's responsibility for Pollution in § A.4 – the statement at the end of § C.1 (Y_t 9b3; H 1979, 41; see § 10.1, (3d)) that the elimination of ālayavijñāna implies that of Pollution (*saṃkleśa*, comprising both [present and future] *duḥkha-satya* and *samudayasatya*).[1]

1. In sentence 1.b (see [A]!), *saṃkleśa* is obviously used in a narrower sense, viz. as equivalent to *samudayasatya*, i.e. *kleśas* (and pollutive karman).

n. 555 fn. 3

SaṃdhVy (D) cho 90b3 reads *gnas ṅan len pa*.

n. 572

MSg III.1 may even be a still later addition since it is not commented upon in the first version of $MSgBh_t$ (see n. 717).

n. 591

My interpretation of the expression *'-nirbīja āśrayaḥ pari-vartate'* is based on ŚrBh 283,8f., but in the present passage (as well as in the case of the similar expression *'nirdauṣṭhulya āśrayaḥ parivartate'* at ASBh 82,22) I for one cannot exclude the possibility of an interpretation as "his Basis is Transmuted [so as the become or be] devoid of all Seeds of ...", i.e. in the sense of the phrase *'laukiko mārgo ... lokottaratvena parivṛttaḥ'* found at ASBh 93,17f.

n. 657 (end)

Read: ... to this state, as is, of course, natural in the case of the S a c i t t i k a bhūmi-viniścaya).

ns. 659 and 663

Add: TrBh 19,8.

n. 708

The second (i.e., from the point of view of elaborateness of the arguments, the later) version of the Bhāṣya, though placed first, yet clearly appears to be intrusive; for its beginning (163b6) interrupts what seems to be the initial words of (the older version of) the Bhāṣya on I.49 (*ji ltar kun gźi - - -*, continued at 166b5: - - - *rnam par śes pa daṅ bcas pa*[1]) by what would seem to be the first sentence of (the later version of) the Bhāṣya on I.5o (*'gog pa la sñoms par źugs pa'i ... rnam par śes pa daṅ mi 'bral lo // źes ...*; cp. 166b8f.), the latter being mixed up with a fragment of the end of (the later version of) the Bhāṣya on I.49.

1) **savijñāna-* may be taken as a misreading of **///yavijñāna-*, i.e. **⟨āla⟩yavijñāna*; cp. the Ch. versions.

It may be helpful to give a diagramm of the arrangement of the material in $MSgBh_t$ (A = earlier version, B = later version):

A I.48	163b1-6
A I.49[beginning]///	163b6
///B I.49[end] + I.5o	163b6-164a1
B I.51	164a1-3
B I.52	164a3-165b3
B I.53	165b3-166a2
B I.55[beginning]///	166a2-3
A I.52-cum-54/// (end missing)	166a3-b5
///A I.49[contin.]	166b5-8
A I.5o	166b8-167a3
A I.51	167a3-5
A I.52-cum-54[beginning]///	167a5-6
gap: see 166a4-b5	

///A I.52-cum-54[end]	167a6
A (I.52-cum-54 utsūtra)	167a6-b5
A I.55	167b5ff.

n. 708 fn. 3

gaṅ daṅ gaṅ dag is strange and may represent a combination of the beginning of the pratīka of I.55 (*gaṅ (yaṅ)* ...) as the final, fragmentary element of the later Bhāṣya version, and the beginning of the comm. on I.52-cum-54 (*gaṅ yaṅ* ...) of the earlier version (cp. 167a5!); it may thus go back to something like *yaś (ca)/// yaś ca* ... or *yo ('pi)/// yo 'pi* ... (or: *ye (ca)/// ye ca* ..., etc.).

n. 741

Add: For the lack of activity in dharmas including *vijñāna* and for the fact that the use of action phraseology (like '*vijānāti*') with regard to them is hence merely metaphorical, cp. also AKBh 31,11ff.

n. 816 (p. 424, l. 10)

After '*upagata*' insert:
as second member of an accusative tatpuruṣa

n. 817(a)

For *sbyor bar byed pa'am /*, SaṃdhVy (P,D) has *sbyor bar byed pa d a ṅ /*.

n. 817 fn. 1

D reads *kun gźi'i don*, which is preferable.

n. 817 fns. 3, 5

D confirms YVy.

n. 837

My emendations are confirmed by D (cho 69a3), which has, besides, *thigs pa gcig* in both cases.

n. 1062

For *'taṇhālaya'* see add. to n. 202.

ns. 1249ff.

Variant readings in SaṃdhVy (D) cho 67a3-4 (= a) and cho 89b4-90a5 (= b):

n. 1250 b: *bsgom*
n. 1251 a: *bsgoms*; b: *bsgom*
n. 1262 b: *gcig tu sdud*
n. 1263 b: *spuṅ ba*
n. 1265 b: *bsten*!
n. 1267 b: *spaṅ bar*

n. 1330 (p. 497, l. 6f. from below)

The remark in parantheses "(probably ... momentariness)" should be deleted. H. Sakuma convinced me that this is a wrong track. A detailed discussion of the passage will be offered in his dissertation on *āśrayaparivṛtti*.

n. 1426(C.c)

If taken in the sense of [III], PG 33cd would, though perhaps with a slightly different emphasis (see n. 1426(C.d)), express the same idea as does PG 35ab - an assumption in favour of which one may adduce that *vaiṣamyaparigata* at 35a evokes the *visame n i v i ṭ ṭ h a* of Sn 774b (cp. n. 1432) and may thus indeed intend the same attitude as *niveśana* at 33c.

Additions to page 625, left column:

ā.-v. in Vasubandhu 22, 61, 83, 101ff; ns. 16, 17, 37, 78, 120, 138-140, 348, 419, 709, 717, 719, 720, 733, 736-738, (741), 1369, 1373, 1477(H.c)

SCHMITHAUSEN, Lambert (Köln 17. November 1939)

Studiert Indologie, Philosophie und Arabistik an den Universitäten Köln, Bonn und Wien (1958-1963).
Dr.phil. (Wien 1963), Dr.phil.habil. (Münster 1966).

Dozent (1967-1970) und apl. Professor für Indologie an der Universität Münster (1970-1973); o. Professor für Indologie (Buddhismuskunde) an der Universität Hamburg (1973-).

Visiting Research Fellow at The Reiyukai Library (now The International Institute for Buddhist Studies)(1979).

VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN: *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ, mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der indischen Irrtumslehre* (Wien 1965), 269 pp.; *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ* (Wien 1969), 219 pp.
"Zur advaitischen Theorie der Objekterkenntnis", *WZKSO*, XII-XIII (1968-1969), pp. 329-360; "Zu den Rezensionen des Udānavarga", *WZKS*, XIV (1970), pp. 47-124; "Textkritische Beobachtungen zum 1. Kapitel der Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā", *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems (Edward Conze Volume)* (Berkeley 1977), pp. 35-80; "On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism", *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf)* (Hamburg 1981), pp. 199-250; "Buddhismus und Natur", *Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus* (Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1985), pp. 100-133; "Beiträge zur Schulzugehörigkeit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialien", *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, II (Göttingen 1987), pp. 304-403.
Und viele andere Aufsätze und Besprechungen.
Siehe auch S. 603f. dieses Buchs.